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An edited book is usually the product of many conversational circles. 
The 43 chapters of this book draw together the work of an especially 
talkative group, the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) program 
based at The Australian National University (ANU). 
John and Valerie Braithwaite established RegNet in 2000. 
John  Braithwaite  had obtained financial backing from ANU in the 
form of a strategic development grant. Initially,  RegNet  was a part 
of The Australian National University’s Research School of Social 
Sciences, but, as a result of wider processes of restructuring,  it is now 
part of The Australian National University’s College  of Asia and the 
Pacific. The plan for RegNet included establishing  an ANU-wide 
network for the study of regulation involving other centres in other 
parts of the university, such as the Centre for Health Stewardship at the 
Medical School and the Australian Centre for Environmental Law at 
the Faculty of Law. RegNet’s network aspirations moved well beyond 
ANU, with membership open to non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), government departments, regulators and other universities. 
It was all about building networks, networking networks and creating 
interdisciplinary conversations around the concept of regulation.
Why build an interdisciplinary research program devoted to the study 
of regulation? Lawyers, after all, had turned regulation into a dull topic. 
Regulation was about authoritative rules issued by the state. For some 
lawyers the meaning of regulation was confined to the rules of delegated 
legislation. The answer has both theoretical and empirical dimensions. 
Empirically, regulation had pluralised in important ways. States were 
drawing on third parties to deliver, for example, their welfare programs 
or foreign aid programs. Businesses such as banks were required to 
have compliance units that met particular standards—standards that, 
as in the case of banking regulation, were increasingly coming from 
international organisations such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
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Supervision. Would these bodies keep the world’s financial system safe 
from crisis? States were signing on to free-trade agreements that were 
long and complex and seemed to go well beyond dealing just with the 
movement of goods. Why did these agreements contain standards that 
strengthened patent monopolies? This seemed inconsistent with the goal 
of free trade. The publics of states began to learn that their states could 
be sued directly by foreign investors. Consumers were taking a lot of 
interest in labels to do with standards relating to fair trade and forest 
stewardship. Who set those standards? Who checked for compliance? 
Regulation was changing in many different ways.
The changes taking place in regulation were only part of the reason to 
build a research program around it. The big problems facing states—such 
as crime control, environmental degradation, sustainable development, 
improving outcomes for the poor, women, indigenous peoples, children 
and the elderly and stopping the degradation of tax systems—would 
require creative regulatory solutions. John Braithwaite, normally the 
embodiment of respect for others, engaged in some mild-mannered 
trashing of disciplinary boundaries in the social sciences, arguing that 
traditions of excellence within the disciplines were narrowing their 
capacity to deliver creative solutions to these big problems. If these 
creative solutions were to have a chance of arriving, regulation could 
not continue to be thought of as an inelastic thing of law. Rather it had 
to be seen as a multilevel dynamic process in which many actors play a 
part and have varying capacities and means of intervention. Better ways 
of tackling big problems would only come when regulation achieved a 
resonance across the social sciences. Naturally, the important insights 
and findings of the disciplines would be retained, but synthesised into 
bigger and bolder regulatory theories for testing. The search for insights 
was not to be confined to the analytical worlds of social scientists, but 
included the insights of regulatory practitioners. Of course, this was 
not a prescription for a lack of excellence in the disciplines, but rather 
one that aimed to encourage the disciplines to come out from behind 
their walls in search of the partnerships that would generate the new 
knowledge needed to address the world’s problems. 
Perhaps drawing inspiration from the story of the Ark, Braithwaite 
assembled a group of scholars from different disciplines including 
anthropology, criminology, law, psychology, sociology, geography 
and political science. As the people who had been recruited to the 
RegNet enterprise began arriving, they were housed in various 
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parts of The  Australian National University’s campus. When, for 
example, Drahos arrived, he was given a room with a window directly 
opposite a kitchen vent—a special bonus, according to Braithwaite. 
The  accommodation problems were solved when ANU provided the 
RegNet group with a new building that remains its home today: the 
Coombs Extension building (named after Herbert Cole Coombs, a 
senior Australian public servant, financial regulator and a Bretton Woods 
architect, who, among many achievements, helped found The Australian 
National University in 1946).
In its first three or so years, the RegNet program underwent an intense 
period of growth. By the beginning of 2004 there were more than 
40 academic staff. Close to AU$32 million had been raised. Long-
term research partnerships had been established with government 
departments and regulators, including the Australian Federal Police, the 
Australian Taxation Office, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission and the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission, as well as with organisations outside Australia such as 
the British Home Office and Metropolitan Police and the Canadian 
International Development Agency. 
The structure of the core RegNet program was always a little opaque 
to outsiders. Within RegNet there were various centre initiatives such 
as the Centre for Tax System Integrity (led by Valerie Braithwaite, 
it was RegNet’s biggest centre and established in 1999 with funding 
from the Australian Tax Office); the Centre for Restorative Justice led 
by Heather Strang; the Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy 
led by Imelda Maher; Security 21: The International Centre for Crime 
and Justice under the charge of Peter Grabosky and Clifford Shearing; 
and the National Research Centre for OHS Regulation, its first director 
being Richard Johnstone. John Braithwaite described these centres as 
‘tents’, the idea being that they would be collapsed (after people had 
exited, it  should be added) and new tents erected to explore different 
dimensions of regulation.
And that is more or less what happened. Centres were closed and new 
ones erected. Examples include the Centre for International Governance 
and Justice (Hilary Charlesworth) and the Centre for the Governance 
of Knowledge and Development (Peter Drahos). RegNet was also part 
of a successful bid for funding from the Australian Research Council 
that saw the establishment of the Centre for Excellence in Policing and 
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Security. Peter Grabosky and then Roderic Broadhurst led the RegNet 
node of that centre. Roderic Broadhurst has gone on to be appointed to 
the foundation chair in criminology at ANU.
The variety of topics contained in the chapters of this book is a product 
of an openness to new initiatives that was nurtured by the Braithwaites. 
One did not join RegNet to be a criminologist, a tax lawyer or some other 
kind of specialist, but rather to collaborate in the study of regulation in its 
manifold forms, seeing if there were patterns and solutions to problems 
that could become the basis of a more general set of theories. Forming 
working groups around crosscutting thematic initiatives such as the role 
of hope in governance was one way in which thinking across regulatory 
areas was encouraged.
Today’s RegNet is led by Sharon Friel. With its foci including 
health equity and governance, climate change, energy governance, 
peacebuilding,  trade  and investment, it is different to the RegNet 
that started a decade and a half ago. The one constant in this process 
of exploration and rebuilding has been advancing knowledge about 
regulatory processes to solve big problems. 
The PhD students who joined the RegNet enterprise found that their 
topics seemed to have very little in common with each other. What were 
the links among, for example, tax havens, open-source biotechnology, 
the auditing of human rights in the HIV/AIDS field, public security in 
Northern Ireland, Somali piracy, corruption in Myanmar and Australia’s 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme? It wasn’t immediately obvious. If unity 
was to be found in regulatory theory what was regulatory theory about? 
How were responsive regulation, smart regulation and meta-regulation 
related? This book is a response to these and many other questions asked 
by cohorts of RegNet PhD students over the years. It arrives late, but 
then could not have arrived much sooner since the questions and work 
by RegNet’s PhD students have been central to the development and 
testing of regulatory theory. Many of these students have gone on to 
academic careers and some of them have contributed to this volume 
(see the chapters by Russell Brewer, Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, Lennon 
Chang, Christian Downie, Miranda Forsyth, Ibolya Losoncz, Gabrielle 
Simm and Natasha Tusikov). Other contributors to this volume, such 
as Cameron Holley, Nathan Harris, Kristina Murphy and Gregory 
Rawlings, spent the initial parts of their postdoctoral careers at RegNet 
in its early years, contributing to its growth.
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The conversation that finally sparked this book into project form took 
place between Peter Drahos, Veronica Taylor (Regnet’s director until the 
end of 2014) and Jeroen van der Heijden, who has taken regulatory theory 
into the field of urban sustainability. As RegNet had moved to improve 
its educational offerings to its PhD students under the stewardship of 
Kate Henne, the need for a text that provided PhD students with a more 
structured entry into the work of the RegNet program had become 
compelling.
The overall goal of this collection is to introduce a reader such as a PhD 
student, a regulatory practitioner or a policymaker to the central issues of 
regulatory theory through a selection of key concepts and topics that have 
been investigated by members of the RegNet group. The authors, all of 
whom either are at RegNet or have spent significant periods at RegNet, 
were asked to focus on the arguments around those key concepts, to 
reference texts they saw as important (while avoiding over-referencing), 
suggest some further reading and to stick to a word limit. 
One aspiration for this book is that it will be a useful text for those 
wishing to learn more about the field of regulation, how it pervades 
social life in more ways than we realise, its dynamics of change and the 
possibilities of constructive intervention in its processes. RegNet, as is 
clear from the second half of the book, has studied regulatory problems 
in many different substantive contexts. One advantage of representing 
the diversity of RegNet’s work in this volume is that a law enforcement 
official, a public health policymaker, a human rights lawyer, a competition 
regulator, a tax regulator or a practitioner from any of the other fields that 
are discussed in this volume will be able to read a chapter or chapters 
that engage with some contextual detail with which they are familiar, but 
should also see from other chapters that specific issues of interest to them 
also relate to broader patterns such as that regulatory outcomes within 
the borders of one state increasingly have their origins in decisions taken 
outside those borders (the globalisation of regulation).
With around 100 academics having trodden through RegNet’s 
corridors of conversation it would have been difficult in one volume to 
give everyone an individual voice. Rather, the goal has been to group 
chapters around dominant themes and concepts that have emerged in 
the process of RegNet’s rethinking of regulation over the past decade 
and a half. As the introduction by Drahos and Martin Krygier makes 
clear, three lines of investigation have been recurrently important in 
RegNet scholarship: the role of emotions in understanding the limits 
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and creative possibilities of regulatory institutions; the redistribution 
of the tasks of regulation within state and society; and regulation as 
a continuous process in which actors do or can intervene. 
The first three sections (social-psychological foundations, concepts and 
theories and the role of the state in regulatory transformations) bring 
together the theory-building part of RegNet’s work. The remaining 
sections set their discussion of theories and concepts in substantive 
areas such as human rights, health and commerce. This might be read as 
setting up a distinction between theory and its application, but within 
the RegNet program this distinction has not been seen as useful. Rather 
the goal has been innovation in regulatory knowledge, recognising 
that innovative ideas are part of a messy developmental loop that may 
have its source in the concrete particulars of regulatory systems or with 
practitioners who in moments of reflection offer insights that become 
the basis of new theory-building initiatives. 
The book begins by introducing the reader to some of the psychological 
dimensions of regulation. Under Valerie Braithwaite’s leadership, 
RegNet has a long history of exploring the psychological underpinnings 
of regulatory institutions such as tax or institutionalised virtues such as 
trust. This section also conveys some sense of the methods of the RegNet 
group, ranging from statistical analysis of large datasets to qualitative 
fieldwork and the use of case studies. RegNet can fairly claim to be the 
home of much of the work on responsive regulation; the first complete 
articulation of that theory is to be found in Ayres and Braithwaite’s 1992 
book, Responsive Regulation. As the next section of the book makes clear, 
the investigation of the ideal of responsiveness in regulation has led to 
the identification of different types of responsiveness, as well as theories 
such as smart regulation that place the emphasis on flexibility and the 
complementarity of regulatory instruments rather than on following a 
preset sequence of responses. The third section brings together the work 
done by RegNet scholars on the changing role of the state in regulation. 
To what extent have states been rendered rule-takers rather than rule-
makers under conditions of globalisation? Can we plausibly argue that 
capitalism has entered a regulatory phase of its evolution? After these 
three sections there come four sections that represent substantive and 
persistent themes within RegNet’s work. Rights-based regulation in its 
many forms, such as the human rights work of Hilary Charlesworth 
or the work by Nicola Piper on the rights of vulnerable temporary 
migrant workers, has been a hugely important part of RegNet’s 
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research programs. Judith Healy was an early leader in RegNet on the 
integration of health regulation and regulatory theory and Scott Burris’ 
visits to RegNet helped to foster this part of RegNet’s work. As the 
essay by Sharon Friel makes clear, a sweeping research agenda around 
public health regulation has grown. The section on crime and regulation 
could easily have been the subject of a separate book. The essays in this 
section reflect the diversity of RegNet’s contributions and methods in 
the study of crime, security and institutions of justice. As with many 
other disciplines, regulatory theory is slowing beginning to revitalise 
criminological theory. So, for example, Heather Strang’s essay details 
the randomised trial carried out to test hypotheses in restorative justice 
while Roderic Broadhurst and Mamoun Alazab use datasets involving 
millions of emails to analyse the problems of regulating a global public 
bad: spam. 
The final section on regulation and commerce covers what might be 
thought of as more traditional areas of regulation such as consumer 
safety, mining regulation and competition regulation—areas into which 
RegNet scholars have sought to inject innovative ideas. The essay by 
John Wood on consumer regulation speaks to a connection that has 
been deeply important to RegNet: the connection with the world of 
regulatory practitioners where practitioners include those from advocacy 
organisations and social movements. A number of practitioners were 
invited to contribute to the volume, but only John Wood found the time 
to write. His essay on consumer regulation is a gentle tour of regulatory 
achievements that date back decades and represent hard-fought victories 
won by a consumer movement in which he was a leader, working with 
others such as Ralph Nader. His contributions to promoting public 
goods are too long to list here, but they include helping to bring about 
freedom of information legislation in Australia, serving as Deputy 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and, in later years, bringing his skills and 
knowledge to help island countries in the Pacific region. He passed away 
in 2016. His daughter Charlie Wood, a key climate activist in 350.org 
Australia and in the RegNet family, continues to fight for those public 
goods that motivated John throughout his life.
Tracing the intellectual influences on the work of RegNet is not an 
aim of this volume. This would end in an impossibly long and likely 
incomplete list of names. In any case, the various chapters in the book 
convey a strong sense of where the influences have come from. By way of 
illustration, ideas and approaches from the law and society tradition such 
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as Nonet and Selznick’s writings on responsive law have consistently 
informed much of RegNet’s work, perhaps because law and society has 
been an open tradition in which different views of what it is to be critical 
and empirical have emerged. There have been long-term collaborations 
such as the one between Robert Kagan from the University of California, 
Berkeley, and Neil Gunningham from RegNet. There have been 
important writing projects such as Regulating Law, led by Christine 
Parker, Colin Scott, Nicola Lacey and John Braithwaite. There have been 
joint initiatives such as the one by David Levi-Faur (Hebrew University), 
John Braithwaite and Cary Coglianese (Pennsylvania University) 
that produced the founding of the journal Regulation and Governance, 
a  journal that has become a home for some of the best writing in the 
field. Individuals have impacted on particular strands of RegNet’s work 
as in the case of Tom Tyler’s and Kristina Murphy’s work on procedural 
justice and obedience, Lawrence Lessig’s writings on code and the way it 
expands regulation by architecture, Michael Power’s pioneering analysis 
of the rise of the audit society and Philip Pettit’s work on the republican 
idea of liberty.
Beyond the many individual collaborations, initiatives and influences, 
RegNet has also seen itself as part of a broader community 
of  organisations and centres that were also advancing knowledge of 
regulation. The American Bar Foundation (where Terry Halliday, a long-
time adjunct at RegNet, is based) and the Centre for Analysis of Risk 
and Regulation at the London School of Economics are examples of 
influential nodes in a bigger network of the study of regulation. 
Having well and truly committed the sin of grievous omission in the 
preceding paragraph, it is time to end. The principal reason this volume 
has swollen into obesity is that it presents a stocktake of RegNet@15. 
While the primary aim of this stocktake is to provide a service to our 
students and the broader community of regulatory studies, it might also 
be helpful for ANU, which provided the start-up funds for RegNet, to 
see whether it has been money well spent. 
Last but not least, it also serves as a tribute to John and Valerie 
Braithwaite  for having the vision and bravery to build RegNet 
and to infuse it with an atmosphere of affection and loving support. 
The achievements of great athletes are underpinned by countless 
micromovements that escape the notice of admiring observers, but 
produce what seems impossible. In academic life, great leadership and 
achievement depend on many micro-acts quietly done, some of which 
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are not noticed by other than their recipients: the door that is always 
open, the conversational moments that help colleagues produce fresh 
insights, writing notes of praise that help build confidence, participating 
in events that matter to others, always engaging with the work of 
colleagues, delivering criticism gently, reading and rereading their drafts, 
suggesting ways to improve them and making individuals feel part 
of circles of public achievement. Somehow, John and Val found the time 
for these things and more. The essays in this book are just one example 
of their remarkable influence on regulatory scholarship.
On a personal note, my thanks go to the contributing authors whose 
timely  responses to my deadlines have helped bring this volume to 
fruition. Martin Krygier read all the chapters of the book and helped 
me to think through the complexities of introducing the volume. 
John  Braithwaite, Julie Ayling, Jeroen van der Heijden and Neil 
Gunningham provided helpful comments and suggestions at various 
stages. I am also grateful to the members of the Social Sciences Editorial 
Board of ANU Press for the speed with which they were able to find 
reviewers for the manuscript, and also for their constructive thoughts 
on the manuscript itself. As an aside, I regard the ANU Press model 
of publishing as a wonderful example of how academics can break 
free of the tyranny of global publishing cartels. My thanks also to the 
three reviewers who found the time to read the manuscript and make 
suggestions for its improvement.
Clare Kim provided wonderful editorial support helping to bring the 
chapters into line with various formatting requirements. Jan Borrie, the 
copyeditor, took on the manuscript and, with great calm and efficiency, 
applied the final coat of polish. Jillian Mowbray-Tsutsumi, the Senior 
Research Communications Officer at RegNet, read all the chapters and 
drafted a summary of the themes that appears as an interactive tool in 
the electronic version of the book. It is not the first time administrators 
at RegNet have crossed over into academic authorship. Boundaries have 







Peter Drahos and Martin Krygier
1. Regulation and rules
When we set out for a shopping trip to our supermarket most of 
us do not think of it as an encounter with an increasingly global 
regulatory order. If asked to guess about the regulations applying to the 
supermarket, we would probably nominate things such as zoning rules, 
food safety standards and rules regulating opening hours and working 
conditions. We might sum up by saying that supermarkets are probably 
regulated by lots of rules passed by local and national governments. 
By implication, we would be thinking about the definition of regulation 
in terms of legal rules backed by penalties for noncompliance. We might 
even, in a moment of jurisprudential inspiration, label this the juridical 
version of regulation. This is not a false picture of our regulatory world, 
but, for reasons we will explain, it is a radically incomplete one.
We enter the supermarket, not having really noticed the private security 
guards in the mall or the surveillance cameras, and head over to the 
fresh  fruit and vegetable section. We will not be thinking about the 
pesticide residue levels on the fruit or vegetables. If asked about this, 
we  would guess that there is a government regulator setting and 
enforcing safe limits on health matters such as this. Not many of us 
would know about the links between national regulators and the 
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Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) in Rome or the hundreds of 
Codex technical committees working on harmonising food standards, 
including maximum limits on pesticide residue levels. The effect of being 
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) when it comes to 
implementing Codex standards is not a topic of conversation for most 
of us and we would perhaps be surprised by the number of industry 
representatives with interests in the outcome of these standards who sit 
on Codex committees. We might wonder whether the science triumphs 
over the commerce. 
We pick up some berries for dessert. The name on the label is ‘Driscoll’s’. 
If we could be bothered researching it, we would find it was a US 
company  that owned a lot of the genetics in berries. It seems odd to 
be able to own the genetics of something. That would seem to be a big 
regulatory stick with which to beat competitors over the head. Where did 
those standards of intellectual property regulation come from?
As we move down the aisles, we are surrounded by information, most 
of  which we do not take in: labels, logos, special offers and so on. 
We may be registering only a fraction of all this information but we are 
still making purchasing decisions. On what basis? Perhaps we are being 
‘nudged’ into making some of our choices. After all, supermarkets have 
had decades to study our behaviour in the aisles of their many stores. 
It would not surprise us to learn that large businesses are investing 
millions of dollars in understanding what happens in our brains when 
we see their brands (Yoon and Shiv 2012). We might know something 
about the standard-setting processes that sit behind the labels on some 
of the products we buy. Perhaps we have done some research on fair-
trade labels and like the idea that producers will end up with more of 
the dollar we spend to buy their product. But there will be many labels 
communicating standards about which we know nothing. We could scan 
the information on some of the labels using smart apps, if we had the 
time. Supermarkets have their own labels, we notice. Have they become 
some sort of combination of regulators and ‘nudgers’?
Of course, we might decide to do our shopping over the internet, but, 
if anything, that brings us into an even closer encounter with the global 
regulatory order. Internet ordering is an efficient way for supermarkets 
to gather data about their customers and to communicate with them. 
The compilation of customer data has been going on for decades through 
the issue of loyalty cards and linking purchases to credit card numbers, 
but digital technologies are allowing supermarkets to turn their fuzzy 
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sketches of consumers into intimate portraits. We might like the idea of 
the anonymity of cash, but for how long will payment by cash remain 
an option? The regulation of payment systems seems to be heading in 
the direction of total transparency of our purchasing behaviour. Will the 
anonymity and privacy of these transactions become things of the past 
or will new payment systems like Bitcoin preserve some aspects of these 
two things? Where all these data might end up depends on factors such 
as the cybersecurity competence of its holders, privacy laws and even 
trade negotiations. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, should it 
ever come into force, tilts the field against restrictions on data export 
limitations (Greenleaf 2016).
2. Regulation: The broader version
Supermarkets are one of the places where we can see or trace many 
of the fundamental changes in regulation that have occurred in states 
over the past few decades. The rise in private security services, private 
voluntary certification standards and the globalisation of regulation 
are some examples of such changes. Concepts such as the regulatory 
state and regulatory capitalism capture the scale and dynamics of these 
changes (see Scott, Chapter 16; and Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, this volume). 
However, if we approached a study of regulation and supermarkets that 
confined the meaning of regulation to rules commanded by a sovereign 
for the purposes of guiding or restraining behaviour, we would miss or 
only glimpse many of the processes of which supermarkets were a part. 
We might not pick up, for example, the way in which supermarkets 
were setting standards for those in their supply chains and how farmers, 
if asked, would say that supermarkets were the new regulators. Moreover, 
if we wanted to strategically intervene in systems such as the food system, 
a rules-based definition might mislead us as to how best to intervene. 
Assume for a moment that we become convinced that one highly 
effective way to tackle the rise in obesity is to do something about 
the fat and sugar content of foods. If we were operating with a rules-
based view of regulation, we might conclude that it is a matter of 
influencing national authorities to make laws limiting fats and sugars 
in food. But planning an intervention strategy based on targeting the 
legislature might not be the best strategy or not the only one we should 
be pursuing. A broader view of regulation that included non-legal forms 
of norm-making, along with the idea that private sovereignty over such 
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norm-making mattered to regulatory outcomes, might lead us to think 
about other strategies. Perhaps supermarkets with their command over 
the layout of choices to be found in their aisles could be persuaded to 
bring more healthy choices into focus for busy consumers. We might 
consider harnessing the regulatory power of code through smart apps 
that allow consumers to scan products for information about their fat 
and sugar content. We might also focus on the work of committees on 
the Codex—committees such as the one on fats and oils or the one 
on sugar. The work of Codex committees is geared towards having 
a worldwide impact on food standards of all kinds. It is foundational to 
a global trading system in food. A picture of regulation that ignored the 
Codex and its standards, or, for that matter, the global level of regulatory 
decision-making for any substantive area, would miss the empirical 
reality of the origins of many national regulatory standards.
So, one virtue of moving beyond the narrow or juridical view of 
regulation is that it leads to a theory of regulation with much more 
empirical content. All of the essays in this book in one way or another 
contribute to this broader theory of regulation. Importantly, and as we 
argue in Section 5, the state does not drop out of this broader picture of 
regulation (although some states may increasingly become rule-takers 
rather than rule-makers). Rather, the state becomes part of a network of 
regulation in which the tasks of regulation are redistributed in various 
ways among actors within the network. As the preface to this volume 
makes clear, all the authors have at various points been part of the 
Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) at The Australian National 
University (ANU). Aside from contributing to a broader understanding 
of regulation, the chapters also link to more specific concepts and themes 
that are distinctive of RegNet’s work over the past decade and a half and 
that have led to shared approaches and related theories of regulation. 
We begin a discussion of these concepts and themes in the next section.
3. Regulation and RegNet
Through the analytical development of concepts such as meta-
regulation  (see our discussion below, as well as Grabosky, Chapter 9, 
this volume), RegNet scholarship has played a major role in opening 
the  door to a world of regulation by networks in which the same 
actor in one context might be the regulator and, in another context, 
the regulatee. If, for example, supermarkets collude on price, they risk 
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the wrath of competition law regulators, but they can and have cooperated 
in the global development of certification systems on matters such as 
food safety, sustainable production and animal welfare—standards 
with which their suppliers have to comply (known as the Global GAP 
(Good Agricultural Practice) initiative). 
A book that did much to explore the creative possibilities of a world of 
distributed regulatory capacities was Ayres and Braithwaite’s Responsive 
Regulation (1992). The theory of responsive regulation developed in that 
book aimed to shift the debate about business regulation away from 
the frozen positions of those who favoured deterrence-based regulation 
through the consistent and present application of rules and penalties 
and those who favoured removing as many of those rules as possible, 
thereby maximising the role of freedom and rationality in the business 
world. Responsive regulation advanced the idea that regulators should 
understand the context and motivations of those whose conduct they 
were regulating and then choose a response based on that contextual 
understanding. A responsive regulator is not denied the option of 
penalties, but is denied their first and automatic application. The 
question of when ‘to punish or persuade’ (Braithwaite 1985) led to the 
development of the now famous regulatory pyramid in which a range 
of possible responses is arranged in sequential order, with dialogue and 
persuasion appearing at the base of the pyramid. As one travels up 
the pyramid, options carrying a greater degree of coerciveness become 
available to the regulator. There is a heavy presumption in favour of 
starting at the base of the pyramid because dialogue is a low-cost, 
respectful and time-efficient strategy for obtaining compliance. The 
responses of the regulatee to interventions drawn from the base of the 
pyramid are the ones that determine if, how far and when the regulator 
escalates up the pyramid.
Responsive Regulation was important not just for what it said about 
compliance and enforcement, but also for what it said about the role of 
public interest groups in increasing the regulatory capacity of a society. 
A relationship of close cooperation between a regulator and a firm 
can begin a slide into a partnership in which the independence of the 
regulator is replaced by corruption. A way to counter this danger is to 
think about models of regulation that draw third parties into the circle 
of regulation. Labelling this ‘tripartism’, Ayers and Braithwaite argued 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
6
that tripartite models of regulation required public interest groups to be 
given the information available to a regulator, the chance of a seat at any 
negotiations and the power to initiate enforcement actions. 
Tripartism recognises that society cannot rely exclusively on law and its 
agencies of implementation. The law and society movement that had 
begun in the first half of the twentieth century had brought the methods 
of the social sciences to bear on the actual operation of legal rules and 
found too many gaps between what they promised and what actually 
happened. Legal rules were not enough to alter the pattern of the ‘haves’ 
always coming out ahead (Galanter 1974). The combination of law and 
reason on which social-contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke had placed so much emphasis as a means to a largely peaceful 
and safe state for citizens was looking less and less sufficient.
Behind the model of regulatory tripartism found in Responsive 
Regulation, there is a more basic message to citizens of a polity. If you 
want to safeguard your interests within the state then you will need to 
contribute in some way, big or small, to building a world of distributed 
regulatory capacities and enforcement. It is not enough to assume that 
legal rules and rights alone will protect you. It is not enough to think 
of civil society as an arrangement devoted exclusively to the pursuit 
of self-interest. And,  in the end, and to a large extent by implication, 
it is not enough to count on civic virtue or even associations of the 
civically minded. The norms of civic virtue have to be accompanied 
by the organisation of regulatory networks—networks that have 
meaningful powers of intervention. Law has to become part of a much 
larger regulatory world in which there are many defenders, guardians 
and protectors of public interests, all operating under conditions of full 
information, mutual transparency and accountability. 
Tripartism is not itself a novel idea, but a systemisation of the hard-won 
insights of social movements such as the consumer movement. If one 
wanted better regulation of car safety then, as Ralph Nader showed in 
the 1960s, one had to establish a consumer movement that would fight 
for better safety standards and help to enforce them. The alternative of 
leaving it to the regulator and the US car industry was a death and injury 
toll from cars that were ‘unsafe at any speed’ (Nader 1965).
The theory of responsive regulation is an important part of a conceptual 
evolution in which the narrow view of regulation as a subordinate 
species of law is replaced by a broader view in which law becomes part of 
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a regulatory world in which regulation has multiple levels and sources. 
This broader view of regulation is nicely captured in the definition of 
regulation as ‘influencing the flow of events’ (Parker and Braithwaite 
2003: 119). This, as we discuss in the final section of this introduction, 
pushes regulatory theory in the direction of much greater engagement 
with processes of change and responses to change. A lot of RegNet’s 
ideas about regulation turn out to be ideas about processes: processes 
of escalation up and down enforcement pyramids and processes for 
bringing together victims and offenders into restorative justice circles. 
This wider definition of regulation underpins much of the writing 
by RegNet scholars and has, among other things, led to theories of 
networked, nodal or polycentric regulation or governance (see Holley 
and Shearing, Chapter 10; Brewer, Chapter 26; Maher, Chapter 
39; and Holley, Chapter 42, this volume). In these types of theories, 
regulation emerges as increasingly networked interventions in processes 
of institutional change. 
Much of the work done by RegNet scholars on institutions has been 
aimed not at a general theory of institutional change so much as at 
an understanding of how individuals engage (or do not engage) with 
institutions. Valerie Braithwaite’s (1995, 2009) concept of motivational 
postures has been foundational to understanding this engagement and, 
in particular, how those in positions of regulatory authority might better 
learn to look for and interpret the signals coming from individuals reacting 
to regulatory interventions. Motivational postures are a composite of 
values and beliefs about authority that are held by individuals and used 
by them to enter into a positioning game with regulatory authorities. 
The  positioning game is a dynamic process in which individuals may 
choose a posture such as commitment but at some later point, because 
of an adverse experience, adopt a posture of resistance or disengagement 
from authority. Whether regulatory authorities realise it or not they 
operate in regulatory domains that are saturated with signals from 
individuals about how close to or distant from the goals of the authority 
each individual views herself. Motivational postures of resistance 
and disengagement are linked to actions of defiance, with defiance 
itself taking on two distinct forms: resistant or dismissive. Without 
elaborating the distinction in detail, resistant defiance targets particular 
rules of an authority for change while dismissive defiance targets the 
very legitimacy of the authority itself. The dismissively defiant are much 
more likely to enter behavioural worlds in which the reach of authority 
no longer matters.
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Motivational postures are empirical constructs arrived at by means 
of statistical testing of large-scale survey data obtained from specific 
domains such as tax regulation. Although the theory of motivational 
postures has been tested in domain-specific contexts and is closely linked 
to theorising about regulatory compliance, it is also relevant to a more 
generalised theory of institutional change. For example, the apparently 
sudden collapse of institutions or states, as in the case of former Soviet 
Bloc states, might have its micro-foundations in a long lead-up period 
in which individual citizens increasingly adopt motivational postures 
that enable defiance. Regulators that do not actively scan their respective 
domains for signalling behaviour and put effort into interpreting its 
processual implications may end up learning about its meaning when 
they are confronted by a ‘sudden’ mass movement—a movement that 
is coordinated by leaders in whom the defiant have vested their hopes. 
The mass movement may seem sudden but it will generally have a long 
history in the form of trails of psychological engagement/disengagement 
by individuals with the institution to which the mass movement is the 
latest and now, worryingly for authorities, potentially highly coordinated 
response. Pretty well everyone was surprised by the collapse of European 
communism, but in retrospect they should not have been. More recently, 
the results of the Brexit referendum and the 2016 US Presidential 
elections came out of the blue to most of us. In both cases, we seem to 
explain with retrospective ease what we never saw coming. Perhaps with 
a better analysis we would suffer fewer surprises.
So far we have seen that two themes weave their way through much of 
RegNet scholarship. The first is a focus on the possibilities of regulatory 
change and improvement in the state when the tasks of regulation have 
become radically re-redistributed (a theme we explore in Section  5). 
The  second is an emphasis on the use of processes to respond to the 
changing dynamics of regulatory domains (Section 6 discusses the 
implications of this shift). A third and final theme is the importance 
of including the emotions in a theory of regulation and, in particular, 
understanding the potential of institutions to catalyse processes of 
repair and healing of relationships among individuals. In analysing the 
connections between emotions and regulatory institutions, RegNet 
scholars have been early movers in a more general movement within the 
social sciences that has exposed the limits of rationality in explaining and 
predicting human behaviour and has begun to look to the emotions for 
a fuller understanding of our chosen actions. The next section expands 
on this theme.
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4. The emotions as regulators
David Hume, perhaps more than any other philosopher, formulated 
the relationship between reason and the passions in provocative terms. 
Reason is, he argued, the ‘slave of the passions’, its role being ‘to serve and 
obey them’ (Hume 1739: 217). Responses to this particular provocation 
by Hume were slow to gather, as philosophy and the social sciences 
for much of the twentieth century focused on reason, assuming that 
its study would unlock most of what was important about the mental 
and behavioural life of human beings. Over the past several decades, 
more of social sciences, as well as the sciences, have developed theories 
and models of the emotions, perhaps even ‘over-intellectualizing’ the 
emotions (Goldie 2000: 3). The greater focus on emotions is to be 
welcomed because, among other things, it has helped to widen the 
discussion of what the ultimate objects of an economic system might be, 
prompting data-driven investigations of the links among the emotions, 
progress and economic systems (see, for example, Helliwell et al. 2015).
Emotions may help to account for the long-running ideological debates 
over regulation, but it remains true that theories of emotion do not 
generally feature strongly in theorising about regulation. Implicitly or 
explicitly, the use of regulatory tools and strategies by a regulator to 
alter the behaviour of regulatees is dominated by the assumption of 
rationality. The relevant binary is thought to be rational/irrational rather 
than rational/emotional. Our intention here is not to question the 
robustness of the rationality assumption. If anything, regulators around 
the world do not make enough contextual use of the links between, 
for example, rationality and deterrence. For example, multinationals 
generally have superior information and resources compared with 
national regulators. The use of financial penalties will often not change 
the cost–benefit calculations of these multinationals when it comes to 
compliance with regulatory standards. However, threatening to strip 
these multinationals of their intellectual property rights might be a much 
more effective means of deterrence because in today’s global knowledge 
economy multinationals all depend on intellectual property rights such 
as trademarks for their income and valuation.
The assumption of rationality has to remain a part of our regulatory 
world view, but this does prevent an exploration of theories of the 
emotions and their implications for regulation and institutions. 
The  challenge in opening up the emotions for investigation is the 
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difficulty of generating universals about them. As Jon Elster (2007: 146) 
points out, for every supposed attribute of an emotion, counterexamples 
can be found. They may or may not generate action, they may be fleeting 
or long lasting—sometimes, seemingly, as in the case of anger, pride or 
shame, being transmitted across generations. For the physicist, it would 
be similar to trying to write equations about a universe in which the 
electrons carried a negative charge at some times, a positive one on other 
occasions and no charge at other times, with variations in intensity, 
time and place, and with all other particles also behaving as if they 
were carrying fluctuating rather than stable charges. Whatever laws 
we might write to describe this universe they would not be of the kind 
‘all As are Bs’.
One issue of major significance for regulatory theory lies in the causal 
attributes of the emotions and, in particular, whether emotions are 
dependent on beliefs or in some way account for the origins of our 
beliefs (Frijda et al. 2000). The former account suggests the comforting 
possibility that mounting evidence will eventually overcome those 
emotional commitments fuelled by false world views. The emotional 
genesis of beliefs is a less comforting hypothesis because emotion may 
so suffuse an actor’s world view that no amount of contrary evidence will 
change an actor’s beliefs. So, for example, irrespective of the evidence 
around the inadequacy of gun control in the United States, its National 
Rifle Association will defiantly hold on to its beliefs and maintain its 
adopted identity of civil rights defender. The existence of emotionally 
resilient but false beliefs can create regulatory problems on a national 
or transnational scale, as does, for example, the belief in the curative 
powers of rhino horn (see Ayling, Chapter 29, this volume). In a world 
where truth is not a self-executing regulatory tool of persuasion do we 
return to the pre-Socratic traditions of rhetoric to influence emotion and 
therefore outcomes? In reality, these techniques have never left practical 
life and politics, only that nowadays they are practised on digital media 
at a speed and scale unimaginable to the rhetoricians of Ancient Greece. 
Social media, as Peter Grabosky (2016) has argued, has made the use 
of ridicule an even more potent form of regulation. 
Hopefully, to use an emotional term, it should be clear that theories of 
emotion as well as specific emotions such as shame and pride deserve 
more attention in regulatory scholarship. The psychology of rationality, 
along with its heuristics and biases, continues to occupy much of the 
social sciences’ stage (see Gilovich et al. 2002). Well-developed theories 
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of framing help to explain why a food manufacturer will advertise its 
chocolate bars as ‘fat-reduced’ rather than ‘fat-included’. If we were 
totally rational utility calculators, the presentational language around 
products would not make a difference and manufacturers would not 
invest in developing and using it. Understanding the contextual fallibility 
of rationality is only one small part of understanding human behaviour. 
As Aristotle suggested long ago in his On Rhetoric, there are different 
paths to persuasion, of altering the course of affairs, including through 
the awakening of emotions. There are famous chapters in On Rhetoric 
discussing paired emotions such as anger and calmness, friendliness and 
hate, fear and confidence and shame and shamelessness. The emotions, 
if the Greek myths are any guide, are likely to explain at least as much 
of the judgements of men and women as theories of cognitive heuristics 
and biases. 
As the chapters by Valerie Braithwaite (Chapter 2), Kristina Murphy 
(Chapter 3), Nathan Harris (Chapter 4) and Heather Strang 
(Chapter  28)  show, the connections between emotion and regulation 
have formed an important part of the RegNet corpus, with much of the 
foundational work being done in the years when RegNet’s formation 
was conceived. Examples of this early pioneering conceptual work 
that have carried over into RegNet projects include John Braithwaite’s 
Crime,  Shame and Reintegration (1989), Eliza Ahmed et al.’s Shame 
Management through Reintegration (2001) and Valerie Braithwaite’s 
(1995) work on motivational postures to explain the variety of individual 
responses to  regulatory authority. From these beginnings, RegNet’s 
engagement with emotion theory has widened to include a focus on 
institutions of hope (Braithwaite 2004).
5. Redistributing regulation
In their contribution to this volume, Holley and Shearing recall the 
frontispiece to Hobbes’s Leviathan, which encapsulates a whole political 
philosophy, topography and armoury in one deftly drawn page. At its 
centre, and towering over the well-ordered society (‘Commonwealth’) in 
the foreground, is the sovereign, literal embodiment of his people and 
indispensable guarantor of their lives and any chance of ‘commodious 
living’. His huge sword, which also towers over the landscape, 
protects and enforces obedience among the populace living in the tidy 
settlement below.
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Obedience to what and to whom? Hobbes makes clear in the text of 
Leviathan that the sword is the necessary handmaiden of the law, which 
‘is not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any man, 
but only of him whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged 
to obey him’ (Hobbes 1946: 172). And who can issue such commands? 
‘The legislator in all Commonwealths is only the sovereign’ and ‘none 
can abrogate a law made, but the sovereign’ (Hobbes 1946: 173).
Hobbes’s philosophy has been endorsed, amended and rejected by 
scores of later hands, but the political frame and architecture that he 
half-observed, half-designed and the elements—sovereign state, law 
and rule—that he regarded as foundational to it, have over centuries 
remained at the heart of Western political imaginaries. Some wanted 
Leviathan pur sang; others wanted to moderate it, tame it and make it 
benevolent. Anarchists loathed it, but, as exceptions that prove the rule, 
their aim was defined by it: their focus was on Leviathan, even as their 
aim was to destroy it. In the meantime, sovereign, rule and law were what 
we supposedly had to deal with in the normal course.
Certainly, that is what generations of legal theorists have assumed. 
Anglophone lawyers learnt from John Austin that ‘law is the command 
of a sovereign to habitually obedient subjects’; Continentals examined 
variations of the Rechtsstaat or état de droit or stato di diritto. The terms 
(and meanings; see Krygier 2015) differ, but the locations and occupants 
of them, and their instruments of rule, less so. 
Within this frame, regulation appears as a subcategory, a species, of law. 
Thus, Orbach explains: 
People intuitively understand the word ‘regulation’ to mean government 
intervention in liberty and choices—through legal rules that define 
the legally available options and through legal rules that manipulate 
incentives. (Orbach 2012: 3) 
Narrowly construed, regulation is commonly reduced to a technical 
meaning of subordinate rules passed to amplify the operation of a statute. 
Even in its broader sense, the meaning of regulation remained narrow; 
regulation was carried out by states using law. Governance was also part 
of an analytical jurisprudential circle in which the state was the primary 
governor and good governance was about the rule of rules (rules being 
the essence of law). 
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Indeed, while the literature on governance is a little akin to a big-bang 
phenomenon, many definitions of governance retain this jurisprudential 
influence. The World Bank, for example, as part of its worldwide 
governance indicators work, presents governance as consisting of ‘the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’, 
including the selection of governments (see World Bank 2015).
So: sovereign/state/government > laws > regulations > society. Those of 
a sociological inclination often switch the first and last place-holders, 
so that society comes first. Either way, these are the familiar parts of a 
picture easily visualised. You might be friendly or hostile to any element 
in the picture, think it works well or ill, but its place in the landscape 
can be assumed. A major finding of regulation theory is, however, 
that it cannot.
One way in which that finding is expressed is in discussion of 
‘meta-regulation’. The Greek term ‘meta’ implies that in talking about 
meta-regulation we are referring to something beyond regulation. 
What  lies beyond regulation, as commonly understood? RegNet 
theorists use the term to draw attention to two phenomena. The first is 
that regulation is not just something that applies directly to objects but 
may itself be an object of regulation. The answer to the question of what 
lies beyond regulation is more regulation. The point of the second use 
of the term is to redraw the map more radically: it is that the activity of 
regulation has many sources other than the state (multisource regulation).
In the first sense, the regulation of the regulatory process still often 
has the state at the centre, but the distance between it and its targets 
increases, intervening actors between it and them are introduced and 
sometimes targets themselves are enlisted in the processes of supervised 
self-regulation. Thus, Braithwaite’s model (1982) of enforced self-
regulation, which gave origin to this use of the term, begins from the 
premise that the state will, in the context of corporate crime, generally 
fail when making corporations the direct object of regulation because 
of resource issues (for example, not enough inspectors, not enough 
technical expertise). The model has two prescriptive elements, the first 
of which is to switch to making the self-regulation of corporations the 
object of regulation, with the second being to strengthen the process 
of self-regulation so that it is more likely to generate the social benefits 
of compliance rather than the private rewards of noncompliance. In short 
form, this means the state requiring corporations to develop credible 
rules around, for example, accounting standards and then enhancing 
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the capacity of corporate compliance units to act independently in the 
enforcement of those rules. Enforced self-regulation is all about finding 
ways to tilt the exercise of the discretionary core of self-regulation into 
the zone of socially responsible decision-making. 
In the second usage of the term, the redistribution of tasks—often 
called the ‘decentring’ of the state—is more wideranging; indeed, it is 
multiple. The state is decentred, so is law, so too regulation. We speak of 
redistribution rather than the more common ‘decentring’, since moving 
from the centre is only part of the story. A lot more has been found to be 
happening than that. Thus, the early work on multisource regulation by 
Peter Grabosky (for the history, see Grabosky, Chapter 9, this volume) 
and John Braithwaite has blossomed into a field of research by RegNet 
scholars on the role of third parties in regulation that looks at, for example, 
how professionals can infiltrate corporations to render them more ‘open’ 
(Parker 2002); how banks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and online auction houses might be drawn into a regulatory strategy 
to help make progress on seemingly intractable problems such as the 
illegal taking and trafficking of wildlife and timber and the international 
dumping of toxic waste (see Ayling, Chapter 29, this volume); or how 
intellectual property owners, the US state and payment providers such as 
Visa, Mastercard and PayPal have formed a global enforcement network 
that reaches across borders to close websites believed to be infringing 
intellectual property rights (see Tusikov, Chapter 20, this volume). 
Conceiving of regulation as being multisourced leads, as many 
chapters of this book discuss, into theories of polycentric, networked, 
nodal, decentred, new, plural or collaborative governance or regulation 
(see,  in  particular, Brewer, Chapter 26; Holley and Shearing, 
Chapter  10;  Holley, Chapter 42; and van der Heijden, Chapter 41, 
this volume). At  the risk of offending proponents of these labels, the 
differences among these approaches are more of nuance than of kind, 
with all recognising that regulation no longer has one exclusive command 
centre and that rising interconnectedness characterises the relationship 
among the many centres and sources of regulation in the modern world. 
So, for example, if one focuses more on the qualities and capabilities of 
organisational sites of governance then one can usefully think of this 
dimension of governance as nodal governance. If, on the other hand, one 
is more interested in the interaction among nodes (where nodes now 
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refers to any set of objects making up a network) then one can think 
of this as networked governance. Placing the emphasis on the influence 
of non-state actors leads to decentred or polycentric governance. 
The network concept is highly relevant for regulatory studies because 
it offers a better description of how regulation is changing, as well as 
allowing researchers to focus on both the structure of regulation and 
the strategic behaviour of actors within regulatory domains (Easley 
and Kleinberg 2010: 4–6). It is also useful since it allows us to track 
connections that exist both within and without the boundaries of states, 
without needing to make some conceptual leap or contortion, in the face 
of empirical links that are often seamless and borderless. 
For the most part, RegNet’s researchers have not followed the precise 
metrics of social network analysis (SNA) (for example, measures of 
density, centrality, fragmentation; see Everton 2012: 11–12), although, 
as Russell Brewer’s chapter makes clear, some use has been made of SNA 
techniques in studying crime (see, in particular, the references to the 
work of Benoit Du Pont). RegNet researchers have been more interested 
in networks that form ‘webs of influence’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 
550) than in the algorithmic mapping of the actors and their ties in a 
network. One can have a network, such as the names in a telephone 
directory, without that network constituting a web of influence. Webs of 
influence are constructed, in the jargon of philosophers, by intentional 
agents acting on their beliefs and desires to intervene in processes. 
Through disaggregation into webs of dialogue, coercion and reward, 
webs of influence provide a more fine-grained explanation of how 
power is used within such networks to secure regulatory outcomes and 
bring about institutional change. The focus of RegNet researchers has 
predominantly been on behavioural dynamics within these distinctive 
types of networks, as well as on the possibilities for weaker actors 
such as groups of indigenous people (Drahos 2014), small farmers in 
developing countries (Hutchens 2009) or scientists fighting for open-
source principles (Hope 2007) to create strands that may be tied to webs 
of empowerment across space and, as Terry Halliday’s Chapter 18 in 
this volume suggests, across time. Network thinking, it is fair to say, 
has become part of the attitude of responsiveness (Drahos 2004).
Apart from shifting topographies, matters of style also change with 
location—not now ‘meta’ but what might be ‘better’ or ‘smarter’ 
(see  Gunningham and Sinclair, Chapter 8, this volume). When 
regulation moves from the state to various differently configured ‘nodes’, 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
16
it shifts not merely in space but often also in kind. RegNet researchers 
have found, and have recommended, hosts of kinds of regulation, in 
hosts of kinds of places, generated by hosts of different actors, which 
‘challenge rulish presumptions’, as John Braithwaite puts it. Rules might 
still matter inside and outside states and law, but, even where they do, 
there are many contexts in which they ‘derive strength from being woven 
with other strands into a fabric of flexible regulation’ (Charlesworth, 
Chapter 21, this volume).
Where the state is and what it does in relation to particular forms and 
styles of regulation are matters to be discovered and analysed. They 
can no longer—if they ever could—be assumed. States have a range 
of powers for good and ill that few other institutions, even today, can 
match, and there are many contexts where it might indeed turn out that 
‘the state remains at the centre of regulatory space’ (Grabosky, Chapter 
9, this volume). The point is that the extent to which this is so must be 
a matter of theorisation and investigation, not presumption, and what 
theory and investigation we have suggest that it varies hugely between 
societies and across domains. 
So none of this is to suggest—and no one at RegNet does suggest—that 
states are irrelevant or laws of no use to regulation. Rather, the state and 
its law are not always to be found at the centre of the action, nor are 
they always the best things to be found there. That does not mean they 
are unimportant. Nor even that we know as a general truth what else 
can/should replace them or what it should do. What we do know, or are 
coming to see, is that assuming there is one entity, in one metaphorical 
space, behaving in one commanding way, to which regulation is or must 
be attributed, is both empirically misleading and normatively misguided. 
Indeed, even to think of regulation as a thing, and the process of regulation 
as imposing things of one sort on things of another, already misleads.
6. Things and processes 
Consider the disarmingly simple definition of regulation as ‘influencing 
the flow of events’ (Parker and Braithwaite 2003: 119). The greater 
attention being paid to regulation and governance within the social 
sciences is a long story, but in abstract terms it has to do with ideas and 
concepts that shift the focus from an ontology of things to an ontology of 
process. So, to illustrate, Michel Foucault’s (1980: 98) insight that power 
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circulates rather than being a thing possessed by a sovereign represents 
one of many starting points to seeing power and governance in network 
terms. Friedrich von Hayek (1945), to take a rather different thinker, 
also contributes to an ontology of process though his insights concerning 
the dispersal of knowledge among individuals and how markets can 
bring about economic processes of spontaneous ordering based on the 
use of this knowledge. A third and final example is the emergence in 
the twentieth century of philosophical ideas about language that spread 
to produce, among other things, analyses of rights not as entities, but 
as behavioural outcomes of speech act processes ( Jackson 2010) and 
legal concepts as the outcomes of processes engaged in by interpretative 
communities (Robertson 2014).
Conceiving of regulation as influencing the flow of events connects 
regulation to the study of processes—processes that spread in terms of 
their ordering effects far beyond anything that is captured by thinking 
of regulation as rules commanded by a sovereign holding the authority 
to do so, or indeed any jurisprudential theory that ascribes to regulation 
the essentialising characteristic it has selected for law. The enforcement 
pyramid in responsive regulation is an example of how, in much of the 
work done by RegNet scholars, there is a mild ontic commitment to the 
category of process. The pyramid comprises sequenced interventions that 
begin with processes of dialogue and persuasion and escalate to processes 
of punishment. Whether or not processes of intervention will produce 
compliance is contingent on a variety of other processes. Compliance 
with gun regulation will depend on, for example, institutional processes 
of procedural fairness, as well as the role emotion plays in the genesis of 
beliefs held by an individual about the need to possess guns. Emotion 
theory suggests that some psychological processes may not be responsive 
to processes of intervention based on rational persuasion or procedural 
fairness because, as Valerie Braithwaite’s chapter makes clear, the 
emotions have set individuals on a path of disengagement that pushes 
them towards the precipice of coercion and counter-coercion. 
Whether process is the most important ontological category for 
understanding the world (as opposed to categories such as objects or 
events) is an issue for professional metaphysicians using their analytical 
tools of investigation. Process is certainly a useful category for regulatory 
studies in that it helps us to make sense of observable data. We can 
identify many chemical and biological processes of transformation in 
the physical world. Even if we begin with a study of events, we may 
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end up with a much wider investigation of the processes that enable 
us to understand those events as part of a pattern. So, for example, we 
can think of forest fires as events, but explaining their frequency will 
very likely be connected to deeper processes of climate change. In the 
social world, the study of processes allows us to follow trails of evidence 
across contexts and scale, jumping the fences of the social science 
disciplines as we go. For example, studying the shame of a people within 
a nation and the shame of an individual within a group may reveal 
processes of formation common to both, perhaps suggesting processes 
for the peaceful resolution of shame capable of applying across contexts 
(Ahmed et al. 2001: 3). More abstractly, process has some claim to be 
the naturalistic starting point for the development of concepts that unite 
micro and macro contexts of regulation. By linking regulation to the 
study of processes of intervention or influence in other processes, we can 
draw on the insights of thinkers as different as Hayek and Foucault and 
work our way towards a more coherent and general theory of regulation. 
Once we tread this processual path, the distinction between regulation 
and governance becomes blurred and perhaps collapses altogether. If a 
distinction is needed, one can see them as part of a continuum in which 
the focus of regulation is on actors and their modes of intervention or 
influence, while in governance we focus more on the normative attributes 
(for example, accountability, authority, legitimacy) of institutions. 
Summing up, linking regulation to the category of process creates a link 
between regulatory theory and what appears to be true—namely, that 
we live in a world where processes from the most microscopic to the 
most macroscopic are everywhere. If we adopt the responsive attitude to 
regulation, our approach should be to study this multiplicity of processes 
to better intervene in them. What has been learned from this study of 
processes occupies the remaining chapters of this volume.
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Under Valerie Braithwaite’s leadership, RegNet has a long history of 
exploring the psychological underpinnings of regulatory institutions 
such as tax or institutionalised virtues such as trust. The goal has been 
more to produce an understanding of how individuals engage (or do 
not engage) with institutions than to produce a general theory of 
institutional change.  
Valerie Braithwaite’s chapter draws together much of the work done 
by RegNet scholars on the psychological processes that underpin 
individual responses to regulatory institutions. Key explanatory concepts 
here are motivational postures of accommodation and defiance towards 
authority and the way these are, in turn, shaped by interaction among 
the different parts of the individual psychological self, such as the moral, 
grievance and status-seeking selves. Kristina Murphy focuses on how 
the use of procedural justice by authorities may draw out the moral 
self in citizens, highlighting, however, that procedural justice does not 
operate mechanically to produce greater compliance. Compliance and 
other regulatory concepts have been dominated by the assumption of 
rationality in processes of human decision-making. Nathan Harris, 
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noting the greater attention being paid to the emotions by regulatory 
scholarship, analyses the various effects of shame and the ways in which 
it should or should not be used in regulatory settings.
The final two chapters of this section introduce the reader to the various 
methods employed by RegNet scholars (the reader will also find more on 
these methods in Brewer, Chapter 26; Burris, Chapter 32; and Broadhurst 
and Alazab, Chapter 30, this volume). Ibolya Losoncz describes the 
psychological methods, introduces the reader to the philosophical issues 
that sit behind choices of methodology and locates much of the work 
of the RegNet group within the critical realist tradition—a tradition 
that stays sensitive to the empirics of causality, as well as the need to 
look for theoretical reconceptualisations of regulation that open up 
causal fields in new ways for investigation and testing. One way into the 
complexity of these fields, their linked levels and subjective meanings 
is through multi-sited fieldwork, with such fieldwork central to many 
RegNet projects, including on globalisation (see Drahos, Chapter 15, 
this volume). Kathryn Henne’s chapter analyses the strengths and 
appropriate uses of this method.
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Closing the gap between 
regulation and the community
Valerie Braithwaite
1. Introduction: Regulation—from social 
dread to social ‘cred’ 
For most people, ‘to regulate’ means to control or direct others by rules 
or standards. The term can carry negative baggage, particularly when 
attached to government. Rightly or wrongly, government regulation has 
connotations of a powerful authority ‘making’ people do things they 
would not otherwise do and generally interfering in people’s lives in 
intrusive and wasteful ways. 
Regulation need not be this way. First, it need not be dominating. 
We can agree to regulation and participate in it. Second, it need not 
involve government. In an era where governance is global and nodal, 
we find ourselves being regulated by international bodies, professional 
associations, trade agreements, markets, private industries, local entities 
and even event organisers unknown to us. And third, regulation may 
of course serve a useful and important function for the community. 
It may enhance wellbeing—as through quality standards in health care, 
education, food, water and housing—provide consumer protection and 
safeguard our security and rights. 
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So why do we hear the word regulation and think bureaucratic overload 
instead of valuable community oversight? If regulation has been gift-
wrapped as Pandora’s box to which government alone holds the key, 
it is time for us to undo the wrapping and be part of the conversation 
about the contents of the box and how to best manage its harms. As a 
social activity that includes persuasion, learning, praise, emulation, 
self-regulation, influence, voluntary compliance, along with its usual 
companions, deterrence and coercion, the term ‘regulation’ might lose its 
mystery and remoteness. We can recognise regulation as something we 
all engage in when we intervene purposefully in any social world. 
As social beings, our acts of regulation are endless. On a daily basis, we 
shepherd each other at home, school, work and play: holding a child’s 
hand when crossing a road, giving others feedback on their written work, 
complimenting a person on a job well done, showing appreciation of 
another’s thoughtfulness, reciprocating a favour or offering advice to a 
person in distress. New forms of formal regulation should never be about 
undermining the social fabric that regulates effectively. The purpose 
should be to strengthen the useful aspects of informal regulation that 
are already in play, complementing, not undermining, them. So, for 
instance, we teach a child to watch the traffic lights as we cross a road, 
we assess and review papers to improve their quality, we have awards 
for excellence in performance and extraordinary acts of kindness, and 
we have help lines and emergency numbers to phone for assistance. 
None of these regulatory measures weakens the natural systems of social 
regulation already in place. Rather, formal regulatory measures build on 
the informal. They become a welcome part of the flow of everyday life 
because they are judged to add value. 
Looking at regulation through a social lens may seem to some to miss 
the mark, given the many regulatory activities we witness occurring at a 
distance from human beings. Simple regulatory measures in this category 
include building pathways, gates and walls. More sophisticated examples 
are the technological surveillance of money transfers, tracking devices on 
aircraft, withholding pension payments from wages, income management 
within social security systems, satellite imaging of vegetation and forest 
degradation, desk analyses of big data, paper trails and record keeping 
and the highly technical, complex and voluminous tax code. Such high-
tech approaches combined with intricate design rules that allow only an 
elite to understand the game makes ‘the social’ in regulation seem quaint, 
if not entirely the wrong genre for analysis. 
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It is important, however, to differentiate mechanism from purpose. 
Mechanisms at times may be devoid of the social, being impenetrable 
and invisible to us. Yet their purpose may be deeply social and have far-
reaching consequences for a society. The use of drones to drop bombs 
in war zones is distant from us. They are the weapons of politicians, 
though they may also deny responsibility with a moral defence of 
distance. Drones are highly sophisticated, ‘thinking’ machines that do 
their jobs devoid of human intervention. The consequences, however, 
may involve the destruction of towns and villages, and the loss of civilian 
lives. The  consequences are not only highly social, but also political. 
‘Human  hands-off ’ technology may destroy not only societies and 
culture, but also international cooperation and trust. So-called asocial 
interventions change the social fabric and relationships beyond the 
zones in which they operate. Regulatory purpose, as Christine Parker 
and John Braithwaite (2003) express it, is to steer the flow of events. 
Steering at some point takes place through, or impacts on, people; people 
at some point become aware of changes in the flow of events, they give 
meaning to events and meaning plays an important role in determining 
regulatory outcomes, not only on that occasion but also in future. 
2. An example: Higher education in Australia
Australia’s higher education contingent loan scheme provides a fitting 
example of why shared meanings of regulation in the community 
are important. The Australian Government replaced free tertiary 
education in 1989 with a scheme whereby government paid universities 
for a  student’s tuition through a loan, which was to be repaid by the 
student when her income exceeded a certain level. Policymakers hailed 
it a brilliant regulatory strategy. The idea was exported to other countries, 
including the United Kingdom. The public, however, did not agree, 
as Eliza Ahmed demonstrated in a series of analyses of tax and loan 
repayment (Ahmed and Braithwaite 2004, 2005, 2007; Braithwaite 
and Ahmed 2005). Students who considered the scheme unjust and 
who were less than satisfied with the education they received acted out 
their grievance through shifting the focus of their retribution from the 
government to the tax system. The tax system, used to collect the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) debt, became the target of 
abuse for work-related expenses and undeclared income. This was a 
paradoxical regulatory result given that a rationale for abolishing free 
higher education was that the public was said to be unwilling to pay 
higher taxes for free education for their children. 
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This tax blowback was symptomatic of trouble to come. The government’s 
attempt to reform the tertiary sector in 2015 collapsed, with the feared 
cost of tertiary education fees being no small part of the community 
backlash. A lost Arcadia of free tertiary education lay dormant as 
a benchmark and high point of Australia’s tertiary education system—
not according to the technocrats of Treasury and higher education 
policymaking, but in the meaning ascribed to it by ordinary Australians. 
Free tertiary education meant a fair go and equal opportunity for one’s 
children and grandchildren. 
The interpretation and meaning given to regulation by those being 
regulated may not match that of regulators. If the gap in sense-making is 
associated with low trust, cooperation may be jeopardised. Cooperation 
does not guarantee regulatory success, but it helps. Cooperation and 
willingness to comply are most likely to occur if those being regulated 
see benefits, believe the regulation is fair and feel a sense of obligation 
to defer to a regulating authority’s wishes. It also helps if alternative 
authorities (for example, peak bodies or international organisations) 
endorse the regulator’s efforts and do not lead a campaign to steer the 
flow of events in different directions. These dynamics are all part of 
the compliance process in a democratic society.
3. Foundation concept: Compliance 
as process
Compliance has two usages: outcome and process. First, it may represent 
an outcome of a regulatory intervention. Did the regulated party do 
what was required according to law or the demand of the regulator? 
Was a tax return filed on time at the behest of a tax authority? Was a 
restraining order adhered to at the behest of the court? Was a security 
alarm activated in a building at the behest of an insurance company? 
Was  a car securely locked? Were dietary restrictions adhered to at 
the behest of a doctor? Compliance as outcome tends to be specific, 
behavioural and measurable.
Compliance as process is a broader, relational concept. Compliance as 
process bridges the world of the regulated and the world of the regulator. 
From the perspective of the regulated, it incorporates our understanding 
of what an authority wants us to do, the purpose behind the regulation, 
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whether or not we agree with it, how we evaluate implementation of the 
regulations and what our attitudes and behavioural intentions are with 
regard to the regulatory request and the authority. 
From the perspective of regulators, compliance as process asks what 
effort has a regulatory authority made to elicit compliance and what 
have alternative authorities been doing: contesting the actions of the 
lead regulator or endorsing them? How regulators and regulatees 
view each other and negotiate the compliance space is relevant not 
only to compliance as outcome, but also to the future legitimacy and 
trustworthiness of the regulatory system more generally. 
Compliance as process involves mapping the regulatory actors in 
what Meidinger (1987) calls the ‘regulatory community’. A regulatory 
community comprises different subcultural groups with their own values, 
norms, beliefs and processes. Through their leaders, they may undermine 
regulatory authority or extend its reach. They use their networks and 
alliances to push back and shape the actions of the regulator, just as the 
lead regulator uses its power and authority to steer the flow of events in 
the direction it wants. 
4. Freedom, respect and procedural 
fairness: Regulatory principles to live by
The RegNet community philosophy has always been to respect pushback 
wherever it comes from. This is why compliance as process has such 
appeal in our work. We do not assume that those with power always have 
it right. And we do not assume that regulation is the answer to all social 
ills. Indeed, Peter Grabosky’s (1995) work on unintended consequences 
demonstrates how the best of intentions in regulation can go horribly 
wrong. Debate and contestation over what regulation might achieve and 
how best to regulate in the context of democratic governance are at the 
core of our conception of good regulatory practice. 
Two meta-principles have guided our work in RegNet. The first is to 
use regulation sparingly, introducing formal regulation only when it 
is necessary as a means of structural reform to further the Republican 
principle of ‘freedom as non-domination’ (Pettit 1997). The right kind 
of regulation is that which reduces the amount of domination (increases 
the quantum of freedom) in the world ( J Braithwaite et  al.  2007). 
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The  second  meta-principle is consistent with the first, but focuses 
specifically on how a regulatory system should operate and how 
regulators should engage with the community—that is, with respect and 
procedural fairness (see Murphy, Chapter 3, this volume). 
Freedom as non-domination, respect and procedural fairness are held as 
desirable principles in their own right. They also serve another function. 
When regulations are designed following these principles, cooperation 
and voluntary compliance are likely to be higher and fewer parties are 
likely to need coercive measures to comply. 
This approach should be tantalising for a regulator: a regulatory system 
that runs essentially on goodwill with regulatory effort dedicated to the 
recalcitrant few. Why should this not be the normal experience with 
government regulation? Globally, workplaces mostly manage to run this 
way. Locally, families do, too. How, then, can we replicate this across 
our society?
5. Regulating well: The wheel of social 
alignments
One way of thinking about how to turn this aspiration into a practical 
implementation plan is through the wheel of social alignments 
represented in Figure 2.1.
The wheel of social alignments was developed by the author to guide 
regulatory conversation and responsiveness in the regulatory community. 
The model grew out of work in the Centre for Tax System Integrity 
(CTSI, 1999–2005) undertaken by Eliza Ahmed, John Braithwaite, 
Nathan Harris, Kersty Hobson, Jenny Job, Kristina Murphy, Greg 
Rawlings, Declan Roche, Yuka Sakurai, Natalie Taylor and Michael 
Wenzel. The work of the centre challenged traditional deterrence 
theory as the approach best suited to understanding tax compliance. 
The odds of detection and penalties were so low that it was rational to 
cheat on tax, yet most people did not. The CTSI research focused in 
particular on the importance of the social-psychological determinants of 
compliance: norms, values, identity, shame, guilt and trust (Braithwaite 
and Wenzel 2008).
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Figure 2.1 Tracking the process: Wheel of social alignments
Source: Author’s research.
The wheel integrates the results of this work into bands and segments 
that a regulatory authority needs to monitor systematically if 
they are to  regulate in accord with the democratic and republican 
meta-principles above. 
The outer band of the wheel represents the design of the regulatory 
system. This part sets out the legislation, guidance for interpretation 
and policy intent, investigative rules and enforcement practices, 
principles of  governance and administrative practices. The outer band 
incorporates the activities of the regulator and the base from which the 
regulator works. 
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The middle band represents how those who are being regulated evaluate 
what is being asked of them and the primary factors shaping compliance. 
Conflict with authority is most likely to arise around the failure of 
regulations to: 1) provide benefits; 2) ensure justice; and 3) elicit moral 
obligation. Michael Wenzel provided an extra dimension to these 
considerations through demonstrating that each of us identifies with 
our own interests, as well as with the interests of the many groups to 
which we belong. Depending on our level of identification at the time—
from personal to national—our evaluation and discussion of benefits, 
justice and obligation change. Regulatory leadership is necessary to 
convince us which collective identity we should put forward to facilitate 
collective action. 
If leadership is not forthcoming and we remain unconvinced of the 
value of the regulations for the community, even if not for us personally, 
we may turn to other sources for advice. The inner core of the wheel 
represents ‘the other’—the significant voices or nodes of influence 
that shape our views and to which we turn to formulate a regulatory 
response. ‘The other’ in the regulatory community thereby can take on 
the role of an alternative authority. The role is strengthened when there 
is confusion, uncertainty, dissension and loss of trust in the system as 
represented by the outer circle in Figure 2.1. For taxpayers, the alternative 
authority may be  aggressive tax planners; for young disenfranchised 
Muslims, it might be Islamic State; for unskilled, marginalised workers 
engaging in unsafe work practices, it may be their hire company or 
recruitment agency.
The width of the three bands in Figure 2.1 indicates the degree of 
dialogue and contestation, and varies with culture and context. The inner 
core and middle band are likely to be relatively wide when regulators 
must rely on public cooperation, as is the case with anti-littering laws 
or safe work practices. When a regulatory system is imposed ‘invisibly’ 
without opportunity for noncompliance, the outer band will be wide, 
leaving the middle band and inner core empty, bereft of dialogue and 
contestation. This was the case with the collection of metadata and 
surveillance of private phone calls and emails by the US Government, 
until the revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013. 
The central idea of the wheel of social alignments is that when the parts 
in Figure 2.1 work harmoniously together, the wheel moves forward. 
When one part separates from the others, the wheel comes to a stop 
or is difficult to move until repaired through dialogue, responsiveness 
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and regulatory leadership. The greatest risk to forward momentum is 
defiance by individuals or groups who form alliances to confront the 
regulatory authority with its failings. Examples of alliances of defiance 
that demonstrate ‘the strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973) in 
the regulatory context include the Boston tea party, with its chants of 
‘no taxation without representation’ (1773), Australia’s Eureka Stockade 
(1854), Gandhi’s Salt March in India (1930), the 1960s US civil rights 
movement, Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress’s 
fight against apartheid in South Africa through the second half of the 
twentieth century, Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution (1989) and, more 
recently, public protests against police brutality in the United States.
6. Responding to authority: Defiance and 
motivational postures
Defiance can be understood not only as an act of combustible contrariness, 
but also as a premeditated response when a regulatory authority threatens 
identity. Authority threatens by virtue of being an authority—an entity 
that can take away one’s freedom to act as one pleases. From the moment 
of birth, we learn to cope with authority: parents, teachers, work bosses, 
an array of professionals whose role is to advise and care and officials 
from the government and private spheres. We are well practised in 
dealing with authority that exercises control over what we do. 
Motivational postures refer to the signals or messages that we send to 
authority about the control it purportedly has over us. Motivational 
postures are sets of beliefs and attitudes that sum up how individuals 
feel about and wish to position themselves in relation to authority: they 
communicate social distance. Social distance has two aspects: liking 
and deference. Liking and deference often go together, but not always. 
Theoretically, they are distinct. I may like and admire my supervisor in 
the sense that I have positive emotions towards her, but I may not always 
defer to her judgement of how I should progress my career. I may judge 
her not to be an authority on what is best for me. On the other hand, 
I may defer to her judgement on every occasion because of her capacity 
to help me further my career, but I may not particularly like or admire the 
way she operates. In other words, we may be satisfied with and approve 
of an authority, but not defer to the requests it makes of us. Or we may 
defer, but not think well of the authority to which we are deferring. 
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The five motivational postures are empirically derived. We have found 
that people adopt these postures in many different areas of regulation, 
from aged care regulation and taxation to the regulation of civil wars 
( J Braithwaite et al. 2007, 2010; V Braithwaite 2009). First, we may 
display the posture of commitment—that is, we may communicate to 
the authority that we believe it has a worthy mission and we feel duty 
bound to support its work. Or we may recognise the authority, but be 
somewhat less enthusiastic or agnostic about what it does. That is, we 
may signal capitulation: ‘Tell me what you want of me and I will do it; 
you’re probably legitimate and I don’t want trouble.’
Both commitment and capitulation are postures of accommodation to 
authority. In a democracy, both tend to be strong. Regulatory bodies 
that do not command support from a critical mass do not last long, 
as Bernstein (1955) observed in his study of US railway commissions. 
Railway commissions were legal entities with specialised knowledge that 
sought to emulate the impartiality and political aloofness of the judicial 
system. Their complexity and remoteness, however, meant that outsiders 
lost sight of their purpose and value, and they were dissolved.
In addition to accommodating postures, we may signal defiant postures. 
We often mix them, hedging our bets in a bid to be self-protective in 
case the threat from authority escalates. The most common defiant 
posture is resistance. Resistance is healthy in a democracy and signals 
dissatisfaction with how the authority is doing its job. Resistance, more 
than any other, is a plea to authority to be fair and respectful. Authorities 
manage resistance successfully when they introduce greater procedural 
fairness into the way they operate (see Murphy, Chapter 3, this volume). 
Two other defiant postures are less common, but far more threatening 
to regulators. They are postures that are adopted by those who refuse 
to defer to the authority’s rule. They are postures of dismissiveness. 
The first is disengagement, in which social distance from the authority is 
greatest. Disengagement involves neither attending nor responding to 
the authority, but rather continuing business as usual. Disengagement 
mirrors Merton’s (1968) construct of ‘retreatism’: ‘in the society but 
not of it’. The final dismissive posture of game playing takes place in an 
adversarial space where the regulator is being watched carefully and the 
objective is winning against the rules. Game playing involves searching 
for loopholes and ways around the regulatory authority, undermining 
the authority’s effectiveness and its legitimacy. 
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Postures of accommodation and defiance ebb and flow in all of us 
and provide regulators with a complex, ever changing set of signals 
to decipher. It is in response to this challenge that the wheel of social 
alignments is useful. It reminds regulators to reflect on their own mission 
and practice and ask if they have all the pieces in place to have earned 
postures of commitment and capitulation from the public, if they have the 
institutional mechanisms in place for hearing resistance and responding 
respectfully and constructively to it and if they have accurately assessed 
the root causes of disengagement and game playing. 
Dealing with disengagement and game-playing, both of which have 
been empirically related to law violation, seriously challenges an 
authority’s enforcement capacity and legitimacy. The battle here is not 
about procedural fairness since postures of disengagement and game 
playing are adopted by those individuals or groups who have no respect 
for the regulatory institution and expect none in return. The battle is 
about moral authority: what is the right thing to do (and who has the 
power to decide)? This requires the force of the law, credible enforcement 
and society’s backing to add normative moral gravitas to the debate.
7. What shapes motivational postures? 
World views and three selves 
Motivational postures sum up our feeling about and responsiveness to 
authorities. They are shaped in part by stable world views. It is unlikely 
that wildlife traffickers hold accommodating postures to the World Wide 
Fund for Nature when it supports local governments in the fight against 
illegal trafficking. Similarly, supporters of civil liberties are unlikely 
to adopt accommodating postures to government keeping records of 
private phone calls and internet usage. In the field of tax compliance, 
we find that those disillusioned with the democracy feel less obliged to 
pay tax, as do those who believe in small government and free markets. 
Those who look to government to care for the vulnerable, on the other 
hand, willingly pay tax. 
While values and world views are important, so, too, are contextual 
variables. Credible enforcement matters in so far as it signals an authority’s 
(and society’s) belief that compliance matters: it is not just obeying rules; 
it is the right thing to do. When costs and benefits are being weighed up 
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in a rational or pseudo-rational manner, credible enforcement sways the 
ledger in the direction of compliance rather than noncompliance, and in 
the direction of the more accommodating motivational postures. 
Just as important as deterrence is how a regulatory authority manages 
the wilfulness of potential noncompliers. Shame and guilt are powerful 
emotions for driving compliance (see Harris, Chapter 4, this volume). 
But when regulators set out to publicly shame regulatees in a stigmatising 
way, they risk a regulatory stalemate. Stigmatising shaming by authority 
is likely to induce humiliation and set in train social ostracism. Those 
affected are likely to express their anger and grievance through fighting 
back, inflicting reputational damage on the regulator in the process 
(V Braithwaite et al. 2007). This is why procedural fairness, whatever the 
regulatory breach happens to be, is so important as part of a regulator’s 
standard operational procedure. The regulatory purpose is to change 
the harmful behaviour and not be diverted into reputational battles, 
as Kristina Murphy (2004, 2005) describes in her research on Australian 
taxpayers. In 1998–99, many were caught in mass-marketed schemes 
that the Australian Taxation Office judged to be tax-avoidance products, 
peddled by promoters in the financial planning industry.
Nathan Harris (Chapter 4, this volume) discusses the role of guilt and 
shame in regulation, but equally important is the role of pride. Eliza 
Ahmed’s work apprises us of how important pride is in a regulatory 
context, particularly ‘humble pride’ (Ahmed and Braithwaite 2011). 
Ahmed draws a distinction between humble and narcissistic pride. 
Narcissistic pride occurs when individuals garner success to put 
themselves above others, to be superior and dominate others. Humble 
pride is about self-respect for our achievements and inner satisfaction, 
while acknowledging our social infrastructure and its support. Humble 
pride allows us to be socially in tune with others and is responsive to 
quiet acts of appreciation and acknowledgement of effort by others that 
help us achieve success. Recent work on regulating through supports as 
well as sanctions (Healy 2011) targets our humble pride, recognising 
and  thereby reinforcing our inner belief in our goodness, competence 
and self-efficacy (Bandura 1986; Jenkins 1994).
Whenever we are faced with a regulatory imperative—as individuals or 
groups—threat lies in the background. Emotions therefore are triggered 
as well as reason. One way of thinking about our inner psychic battles 
when a regulatory agency makes its presence felt is in terms of three 
selves that step forward to analyse or make sense of the potential threat 
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for us. There is the moral self that assures us we are good, competent and 
law abiding, and that the best course of action is not to be afraid, but 
rather to tend and befriend the regulator. Safety lies in working with the 
regulators. Then there is the grievance self, the self that feels oppressed 
and unappreciated, and threatened by impending unreasonable 
demands and acts of injustice. The grievance self is a threatened self 
that needs reassurance and support. The third self is the status-seeking 
self. This  self  overcomes and solves problems, determinedly pursuing 
a path of personal achievement and ensuring no real regulatory threat 
materialises. 
These three psychological selves explain how postures ebb and flow. 
Motivational posturing theory posits that the defiance of resistance 
comes about when our grievance self is strong, possibly triggered 
by disrespect from the regulator, and our moral self is weak, possibly 
left to wither on the vine by the regulator. In contrast, the defiance of 
dismissiveness of authority (involving disengagement or game playing) 
pits a strong status-seeking self against a weak moral self.
These three psychological selves reinforce the regulatee’s segments in the 
wheel of social alignments: provide benefits, to be mindful of a status-
seeking self; ensure justice, to be mindful of the grievance self; and elicit 
moral obligation, to be mindful of the moral self. Offending any or all 
of these selves is likely to make the task of regulating without constant 
surveillance and coercion extremely difficult.
8. Conclusions: 10 things to know and 
10 questions to ask 
Ten principles follow from looking at micro–macro regulation through 
a  social-psychological lens and they trigger important regulatory 
questions for conversation in the regulatory community:
1. Understand that people view a regulatory authority as a potential 
threat to freedom and wellbeing. This threat exists for those who 
break the law and those who do not. How is the threat being 
interpreted by different segments of the community?
2. Know the regulatory objective. Is the purpose to punish or alienate 
or is it to elicit a substantive improvement and cooperation in the 
future?
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3. Be open and responsive to cases of hardship. Is this individual or 
organisation being burdened or limited in unexpected and unfair 
ways by regulation?
4. Deliver procedural justice by treating those being regulated 
with respect, have clear and transparent procedures and provide 
reasonable and fair hearings for dissidents. Are various segments in 
the regulatory community experiencing regulation as an unfair and 
unreasonable imposition because they see no mechanism for change 
and are denied a voice in stating and resolving problems? 
5. Engage constructively with dissenting voices. Have the regulator 
and other relevant authorities got it wrong, and is there a better way 
of dealing with a harm that everyone acknowledges is there?
6. Engage with dissent in terms of social justice. Do the outcomes of the 
regulation benefit everyone or are the costs and benefits of regulation 
born disproportionately across the regulatory community?
7. Engage with dissent on moral grounds. Is it right morally to steer 
the flow of events in the way proposed?
8. Provide hope for the future through recognising and praising 
strengths openly. Are there acknowledgements and rewards in the 
system that are set up in such a way as to strengthen internal resolve 
to achieve the goals of the regulatory system and encourage humble 
pride among others to do likewise?
9. Return to the scene of noncompliance and reengage with regulatory 
interventions. Is there a restorative justice and responsive regulatory 
framework that can be used to simultaneously build commitment to 
the regulatory system and achieve compliant outcomes?
10. Build networks within the regulatory community to ensure 
clear communication and exchange of views and information. 
Will alternative authorities be willing to support the regulator 
with enforcement challenges or will alternative authorities act as 
countervailing forces?
These 10 principles and questions emerge from seeing regulation 
through a  social-psychological lens. We have engaged with regulation 
in  this chapter as a set of social institutions that coordinate 
communities—individuals and organisations alike—with respect and 
with the minimum  amount of intrusion required to redress harms of 
domination by some that undermine the freedom of others to pursue 
their  hopes and dreams. Seeing regulation in this way may demand 
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a quality of social nuance in government that is unusual on the world 
stage these days. But as people turn to a philosophy of individualism to 
give their life meaning and purpose, as trust in democratically elected 
governments continues on a downward slide and as alternative authorities 
see a power vacuum and extend their influence, there seems little option 
for us collectively but to place our hopes in a transformation where 
governance and regulation are openly contested and regulatory measures 
are agreed to with eyes wide open. In other words, the time may have 
come for a genuine effort to regulate responsively and transparently with 
inclusion of the nation’s residents and citizens. It is time for us together 
to open this Pandora’s box and let hope out. 
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Why do people obey the law, and what can authorities do to encourage 
people to comply voluntarily with the law? These questions have received 
interest from regulators and scholars interested in understanding the 
motivators of law-abiding behaviour. This chapter addresses these two 
questions. It first discusses different perspectives on why people obey 
the law and it then proceeds to discuss in detail the growing interest 
in procedural justice–based approaches to regulation. The chapter puts 
forward that people can be rational actors motivated solely by personal 
gain or they can be moral actors motivated to obey authorities and 
laws because of an intrinsic obligation to do the right thing. Research 
across a variety of regulatory contexts has revealed that the latter form 
of compliance can be fostered when authorities use procedural justice. 
The  key ideas and controversies in the procedural justice literature 
will also be presented, followed by a discussion of future directions in 
the field.
1  Email: t.murphy@griffith.edu.au.
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2. Why do people comply with the law? 
Laws are established to control human behaviour, and regulatory 
authorities are put in place to enforce those laws. For a well-functioning 
society, we need people to comply with the law and to follow the directions 
of those who enforce the law. A longstanding debate has existed in the 
literature between those who believe people obey the law only when 
confronted with harsh sanctions and penalties and those who believe 
people obey the law because it is right and just to do so (Tyler 1990). 
The  former perspective on compliance is instrumental in its focus 
while the latter perspective is normative in its focus. This dichotomy 
resonates with Valerie Braithwaite’s discussion in the previous chapter 
of compliance being driven by both outcome and process.
The basic premise of the instrumental model of compliance is that 
people are motivated to maximise their own personal gains; they are 
rational actors who behave in a manner that personally benefits them. 
Individuals are thought to assess opportunities and risks and will 
disobey the law when the anticipated fines and probability of being 
caught for noncompliance are small in relation to the profits to be made 
through noncompliance. The view is that if compliance is a rational 
choice, authorities should respond by deterring individuals from acts 
of noncompliance by ensuring the benefits to be obtained through 
noncompliance are much lower than those obtained through compliance 
(Becker 1968). Advocates of this perspective suggest that compliance 
can be best achieved in two ways: 1) by increasing the probability 
of detecting noncompliers; and 2) by increasing sanctions to the point 
where noncompliance becomes irrational. According to this deterrence-
based approach to regulation, authorities need to find an appropriate 
balance between these two measures to make compliant behaviour 
the rational choice. This instrumental perspective of human behaviour 
underpins many of the enforcement policies adopted by regulators. 
The problem with such an instrumental perspective of behaviour, 
however,  is that it can only ever give a partial explanation for why 
people obey the law. Deterrents may prevent noncompliance, but they 
cannot explain why people obey the law in the absence of deterrence. 
We know  from the work undertaken at the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity (CTSI) at RegNet (1999–2005), for example, that taxpayers 
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often complied with their tax obligations despite the fact that the odds 
of detection and penalties for noncompliance were low. In other words, 
deterrence is less helpful for explaining why people obey laws voluntarily. 
The normative perspective of compliance, in contrast, suggests that 
people comply with the law not because of a fear of the consequences 
they may face for noncompliance, but because they see the law as right 
and just and feel a moral obligation to obey the law (see Tyler 1990). 
Here, compliance is therefore voluntary in nature because it occurs in 
the absence of deterrents. Research has supported the idea that law 
compliance is motivated more often by normative concerns borne out 
of the perceived legitimacy of the system than by instrumental concerns. 
In his influential study, Tyler (1990) found that people reported being 
compliant with laws because the laws aligned with their morals about 
what was right and just. Tyler also found that these internal morals 
influenced people’s compliance behaviour more so than the perceived 
risk of detection or sanctions for wrongdoing.
It is appealing to think of most people as committed moral actors 
motivated to comply with the law out of a sense of obligation to do 
right (Braithwaite, Chapter 2, this volume), but what happens if the 
law contravenes an individual’s morals? What if the law is seen to be 
inconsistent with what an individual sees as right and just? This might 
lead to a situation where a person becomes resistant to authority and 
its laws or feels justified breaking the law. This situation points to 
the crucial role that authorities can also play in securing voluntary 
compliance. Importantly, research has revealed that compliance can 
also be influenced by how a person views an authority charged with 
enforcing the law. Tyler  (1990) again has shown that the perceived 
legitimacy of an authority is key to securing compliance with laws that 
might be incompatible with an individual’s morals. Legitimacy reflects 
the degree to which people recognise the right of an authority to govern 
their behaviour. If people view an authority as legitimate, they agree 
that the authority has the right to govern them. Providing an authority 
with legitimacy transfers to them the authority and right to define what 
constitutes acceptable forms of behaviour. As such, citizens will be more 
willing to defer to a legitimate authority’s laws even if they may not like 
the law they are obeying. 
The fact that the perceived legitimacy of an authority can also promote 
voluntary compliance behaviour, even when people view a law itself as 
unjust, is important because authorities are able to directly shape the way 
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in which people view them. Some of the taxation and policing research 
undertaken at RegNet suggests that an authority’s legitimacy can be 
built through the way in which authorities yield their power (Hinds and 
Murphy 2007; Murphy 2005). Tyler (1990) argues that authorities 
that govern with procedural justice will be better able to foster voluntary 
compliance and will have to rely less heavily on deterrence. Regulators 
are often unable to change unpopular laws but they are able to change 
the way they treat those they are charged with regulating. This makes 
procedural justice an appealing and valuable tool for promoting 
voluntary compliance.
3. What is procedural justice? 
In the social-psychological literature, procedural justice is conceptualised 
as involving the quality of treatment and quality of decision-making 
received by an authority. It involves more than a regulator just being nice 
to people. Criteria typically used to define procedurally just treatment 
include respect, neutrality, trustworthiness and voice. Respect refers to 
whether the authority is respectful and polite in their dealings with 
a person, and also whether they respect people’s rights under the law. 
If they treat people with dignity and are respectful in how they issue 
orders or enforce laws then people will view them as more procedurally 
fair. Research has found that people are particularly sensitive to the 
way in which authorities issue directives, with disrespectful treatment 
being shown to produce reactance and negative evaluations of the 
authority (Murphy 2004). Neutrality involves making decisions based 
on consistently applied legal rules and principles and the facts of a case, 
not on personal opinions and biases. People want to feel assured that 
authorities are treating them in the same way as any other individual 
in society. Transparency or openness about how decisions are being 
made also facilitates the belief that decision-making procedures are 
neutral. An authority’s trustworthiness is an indicator of whether the 
authority will be motivated to treat a person in a fair manner. People 
react favourably to the judgement that an authority they are interacting 
with is benevolent and caring and is sincerely trying to do what is best 
for the people with whom they deal. Authorities communicate their 
trustworthiness and fairness when they listen to people’s accounts 
and explain or justify their actions in ways that show an awareness of 
and sensitivity to people’s needs and concerns. Finally, voice is important 
to individuals. People value having the opportunity to voice concerns 
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and issues to an authority before a decision is made in their case. If an 
authority then takes these concerns into account in the decision-making 
process, people will be left feeling that they have received procedural 
justice. Resistance can be allayed through providing regulatees a voice 
(see also Braithwaite, Chapter 2, this volume). Giving an individual 
a  real voice, however, requires that an authority genuinely commits to 
acting on any valid concerns that may be raised. Ignoring an individual’s 
grievances or concerns is unlikely to foster a sense that the authority 
has used procedural justice. In summary, then, if individuals are treated 
respectfully by an authority, are dealt with in an unbiased fashion, believe 
the authority has demonstrated trustworthy motives and has taken 
the individual’s concerns into account before reaching a decision then 
individuals will evaluate the interaction as more procedurally just. 
There has been a plethora of studies published that demonstrate 
how procedural justice can build legitimacy and promote voluntary 
compliance with both authority directives and laws. The majority of 
these studies use self-report survey methodologies to show that people 
who view their experience with an authority to be more procedurally 
just are much more likely to view the authority as having legitimacy 
(for example, Hinds and Murphy 2007; Murphy et al. 2008; Sunshine 
and Tyler 2003; Tyler 1990). Many of these studies also find a direct 
link between procedural justice evaluations and subsequent self-reported 
compliance behaviours, or they find that procedural justice shapes 
compliance indirectly through the mediating influence of legitimacy 
(Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Murphy et al. 2008; Murphy 2005). 
While  much of this research has been undertaken within a policing 
context, similar findings have been obtained across a number of different 
regulatory contexts, including in prisons, in taxation regulation and in 
nursing home regulation, to name a few (for example, Braithwaite and 
Makkai 1994; Reisig and Mesko 2009; Murphy 2004, 2005; Wenzel 
2006). Studies that use observational or interview methodologies reveal 
similar findings to survey studies. For example, McCluskey’s (2003) 
observational research showed how interactions between police and 
the public were less likely to result in defiance towards officers and 
were less likely to escalate to violence if police officers used procedural 
justice when initially dealing with individuals. Authorities often have 
to deliver unfavourable decisions or outcomes, yet even if an outcome 
is unfavourable, research has demonstrated that people will still be 
more likely to accept those decisions and will be more likely to comply 
if the authority has delivered that outcome in a procedurally just way 
(Tyler 1990).
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
48
4. Theories of procedural justice 
With empirical evidence consistently showing that procedural justice 
has beneficial effects on promoting an authority’s legitimacy and people’s 
willingness to comply with the law, understanding the theoretical 
mechanisms that explain why this occurs is important. Early theorising 
in the field suggested that procedural justice mattered to people because 
it was able to maximise their instrumental gains. This instrumental 
perspective on procedural justice can be traced back to the seminal 
work of Thibaut and Walker (1975). Their ‘process control’ theory was 
developed after observing the way in which disputants who were party 
to a formal grievance evaluated the authorities that made decisions in 
their case, and it focused on the degree to which people were able to 
exert influence over the authority’s decisions. Thibaut and Walker posited 
that if people felt they had control over decisions pertaining to their 
dispute, they would believe the procedures arriving at those decisions 
had been just. In contrast, if people felt they lacked control over the final 
outcome of their case, they were more likely to believe the process had 
been unjust. In this particular theory, voice and control were of particular 
concern to people. If they felt they were able to voice concerns and that 
voice was able to shape the outcome of their case then they evaluated the 
experience as more just.
Later theories in the field steered away from this instrumental view 
of procedural justice. Instead, the next wave of theories suggested that 
procedural justice mattered to people because it conveyed important 
symbolic messages about a person’s identity, value and status in 
society. Social identity thus comprised the core theoretical mechanism 
explaining why procedural justice had the effects on people that it 
did. And, indeed, work undertaken by Wenzel (2002) from the CTSI 
revealed the importance of identity processes in shaping how individuals 
respond to justice concerns. The ‘group engagement’ and ‘group value’ 
models specifically incorporate these notions of identity to explain the 
relationship between procedural justice, legitimacy and compliance 
(see Blader and Tyler 2009; Lind and Tyler 1988). These identity-based 
explanations have dominated theorising in the field and they provide a 
way of understanding the dynamics of power relationships within social 
groups. Specifically, they attempt to explain why people comply with 
group laws and internalise group values. These theories suggest that 
the experience of receiving procedural justice from authority figures 
has positive effects on perceptions of legitimacy and on compliance 
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behaviour because such experiences strengthen people’s connections to 
the social groups that the authorities represent. This in turn promotes 
allegiance to group norms and values and encourages compliance with 
the law (Blader and Tyler 2009). In other words, receiving procedurally 
just treatment from an authority communicates to people that authorities 
respect them and see them as worthwhile members of the community. 
This promotes greater identification with the community by generating 
a positive sense of the individual’s place in society and leads the person 
to feel more committed to doing right by the authority who represents 
that community. Hence, people are motivated to legitimate the authority 
of groups within which they feel status and standing. They feel they 
should support the authority of the groups to which they belong and 
they internalise the value that they should obey the authority of a group 
with which they identify (Bradford et al. 2014). 
More recent theorising in the field highlights the added importance 
of  emotion for understanding the effect of procedural injustice on 
legitimacy and noncompliance. Murphy and her colleagues have 
acknowledged the value and importance of identity, but they have 
posited that both identity and emotion should be included within 
one explanatory framework to fully understand how, when and why 
procedural justice works as it does. In other words, perceptions of 
an authority’s legitimacy, in addition to emotional experiences and 
identity processes, need to be considered together to fully understand 
the different effects that procedural justice can have on different 
people across different contexts. Using empirical data, Murphy and her 
colleagues demonstrated how unjust treatment by authorities could elicit 
negative emotions in individuals (for example, Murphy and Tyler 2008; 
Barkworth and Murphy 2015). These negative emotional reactions 
subsequently produced a variety of retaliatory behaviours in response 
to unfair treatment, including reactance, defiance towards authorities 
and subsequent noncompliance with the law. The idea that authorities 
can have an impact on people’s emotions is not new. There is a long 
tradition in the criminology literature showing how injustices can elicit 
negative emotions (for example, Sherman 1993; Braithwaite 1989; see 
also Harris, Chapter 4, this volume). What is new in Murphy’s work is 
the attempt to merge theories of emotion with theories of identity to 
produce a more sophisticated theory of procedural justice. 
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Murphy argues that events (for example, being regulated or punished) 
can be appraised as either harmful or favourable to an individual’s 
personal goals or desires. Here, emotions can be experienced in response 
to such appraisals. Anger, it is argued, results from an appraisal that 
another person or group is harming or threatening the self. This can 
result in retaliatory action as a person attempts to protect their identity 
and self from the harm. Unfair treatment from an authority could be 
one such threat to a person’s sense of self (Braithwaite, Chapter 2, 
this volume). Such treatment can lead individuals to perceive their 
identity and standing in a group are being threatened. This identity 
threat can produce a negative emotional response that in turn results 
in destructive thoughts and behaviours. Hence, Murphy proposes that 
when unfair treatment threatens one’s identity, negative emotion may 
result. If negative emotion is then not managed appropriately it has the 
potential to lead people to question the legitimacy of an authority or 
can lead to retaliatory behaviour and noncompliance with authorities 
and laws. Studies testing the validity of an emotion-based theory of 
procedural justice are only in their infancy, but findings thus far appear 
to support the value of considering legitimacy, emotion and identity 
in one explanatory model. 
5. Controversies in the field
The discussion presented earlier suggests that procedural justice is a 
useful tool for authorities wishing to promote their own legitimacy and 
to encourage people to voluntarily comply with the law. Despite the 
apparent success of procedural justice, however, research in the field is 
not without its limitations. Several continuing controversies with this 
body of research remain. Three of these controversies will be highlighted 
followed by a brief discussion of new research agendas that have attracted 
attention in the field.
Measurement issues represent one recurring controversy in the field. 
A number of scholars have argued that procedural justice research 
inconsistently operationalises key constructs and has done little to 
evaluate the construct validity of existing scales (for example, Gau 2011; 
Reisig et al. 2007; Johnson et al. 2014). These authors have noted that 
measures of procedural justice and police legitimacy have differed from 
one study to the next. Concern has also been raised about whether 
measured variables actually reflect different concepts. For example, 
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it  has  been argued that commonly used procedural justice measures 
often overlap with measures used to construct legitimacy. If measures are 
inconsistent or do not measure what is intended, it can lead to misleading 
and inaccurate conclusions across different studies.
Second, Tankebe (2009a) has noted that the procedural justice literature 
has tended to overemphasise the relationship between procedural 
justice and compliance, and has tended to underemphasise the role 
of instrumental factors such as outcome favourability or authority 
effectiveness in shaping people’s compliance behaviour. Tankebe used 
research from the field of restorative justice to demonstrate his point. 
He noted that many restorative justice studies fail to find long-term 
effects in reducing reoffending. Offenders participating in restorative 
justice conferences tend to rate their experience as more procedurally 
just than those who attend traditional courts. Hence, one would expect 
long-term changes in compliance to occur among participants involved 
in restorative justice conferences if claims made in the procedural justice 
literature are valid. In fact, many procedural justice studies that purport 
to examine compliance behaviour do so using self-report measures of 
compliance. In those studies, procedural justice is typically found to be 
linked to compliance, yet the conclusions are more mixed when objective 
measures of compliance are used, as is the case in restorative justice 
studies. 
With respect to Tankebe’s (2009a) second issue, it has been noted that 
procedural justice scholars tend to underemphasise the importance 
of instrumental factors in shaping people’s views and behaviours. For 
example, when compared with American and UK-based research, 
Australian procedural justice policing research finds that citizens 
often place much greater weight on the effectiveness of authorities 
when judging their legitimacy or when predicting their cooperation 
(Hinds and Murphy 2007; Sargeant et al. 2014). While procedural 
justice still dominates most Australians’ assessments of the legitimacy 
of authorities, such findings do suggest that researchers should not 
discount the importance of instrumental concerns. In fact, in research 
from Ghana—a country characterised by the widespread corruption of 
regulatory authorities—it has been found that citizens are more likely to 
view authorities as legitimate or are more likely to cooperate with them 
if the authorities are viewed to be effective in their job, with procedural 
justice playing little role in predicting their compliance behaviour or 
assessments of an authority’s legitimacy (Tankebe 2009b; for similar 
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findings across different regulatory contexts, see Murphy 2009; 
Murphy  and Barkworth 2014; Sargeant et al. 2014). Hence, context 
appears to matter and researchers should not underestimate the potential 
effect that instrumental factors, in addition to procedural justice, have in 
shaping people’s compliance behaviour and views of authorities.
The third major criticism raised in relation to the procedural justice 
literature is the tendency for some regulators and researchers to 
overemphasise the value of procedural justice for securing cooperation 
and compliance, rather than promoting it as a good in itself (Tankebe 
2009a). Regulators have an obligation to exercise their authority in a 
procedurally fair way, irrespective of any instrumental benefit such an 
approach may have in facilitating their role in maintaining compliance. 
This needs to be kept in mind when advocating a procedural justice–
based approach to regulation.
Future research directions
It is important to highlight at this stage in the chapter that the majority 
of new studies published in the procedural justice literature simply aim 
to replicate existing studies in the field. The concern with this type of 
research is that the procedural justice literature risks becoming stale, 
failing to push the boundaries or challenge the key assertions put forth 
in the existing literature. This is what made the procedural justice work 
coming out of RegNet so appealing; it sought to push the boundaries in 
theory development. What is needed for the future of procedural justice 
scholarship is research that adopts new methodologies or that seeks to 
better understand the contexts where procedural justice works more or 
less effectively or why it works as it does. In terms of future directions 
for the field, therefore, there are a few developments that have occurred 
in the past five years that offer important avenues for extending research 
in the field. These developments include: 1) more sophisticated theorising 
around the concept of legitimacy; 2) extending existing theoretical 
frameworks to better understand when, how and why procedural justice 
works; and 3) utilisation of innovative methodologies to understand the 
effect of procedural justice in practice. 
Reconceptualising legitimacy
Legitimacy has typically been conceptualised in the procedural justice 
literature as people’s ‘obligation to obey’ an authority and by the 
perceived  ‘institutional trust’ of an authority. Tyler’s (1990) measures 
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of ‘obligation to obey’ and ‘institutional trust’ feature prominently 
in most of the empirical research on perceived legitimacy. Recently, 
however, Tankebe (2013) offered an alternative conceptualisation of 
legitimacy, arguing against equating legitimacy with a felt obligation 
to obey authorities. Tankebe (2013) posits that legitimacy comprises 
four components: distributive justice (that is, the equal distribution 
of services across groups), procedural justice, authority lawfulness and 
authority effectiveness. While Tyler treats procedural justice as an 
antecedent of legitimacy, Tankebe considers it a component of legitimacy. 
Moreover, Tankebe (2013) treats obligation to obey as a consequence 
of legitimacy, rather than it being a component of legitimacy, as originally 
conceptualised by Tyler. 
Jackson et al. (2012) also suggest that legitimacy entails more than just 
trust and obligation to obey. They have recently defined and measured 
police legitimacy as a multidimensional concept with three interlinked 
elements: 1) obligation to obey; 2) moral alignment; and 3) legality. 
Obligation to obey is consistent with Tyler’s definition of legitimacy, 
with a legitimate authority able to garner obedience from the public. 
Moral alignment reflects the belief that authorities and the public 
share broadly similar moral positions about appropriate law-abiding 
behaviour. Legality reflects whether authorities themselves follow 
their own rules (similar to Tankebe’s authority lawfulness concept). 
If authorities are seen by the public to be acting in an ethical manner or 
exercising their authority according to established principles, they will 
be seen as legitimate. 
The reconceptualisation of legitimacy shows much promise as a future 
research direction. By exploring empirically the link between these 
different proposed notions of legitimacy, future research can begin 
to tease apart the separate roles that each might play in explaining 
compliance behaviour.
Extending theory
As noted earlier, the group value and group engagement models have 
dominated theorising in the procedural justice field. Very few scholars 
have attempted to offer alternative models or to extend theories 
in the field, opting instead to utilise existing theories. Murphy has 
perhaps been one of the few recent procedural justice scholars to offer 
an alternative perspective to the dominant identity-based theories, 
suggesting that researchers should consider the role of emotion in 
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addition to identity and legitimacy to understand how, when and why 
procedural justice works as it does (see the discussion earlier explaining 
this new perspective). Future researchers should consider whether the 
inclusion of this emotion perspective represents a more valid and reliable 
explanation for procedural justice effects or whether other alternative 
theoretical explanations may offer more reliable explanations for the 
procedural justice effect across different contexts and groups. One such 
example is Valerie Braithwaite’s motivational posturing theory of 
defiance (Braithwaite, Chapter 2, this volume; see also Murphy 2016).
Innovative methodologies
Finally, a burgeoning area of study in the procedural justice field, and 
one that offers another fruitful avenue for future research, has involved 
researchers working closely with regulators to evaluate procedural 
justice effects in applied settings using randomised controlled field trials. 
The limitation with many of the other methodologies commonly used 
in the procedural justice field—that is, survey research, observation and 
interview methods—is that the causal relationships between the key 
variables of interest are difficult to establish. Randomised controlled 
field trials allow researchers to directly manipulate one variable (in this 
case, procedural justice) to explore its effect on a range of other variables 
(for example, can introducing procedural justice change how people 
evaluate police?). By randomly allocating people into different groups 
to experience a manipulation differently—that is, a control versus an 
experimental group—this allows direct causal testing of the effect of 
procedural justice on the public’s views and behaviour.
A few notable scholars have made use of randomised controlled field 
trials to evaluate whether authorities can be trained to use procedural 
justice and whether this has beneficial effects on the public’s behaviour 
and their perceptions of those authorities (for example, Mazerolle 
et  al. 2012, 2013, 2014; Murphy et al. 2014; Wenzel 2006; Wheller 
et  al. 2013). Of the limited number of studies that exist, researchers have 
typically found that members of the public who have interactions with 
procedurally just authorities—that is, those exposed to the experimental 
condition—are significantly more likely to evaluate those authorities 
positively and are more willing to display cooperative and compliant 
behaviours compared with people exposed to the control condition. 
While there are likely to be more fruitful developments that arise, these 
three directions are currently receiving attention in the field.
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6. Conclusion
To conclude, procedural justice appears to have an important role to 
play in regulatory practice. Procedural justice can improve people’s 
willingness to cooperate with authorities and it can encourage them to 
voluntarily comply with the law. This is because procedural justice can 
promote identification with authorities and reduce negative emotion 
and resistance. It can also build public perceptions of the legitimacy 
of authorities, leaving people to feel more obligated to obey their 
instructions and laws. 
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Shame in regulatory settings
Nathan Harris
1. Introduction 
How do people feel when they have broken the law? Does it make a 
difference whether their behaviour was also against their own values? 
And how does this feeling affect their response to regulatory action? 
As a consequence of questions like these, the moral emotions and their 
implications for regulatory systems have received increased attention 
within disciplines such as criminology, sociology and psychology. 
One reason for the revival of interest in shame, in particular, is John 
Braithwaite’s (1989; Ahmed et al. 2001) theory of reintegrative shaming. 
While the theory has its roots in sociological and criminological theory, 
it suggests that an important psychological effect of social disapproval is 
the emotion of shame, and that the emotional responses to disapproval are 
critical to explaining the effect that regulatory action has on subsequent 
compliance. In response to growing recognition that moral emotions are 
important, two sets of questions have been explored. The first is whether 
social disapproval, or ‘shaming’, should be used in regulatory contexts and, 
if so, how? Restorative justice is one domain that draws on the concept 
of reintegrative shaming, but it is also a domain in which concerns about 
the dangers of shaming have been raised. The second set of questions 
concerns the nature of shame itself. Is the emotion a response to the 
fear of rejection, is it a response to a perception of being a failure or is it 
a consequence of violating one’s values? What does the emotion tell us 
about the moral engagement of individuals with regulatory practices?
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2. Shaming in regulatory contexts
A focal point for the revival of interest in shame was publication of 
John Braithwaite’s (1989) book Crime, Shame and Reintegration. In this 
book, he argues that the criminal justice system has underestimated the 
significance of social disapproval in preventing offending. To understand 
crime rates, we need to look beyond official mechanisms, such as 
penalties that are imposed by criminal justice systems, to the degree to 
which societies express disapproval of crimes. The concept that is central 
to Braithwaite’s analysis is shaming, which he defines as: 
all societal processes of expressing social disapproval which have the 
intention or effect of invoking remorse in the person being shamed 
and/or condemnation by others who become aware of the shaming. 
(Braithwaite 1989: 100) 
An important characteristic of this definition is that it does not limit 
itself to demeaning or humiliating forms of disapproval but seeks to 
encompass the full spectrum of ways in which disapproval might be 
expressed. 
The fundamental distinction the theory makes is between stigmatisation 
and reintegration. Stigmatisation occurs when disapproval is directed 
at the person as well as at the offensive behaviour, when the person is 
not treated with respect, when there is no ceremony to decertify the 
individual’s deviant status and when deviance is allowed to become a 
master status trait (Makkai and Braithwaite 1994). As with labelling 
theories, stigmatisation of offenders is expected to lead to greater 
reoffending. Being charged with a crime, found guilty in a court and 
then sanctioned imposes a deviant identity on an individual because it 
ceremonially changes the position of the person within society and has 
important social implications, such as reduced employment opportunities. 
This critique of criminal justice asserts that, once imposed, a deviant 
identity becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: marginalisation reduces 
the individual’s access to legitimate opportunities while increasing 
perceptions of injustice and the attractiveness of supportive subcultures.
Reintegrative shaming theory diverges from the labelling tradition by 
rejecting the idea that stigmatisation is an inevitable product of social 
disapproval. Reintegration can occur, instead of stigmatisation, when 
shaming is respectful, distinguishes between the person and their actions, 
concludes with forgiveness or decertification of deviance and does not 
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allow the person to take on a negative master status trait. One context 
in which this often occurs is in family life and the disciplining of children, 
where research shows that authoritative approaches are more effective 
than either permissiveness or authoritarianism.
While an important element of reintegrative shaming theory concerns 
the failure of stigmatisation, the distinctive contribution the theory 
makes is to explain why it is that reintegrative shaming works to reduce 
offending. Here the theory places greatest emphasis on the role shaming 
plays in the development or engagement of conscience. As Braithwaite 
(1989: 9) puts it, reintegrative shaming, is: 
conceived as a tool to allure and inveigle the citizen to attend to the 
moral claims of the criminal law, to coax and caress compliance, to reason 
and remonstrate with him over the harmfulness of his conduct.
Shaming is important because of its educative value in developing or 
reinforcing beliefs about what is wrong. Shaming can have a deterrent 
effect, as an informal sanction that threatens the loss of respect by valued 
others. This is, however, secondary in reintegrative shaming theory to 
its moralising qualities. Shaming that is reintegrative is seen as having 
distinct advantages over shaming that is stigmatising because it allows 
concerns about behaviour to be communicated effectively to offenders. 
Affirmation and inclusion of the individual allow for moralising and 
denunciation of the act to occur in a way that invites the offender to 
acknowledge guilt and express remorse, knowing that he or she will not 
be outcast and that forgiveness, or decertification of their deviant status, 
will occur. Stigmatisation focuses attention on the individual’s status 
rather than the harm he or she has caused and is more likely to damage 
the offender’s bonds with law-abiding others.
Reintegrative shaming theory places considerable store in the ability 
of  moral persuasion to reform individual offenders. However, this 
faith  in moral persuasion at the individual level stems from a broader 
social premise, one derived from control theory, that the reason 
individuals do not commit crime is because they have commitments to 
shared moral norms and social institutions. It is argued that punishment 
is irrelevant to most people because committing serious crime is 
unthinkable to them. Socialisation of children in families and schools 
about moral norms leads to a broad consensus about what acts should be 
crimes. While subcultures that support alternative cultural values exist, 
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support for the criminal law is much greater. Indeed, Braithwaite states 
that reintegrative shaming theory is only valid to the degree that there 
is a consensus that certain actions should be prohibited. 
The application of shaming theory to 
restorative justice
The significance of shaming to regulatory intervention has been 
explored in a variety of domains, including school bullying (Ahmed 
and Braithwaite 2006; Morrison 2006), workplace bullying (Ahmed and 
Braithwaite 2011; Braithwaite et al. 2008; Shin 2005), sexual offenders 
(McAlinden 2005), tax evasion (Braithwaite 2009; Murphy and Harris 
2007), nursing home regulation (Braithwaite et al. 2007) and business 
regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2002). However, the most extensive 
application has been in the development of restorative justice programs, 
which expanded rapidly in the 1990s and are now found in criminal 
justice, child protection, schools and prison systems in many parts of 
the world. Restorative justice is an alternative to the criminal justice 
system that redefines the goals of justice as well as the way in which 
it is carried out. A defining principle of restorative justice is that an 
offence creates an obligation for offenders to repair the harm that has 
been caused (Zehr 1990). Unlike the principles of traditional justice that 
emphasise the importance of consistent and proportional punishment, 
the aims of restoration are the empowerment of participants as well as 
reparation and reconciliation. These broad goals include reintegration of 
offenders because the focus is on repairing harm that has been caused 
to the offender and their social networks as well as any victims. 
The dynamics of restorative justice interventions—such as family group 
conferences, victim–offender mediation or healing circles—are also 
rich contexts for the reintegrative kinds of shaming that are advocated 
(Harris  et al. 2004). Family group conferences, for example, involve 
semiformal meetings between the offender(s), people who are close to 
them, the victim(s) and their supporters. The focus of a conference is 
on finding out what happened and how the incident has affected all 
of the parties, as well as coming to an agreement about what needs to 
be done to repair the harms that are identified. As a consequence, they 
involve communities in the kinds of conversations about the negative 
consequences of crime that Braithwaite argues are critical to developing 
individual conscience and commitment to the law. Empirical observations 
suggest that family group conferences are perceived as significantly more 
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reintegrative than court cases (Harris 2006) and that well-run programs 
have the potential to assist in resolving shame-related emotions that 
occur during them (Retzinger and Scheff 1996).
Concerns about shaming
While awareness of shaming has increased, so, too, have concerns about 
the explicit use of shaming to control or respond to crime. The explicit 
use of shaming by courts has also seen the rise of ‘shaming’ practices that 
are completely contrary to the restorative approaches discussed above. 
Recent examples have occurred, particularly in American criminal 
justice, where shaming has been used in the court system as a deterrent 
or punishment for convicted offenders. Offenders have been ordered to 
complete ‘shame sentences’ relevant to the crime they commit instead 
of spending time in jail. Shoplifters have been ordered to stand out the 
front of shops holding signs declaring that they stole, drink-drivers 
are ordered to attach ‘DUI’ (driving under the influence) stickers to 
their cars, while those convicted of soliciting sex are ordered to sweep 
the streets. 
Massaro (1997) argues that this ‘modern’ kind of shaming outcasts 
certain segments of society in a way that does not protect the individual 
and undermines the dignity of the whole community (see also Condry 
2007). In addition to arguing against the decency of this approach, 
she  argues that the complexity of the emotion of shame is such that 
courts are ill equipped to employ shaming and that the effect on 
offenders would be difficult to predict. Martha Nussbaum (2004) 
identifies five arguments in the literature against the use of shaming 
punishments: that they are an offence against human dignity, that they 
are a form of mob justice, that they are unreliable, that they do not 
hold the deterrent potential that they are supposed to and that they are 
potentially net-widening. 
While it is not surprising that concerns are raised about overt forms of 
humiliation, the appropriateness of shaming within more reintegrative 
forums such as restorative justice has also been questioned. Maxwell 
and Morris (2002) and others have argued overt disapproval should 
not be an aim of restorative practices, suggesting instead that they are 
oriented towards exploring the consequences that an offence has on its 
victims, with the aim of provoking empathy. They argue that ‘shaming’ 
is a dangerous proposition in restorative justice because even with the 
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best of intentions offenders might interpret shaming as stigmatising. 
Shaming young offenders may exacerbate problems rather than 
prevent reoffending, particularly if offences have been committed as a 
consequence of low self-esteem, which has occurred as a consequence 
of an absence of emotional support or a difficult past. 
This critique of shaming is based in part on doubt as to whether shame 
is a positive emotion for offenders to feel. A number of scholars have 
argued that the more important mechanism in restorative justice is 
the eliciting of remorse, which occurs as a consequence of the offender 
coming to understand the impact that their actions had on the victims. 
Shame, on the other hand, is said to be a dangerous emotion to invoke 
in offenders because it is a threat to their sense of self worth and is 
potentially destructive. These questions reflect a broader debate about 
the virtues of shame as an emotion, in which there is a clear division 
between those who are pessimistic about the role shame plays and those 
who are more optimistic.
3. What is the role of shame in regulatory 
contexts?
As just illustrated, various ideas about shaming—both positive and 
negative—are based on assumptions, often implicit, about the nature of 
the emotion that shaming invokes. This raises the question of what is 
shame, when does it occur and what are its characteristics? Answering 
these questions is critical to understanding the role that shame plays in 
regulatory settings and has been the focus of recent research, discussed 
below. Two broad conceptions have dominated thinking about shame.
Shame as a social threat
The first of these conceptions describes shame as a response to social 
threat, which is precipitated by the individual’s perception that they 
have been rejected or disapproved of in some way. This conception of 
shame is apparent in early anthropological perspectives that describe 
shame cultures as those relying for social control on the sensitivity 
of individuals to negative perceptions of others, rather than through 
the development of conscience (Benedict 1946). This idea has been 
elaborated in contemporary research. While these approaches have varied 
in their explanations of why people are sensitive to social evaluation, they 
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all emphasise the need to be accepted by others—because the need to 
have strong personal ties is a basic human motive, because there is an 
evolutionary need to maintain status or because shame is related to the 
person’s perception of his or her own self-worth (Gilbert 1997; Leary 
2000; Scheff and Retzinger 1991). An important characteristic of this 
conception is that it describes shame as a response to social pressures 
that are exterior to individuals and constraining. The individual feels 
shame as a result of others’ decision to reject. If others do not reject in 
the face of the same actions, no shame is felt. 
Shame, or the fear of shame, is described as powerful motivation for the 
individual to continually monitor and work on personal relationships 
and to comply with social expectations at a broader level. Scholars have 
drawn on this understanding of shame to argue that informal social 
sanctions represent a significant deterrent (for example, Grasmick and 
Bursik 1990). A number of empirical studies, which place shame within 
a rational choice perspective, show that concern at feeling shame is 
associated with lower self-reported projections of offending and, in some 
cases, that the effect is comparable with, or greater than, official sanctions 
(Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Paternoster and Iovanni 1986; Svensson 
et al. 2013). While research suggests that expectation of feeling shame 
deters offending, it provides less support for conceptualising shame as a 
direct response to social threat. Studies suggest that shame can occur in 
the absence of external disapproval, that individual sensitivity to criticism 
is a moderating factor and that the individual’s own moral judgement 
is important (Gausel et al. 2012; Liss et al. 2013; Smith et al. 2002). 
Shame as personal failure
A second way in which shame is described in the literature is as a response 
to perceptions of personal failure. This is based on the proposition that 
shame occurs when an individual perceives that they have failed to live 
up to an ideal or standard that they uphold, and that the consequence of 
this is the perception that the ‘whole’ self is a failure (HB Lewis 1971; 
M Lewis 1992). This proposition has been explained using a number 
of theoretical frameworks, including psychoanalytic theory, attribution 
theory and affect theory. Shame is compared with guilt, which is 
described as a response to the perception that an act or more transient 
characteristic of the self was deficient, as opposed to the whole self. 
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Unlike the social threat conception described above, here, perceptions 
of failure are not necessarily prompted by disapproval, but can occur in 
isolation and in relation to personal ideals.
June Tangney and her colleagues, in particular, have argued that a 
disposition to feel shame is far less adaptive than a disposition to feel 
guilt,  because shame involves an overwhelming negative evaluation 
of the  self that prevents individuals from responding positively 
(see  Tangney and Dearing 2002). An extensive program of research 
shows that individuals who are shame-prone are more likely to feel anger 
and hostility, are less likely to feel empathy for others and are more likely 
to suffer from psychopathology. The implication of this research is that 
regulatory systems would engender more adaptive responses in offenders 
if they provoked guilt rather than shame in offenders. However, recent 
research in offending populations did not show a direct relationship 
between shame-proneness and reoffending, although shame-proneness 
did predict externalisation of blame, which, in turn, predicted reoffending 
(Tangney et al. 2014).
A critique of both the social threat and the personal failure accounts of 
shame is that they fail to adequately explain the complex relationship 
between the individual and the social contexts in which shame occurs, 
either conceptualising shame as a response to values that are extrinsic 
to the person (social threat conception) or having little to say about 
the social context at all (personal failure conception). Neither of these 
conceptions adequately accounts for repeated observations that shame 
is both intimately tied to identity and sensitive to the disapproval of 
others. Understanding the effect of social context on what the individual 
feels and how they respond is critical for understanding the relevance 
of shame to regulatory contexts. 
67
4 . SHAME IN REGULAToRY SETTINGS
4. Shame as threat to ethical identity
To better explain the social context in which shame occurs, an ethical-
identity conception of shame has been proposed (Harris 2001, 2011).1 
It is argued that shame occurs when people perceive that their behaviour 
was or is inconsistent with their ethical identity. In contrast with the 
social threat conception, here, it is argued that shame occurs in reference 
to the individual’s own values. A central question for individuals is 
whether they have done the wrong thing or are in some way defective. 
For at least some shame experiences, this question is not easily resolved. 
This does not mean that the experience of shame is immune from 
external disapproval. Social-psychology research shows that the 
influence of others is not necessarily due to fear of social disapproval. 
People are sensitive to the opinions of others—at least those whose 
views we respect—because they contribute to our interpretation of our 
behaviour. A long history of research in psychology demonstrates that 
the values, attitudes and beliefs held by individuals are influenced by 
others (Turner et al. 1987). We expect to agree with those people whom 
we see as similar to ourselves and as having the same social identity, and 
it is disconcerting when we do not. Social disapproval results in shame 
because it either validates the person’s belief that a particular behaviour 
was shameful or it challenges an interpretation that it was not. 
The central experience of shame is a threat to the person’s identity. If we 
come to the realisation that we have violated values that we believe are 
important, this undermines our sense of who we are. Holding certain 
values is at the heart of personal or social identities because identities 
are defined in large part by one’s beliefs and their related behaviour. 
For example, being nurturing and protective might be perceived as 
important characteristics of a mother or a father. It follows that when 
we become aware that we have acted contrary to our values, our identity 
is called into question. The painful feelings of self-awareness, anger at 
1  This understanding of shame has a much longer history in moral philosophy. Bernard Williams 
(1993), in particular, argues that the precondition for feeling shame is the perception that a respected 
‘other’, defined in ethical terms, would think badly of us. In this view, people are seen as neither 
morally autonomous nor responsive to the disapproval of anyone. Instead, Williams presents an 
argument for understanding shame as an emotion that is intimately connected with individuals’ 
sense of their own ethical identity.
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ourselves and confusion that are associated with shame occur because 
the contradiction between our values and our behaviour cannot be easily 
reconciled.
Along with threat to identity, shame motivates the individual to 
resolve the contradiction between their identity and their behaviour. 
We experience a sense of dissonance that is uncomfortable and that 
motivates us to make sense of what has occurred. An individuals, we 
can resolve the inconsistency in a variety of ways, depending on a range 
of factors including social context. This means that the experience of 
shame can be heterogeneous. For example, an individual might seek to 
diminish the significance of their behaviour by seeing it as an aberration, 
apologising and seeking to repair harm that was caused. A very different 
response would be to decide that there was a compelling excuse for their 
behaviour, which justified it. As will be discussed below, scholars from a 
number of theoretical perspectives have also observed that, in some cases, 
individuals struggle to resolve shame, often with negative consequences. 
5. Shame management: The different forms 
of shame
Evidence that the experience of shame is heterogeneous and that it can 
have both positive and negative consequences has turned attention to 
understanding why shame is a constructive emotion in some situations 
but counterproductive in others. Why do we hope that some individuals 
feel shame for what they have done, but experience unease at the idea 
of imposing shame within criminal justice? A long tradition of research 
on shame emotions has explored variation in how individuals experience 
the emotion, and this, like more contemporary research on dispositions, 
has generated the notion of shame management (Ahmed et al. 2001). 
This theoretical perspective suggests that when confronted with feeling 
ashamed for their actions, individuals can manage or respond to the 
emotion in different ways. This has important implications for criminal 
justice institutions. 
Evidence of differences in shame experiences was first captured in the 
seminal work of psychiatrist Helen Block Lewis (1971). In her research 
with patients, Lewis identified three different forms of shame. The first, 
‘acknowledged shame’, involves the recognition that one feels shame 
and has awareness of associated feelings. ‘Overt-unidentified shame’ 
69
4 . SHAME IN REGULAToRY SETTINGS
describes the experience of feeling the negative emotion associated 
with shame but  not recognising it as shame and thus mislabelling it. 
‘Bypassed shame’ involves an awareness that an event may be shameful 
and doubt about how others see the self, but the emotion is bypassed, 
leaving the person with ‘an insoluble, plaguing dilemma of guilty 
thoughts which will not’ be solved (Lewis 1971: 134).
One of the important findings from this work for understanding the 
implications of shame is that unacknowledged forms of shame are 
associated with feelings of anger and hostility towards others. Scheff 
and Retzinger (1991) extended Lewis’s analysis by arguing that shame is 
a signal that the bond between the individual and others is threatened. 
When an individual does not acknowledge feelings of hurt associated 
with rejection, as is the case in unacknowledged forms of shame 
(bypassed and overt-unidentified), this emotion becomes redirected as 
anger towards the self and others. According to Scheff and Retzinger 
(1991), this is the cause of humiliated fury and helps to explain not just 
individual anger but also the behaviour of groups who experience a sense 
of shared shame. The implication is that shame that is not acknowledged, 
or resolved, by the individual can manifest itself in an unhealthy reaction. 
Eliza Ahmed and her colleagues (2001) have described the various 
manifestations of shame through the concept of shame management. 
This captures the notion that, when confronted with a shame-inducing 
situation, individuals can manage the negative feelings in a variety of 
ways, influenced by both individual characteristics and the social context. 
Acknowledged shame occurs when the individual accepts that they 
are responsible. When this occurs, the person is more likely to make 
amends, to feel less anger towards others and is more likely to discharge 
the negative feelings. In contrast, unacknowledged shame, which 
Ahmed describes as displaced shame, occurs when the person does not 
accept that they are responsible. Failure to resolve the emotion, because 
of the  tension between the disapproval of others and this denial of 
responsibility, results in shame being displaced into anger towards others.
There is growing empirical evidence that shame management predicts 
both bullying and criminal behaviours. Ahmed’s own research in 
Australia and Bangladesh shows that children who are bullies are 
more likely to displace shame compared with children who have not 
bullied, who are more likely to acknowledge shame feelings (Ahmed and 
Braithwaite 2006; Ahmed et al. 2001). These results have been supported 
and extended in a study by Ttofi and Farrington (2008), which showed 
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that stigmatisation predicted poorer shame management in children, 
characterised by shame displacement, and that this predicted a greater 
prevalence of bullying. Positive shame management, characterised by 
shame acknowledgement, predicted a lower prevalence of bullying. 
Murphy and Harris (2007) found a similar result in the context of 
white-collar crime. In this study, unacknowledged shame (or  shame 
displacement) predicted recidivism, and the relationship between 
shame acknowledgement and recidivism was mediated through feelings 
of remorse. 
Research on shame management has significant implications for 
reintegrative shaming theory and has prompted a revision of the theory 
(Ahmed et al. 2001). While the revision does not alter the theory’s 
prediction that reintegrative shaming increases compliance (while 
stigmatic shaming increases offending), it does clarify why this is the 
case as well as the role that shame plays. The original formulation of 
the theory implies that the benefit of reintegrative shaming is that it 
leads to greater feelings of shame. However, the implication of shame 
management is that reintegrative shaming allows greater moral 
engagement with disapproval and the threat that it poses to ethical 
identity, because it provides individuals with greater opportunity to 
engage with others’ interpretations of their behaviour and to respond 
positively. As a consequence, individuals are more likely to acknowledge 
and resolve feelings of shame. Stigmatisation, on the other hand, is 
more likely to result in offenders displacing shame and feeling anger 
towards others. Thus, it would seem, somewhat ironically, the benefit of 
reintegrative shaming is that it allows offenders to resolve and diminish 
any shame they feel.
6. Conclusion
Interest in the role of emotion has grown in a number of regulatory 
fields (Karstedt 2002). Shame is of particular significance because 
most regulatory interventions implicitly or explicitly communicate 
disapproval. In some cases, such as restorative justice with juveniles, 
great care is necessary to avoid this disapproval becoming stigmatising. 
In other cases, such as regulating powerful corporations, disapproval has 
to be expressed loudly if it is to be heard (Braithwaite and Drahos 2002). 
In all these cases, the expression of disapproval raises the possibility 
of invoking shame. While discussion of shaming punishments and 
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‘naming and shaming’ strategies has tended to focus on the social impact 
of these strategies, such as loss of face or humiliation, this chapter 
has highlighted research that indicates that shame has a much more 
complex role. Shame is invoked when individuals question whether they 
have violated their values and, when experienced, represents a threat to 
the person’s sense of who they are. This suggests that shame is invoked 
when individuals are morally engaged. A question for those who seek to 
change or regulate behaviour is how to engage the individual in this kind 
of discussion. Restorative justice does so by exploring the consequences 
for victims with the offender and those who are important to them 
in a reintegrative process. Similar approaches have been proposed in 
the regulation of aged care (Braithwaite et al. 2007). The concept of 
shame management shows that the way in which individuals manage 
the experience of shame is just as important as whether or not they 
experience the emotion. Indeed, unresolved or unacknowledged shame 
can appear very much like an absence of shame, and there is evidence 
that this form of shame has the potential to be a destructive emotion 
that is associated with anger and defiance. On the other hand, shame 
that is acknowledged would appear to promote empathy, remorse and 
reparation. These dynamics have important implications for the efficacy 
of regulatory interventions that are only just beginning to be understood.
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The chapters in this book cover a broad range of regulatory topics 
through a kaleidoscope of lenses, such as law, sociology, economics, social 
psychology and theories of regulatory regimes and networks. A notable 
and shared element of the chapters is the seamless overlaying of two or 
more lenses to best illuminate the complex connections and interplays 
between actors, events and mechanisms contributing to regulation. 
Yet, to date, little work has been published explicitly describing the 
methodological approaches that might be used to integrate the range 
of paradigms present in most regulatory research. As a result, those 
new to the regulatory research field can find themselves in a quagmire 
of theoretical perspectives brought on by the considerable divergences 
between, and within, disciplines and their methodological approaches.
The aim of this and the next chapter is to fill this gap by considering 
two of  the many methodological aspects of studying regulation: 
integrating the objective and subjective concerns informing regulation 
and accounting for the transnational dimensions of regulation. 
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This chapter analyses some of the theoretical considerations we, 
the  researchers, should consider before embarking on our regulatory 
research project. Included in such an analytical reflection are fundamental 
questions. What is your underlying logic of seeing the social world 
and, thus, what theoretical rationale should you adopt for your research 
project? What methodology, design or chart will you use to navigate your 
inquiry? What methods, techniques and procedures should you employ to 
execute your plan? And, importantly, how do the choices that you make 
influence your findings? What are the things you will not know because 
your inquiry is limited due to a biased selection of your theoretical 
rationale, methodology or methods?
The next chapter, by Kathryn Henne, discusses the use of multi-sited 
fieldwork to address the complex, transnational dimensions of regulation. 
Regulation is often embedded in world systems and researchers should 
be attuned to how global, national and transnational systems and 
discourses inform and affect their studies. Henne proposes field-intensive 
qualitative methods to analyse the many factors that emerge across 
structural, systemic and local-level systems. She explains how field-
intensive methods facilitate the gathering of in-depth data to uncover 
how relationships between the events, social conditions and actors shape 
regulation, and how participants’ perceptions and social context inform 
the meanings attributed to regulation.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
looks at what regulatory research involves and the implications it has for 
choices concerning theoretical approach and research design. The second 
section discusses the principal building blocks of research projects in 
general, as well as in the context of regulatory research. The chapter 
concludes with some examples of critical-realist theoretical approaches 
in regulatory research.
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2. What does regulatory research involve? 
Regulatory research involves the description and explanation of complex1 
interplays between structural and systemic conditions and actors and 
their agency over time and at different levels. Regulating and influencing 
the behaviour of people and organisations never occur on the basis of 
a single mechanism (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). They usually involve 
a number of leverage points, such as changes in law and norms, changes 
in networks and protocols or changes in relationships and behaviour. 
Regulatory controls are enmeshed in webs of legal and social structures, 
and institutional power, action and ambition. Yet, if institutions want 
to be successful in influencing people and gaining their cooperation, 
they need to understand and connect with people’s constructions 
of institutions and institutional actions and ambitions (Braithwaite 
2009a, 2009b). At the same time, people’s behaviour, or the meanings 
they attach to events, is worked out within the framework of cultures2 
and social structures (specific to times, places and groups of people), 
and  regulatory interventions need to consider and reflect the context, 
values and cultures of the regulatory community (Meidinger 1987).
Some of these elements, such as the power of law and how actors (people 
and organisations) respond to it (that is, comply, ignore or violate), exist 
objectively. Yet, actors experience the mechanisms underlying these 
responses subjectively. The experience is subjective in the sense that it 
is influenced by the individual, cultural and historical experiences of 
actors. These subjective experiences have a strong influence on how 
interactions and relationships with regulatory regimes are constructed. 
Thus, regulatory research needs to account for both the objective and 
the subjective.
The relation between the objective and the subjective, and the 
complex interplays between structural, cultural and agential properties, 
has important implications for one’s methodological approach. 
Understanding these implications requires a brief, yet systematic, 
mapping and discussion of the main elements of the social research 
process—a task taken up in the next section.
1  For distinguishing between simple, complicated and complex problems, see Zimmerman and 
Glouberman (2002).
2  A set of shared understandings that makes it possible for a group of people to act in concert 
with each other (Becker 1982).
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3. The building blocks of the social 
research process
There are numerous constructions of the social research process. 
What  I  offer here is just one perspective, based largely on Crotty’s 
(1998) framework. Under the perspective I propose, researchers should 
ask the following three questions: 
1. What is my theoretical perspective? That is, in my view, what 
theoretical rationale would capture effectively the interplay between 
actors, events and mechanisms?
2. What is my overarching research strategy or methodology?
3. What methods or tools will I use for my data collection?
Answering these questions, in this order, guides researchers in 
developing  a coherent research design and overall consistency. 
Figure  5.1  is a schematic representation of this process of moving 
from  theoretical rationale to methodology to method, with examples 
of some3 of the options under each. Next, we turn to a focus on the 
theoretical rationale with a particular look at critical realism.




















Figure 5.1 The main building blocks of a social research process
Source: Adapted from Crotty (1998).
Theoretical rationale
To adopt a theoretical rationale is to adopt a way of looking at the world 
and making sense of it. It embodies a certain way of understanding 
what  is  (ontology) and a certain way of understanding what it means 
to know (epistemology) (Crotty 1998). In other words, ontology asks 
3  These are just a few examples and not an extensive list of options.
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what is the nature of existence, what constitutes reality and how can 
we understand existence. Epistemology, on the other hand, asks what 
constitutes valid knowledge and how can we obtain it. The theoretical 
rationales most often discussed in the social sciences are those of 
positivists, also referred to as empiricists, and constructivists, also referred 
to as relativists. 
Positivists hold that there is a single, objective truth or reality and this 
reality can be captured by finding regularities in observable empirical 
events. It is the analysis of these patterns that can lead to constructs 
underlying individual and social lives (Miles et al. 2014). Constructivists, 
on the other hand, argue that the world and reality are socially constructed 
and, before we can look for plausible causal relationships between events, 
we need to understand the experience of these events in terms of people’s 
subjective meanings (Hammersley 2008). Positivist approaches, then, 
lend themselves to structural-level analysis, while cultural and agential 
concepts are more adequately analysed from constructivist perspectives. 
Yet, by simply applying each of those approaches to the appropriate 
concepts, or level of analysis, we will not be able to adequately capture 
and account for the relation between the objective and the subjective and 
the linkages and interactions between social and institutional structures, 
the agency of actors and regulatory cultures. 
Understanding the relationship between structure and agency is a deep-
seated and persistent problem in social sciences in general (Archer 1995; 
Bakewell 2010; Carter and New 2004; King 2007). The crux of the 
challenge is how to acknowledge the importance of both social structures 
and agency in understanding social action and social change. But why is 
this such a challenge? To a large extent, the challenge is a consequence of 
the division, and often dispute, between positivism and constructivism 
and the inherent inability of either of these approaches to adequately 
capture and explain the social world on their own. 
The main criticism of positivism is ontological flatness (Abbott 2001)—
that is, equating reality with what is knowable about it through 
observable events. Many researchers (for example, Danermark et al. 
2002; Sawyer 2005; Sayer 2000) also argue that empirical regularities are 
not sufficient for claims of causal explanation; rather they are pointers 
to further inquiry to find the generative mechanisms that underlie the 
regularities. Critiques of constructivism, on the other hand, argue that 
reality cannot be reduced to experiences and interpretations of reality. 
Furthermore, by relativising truth, constructivists deny the possibility 
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of objective knowledge about the world, and undermine the notion of 
causal explanation or the ability to adjudicate between different theories 
of reality (Iosifides 2012). Constructivists also have a tendency to 
overemphasise the ‘discursive processes by which they are constituted 
and identified by culture members’ (Hammersley 2008: 173), whereas 
the focus should be on what causes phenomena and what effect they 
produce. Finally, the social actions of actors cannot be restricted to an 
understanding of meaning-making or agential intentionality as these 
things are also the subject of structural and cultural context, social 
relationality and other external conditions (Somers 1998).
Yet mixing positivism and constructivism, or mixing methods resting 
on competing definitions of knowledge and how it is obtained, without 
a coherent theoretical rationale for the mix can make things even more 
complicated. Data collected using different methods cannot simply be 
added together to produce a unified reality. The analysis of data needs 
to be integrated and made sense of in relation to each other. Objectivity 
and subjectivity need to be viewed and treated in ‘dialectical unity’ 
(Iosifides 2012: 39), despite the fact that they are at different ontological 
levels. One way out of this ontological quagmire is critical realism. Unlike 
positivism or structuralism, critical realism has a stratified ontology. 
Through its stratified levels, it can connect interpretations of reality with 
objective aspects and patterns to be found in the social world.
Critical realism
The key feature of critical realism, founded by the British philosopher 
Roy  Bhaskar in the 1970s, is the rejection of ‘epistemic fallacy’ 
(Bhaskar  1978: 36), which conflates reality with our knowledge of 
reality. That is, while critical realism recognises that there exists a reality 
independent of our representation of it, it acknowledges that our knowledge 
of reality is subject to a range of social constructions (Danermark et 
al. 2002; Sayer 2000). It accepts the relativity of all knowledge claims 
(interpretations of experiences), while critically assessing the validity of 
related conceptual schemes, theories and interpretations. It does that 
by distinguishing between three reality domains of empirical, actual and 
real (Bhaskar 1978; Danermark et al. 2002), as presented in Figure 5.2. 
The domain of the empirical consists of experiences, concepts and signs, 
which are known and conceptualised by social agents and researchers. 
This domain is always theory-impregnated and is always mediated by our 
theoretical conceptions. The domain of the actual consists of experiences, 
concepts, signs and events. Unlike experiences that are known through 
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conceptualisation (by the social agent or the researcher), events are what 
happen in the world irrespective of its conceptualisation and knowledge. 
Finally, the domain of the real includes experiences, concepts, signs, 
events and generative causal mechanisms—interactions between structures 
and causal powers exerted by social objects. These causal mechanisms are 
unobservable at the empirical level, yet they produce observable events, 

































Figure 5.2 The reality domains of critical realism
Sources: Bhaskar (1978); Danermark et al. (2002); Hartwig (2007); Sayer (2000).
The focus of causality in critical realism is not the regularity of observable 
empirical events (as per positivism), but the generative mechanisms 
that produce events, processes and phenomena. Causality derives from 
causal powers exerted by social objects due to their structure. These 
causal powers are relational and, depending on the interaction between 
them and other mechanisms, they may be exercised, modified or remain 
unexercised. It is through this relational phenomenon, labelled social 
emergence, that critical realism can link structure with agency and bring 
together individual and social structures, even though they exist on 
different ontological levels. Instead of conflating them, or reducing each 
to the other, they are kept analytically distinct with different emergent 
properties and causal powers, focusing on how their interplay results in 
social transformation. This ‘openness’ of the realist paradigm can also 
account for agency. That  is, while people’s actions are conditioned, 
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they are never determined by structures alone. People can see, choose or 
be forced to choose alternative actions. In other words, the relationship 
between causal powers is not only relational, but also contingent 
(Archer 1995; Danermark et al. 2002; Sayer 2000). 
Critical-realist research is theory driven as well as theory generating. 
Existing theories are used to link concrete phenomena and processes 
to theoretical and conceptual abstractions to generate new theories. 
Thus, conceptualisation and conceptual abstractions of phenomena and 
their emergent properties are critical steps in a critical-realist approach. 
Although the literature on concept analysis tends to be dominated by 
the semantic analysis of words (for example, Sartori 1984), researchers 
who regularly traverse the quantitative and qualitative—for example, 
Goertz (2006)—would argue that a semantic approach is never adequate 
by itself, as ‘a concept involves a theoretical and empirical analysis’ of 
the phenomenon referred to by the word. A good definition of the 
phenomenon to be studied is ‘relevant for hypotheses, explanations, and 
causal mechanisms’ (Goertz 2006: 4). In short, concepts should focus on 
what constitutes a phenomenon and which attributes play a key role in 
causal mechanisms and explanations. This step typically takes researchers 
to the next building block of inquiry: methodology.
Methodology 
Although the terms methodology and methods are often used as 
though they mean the same thing, they are different, have a different 
purpose and should be addressed separately. Methodology is about the 
underlying logic of research—‘our chart to navigate the social world’—
while methods are ‘the tools of our trade’ (Castles 2012: 7). The main 
purpose of methodology is to outline the design and focus of one’s 
research. There are no hard rules on the range of methodologies that 
can be used by realist researchers, as long as the selected methodology 
reflects the rationale that critical realism brings to research. Below, 
I briefly discuss4 one example: grounded theory. Multi-sited fieldwork, 
discussed by Henne in the next chapter, is also compatible with a realist 
framework. 
4  For a detailed and critical assessment of a critical-realist rationale/grounded theory methodology 
package, refer to Clarke (2003) or Oliver (2012).
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Grounded theory
Grounded theory is widely used in the social sciences. It is ultimately 
about uncovering meaning and developing theory grounded in the 
data. While in the past 50 years, grounded theory has seen numerous 
modifications from its original form (developed by Glaser and Strauss 
in 1967), all approaches share its core characteristics: to generate 
theoretical explanations through a process of concurrent data collection 
and analysis. This process is performed iteratively through a constant 
comparative analysis involving moving back and forth through 
increasingly focused data. The researcher gradually links initial codes 
into progressively abstracted higher-level categories and conceptual 
themes (Charmaz 2006; Glaser 1992; Glaser and Strauss 1967).
The power of grounded theory and its important contribution to the 
critical-realist rationale is its analytical process that leads to a theorising 
of how actions, meanings and social structures are constructed. 
It  requires  researchers to move beyond describing data to think 
analytically about the data by applying pre-existing theoretical knowledge 
of concepts. Yet, extant theories have to ‘earn’ their way into the analysis 
based on extensive inductive analytical work, instead of stamping their 
preconceived ideas on the data (Charmaz 2006). We can see, then, how 
critical-realist research can draw considerably on grounded theory to 
support its iterative process of abstraction. The one point of difference 
is the position held by the critical realist that data produced from 
participant narratives are not a sufficient basis alone for theory. Analysis 
(that is, coding) needs to connect categories and abstraction of data to 
their emergent properties (Bakewell 2010; Pratt 1995).
Methods
The final step in developing a research plan is selecting methods, 
or research tools, to execute the research plan. Critical realism does 
not claim to develop new methods; it simply reorients and links 
existing theoretical paradigms (Danermark et al. 2002). Thus, existing 
quantitative and qualitative research tools used in those paradigms can 
also be used and combined in critical-realist research, provided the 
researcher is aware of the functions of these methods in the critical-
realist framework. To explore these functions, this section will describe 
the four main forms of inferences typically used in critical-realist 
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research: deduction, induction, abduction and retroduction. We can 
view these complementary techniques as different thought operations 
of moving from one thing to something else. 
Deduction and induction are well known and frequently used in the 
social sciences. In a deductive approach, knowledge of individual 
phenomena is derived from universal laws by the use of formal logic 
and set inference rules. Inductive reasoning works in the opposite 
way: inferences about larger populations are drawn from individual 
observations. The main limitation of these two techniques is that they 
give no guidance as to how, from something observable, we can reach 
knowledge of underlying structures and mechanisms. Thus, to identify 
causal generative mechanisms, unobservable at the empirical level, 
critical realists often need to go beyond induction and deduction and 
use abductive and retroductive reasoning. 
Abduction and retroduction are seldom discussed in the literature on 
method despite their important contribution. Abduction involves 
taking a known phenomenon and recontextualising it by using 
existing general theories. It is reinterpreting something as something 
else, understanding it within a different frame of context. This 
reinterpretation then provides new meaning, new insight and possibly 
a more developed or deeper conception. Social scientists rarely discover 
new events; instead, they discover ‘connections and relations, not 
directly observable, by which we can understand and explain already 
known occurrences in a novel way’ (Danermark et al. 2002: 91). A well-
known example of recontextualisation5  is Giddens’s interpretation of 
anorexia as a manifestation of reflexive identity—a characteristic of 
postmodern society. In his theorisation, a ‘tightly controlled body is an 
emblem of a safe existence’ in a plural, ambiguous social environment 
(Giddens 1991: 107). 
If abduction is a theoretical redescription then the focus of retroduction 
is identifying what is fundamentally constitutive for the structures and 
relations highlighted in this theoretical redescription. That is, what 
are the basic characteristics of the general structures from which we 
interpret and recontextualise particular actions and events? Retroduction 
requires the researcher to go beyond empirically observable events 
5  Other well-known examples of abduction include Marx’s recontextualisation of the history of 
man, Durkheim’s recontextualisation of suicide, Darwin’s redescription of the evolution of species 
and Freud’s interpretation of people’s dreams.
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and characteristics by asking questions about the more fundamental, 
transfactual conditions for such events. Such questions are constantly 
asked by philosophers, but can also be asked in relation to norms, rules 
or for structuring particular actions. Specific strategies to produce 
retroductive questions and inferences include: counterfactual thinking, 
social experiments, studies of pathological cases, studies of extreme cases 
and comparative case studies (Danermark et al. 2002). 
All four types of inference are fundamental tools in regulatory research. 
Typically, we have to use more than one of these complementary 
inferences in a single regulatory research inquiry, and there is often a 
need to mix methods. As signalled earlier, quantitative approaches are 
well suited for describing the macrosocial changes of a given regulatory 
context, while qualitative approaches are ideal to uncover regulatory 
cultures and individual and community-level responses and social actions 
(see Henne, Chapter 6, this volume). Recent developments in vocabulary, 
taxonomy, process description and systematic integrative procedures6 
have provided mixed-methods research with more sophistication and 
refinement. Despite these developments, most mixed-methods research 
tends to show limited integration of the range of data and methods used, 
partly because of the limited ability of existing theoretical rationales to 
support both qualitative and quantitative methods. But, as we saw in the 
section on theoretical rationale, critical realism has the capacity to treat 
qualitative and quantitative methods as part of a dialectical unity.
4. Examples of a critical-realist approach 
in regulatory research
There are plentiful examples in the social sciences of adopting the 
theoretical and methodological premises of critical realism, from 
migration research (George 2000; Walby 2009) to research exploring 
the dynamic relationship between globalisation and inequalities 
(Carter  2000). An example of a critical-realist approach within the 
regulatory field is research by Losoncz (2015) demonstrating the 
effect of government policies and programs on the resettlement styles 
and strategies of migrants, and their impact on integration outcomes. 
6  For more information on the different types of mixed-methods design and their applications, 
refer to one of the many textbooks on mixed-methods research (for example, Bergman 2008; 
Creswell and Plano Clark 2010; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2008; Thomas 2003).
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Despite robust claims that integration outcomes are influenced by not only 
individual characteristics, resources and strategies adopted by migrants, 
but also acculturation attitudes and public policies and programs of the 
receiving society, our understanding of these processes and facilitators 
is insufficient. An important step towards a better understanding of 
integration is to focus on the conceptualisation of these processes, their 
causal properties and the generative causal mechanisms through which 
they influence integration outcomes.
The research adopted a general theory of goals and means put forward 
by Merton (1968) to demonstrate that current Australian resettlement 
policies are dominated by a strong emphasis on migrants adopting their 
new country’s cultural goals (such as economic participation and tests of 
citizenship), without a corresponding emphasis on ensuring that there 
are effective means for migrant groups to achieve these goals. Resettled 
migrants are expected, after a brief transition period, to use the standard 
modes of means—ones that have been designed for the mainstream 
population and delivered by mainstream institutions. The assumption 
is that existing mechanisms and protocols (such as impersonality, 
equity, uniformity and universalism, codes of conduct, the merit-based 
recruitment system) developed to ensure that institutions provide equal 
access to all members of Australian society will also ensure equal rights 
for resettled humanitarian and other migrant groups. Losoncz (2015) 
argued that these processes do not account for the disadvantage of 
migrant groups and fail to provide equitable paths to shared goals and 
ambitions. Instead, these mechanisms favour those already socialised to 
the functioning and operation of these institutions. Thus, mechanisms 
of fairness become a charade, blocking pathways to social and economic 
security among migrants. Some migrant groups responded by retreating 
from government and social institutions and from the broader Australian 
community. Such social distancing from institutions and communities 
can have long-term detrimental impacts on both the migrant and the 
broader society. It can lead to entrenched resentment and systemic 
problems, including anomie and deviance in structurally excluded and 
stigmatised communities (Merton 1968).
For this research, critical realism provided an ideal approach for 
acknowledging the multilayered social reality of resettlement and for 
adequately framing an interdisciplinary understanding of resettlement 
concepts and processes. The use of grounded theory methodology within 
a critical-realist approach provided a robust research design to integrate 
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participants’ narratives with attributes of government bureaucracies and 
social structures of Australian society. That is, grounded theory directed 
the researcher to uncover evidence and meanings among participants, 
while critical-realist inquiry drove the researcher to go beyond describing 
meanings to examining and analysing the structures that generate them. 
Finally, mixed methods accommodated the integration of multiple data 
sources and analysis techniques. While interviews were the primary 
source of data, this information was augmented through ethnographic 
fieldwork. The subjective experience of social and economic integration 
outcomes reported by participants was compared with objective 
measures available from Australian population census data. This use 
of multiple data sources and methods brought layered, yet convergent 
meanings (Lincoln and Guba 1985) to the research and has contributed 
significantly to the trustworthiness (Maxwell 1992) of the findings 
claimed by the researcher.
Although to date there are few examples of regulatory research explicitly 
inspired by realist principles, there are plentiful examples of regulatory 
research that adopts the theoretical and methodological premises of 
critical realism. Valerie Braithwaite’s theory of tax defiance has connected 
psychological processes of people’s fears, hopes and expectations with 
public policy and the operation of authorities administering the policy. 
She has used sophisticated structural equation modelling techniques 
to test her theoretical models predicting resistance and dismissiveness 
(Braithwaite 2009a). Another example is John Braithwaite’s (1989) 
reintegrative shaming theory (RST). The theory has been highly 
influential in providing a rationale for restorative justice conferencing in 
Australia and internationally. The basic idea of the RST is that societies, 
communities and families among whom shame is communicated 
effectively and reintegratively are less likely to experience crime than 
places where shame is communicated in a stigmatising way or not 
communicated at all. A key concept in the theory is the distinction 
made between stigmatic shaming and reintegrative shaming. The theory 
argues that reintegrative shaming reduces crime, while stigmatic shaming 
increases it (Braithwaite 1989). 
In his theory, Braithwaite drew on aspects of Hirschi’s control and social 
bond theories, Sutherland’s differential association theory and Becker’s 
labelling theory (Makkai and Braithwaite 1994). According to the 
labelling perspective on delinquency, disapproving actions or reactions by 
other people affect the negative beliefs and feelings individuals develop 
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about themselves (Taylor et al. 1973). But, critics of labelling theory 
maintained that any such statement needs to be refined by identifying 
alternative outcomes of labelling and specifying the conditions under 
which each is likely to occur (Grimes and Turk 1978). Braithwaite’s 
theory refined and clarified labelling theory. It also provided a deeper 
conception of shaming by partitioning stigmatising shaming from 
reintegrative shaming. By exploring and identifying the variety of 
qualities and structures involved in shaming, the RST demonstrates 
how shaming can be contingently damaging or beneficial. That is, 
while labelling offenders may make them view themselves as outcasts 
and adopt a deviant identity, there is an alternative outcome, as long 
as it is the act that is being labelled and not the person. Following the 
labelling of the wrongful act and holding offenders responsible for their 
behaviour, offenders are forgiven and accepted back into their family 
and community. Other important conditions facilitating reintegration 
include a communitarian society and a strong family system characterised 
by a sense of interdependency.
The development of the theory started out with observational data of 
encounters between regulatory inspectors and firms in a nursing home 
context, followed by various quantitative methods to empirically test 
initial propositions. Methods included principal component analysis 
to measure the concept of reintegration and multiple regression 
analysis to estimate the impact of reintegrative shaming on compliance 
(Makkai  and  Braithwaite 1994). The development of the theory 
has seen  a  number of empirical tests and validations. To explore the 
dimensionality of reintegration and stigmatisation, Harris (2001) used 
explanatory factor analyses followed by confirmatory analysis in a 
restorative justice context, while the relationship between shaming and 
shame was tested using hierarchical regression analysis.
The RST is one of the compelling examples of how the integration 
of existing theories to analyse social reality can generate a new and 
highly influential theory of social transformation. The RST is also an 
example of theoretical redescription of existing constructs (abduction) 
and identifying the prerequisites or conditions under which those new 
constructs occur (retroduction). 
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5. Conclusion
Regulatory research is an interdisciplinary field. Yet, without a theoretical 
approach that can connect the theoretical foundations and assumptions of 
disciplines, one’s research could become flat, fragmented, unconnected or 
confused. This chapter has considered critical realism as a methodological 
approach to provide a framework for interdisciplinarity. It has explained 
how critical realism can deal with the analytically distinct structural, 
cultural and agential elements of the regulatory realm to capture their 
interplay and the causal mechanisms involved in producing social 
change or reproduction. Critical realism can be especially useful for 
those less experienced in regulatory research, because of its propensity 
to lead researchers from simply uncovering and describing phenomena 
to examining and analysing the powers generating them and developing 
theories of their production. This is important as, without the theoretical 
explanations of these generative causal mechanisms, one’s research is in 
danger of establishing little more than banal descriptions.
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Studying regulation, as the other chapters in this book attest, can 
be a complicated process. The previous chapter provides guidelines 
regarding the theoretical and methodological concerns that we as 
researchers should consider critically before conducting research on 
regulation. It emphasises the importance of studying objective concerns, 
such as regulatory enforcement and whether or not actors comply, 
alongside subjective ones, such as the meanings attributed to regulation 
as influenced by participants’ world views. This chapter acknowledges 
those important considerations, but focuses on the particular concern 
of accounting for the transnational dimensions of regulation. While 
both objective and subjective concerns inform regulation, so, too, do the 
globalised undercurrents shaping broader social change.
This chapter discusses the use of multi-sited fieldwork methodology to 
document and analyse the many factors that emerge across structural, 
systemic and local levels. This approach requires field-intensive 
qualitative methods, which include, but are not limited to, participant 
observation, interviewing, fieldnote taking, archival and document 
analysis, audio and/or visual recording and sustained interactions with 
participants. Regulatory regimes are made up of processes that exceed 
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written laws and rules; they entail a ‘range of policies, institutions and 
actors’ (Scott 2010: 1). As a result, regulation makes for an unwieldy and 
unpredictable object of inquiry. It can be difficult to document and account 
for the number of actors, practices, spaces and norms that contribute to 
regulation, yet alone understand how they contribute. In addition, it is 
not always possible to identify the key actors, mechanisms and principles 
within a regime at the start of a research project. How, then, do we go 
about studying regimes, which may—or may not—have clear boundaries 
and regulatory webs? How do we discern which actors, mechanisms, 
principles and processes matter? How do they interact in practice? 
The foundational assumptions and methods of multi-sited fieldwork 
offer guidance in answering these questions. 
Multi-sited analyses have traced how regulatory regimes influence 
various fields of social activity. Recent studies have examined a wide 
range of domains of regulation and governance, including global 
environmental politics (Downie 2014), internet governance (Tusikov 
2016), global mining standards (Dashwood 2012) and international 
sport (Henne 2015). These studies, although examining distinct arenas of 
activity, point to the many ways that the development and expansion of 
regulation both respond to and reflect globalised changes. Others, such 
as Paul Verbruggen (2014) in his research on advertising and food safety, 
do not limit their focus to a single regime or social arena. Verbruggen 
looks at two distinct regimes to study the broader institutional design 
of transnational private regulation. Studying both spaces helps in 
discerning the weaknesses of private enforcement mechanisms and the 
role of courts in enforcement. Despite their different foci, this body of 
regulatory research shares a common concern: to describe and explain 
how regulation is embedded in world systems.
Globalised systems have major impacts on the study of regulation 
and its concepts. Regulatory capitalism, for instance, is a broad trend 
(see Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, this volume) that demonstrates how the pursuit 
of capitalistic growth often gives rise to more—not less—regulation and 
bureaucracy. That said, regulatory capitalism has not emerged uniformly 
across the globe; it takes on specific contexts and contours in different 
spaces. Researchers therefore should be attuned to localised concerns as 
well as to globalised shifts that inform their studies. Accordingly, carrying 
out field research on regulation requires careful consideration of how 
global, national and transnational systems and discourses inform what 
we observe as researchers. Other disciplines share this preoccupation. 
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For example, anthropologists have employed what is often referred to 
as ‘multi-sited ethnography’ to describe and analyse how people, objects, 
ideas, symbols and commodities circulate and become interconnected 
within transnational processes of globalisation (Marcus 1995). The drive 
for multi-sited ethnography is as much theoretical as methodological: it 
advances a notion of connectivity—one that assumes a ‘local’ site is linked 
to a broader set of globalised relations. In doing so, this approach requires 
the ethnographer to follow those relationships empirically. 
While some anthropologists are dismissive of multi-sited ethnography 
(for example, Candea 2007), we would be remiss not to acknowledge 
some of its parallels with regulatory studies. Regulatory scholarship 
retains a critical focus on how different actors, ideas, objects and events 
inform governance structures, institutions and practices. The regulatory 
theories and concepts discussed in other parts of this book reflect the 
importance of understanding systems, webs and networks in making 
sense of regulatory and governance practices. As regulatory scholarship 
is not confined to anthropological conventions, the study of regulation 
has given way to a distinctly interdisciplinary tradition of multi-sited 
fieldwork. This chapter outlines core concerns underpinning multi-sited 
studies of regulation. It addresses complementary schools of thought, such 
as multi-sited ethnography, and how regulatory studies brings together 
seemingly varied approaches to fieldwork under an interdisciplinary 
umbrella. This chapter is organised by a series of questions that target 
substantive and methodological issues in regulatory studies. Together, 
the sections of this chapter provide an overview of the practices and 
challenges of multi-sited fieldwork. 
2. What kinds of regulatory research 
problems and questions does qualitative 
fieldwork address?
Field-intensive methods facilitate the gathering of in-depth data on the 
relationships between events, behaviours and context, because they require 
three research practices that other methods do not: the direct observation 
of social actions as they take place, the accounting of events that come 
before or after such actions and the consideration of how the resulting 
behaviours are understood by ‘participants and spectators, before, during 
and after its occurrence’ (Becker and Geer 1957: 28). The emphasis of field-
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intensive methods on observing relationships yields robust information 
on the connections between events and behaviours, which interview or 
survey methods alone cannot capture ( Jerolmack and Khan 2014). In 
relation to law and regulation, qualitative fieldwork enables researchers to 
document relationships between the events, social conditions and actors 
that shape regulation and to analyse how participants’ perceptions and 
social context inform the meanings attributed to regulation.
Fieldwork enables a better grasp of how regulation operates in practice, 
particularly how it can reflect or diverge from written rules. Kitty Calavita 
(2010: 9) summarises this distinction and its importance: 
Noting that the law as it is written and advertised to the public is 
often quite different from the way it looks in practice, law and society 
scholars have long had an interest in studying that gap. 
The gap to which Calavita refers can manifest in a variety of ways, taking on 
different forms as conditioned by their context. Consider Losoncz’s (2015) 
analysis of how Australian government policies and programs inform the 
resettlement strategies of migrants. She draws on sustained fieldwork to 
unearth how mechanisms developed to ensure equal access among citizens 
fail to secure such rights to humanitarian and other migrant groups. These 
processes, by failing to account for the marginalisation and cultural values 
of many migrant groups, actually block pathways to social and economic 
security, prompting some groups, such as South Sudanese refugees, to 
disengage from government, community and social institutions. As 
Losoncz’s work demonstrates, in-depth fieldwork can provide significant 
insight into the social actors and milieu of regulation. This focus echoes 
legal-realist principles that embrace ‘a ground-level up perspective’ that 
illuminates how law and regulation impact people in everyday life, be they 
elites or ordinary residents (Suchman and Mertz 2010: 561). Unlike legal-
formalist values, their scope is not limited to formal law. 
It is important to note that law is just one form of regulation. As such, 
regulation encompasses myriad forms of social control and a wide 
array of social activities. The interests of regulatory specialists, in turn, 
often diverge from the traditional foci of law and society scholarship. 
For example, rather than engage the longstanding socio-legal debates 
about what counts as law in society (see Calavita 2010), scholars of 
regulation are more interested in questions about how regulatory 
orders emerge, take on meaning and come to influence behaviour. 
Law, according to David Levi-Faur (2011: 5):
101
6 . MULTI-SITED FIELDWoRK IN REGULAToRY STUDIES
cannot save us from the recognition that there are many ways in which 
regulation enters the public and academic discourse. Instead of forcing 
unity, we need to recognise the many meanings of regulation. 
Qualitative studies of regulation are thus keenly attuned to how multiple 
instruments and techniques of regulation interact when mobilised. 
A mainstay of regulatory research is its engagement with regulatory 
pluralism. Regulatory pluralism, as explained by Neil Gunningham and 
Darren Sinclair (1999: 49), encompasses a ‘much wider range of policy 
mechanisms’ than traditionally assumed of law and policy, including 
‘economic instruments, self-regulation, information-based strategies, 
and voluntarism’. Take, for example, the differences between regulatory 
pluralism and legal pluralism and their study (see Forsyth, Chapter 14, 
this volume). Legal pluralism, as a concept, captures the diversity of legal 
systems and normative orders, which often have formal and informal 
dimensions operating simultaneously (Forsyth 2009). Legal pluralism 
was first observed in colonial societies in the exercise of colonial and 
customary law, but the concept has since been extended to understand 
other domains, including postcolonial settings where customary and state 
law coexist and hybrid regimes that combine multiple regulatory strategies. 
For example, Miranda Forsyth’s (2009) research in Vanuatu illuminates 
the challenges of two systems coexisting, which are exacerbated because 
the state system does not officially recognise the kastom system (the non-
state, customary system administered by chiefs). Regulatory pluralism 
certainly overlaps with these concerns, but accounts for various regulatory 
instruments, which may have customary, colonial or hybrid origins. 
The differing focal points of legal pluralism and regulatory pluralism 
have yielded distinct, though arguably compatible, empirical insights. 
Qualitative studies of legal pluralism—notably, the contributions of 
legal anthropology—provide important methodological and analytical 
approaches to studying law in action, even in situations when some forms 
of social control are not recognised as law. Such contributions include 
the trouble case approach, which looks at disputes to identify ‘the trouble’ 
and how it was resolved; processual analysis, which examines the means 
of settling disputes; and the acknowledgement of semi-autonomous social 
fields, which appreciates that different legal orders are not autonomous 
and affect how other orders operate (Forsyth 2009). 
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Although these represent important analytical breakthroughs in the 
study of law, the recognition of global legal pluralism—that is, forms 
of pluralism that extend beyond the boundaries of the nation-state—
has challenged the applicability of some earlier approaches. Multi-
sited regulatory scholarship offers an important intervention, because 
it considers pluralistic spaces in which law may or may not be present. 
For example, wireless communication standards that shape the direction 
of information technology are not set by global legal organisations such as 
the United Nations (UN) agency the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), but by standards-setting bodies such as the Institute for 
Electrical and Electronics Engineering. These organisations operate 
through voluntary participation, not through legalised enforcement 
mechanisms. The study of regulatory pluralism can thus better capture 
the array of regulatory tactics and their interplay across different 
social orders. 
Through the empirical scrutiny of regulatory pluralism, scholars have 
levied analytical challenges to foundational socio-legal ideas, among 
them reconsiderations of the core characteristics of the state (Braithwaite 
2000) and citizenship (Henne 2015). John Braithwaite’s analysis of the 
‘new regulatory state’ contends that contemporary forms of governance 
and social relations no longer reflect a welfare state model. As a result, 
Braithwaite (2000: 222) argues, social science disciplines must reorient 
their approach if they are to engage new problems as states embrace 
market competition, privatised institutions and decentred forms of 
regulation. Moreover, the critical study of regulatory regimes and their 
influence across jurisdictions emerges as an equally important task. 
Multi-sited field research offers two interrelated contributions: it enables 
a robust empirical explanation of multi-scalar and cross-jurisdictional 
phenomena and can, in turn, aid in generating new concepts to better 
respond to governance challenges. The next section elaborates on the 
features and methods of multi-sited fieldwork.
3. What is multi-sited fieldwork?
Multi-sited fieldwork is most often discussed in relation to ethnography. 
Ethnography, as a methodology, is traditionally described as the systematic 
study of a population in a particular location through long-term field 
research. Although considered a robust methodology for understanding 
localised cultural dynamics and describing what actors do in these spaces, 
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ethnography has clear limitations. Colin Jerolmack and Shamus Khan 
(2014: 181) characterise them as a lack of ‘generalisability beyond those 
actually studied’ and ‘difficulty accounting for social structure’. Different 
methods are thus better suited for certain kinds of research questions. 
For example, ‘the study of macro changes in birth, death, and fertility 
rates is best left to demographers’ ( Jerolmack and Khan 2014: 181). 
While this is an important point about the appropriateness of methods, 
it is a misnomer to assume that field-intensive research can only be 
conducted in one location with immersion achieved only through a long 
period in that location. 
Multi-sited ethnography—a term coined by anthropologist George 
Marcus (1995)—is the practice of producing in-depth research attuned 
to the influence of world systems. World systems theory posits two 
central tenets: first, that capitalism supersedes geographic boundaries 
in significant ways that shape relationships between nations and across 
the globe, and second, that macro-level examinations are necessary 
to understand how capitalism informs global inequality (Wallerstein 
2004). Multi-sited ethnography gleans insights into these macro-level 
developments through the close study of commodities, objects, persons 
and ideas as they travel across time and space. In essence, it uses methods 
traditionally associated with the study of micro-level phenomena (for 
example, participant observation, interviewing, sustained interactions 
with participants) to make sense of larger-scale processes. For Marcus 
(1995), research methods may focus on small-scale interactions, but 
they need to attend to how they take shape in world systems. Rather 
than making sense of cultural changes through the sustained analysis of 
one community, a multi-sited ethnographic approach entails ‘following’ 
objects of inquiry, which can include things (such as gifts, money and 
other objects), people, signs and metaphors, stories and narratives, life 
histories and biographies, as well as conflicts (Marcus 1995: 106–13). 
This definition may at first seem abstract, but, in keeping with the 
conventions of ethnography, it focuses on observable relationships. 
Consider how Kim Fortun (2001) studied advocacy on the behalf of the 
thousands of victims affected by the 1984 Union Carbide gas tragedy 
in Bhopal, India.1 The incident remains a globally recognised industrial 
disaster—a seemingly clear case of regulatory failure. A traditional 
1  Official estimates vary, but the gas leak and explosion exposed over 500,000 people to methyl 
isocyanate gas and other chemicals.
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anthropologist may have an interest in the transnational flows that 
shaped the disaster and how they informed responses to it, but she would 
not necessarily leave India to do so. Instead, a classical anthropological 
approach is more likely to produce an in-depth analysis of the changing 
dynamics within Bhopal over the years following the disaster. Fortun 
spent substantial time in India; however, in pursuing the multiple forms 
of advocacy that emerged in response to the Bhopal disaster, she also 
studied transnational advocacy networks and responses from international 
corporations. Her research questions and methodology required her to go 
to spaces where she could examine different court reactions in the United 
States and India, how Union Carbide designed plant sites and even how 
trade agreements being signed by India influenced domestic discourses 
while the Indian Supreme Court decided the Bhopal case. As Fortun’s 
work demonstrates, multi-sited ethnography prompts the researcher 
to be attentive to changing circumstances during fieldwork, including 
their globalised dimensions. Accordingly, there is a methodological 
imperative to trace the various relationships informing them, which 
often requires following the flows to other field sites. It involves adding 
sites until you arrive at a better explanation of the problem. Whereas 
the traditional anthropologist obtains immersion by remaining in one 
space, the multi-sited ethnographer traverses spaces to understand the 
contours of phenomena.
Multi-sited ethnography aids in examining transnational processes that 
do not map neatly on to global, national or local levels. Marcus (1995) 
underscores three important areas of focus on actors, objects, ideas, 
symbols and stories: how they circulate; how they coalesce and diverge; 
and how their relationships reflect and contribute to existing systems 
of knowledge as well as the production of new forms of knowledge. 
The principles underpinning multi-sited ethnography reflect its 
theoretical subscription to global connectivity. It can be difficult, however, 
to see how this description lends itself to a distinct methodology—and 
this is perhaps part of Marcus’s point. That is, because this approach 
recognises that many research problems are conditioned by transnational 
circulation, an overly prescriptive methodology might undermine the 
dynamism required for multi-sited inquiry. 
Ethnographies of globalisation provide guidance in terms of how to go 
about designing and carrying out a multi-sited project. Anna Tsing’s 
(2005) study of how corporate growth changed the rainforests of 
Indonesia serves as a case in point. She illustrates how an array of capitalist 
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interventions (many backed by regulatory instruments) transformed 
Kalimantan’s forests and the lives of many residents in Borneo during 
the 1980s and 1990s. To do so, she traces a series of developments that 
shaped the area’s transformation: the discursive framing of the area as a 
‘frontier’ ripe for resource extraction, the contingent alliances between 
corporations and local residents, the treatment and responses of the 
Meratus Dayak community—who live deep in the rainforests and are 
considered ‘the disorderly cousins of the civilized people in surrounding 
plains and towns’ (Tsing 2005: 174)—and the rise of a domestic 
environmental movement that vehemently opposed the devastation 
of the forests and their inhabitants. In detailing the relationships 
between these actors and the landscape, Tsing illuminates broader 
structural changes that led to rapid commercial changes and the Dayaks’ 
disenfranchisement. Reminding her readers that globalisation is not 
delivered ‘whole and round like a pizza’ (Tsing 2005: 271), she describes 
how globalisation reconfigured the region through a series of fragmented 
encounters that included dealings with entrepreneurs and conflicts 
between local residents, activists, scientists, private investors and funding 
agencies. Rather than a clash of cultures, Tsing argues, globalisation 
results in sometimes awkward frictions. These frictions expose unequal 
forms of exchange that can yield ‘new cultural and power dynamics 
through the fragmentary intersection of ideas and concepts at global/
local scales’ (Levitt and Merry 2009: 445). In doing so, her analysis 
demonstrates how multi-sited ethnography enables deeper scrutiny 
of the power relations underlying these structural changes.
By attending to localised conditions in individual sites as well as the 
relationships between them, multi-sited ethnography accounts for 
context in critical ways that thin interpretations based on geographic 
case studies can fail to do (Bartlett and Vavrus 2014). This approach 
enables the identification and analysis of activities that exist beyond 
state-sanctioned boundaries by tracing circulations, ‘shifts, technoscience, 
circuits of licit and illicit exchange, systems of administration or 
governance and regimes of ethics or values’ (Collier and Ong 2005: 4). 
According to Sally Engle Merry (2015), ethnography’s emphasis on 
localised and contextual dynamics offers important insights into how we 
think about the global. In fact, as Philip McMichael (1996: 50) explains: 
Global relations are inconceivable without local ‘faces,’ just as the ‘local’ 
has no meaning without context. The very definition of ‘global’ and 
‘local’ are not only mutually conditioning, they continually change. 
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For Merry (2015), examining smaller sites of sociality is critical to 
understanding the everyday actions that take place in international 
spaces, which are sometimes thought of (incorrectly) as abstract and far 
removed from the local. Instead, she argues, the global is a particularly 
important set of localised interactions between influential actors, 
which have ripple effects across other locales. 
Merry (2015) outlines specific kinds of ethnography that can illuminate 
transnational dimensions: deterritorialised ethnography, which studies 
spaces that are not based in a particular geographic locale but exist 
internationally, such as UN conferences; contextualised ethnography, which 
examines how a local site is embedded in larger social systems, networks 
and practices; and the analysis of commensuration, which is the process of 
translating diverse social conditions and phenomena into comparable 
units. Processes of commensuration are important, because they actually 
decontextualise people, events, actions and objects to create points of 
comparison and similarity. Merry (2011) has analysed their power. 
Specifically, she has studied the expansion of quantitative measures used 
to evaluate the efficacy of international legal intervention, which often 
disavow the importance of context. In contrast, Merry brings attention to 
the particular conditions informing the development of indicators, how 
these measures have come to have global currency and the consequences 
of their privileging over other forms of knowledge. Within this in mind, 
formulaic approaches to research design and practice cannot capture the 
variety of ways to account for the transnational dimensions of social 
phenomena and processes. Fieldwork can take place in different sites 
across the globe or in strategically situated sites where a researcher or 
research team can observe and connect relationships beyond a particular 
locale. Thus, and importantly for studies attentive to world systems, the 
researcher needs to pay careful attention to transnational connections as 
well as to site-specific distinctions. This can require the reconsideration 
of both spatial and temporal influences and their bearing on one’s 
research design, objects of inquiry and data. Doing so can actually lead 
to the revision of one’s initial research questions, which is a benefit as 
well as a challenge of adopting this approach. 
There are other words of caution for the aspiring multi-sited fieldworker. 
It can be difficult to ascertain the level of immersion, as ethnographic 
research that traditionally relies on long-term fieldwork within a 
particular space or community. Regulatory researchers, however, are 
not necessarily bound to the conventions of anthropological inquiry. 
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Instead, the interdisciplinarity of regulatory studies yields different 
obligations: the difficult duty of explaining and justifying a multi-sited 
approach to scholars from a range of backgrounds. The next section 
offers a discussion of a few—certainly not all—examples of multi-sited 
regulatory research, each adopting a distinct approach that attends to 
different demands of their research questions and sites. 
4. How have scholars of regulation used 
multi-sited fieldwork methods?
Multi-sited studies of regulation reflect varying approaches to obtaining 
in-depth understandings of the transnational dimensions of governance 
arrangements. In terms of foundational studies of regulation, Global 
Business Regulation by John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (2000) stands 
out as a classic text (see also Drahos, Chapter 15, this volume). It is also 
a pioneering multi-sited research project, drawing on interviews with 
over 500 participants in multiple sites across 13 cases. Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000: 13) refer to their research approach as a ‘micro–macro 
method for the anthropology of global cultures’, which, they argue, 
requires ‘a combination of the qualitative methods of anthropologists 
and historians’. Global Business Regulation is methodologically distinct 
in the sense that it is, for the most part, not comparative, but rather 
global in its orientation. Its transnational character emerges through 
a sustained endeavour to identify and describe themes that cut across 
domains of business regulation.
In her work on human rights and gender violence, Merry (2006) opts 
for a deterritorialised approach to fieldwork. It shares the micro–macro 
methodological concerns expressed by Braithwaite and Drahos (2000). 
Her examination of the global movement to promote human rights and 
to end gender violence brings attention to how global and local activism 
converge in ways that reveal different framings of human rights issues 
across sites that include the United Nations, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, 
China and Hawai’i. In particular, she looks at how activists and other 
intermediaries help global human rights gain local currency, because 
they ‘translate up and down’—that is, across the global–local interface. 
Translation is not the transfer of knowledge from the United Nations, 
but, instead, the appropriation of human rights principles to better fit 
localised contexts. These principles, in turn, become rooted in social 
practices, in ways that reflect ongoing negotiations and translations. 
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Merry’s work demonstrates clearly how ethnographic research can 
engage different parts of world systems and be used to identify synergies 
(as well as distinctions) between and across them. Its important 
contribution is not simply the depth of its investigation across sites, but 
also its ability to demonstrate how a deterritorialised approach can bring 
together disparate sites to illuminate global processes. 
Multi-sited fieldwork can also be used to study a particular regulatory 
concern that requires consideration of different perspectives, spaces and 
actors. Annelise Riles (2010: 7) traces the rise of ‘global private law 
solutions’—as outwardly distinct from direct governmental regulation of 
financial markets—through a focus on the role of collateral in derivatives 
transactions. Riles documents localised practices of and global influences 
on Toyko’s international swap market (for example, the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, with headquarters in New York 
and offices in other parts of the globe) and the financial exchanges they 
enable. Her characterisation of regulation in this field is one marked 
by hybridity: it is ‘neither inherently private nor public, neither global 
nor local’; rather, the governance of global financial markets emerges as 
‘a set of routinized but highly compartmentalized knowledge practices, 
many of which have a technical legal character’ (Riles 2010: 10). While 
this is not an unexpected finding for regulatory scholars, her illustration 
reveals various manoeuvres that gloss over, and even mask, the inherent 
uncertainty of derivatives trades. In short, they give collateral a veneer of 
certainty. In light of this finding, Riles casts doubt on reforms that lack 
a grounded sense of routinised knowledge practices and their influence, 
arguing that a ground-level–up approach offers more regulatory 
potential. In doing so, she demonstrates how micro-level analysis can 
support broader recommendations.
Multi-sited research can facilitate the documentation of an emergent 
form of regulation, while also being attentive to broader globalised 
trends shaping its development and proliferation. Kate Henne’s (2015) 
research on the relationships between antidoping regulation and gender 
verification2 in global sport offers one such example. It is an explicit 
attempt to combine multi-sited approaches used in anthropology with 
the micro–macro methods used by Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) to 
study a hybrid regulatory regime. Henne traces the history of these 
2  Gender verification is a form of regulation in women’s athletic events. It polices a presumed 
binary boundary between women and men by subjecting women to additional levels of surveillance 
and bodily scrutiny.
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intertwined regulations while also conducting ethnographic fieldwork 
on global policymaking, national and sport-specific stakeholders’ 
strategies of compliance, forms of resistance to the regime, individual 
participants’ understandings of the rules and athletes’ experiences of 
navigating the mass surveillance endorsed by the regime. Looking from 
these different angles, she analyses how antidoping regulation shifted 
from a simple set of medical rules and testing implemented by private 
sporting organisations to a more expansive regime backed by corporate–
state partnerships and reliant on various surveillance and legalistic tools. 
According to Henne, the regime—although attempting to preserve 
traditional values of fair play, bodily integrity and moral fortitude in 
sport—actually comes to embody many of the neoliberal values that 
regulators claim to stand against. 
Well-designed multi-sited research can deliver robust findings without 
the long-term fieldwork conventionally required in anthropology to 
justify the depth of fieldwork. Christian Downie’s (2014; see also Downie, 
Chapter 19, this volume) study of prolonged international negotiations 
on the subject of climate change provides an in-depth account without 
following prescribed ethnographic methods. He tracks climate change 
negotiations that took place between 1992 and 2013, which forecloses 
the possibility of participant observation and interviews across this 
period. To better grasp how a state changes its position in relation to the 
type of agreement achieved, Downie (2014: 11) examines the United 
States (US) and European Union (EU) during the Kyoto phase of 
negotiations, as both have changed their stance during negotiations and 
have ‘traditionally been critical to the success or failure of international 
negotiations’. With little data on these closed-door negotiations, 
he relied heavily on interviews with both state and non-state elite 
representatives deeply engaged in the negotiations. This required 
multiple, iterative rounds of interviewing, enabling Downie to refine 
his focus. This resulted in 105 formal interviews in which participants 
served as important interlocutors to ensure a deeper understanding of 
the research problem at hand. As this example evidences, regulatory 
spaces are not favourable to traditional modes of ethnographic inquiry 
and often require strategic reconsideration and recalibration in terms of 
research design and planning. 
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5. What are the future directions of 
multi-sited regulatory research?
Many regulatory concerns have complex, transnational dimensions, which 
lend themselves to multi-sited fieldwork. However, emergent problems 
often have features that are not easy to observe, yet alone access, for field-
intensive research. Growing concerns over big data and its retention, 
internet governance and the expansion of mass surveillance across 
a variety of domains are just a few timely examples. Natasha Tusikov 
(2016) documents how private–public relationships facilitate non–legally 
binding enforcement agreements that are altering how governments and 
corporations regulate content and information on the internet. Drawing 
on research conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada 
and Australia, she convincingly argues that large internet companies, 
such as Google, PayPal, eBay and Yahoo, enable prominent multinational 
rights-holders and states to police vast populations across the globe—
practices that were technologically impossible or prohibitively expensive 
in the past. As these arrangements between powerful actors are secretive 
in nature and protected from public scrutiny, Tusikov’s findings point to 
both the promises and the perils of multi-sited research (see also Tusikov, 
Chapter 20, this volume). On the one hand, multi-sited fieldwork has the 
capacity to shed light on otherwise invisible regulatory relationships. On 
the other, it entails a number of challenges in terms of obtaining access 
and eliciting robust information.
Given the number of transnational governance arrangements that would 
benefit from in-depth scrutiny, refining multi-sited research design is an 
ongoing process. There is a risk that a multi-sited study may not yield 
enough information about a research site or may obfuscate the direction 
of a research project by focusing too heavily on presumed connections 
between sites. In response to these potential limitations and challenges, 
Lesley Bartlett and Frances Vavrus (2014) propose the vertical case study 
approach as a useful model, particularly for researchers new to multi-
sited research design. It essentially offers a guide for tracing relationships 
by outlining a set of axes for researchers to address in relation to each 
field site and then in relation to other sites. Vertical case studies help 
researchers identify connections and divergences across sites in ways that 
are attentive to how globalisation affects fields of governance without 
replicating the tendency of comparative approaches to overemphasise 
the position of the nation-state (Bartlett and Vavrus 2014). 
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The vertical case study approach has three principal areas: the transversal, 
the vertical and the horizontal. Applied to regulatory contexts, the 
transversal facilitates analysis of pluralist dynamics that emerge across and 
through different scales. It accounts for how particular understandings 
of and approaches to regulatory problems circulate and become 
popularised within and across cases. This requires the examination 
of how historical, social and temporal considerations influence the 
development and uptake of regulatory strategies. The vertical focuses on 
how higher-level (for example, institutional, national, global) governance 
practices interact with contextual factors in ways that enable or restrain 
a particular technique or instrument to take hold or receive funding. 
The horizontal captures other grounded developments that interface 
with regulatory interventions (which can, in turn, have other transversal 
and vertical relationships not otherwise captured). The horizontal axis 
can include existing communal, site-specific and/or pluralistic concerns 
that invariably influence regulation in practice. In essence, the vertical 
case study can assist with mapping the distinctions of particular cases in 
relation to transnational regulatory relationships. 
Against the backdrop of globalisation, it is difficult to study regulation 
without considering how it is grounded in nested systems, be they legal 
or otherwise. Globalisation is not an even or uniform process, nor is the 
emergence of regulation. Regardless of the specific design used to guide 
multi-sited fieldwork, an overarching concern for the field researcher is 
to make sense of how pluralistic orders come together and diverge. This 
is especially important, as regulatory pluralism does not always yield 
convergence. For example, labour certification and fair trade schemes 
are spaces in which many different standards are emerging. Such 
challenges make multi-sited fieldwork a particularly useful methodology 
for regulatory researchers. Importantly, multi-sited fieldwork provides 
an organising framework for micro–macro methods while prompting 
the researcher to be empirically attentive to the nuances of regulatory 
pluralism in each site. It can also be compatible with the realist 
underpinnings of regulatory studies by enabling the researcher to add 
sites as she seeks a deeper understanding of how regulation-in-action 
invariably deviates from rules on the books. 
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Section 2: Theories and 
concepts of regulation
The Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) can fairly claim to be 
the home of much of the work on responsive regulation, with the first 
complete articulation of that theory to be found in Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
1992 book, Responsive Regulation. This section encapsulates many of the 
important developments since 1992. The ideal of responsiveness has 
proved remarkably fertile, allowing RegNet’s research to grow in different 
directions and providing new contexts for empirical testing. The chapter 
by John Braithwaite identifies different types of responsiveness such 
as micro-responsiveness, networked/nodal responsiveness and meta-
regulatory responsiveness. The chapter by Neil Gunningham and Darren 
Sinclair on smart regulation and the chapter on nodal governance by 
Cameron Holley and Clifford Shearing provide key examples of how 
RegNet has rethought regulatory theory. 
The other chapters in this section deal with concepts that are central 
to both responsive regulation and regulatory theory more widely, and 
without which a volume on regulation would be incomplete. Peter 
Grabosky analyses the concept of meta-regulation, which lies at the 
very heart of reconceptualising the change in the distribution of 
regulatory tasks in the modern state. Risk is central to regulatory theory. 
Haines  distinguishes three forms of risk—actuarial, sociocultural and 
political—and discusses how perceptions and calculations of each, 
either individually or in combination, influence the path of regulation. 
Michael W Dowdle traces the rise and crisis of accountability—a crisis 
that is being widened by globalisation as it creates different views of 
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duties of accountability and of who should bear those duties. Christine 
Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen’s chapter, through a set of 
questions, provides the reader with a structured way of thinking about the 
information base required for an understanding of the compliance issues 
within a given sector of regulation. The final chapter in this section, by 
Miranda Forsyth, outlines the concept of legal pluralism, showing how its 
application to the case of traditional knowledge regulation in the Cook 
Islands is more likely to connect to the lived reality of social systems that 
produce such knowledge. The theme of traditional knowledge has also 
been the basis of collaboration between RegNet scholars and scholars 
from New Zealand (see the book by Peter Drahos and Susy Frankel, 
from Victoria University of Wellington, Indigenous Peoples’ Innovation).
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Responsive regulation suggests that governance should be responsive 
to the regulatory environment and to the conduct of the regulated in 
deciding whether a more or less interventionist response is needed 
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). From those bare bones, a number of 
types of responsiveness are considered: pyramidal responsiveness, micro-
responsiveness, networked responsiveness and meta-regulatory and 
socialist responsiveness. The Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) 
has been one among many nodes in networks of regulatory practitioners 
and scholars where these ideas have been through decades of research 
and development (R&D). They need decades more.
2. Responsive regulation
Law enforcers can be responsive to how effectively citizens or 
corporations are regulating themselves before deciding whether to 
escalate intervention. Responsive regulation is not something only 
governments do; civil society actors can also regulate responsively—
indeed, they can even regulate governments responsively (Gunningham 
et al. 1998). 
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Responsive regulation requires us to challenge rulish presumptions that 
harmful conduct X mandates regulatory intervention Y. If an armed 
robber is responding to the detection of her wrongdoing by turning 
around her life, kicking a heroin habit, helping victims and voluntarily 
working for a community group ‘to make up for the harm she has done 
to the community’ then the responsive regulator says no to imprisonment 
as an option mandated by a sentencing rule. 
Therefore, many worry that responsive regulation is not designed 
to maximise consistency in law enforcement. The idea of responsive 
regulation grew from dissatisfaction with the business regulation debate. 
Some argue that businesspeople are rational actors who only understand 
the bottom line and who therefore must be consistently punished for law 
breaking. Others contend that businesspeople are responsible citizens 
who can be persuaded into compliance. In different contexts, there is 
truth in both positions. This means that both consistent punishment and 
consistent persuasion are foolish strategies. The hard question is how 
do we decide when to punish and when to persuade? What makes the 
question such a difficult one is that attempts to regulate conduct do not 
simply succeed or fail. Often they backfire, making compliance worse. 
So the tragedy of consistent punishment of wrongdoers of a certain type 
is that consistency causes regulators to make things worse for future 
victims of the wrongdoing. 
3. Pyramidal responsiveness
The crucial point is that responsive regulation is a dynamic model in 
which persuasion and/or capacity building are tried before escalation up 
a pyramid of increasing levels of punishment. It is not about specifying 
in advance which are the types of matters that should be dealt with at 
the base of the pyramid, which are so serious that they should be in the 
middle and which are the most egregious for the peak of the pyramid. 
Even with the most serious matters, such as genocide in the Great Lakes 
region of Africa, responsive regulatory scholars have tended to stick with 
the presumption that it is better to start with dialogue at the base of 
the pyramid. A presumption means that, however serious the crime, our 
normal response is to try dialogue first for dealing with it and to override 
that presumption only if there are compelling reasons. Of course, there 
119
7 . TYPES oF RESPoNSIVENESS
will be such reasons at times: the man who has killed one hostage and 
threatens to kill another may have to be shot without a trial, the assailant 
who vows to pursue the victim again and kill her should be locked up. 
As we move up the pyramid in response to a failure to elicit reform 
and repair, we often reach the point where reform and repair are finally 
forthcoming. At that point, responsive regulation means that escalation 
up the pyramid is put into reverse and the regulator de-escalates 
down the pyramid. The pyramid is firm yet forgiving in its demands 
for compliance. Reform must be rewarded just as recalcitrant refusal 
to reform will ultimately be punished. Responsive regulation comes up 
with a way of reconciling the clear empirical evidence that punishment 
works sometimes and sometimes backfires, and likewise with persuasion 
(Braithwaite 1985; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). The most systematic 
empirical exploration of the feasibility of these ideas can be found 
in  100  working papers of RegNet’s Centre for Tax System Integrity 
(regnet.anu.edu.au/research/publications). 
The pyramidal presumption of persuasion gives the more respectful 
option a chance to work first. Costly punitive attempts at control are 
thus  held in reserve for the minority of cases where persuasion fails. 
Yet it is also common for persuasion to fail. When it does, a recurrent 
reason is that a business actor is being a rational calculator about the likely 
costs of law enforcement compared with the gains from breaking the 
law. Escalation through progressively more deterrent penalties will often 
take the rational calculator up to the point where it becomes rational 
to comply. Quite often, however, the business regulator finds that they 
try restorative justice and it fails; they try escalating up through more 
and more punitive options and they all fail to deter. Perhaps the most 
common reason in business regulation for successive failure of restorative 
justice and deterrence is that noncompliance is neither about a lack of 
goodwill to comply nor about rational calculation to cheat. It is about 
management not having the competence to comply. The manager of the 
nuclear power plant simply does not have the engineering knowhow to 
take on the level of responsibility asked of him. He must be moved from 
the job. Indeed, if the entire management system of a company is not 
up to the task, the company must lose its licence to operate a nuclear 
power plant. So when deterrence fails, the idea of the pyramid is that 
incapacitation is the next port of call (see Figure 7.1). 






Virtuous Actor RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
DETERRENCE
Figure 7.1 Integrating restorative, deterrent and incapacitative justice
Source: Author’s work.
This design responds to the fact that restorative justice, deterrence 
and incapacitation are all limited and flawed theories of compliance. 
What the pyramid does cover are the weaknesses of one theory and the 
strengths of another. The ordering of strategies in the pyramid is not 
just about putting the less costly, less coercive, more respectful options 
lower down to preserve freedom as nondomination (Pettit 1997). It is 
also that by resorting to more dominating, less respectful forms of social 
control only when dialogue has been tried first, coercive control comes 
to be seen as fair. When regulation is seen as more legitimate and more 
procedurally fair, compliance with the law is more likely (Murphy 2014). 
Astute business regulators often set up this legitimacy explicitly. During 
a restorative justice dialogue over an offence, the inspector says there is 
no penalty this time, but she hopes the manager understands that if she 
returns and finds the company has slipped back out of compliance again, 
under the rules, she will have no choice but to refer it to the prosecutions 
unit. When the manager responds, yes, this is understood, a future 
prosecution will likely be viewed as fair. Under this theory, therefore, 
privileging restorative justice at the base of the pyramid builds legitimacy 
and therefore compliance. 
There is also a rational choice account of why the pyramid works. 
System  overload results in a pretence of consistent law enforcement 
where, in practice, enforcement is spread around thinly and weakly. 
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Unfortunately, this problem is worst where crime is worst. Hardened 
offenders learn that the odds of serious punishment are low. Tools such 
as tax audits that are supposed to be about deterrence frequently backfire 
by teaching hardened tax cheats how much they can get away with. 
Reluctance to escalate under the pyramid model means that enforcement 
has the virtue of being selective in a principled way. Moreover, the 
display of the pyramid itself channels the rational actor down to the base. 
Noncompliance comes to be seen (accurately) as a slippery slope that will 
inexorably lead to a sticky end. In effect, the pyramid solves the system 
capacity problem by making punishment cheap. The pyramid says unless 
you punish yourself for law breaking through an agreed action plan near 
the base of the pyramid, we will punish you much more severely higher 
up the pyramid (and we stand ready to go as high as needed). So it is 
cheaper for rational firms to punish themselves (as by agreeing to payouts 
to victims, community service or new corporate compliance systems). 
Once the pyramid accomplishes a world where most punishment is self-
punishment, there is no longer a crisis of the state’s capacity to deliver 
punishment where needed. One of the messages of the pyramid is: if you 
keep breaking the law it is going to be cheap for us to hurt you because 
you are going to help us hurt you (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 44).
According to responsive regulatory theory, a good legal system is one 
in which citizens learn that responsiveness is the way institutions work. 
Once they perceive the system to be responsive, they know that there 
will be a chance to argue about unjust laws. They also see that gaming 
legal obligations and failure to listen to persuasive arguments about the 
harm their actions are doing and what must be done to repair it will 
inexorably lead to escalation. The forces of law are listening, fair and 
therefore legitimate, but also seen as somewhat invincible. 
4. Micro-responsiveness
Development of responsive regulation was inductive. The ideas of 
responsive regulation and restorative justice—that because injustice 
hurts, justice should heal—as researched by RegNet’s Centre for 
Restorative Justice (led by Heather Strang), were greatly influenced by 
conversations with coalmine and nursing home regulators. There was 
little originality, as what RegNet scholars did was distil the thinking 
of people considered master practitioners of regulation. 
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The nursing home regulation data collection by Toni Makkai, Anne 
Jenkins, Diane Gibson, Valerie Braithwaite, John Braithwaite and 
others set out to test pre-existing theories rather than develop a new one. 
Valerie Braithwaite tested Kagan and Scholz’s (1984) classic typology of 
regulated actors as political citizens, amoral calculators and incompetent. 
This was not the structure of reaction to regulatory authorities revealed 
in Braithwaite’s (2009) factor analyses of the nursing home data or 
the subsequent tax data. The results that did emerge grounded her 
theory of motivational postures that became the micro-foundation for 
further R&D of responsive regulation with the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO). The motivational postures towards an authority were 
commitment to the authority and its rules, capitulation, resistance, game 
playing and disengagement. Responsiveness today is understood in terms 
of the variable requirements of responsiveness to individual and collective 
actors with these different motivational postures. These motivational 
postures are also being coded for 60 armed conflicts in ‘Peacebuilding 
Compared’, in which Valerie Braithwaite, John Braithwaite, Hilary 
Charlesworth, Adérito Soares, Bina D’Costa, Camille McMahon and 
other RegNet colleagues have been involved in seeking to understand 
what fails and succeeds in building sustainable peace. 
The other important micro-foundation, developed in work on healthcare 
regulation by RegNet’s Judith Healy (2011), has been on the need 
to complement a pyramid of sanctions with a pyramid of supports. 
Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair’s (2002) work on the importance 
of leaders pulling laggards and environmental outcomes up through new 
ceilings also shaped the pyramid of supports idea. 
5. Networked, nodal responsiveness
Peter Drahos (2004) more than tweaked the responsive regulatory 
pyramid to attune it to possibilities for networked regulation. 
In developing countries in particular, state regulators do not have the 
enforcement resources to escalate to one state regulatory strategy after 
another as each layer of the pyramid sequentially fails. The idea of the 
pyramid of networked escalation in Figure 7.2 is that a state regulator 
escalates by networking regulatory pressure from other actors—which 
can include other states (for example, the United States pressuring 
a foreign airline that puts US travellers at risk), international regulators, 
industry associations, hybrid industry–non-governmental organisation 
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(NGO) certification organisations such as the Forest Stewardship 
Council, competitors, upstream and downstream corporate players in 
the supply chain of the problem actor and, most importantly, different 
media and civil society actors such as trade unions. Of course, civil society 
actors such as human rights groups can reflect responsively on how to 
deploy their own pyramid of networked escalation to enrol (Latour 
1987) actors with more muscle than themselves in their regulatory 































Figure 7.2 Drahos-esque networked escalation
Source: Author’s work.
As combined use is made of pulling different kinds of levers wielded 
by different kinds of actors, the smart regulator attends to the many 
and various insights of Gunningham et al. (1998) into how some levers 
complement one another, while others are mutually incompatible, 
each defeating the purposes of the other. Smart regulation implies a 
diagnostically reflective regulator attending to the possible synergies and 
contradictions a pyramid of networked escalation can throw up.
A fair criticism of responsive regulation in theory and practice is that 
its emphasis on escalation up the pyramid when less interventionist 
strategies fail neglects refinement of tactics for de-escalation and lateral 
movement to more creative forms of networked regulation at the same 
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level of the pyramid. Responsive regulation prescribes consideration of 
these options before escalation. Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing’s 
(2007: 106–7) critique is that the pyramid can encourage the thought 
that if regulatory intervention fails, it is natural to escalate rather than 
scan laterally with fluidity and agility looking for horizontal problem-
solving partners. When a restorative justice conference at one level of the 
pyramid fails, another conference that widens the circle to participants 
who bring new problem-solving resources into the circle is always an 
option, then another that widens it again. The Wood and Shearing 
critique commends special training in how to think more laterally and 
in less automatically escalatory ways. Hence, Braithwaite (2008: 99) 
proposed a set of corrective principles of responsive regulation that 
include never escalating to hard options without considering all available 
softer and horizontal interventions; using restorative dialogue to bubble 
up norm improvement, including law reform and radical deregulation; 
having a preference for ‘governing by providing’ over ‘governing by 
regulating’ and for capacity building over control; and scanning creatively 
and optimistically for potential network partners with fresh resources. 
6. Meta-regulatory responsiveness
Enforced self-regulation was a founding idea of responsive regulation in 
the early 1980s. This was the notion that while self-regulation had the 
potential to harness the managerial creativity of a regulated industry to 
come up with cheaper and more effective means for achieving regulatory 
outcomes, self-regulation has a formidable history of industry abuse 
of this privilege. Peter Grabosky (1995; Gunningham et al. 1998) and 
Christine Parker (2002), among others, developed this theme in the 
more theoretically fruitful direction of meta-regulation. For regulation 
to become more resilient, attention was needed to how to make the 
regulation of regulation meaningful. 
Some of the better-known meta-regulatory initiatives in enforcement 
practice have been disappointments. For example, US prosecutors 
negotiating Corporate Integrity Agreements in lieu of heavier corporate 
crime sentences deferred prosecutions while corporations put in place 
new internal compliance systems to prevent recurrence. These have 
been disappointing in the pharmaceutical industry, for instance, where 
firms like Pfizer have had one failed Corporate Integrity Agreement 
after another (Dukes et al. 2014: 339). A problem here is that 
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prosecutors’ offices are not regulatory bureaucracies. Specialist regulatory 
bureaucracies are better equipped to negotiate meaningful Corporate 
Integrity Agreements. They have superior knowledge of their domain 
of regulation than generalist prosecutors, because of their networking 
with compliance professionals and civil society (a special emphasis in 
Parker 2002) and with advocacy groups interested in monitoring that 
kind of miscreant corporation. Indeed, from a responsive regulatory 
perspective, best practice in the design of negotiated settlements has 
those third parties in the room. They participate when deals are proposed 
on the design of any Corporate Integrity Agreement or Enforceable 
Undertaking. With follow-through, the responsive ideal has always been 
that mandated independent reports on compliance with Enforceable 
Undertakings should be on a public register. These days, that means 
posted on the internet, where meta-regulators, who are competitors of 
the compliance professional who audited corporate compliance with the 
Enforceable Undertaking, can give the regulator a call to suggest that 
their competitor has done a methodologically shoddy or captured job 
of certifying compliance. Their interest in doing this is commercial—
to convince corporations in trouble with the law and regulators that they, 
rather than their competitors, are more trustworthy meta-regulators 
for ensuring that Enforceable Undertakings are exceeded rather than 
underdone. Without this, meta-regulatory laggards are the ones who 
will be rewarded rather than the leaders who take regulatory innovation 
up through new ceilings of excellence.
As with US Corporate Integrity Agreements, the Australian history 
with Enforceable Undertakings is littered with disappointments from 
the time of Brent Fisse’s (1991) earliest attempts to reform them, 
yet also many successes that have occasionally transformed whole 
industries (such as the life insurance industry two decades ago: Fisse and 
Braithwaite 1993; Parker 2004). Some of the successes have been achieved 
with formidable follow-through by the relevant regulator. In the case of 
the transformation of insurance industry practices with disadvantaged 
consumers, prime minister Paul Keating asked for a briefing on what we 
were doing at the Trade Practices Commission to ensure that industry 
transformation occurred. Leading chief executive officers (CEOs) called 
press conferences to announce what they would do to achieve change for 
Aboriginal consumers and other disadvantaged consumers, and leading 
television current affairs programs followed through on those promises 
(Parker 2004). In short, successful meta-regulation is a bureaucratic 
accomplishment; prosecutors’ offices are not regulatory bureaucracies. 
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Prosecutors also have a different ethos from regulatory bureaucracies 
about what key performance indicators count. At worst, prosecutors are 
interested in counting notches on their gun.
The same regulator in Australia had some appalling experiences in 
negotiated settlements with big business, the most notorious being 
Robert McComas, chairman of the Trade Practices Commission, who 
came from being a director of Australia’s largest tobacco company 
(and returned to chair its board). McComas negotiated a remedial 
advertisement with the Tobacco Institute that was as clearly a breach of 
his own statute as the initial advertisement complained about by Action 
Against Smoking and Health. It was an advertisement that claimed 
passive smoking was not proven to be a danger to health. The Australian 
Federation of Consumer Organisations (AFCO) appealed the 
commission’s remedial advertisement. This was a brave decision by 
AFCO’s young CEO, Robin Brown, who risked bankrupting AFCO 
had there been an order to pay the tobacco industry’s costs. The Federal 
Court found the advertisement approved by the regulator to be in breach 
of its own statute because the evidence was clear that passive smoking 
was a danger to health. It was the first time anywhere in the world that 
a court made this finding. As soon as it did, risk managers across the 
globe started to advise restaurants, workplaces, discos and even sports 
grounds to prohibit smoking for fear of passive smoking suits. Such suits 
also started in Australia, citing that Federal Court decision. Surprisingly, 
even in the open air of baseball grounds in the land of the free, consumer 
self-enforcement through raised eyebrows quickly achieved 100 per cent 
compliance with these bans (Kagan and Skolnick 1993). It is hard 
to think of any case of responsive tripartism in Australian regulatory 
enforcement that might have saved more lives around the world. It was 
a case where the grunt of regulated self-regulation came from the 
consumer movement. 
In the next decade, Brent Fisse started a debate on how to replace the 
kind of deals ‘in smoke-filled rooms’ of the passive smoking case with 
statutory provisions for Enforceable Undertakings that were susceptible 
to public checks and balances ratified/modified by a court. One crucial 
discussion among leading regulators in the early 1990s was led by Fisse 
and convened by The Australian National University (ANU) to shape 
this reform. Two decades later, most of Australia’s important regulatory 
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agencies have incorporated into their statutes Enforceable Undertaking 
provisions that were discussed at The Australian National University’s 
University House that day. 
The journey towards more meaningful meta-regulation in Australia 
continues to take steps backwards and forwards. Yet its strength is 
encapsulated by those meetings in Canberra on passive smoking and 
Enforceable Undertakings that delivered greater engagement of 
regulatory bureaucracies, greater public awareness and greater public 
scrutiny and greater third-party engagement with meta-regulation 
than  seen with US prosecutors negotiating deferred prosecutions 
or Corporate Integrity Agreements. 
7. Socialist responsiveness
Responsive regulation found markets to be institutions that could be 
harnessed and regulated to achieve outcomes that reduce domination 
(Pettit 1997). It conceived the past four decades as an era in which 
markets became stronger but so did regulation. It was an era of regulatory 
capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005; Braithwaite 2008). 
I will never forget the first of a sequence of dozens of day-long meetings 
between 1983 and 1987 when treasurer Paul Keating and prime minister 
Bob Hawke argued in the Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC) 
that Australia should not only deregulate certain markets (including 
floating the dollar, which was quickly executed) but also privatise the 
national telecom provider, parts of the post office, the Commonwealth 
Bank, Qantas and many other state-owned enterprises. I was the most 
junior member of EPAC, representing consumer and community 
groups. The shock was that a Labor government was proposing such 
privatising reforms. I became convinced by the arguments for all of 
the initial privatising reforms (other more disastrous steps towards the 
commodification of higher education, for example, started later in 1988). 
The privatisation of Qantas was the one that most worried some of us 
initially. Arguments of some persuasiveness were advanced that Qantas 
had a better safety record than private US airlines, indeed, than any airline 
in the world, partly because it was a public enterprise. The government 
responded with assurances to strengthen air safety regulation.
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In the event, Qantas, at least for its first decade or two as a private 
enterprise, continued to have a very good safety record; indeed, after 
privatisation, it was the first airline in the world to introduce certain 
safety technologies such as new-generation radar. Still, the worry remains 
that in the history of capitalism, public enterprise has taken safety 
practice up through ceilings of excellence that corner-cutting private 
enterprises would never have secured. In the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, British coalmines became much safer than Australian 
or US coalmines (Braithwaite 1985: 76–7). Some analysts (Turton 1981; 
Braithwaite 2013) and even the US General Accounting Office (1981) 
diagnosed great leaps forward in coalmine safety as being caused by the 
nationalisation of the coal industry in Britain from 1946. A good number 
of rapacious mining magnates were replaced with professional managers 
who invested in safety self-regulation, empowered the National Union 
of Mine Workers and invested in R&D into how to make mines safer. 
Interviews at Charbonnages de France in France in 1981 also led me to 
suspect that they and other European nationalised coal industries also 
made strategic global contributions to making mines safer.
In the West, the era of nationalised coal is long gone, as, hopefully, an era 
of leaving coal in the ground approaches. Yet under global privatisation 
of coal, the safety gains of nationalised coal were not lost. Continuing 
progress in improving the safety of mines was internalised as part of the 
social licence that privatised coal had to satisfy. Jody Freeman (2003) 
might say that privatised coal had been publicised by public law values, 
particularly about stakeholder voice in their own safety, during the 
socialist interregnum of coal production systems. Progress has continued 
apace in the safety of Western coal production, though it has been set 
back by authoritarian capitalist coal production from China to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. In the West, strategic socialism was a 
kind of circuit-breaker on the road to a more civilised capitalism. This 
case study of regulatory capitalism might be a clue for more focus on 
the possibilities for temporary socialism as a path to a less destructive 
capitalism.
Elsewhere, Braithwaite (2013) argued that Europe should have 
established a socialist ratings agency after the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis to compete with Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and argued for 
states owning shares in banks they bail out, which they then sell when 
banks return to profitability. Today the imperative for strategic socialist 
shifts away from markets is as strong as it was during the strategic 
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privatisations of the 1980s. Universities as a key site for doing regulatory 
analysis represent a crucial node for that struggle for public value, for 
a gift economy that trumps a market economy where it is important 
to do so. That is why RegNet prioritised pro bono work in its values 
statement. RegNet has been in the business of seeking to persuade ANU 
that giving universities attract even bigger gifts, while universities that 
are on the take reap a bitter harvest.
8. Conclusion
Types of responsiveness considered here complement many others 
that might have been detailed in a longer essay. Normative dimensions 
of responsiveness are a particularly important omission—such as 
domination responsiveness in the work of scholars like Philip Pettit and 
his collaborators and rights and feminist responsiveness in the work of 
Hilary Charlesworth and her collaborators, among others.
The responsiveness frames listed have been enough to illustrate the way 
that responsive regulation is not a tightly prescriptive theory. Rather it 
pushes us to see regulation as central to the kind of regulatory capitalism 
of this century. The suggestion of this chapter is that we might only 
see the dangers and opportunities in regulatory capitalism by picking 
up multiple responsiveness lenses, including consideration of pyramidal 
responsiveness, then micro-responsiveness to motivational postures, 
then networked responsiveness, then socialist and meta-regulatory 
responsiveness to regulatory capitalism. 
Networks of scholars have worked on all these lenses, most from beyond 
ANU. RegNet has perhaps been a noteworthy node in that R&D. It has 
not made this contribution with a few stars, but by 60 RegNet networkers 
across 17 years. PhD scholars made some of RegNet’s best contributions, 
as did research officers and regulatory practitioners who became PhD 
graduates, of which there have been many. Jenny Job’s leadership on 
responsive regulation in the ATO and Safe Work Australia, her work 
as a RegNet research officer and then a brilliant PhD on a micro–macro 
theory of social capital and responsive tax system integrity are fine 
examples. Another is Liz Bluff, who, as a RegNet research officer, built, 
with Richard Johnstone, Neil Gunningham and Andrew Hopkins, the 
National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 
with a large network of scholars and practitioners beyond ANU. Liz 
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completed her PhD and is now a Research Fellow at RegNet. Michelle 
Burgiss-Kasthala worked at that centre even before Liz, completed an 
exciting PhD on architectural regulation (walls) in international affairs, 
moved to a lectureship at St Andrews University for some years and is 
now back at RegNet as an Australian Research Council (ARC) Fellow. 
There are many others whose contributions have been their equal.
Responsive regulation is about listening to the wisdom of practitioners 
in regulatory agencies, business and advocacy groups to discover deep 
structures of theoretical meaning in their struggles. At the various 
ANU and Canberra meetings on passive smoking enforcement and 
on Enforceable Undertakings statutes, and at the 1983–87 meetings of 
the National Economic Summit and EPAC in the Cabinet room that 
helped refine Hawke–Keating regulatory capitalism, scholars did not 
count among the most important voices or sources of ideas. The idea of 
responsive regulation and the idea of RegNet is that wisdom grounded 
in practice leads theory; then that theory provides better lenses through 
which to see and transform practice. The gifts we scholars give, at their 
best, add a little yeast to that noble process.
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Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair
1. Introduction
Gunningham et al. (1998) first advocated the concept of ‘smart 
regulation’  in a book of that title in 1998. Subsequently, the concept 
has been refined in various publications by Gunningham and Sinclair 
(1999a, 1999b, 2002). The term refers to a form of regulatory pluralism 
that embraces flexible, imaginative and innovative forms of social control. 
In doing so, it harnesses governments as well as business and third 
parties. For example, it encompasses self-regulation and co-regulation, 
using commercial interests and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) (such as peak bodies) as regulatory surrogates, together with 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of more conventional forms 
of direct government regulation. The underlying rationale is that, in the 
majority of circumstances, the use of multiple rather than single policy 
instruments, and a broader range of regulatory actors, will produce better 
regulation. As such, it envisages the implementation of complementary 
combinations of instruments and participants tailored to meet the 
imperatives of specific environmental issues.
To put smart regulation in context, it is important to note that, 
traditionally, regulation was thought of as a bipartite process involving 
government (as the regulator) and business (as the regulated entity). 
However, a substantial body of empirical research reveals that there 
is a plurality of regulatory forms, with numerous actors influencing 
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the behaviour of regulated groups in a variety of complex and subtle 
ways (Rees 1988: 7). Crucially, informal mechanisms of social control 
often prove more important than formal ones. Accordingly, the smart 
regulation perspective suggests that we should focus our attention on 
understanding such broader regulatory influences and interactions, 
including: international standards organisations; trading partners and 
the supply chain; commercial institutions and financial markets; peer 
pressure and self-regulation through industry associations; internal 
environmental management systems and culture; and civil society in 
myriad different forms. 
In terms of its intellectual history, smart regulation evolved in a period 
in which it had become apparent that neither traditional command-
and-control regulation nor the free market provides satisfactory answers 
to the increasingly complex and serious environmental problems that 
confront the world. This led to a search for alternatives more capable 
of addressing the environmental challenge and, in particular, to the 
exploration of a broader range of policy tools such as economic 
instruments, self-regulation and information-based strategies. Smart 
regulation also emerged in a period of comparative state weakness, 
in which the dominance of neoliberalism had resulted in the relative 
emasculation of formerly powerful environmental regulators and in 
which third parties such as NGOs and business were increasingly filling 
the ‘regulatory space’ formerly occupied by the state.
At the heart of smart regulation is a series of regulatory design principles, 
adherence to which would enable policymakers to take advantage of a 
number of largely unrecognised opportunities, strategies and techniques 
for achieving efficient and effective environmental policy. These design 
principles include:
• The desirability of preferring complementary instrument mixes 
over single instrument approaches, while avoiding the dangers of 
‘smorgasbordism’ (that is, wrongly assuming that all complementary 
instruments should be used rather than the minimum number 
necessary to achieve the desired result).
• The virtues of parsimony: why less interventionist measures should 
be preferred in the first instance and how to achieve such outcomes.
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• The benefits of an escalating response up an instrument pyramid 
(utilising not only government, but also business and third parties) 
to build in regulatory responsiveness, to increase dependability 
of outcomes through instrument sequencing and to provide early 
warning of instrument failure through the use of triggers.
• Empowering third parties (both commercial and non-commercial) 
to act as surrogate regulators, thereby achieving not only better 
environmental outcomes at less cost but also freeing up scarce 
regulatory resources, which can be redeployed in circumstances 
where no alternatives to direct government intervention are available. 
• Maximising opportunities for win–win outcomes by expanding 
the boundaries within which such opportunities are available and 
encouraging business to go ‘beyond compliance’ within existing legal 
requirements.
While space precludes a fuller discussion of all of these principles, 
two of the most important are elaborated on below: compliance and 
enforcement and the importance of designing for complementary 
instrument combinations. 
2. Compliance and enforcement
Beyond the traditional enforcement roles of the state, smart regulation 
argues that enforcement is possible not just by the state (as traditional 
theories of regulation assume) but also by second and third parties who 
act as surrogate regulators. Building on the original (1992) version of 
responsive regulation (under which the regulator escalates or de-escalates 
their intervention depending on the regulatee’s response), smart 
regulation argues the virtues of escalating up a three-sided enforcement 
pyramid, with escalation of enforcement possible up each ‘face’ of the pyramid, 
including the second face (through self-regulation) or the third face 
(through a variety of actions by commercial or non-commercial third 
parties or both), in addition to the first face (government action). 









Figure 8.1 Enforcement pyramid
Source: Author’s work.
In the case of the third face, an example is the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), which is a global environmental standards-setting 
system for forestry products. The FSC both establishes standards that 
can be used to certify forestry products as sustainably managed and 
‘certifies the certifiers’. As such, its enforcement ‘clout’ rests on changing 
consumer demand in favour of FSC-certified timbers and timber-based 
products. While government involvement, such as formal endorsement 
or preferential procurement, may be valuable, the scheme is essentially a 
freestanding one: from base to peak (consumer sanctions and boycotts), 
the scheme is entirely third-party run. Under such an institutional 
system, the imposition of environmental standards is independent 
of government regulators (McDermott et al. 2010).
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The smart regulation pyramid also conceives of the possibility of 
regulation using a number of different instruments implemented by the 
range of parties mentioned in the previous paragraph, with escalation to 
higher levels of coerciveness not only within a single instrument category, 
but also across several different instruments and across different faces of the 
pyramid. A graphic illustration of how this can indeed occur is provided 
by Joe Rees’s analysis of the highly sophisticated self-regulatory program 
of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). INPO, established 
in the wake of a near meltdown of a US nuclear power plant, is arguably 
among the most impressive and effective of such schemes worldwide 
(Rees 1994). However, INPO is incapable of working effectively in 
isolation. There are, inevitably, industry laggards—nuclear power plants 
that do not respond to education, persuasion, peer group pressure, 
gradual nagging from INPO, shaming or other measures at its disposal. 
INPO’s ultimate response, after five years of frustration, was to turn to 
the government regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
That is, the effective functioning of the lower levels of the pyramid may 
depend on invoking the peak, which, in this case, only government could 
do: closing a nuclear power plant. 
The INPO case also shows the importance of coordination of the 
different levels and faces of the pyramid. The NRC did not just stumble 
across the issue or threaten action against the recalcitrant alone. 
Rather, there was considerable communication between INPO and the 
NRC. This facilitated a tiered response of education and information, 
escalating through peer group pressure and a series of increasingly 
threatening letters, ultimately leading to the threat of criminal penalties 
and incapacitation. Crucially, the peak enforcement response is one the 
government alone possesses, while INPO is in the best position to pursue 
lower-level enforcement responses. Thus, even in the case of one of the 
most successful schemes of self-regulation ever documented, it was the 
presence of a regulatory ‘gorilla in the closet’ that secured its ultimate 
success (as such, it may be more accurately termed co-regulation).
This example is not intended to give the impression, however, that a 
coordinated escalation up one or more sides of an instrument pyramid 
is practicable in all cases. On the contrary, controlled escalation is 
only possible where the instruments in question lend themselves to 
a  graduated,  responsive and interactive enforcement strategy. The two 
measures that are most amenable to such a strategy (because they are 
readily reshaped) are ‘command and control’ and ‘self-regulation’. Thus, it is 
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no coincidence that the above example of how to shift from one face 
(regulator) of the pyramid to another as one escalates up graduated 
enforcement options to invoke a dynamic peak was taken from precisely 
this instrument combination. However, there are other instruments that 
are at least partially amenable to such a response. A combination of 
government-mandated information (a modestly interventionist strategy) 
with third-party pressure (at the higher levels of the pyramid) might also 
be a viable option. For example, government might require business to 
disclose various information about its levels of emissions under a Toxic 
Release Inventory, leaving it to financial markets and insurers (commercial 
third parties) and environmental groups (non-commercial third parties) 
to use that information in a variety of ways to bring pressure and financial 
sanction to bear on poor environmental performers (see, generally, US 
EPA 2014; see also Hamilton 1995).
In contrast, in the case of certain other instruments, the capacity for 
responsive regulation is lacking. This is either because an individual 
instrument is not designed to facilitate responsive regulation (that  is, 
its  implementation is ‘static’ rather than ‘dynamic’ and cannot be 
tailored to escalate or de-escalate depending on the behaviour of specific 
firms) or because there is no potential for coordinated interaction 
between instruments. Another limitation is the possibility that, in 
some circumstances, enforcement escalation may only be possible 
to the middle levels of the pyramid, with no alternative instrument 
or party having the capacity to deliver higher levels of coerciveness. 
Or  a  particular instrument or instrument combination may facilitate 
action at the bottom of the pyramid and at the top, but not in the 
middle levels, with the result that there is no capacity for gradual 
escalation. In the substantial range of circumstances when coordinated 
escalation is not readily achievable, a critical role of government remains 
to fill the gaps between the different  levels of the pyramid. In doing 
so, they should seek to compensate for the absence of suitable second 
or third-party instruments or for their static or limited nature. They 
should do so: a) through direct intervention; or b) by facilitating action 
by other parties;  or c) by acting as a catalyst for effective second or 
third-party action. 
Finally, smart regulation cautions that there are two general 
circumstances where it is inappropriate to adopt an escalating response 
up an enforcement pyramid, irrespective of whether it is possible to 
achieve such a response. First, in situations where there is a serious risk of 
imminent irreversible loss or catastrophic damage, a graduated response 
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is inappropriate because the risks are too high. Second, a graduated 
response is only appropriate where the parties have a relationship 
involving continuing interactions—allowing for credible initiation of a 
low interventionist response and then escalation (in a ‘tit for tat’ fashion) 
if this proves insufficient. In contrast, where there is only one chance 
to influence the behaviour in question (for example, because small 
employers can only very rarely be inspected), a more interventionist first 
response may be justified, particularly if the risk involved is high.
In summary, the preferred role for government under smart regulation 
is to create the necessary preconditions for second or third parties to 
assume a greater share of the regulatory burden rather than engaging 
in direct intervention. This will reduce the drain on scarce regulatory 
resources and provide greater ownership of regulatory issues by those 
directly concerned in industry and the wider community. In this way, 
government acts principally as a catalyst or facilitator. In particular, it can 
play a crucial role in enabling a coordinated and gradual escalation up an 
instrument pyramid, filling any gaps that may exist in that pyramid and 
facilitating links between its different layers. 
3. Instrument combinations
Smart regulation highlights the importance of utilising combinations of 
instruments and parties to compensate for the weakness of standalone 
environmental policies. It cannot be assumed, however, that all 
instrument combinations are complementary. Some instrument mixes 
may indeed be counterproductive. The outcome of others may be 
largely determined by the specific contexts in which they are applied. 
Unfortunately, the task of answering the question of which particular 
combinations are complementary, which are counterproductive and 
which are context-specific is complex. To explore the full implications 
of all instrument combinations would be both impractical and tedious. 
Instead, we provide a brief overview of some potential instrument 
interactions with selective examples to sensitise policymakers and 
others to the importance of selecting judicious policy combinations.1 
Box 8.1 summarises the principal policy instruments from which 
1  A detailed exposition of instrument combinations is provided in Gunningham and Sinclair 
(1999b).
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policymakers may choose. While these examples are taken from the area 
of environmental regulation, the same approach can be taken to many 
other areas of social regulation.
Box 8.1 Policy instrument categories
Command-and-control regulation
The various types of command-and-control standards have fundamentally different 
modi operandi. For example, technology standards prescribe an approved technology 
for a particular industrial process or environmental problem. Such a standard 
‘is defined in terms of the specific types of safeguarding methods one must use in 
specific situations and … places great emphasis on the design and construction 
of these safeguards’ (McAvoy 1977: 9). In contrast, performance standards define 
a firm’s duty in terms of the problems it must solve or the goals it must achieve. 
That is, performance standards are outcome-focused. They avoid overt prescriptions 
on how to achieve these outcomes. Finally, process standards address procedures 
and parameters for achieving a desired result—in particular, the processes to be 
followed in managing nominated hazards. They are most often used in respect of 
hazards that do not lend themselves to easy risk measurement and quantification.
Economic instruments
Three types of economic instruments may be distinguished. The first are broad-based 
economic instruments, such as tradable emission/resource permits and pollution/
resource taxes that apply to the whole industry, which do not discriminate between 
sectors and/or preferred technological solutions or impose performance limits on 
individual firms. That is, apart from government setting the overall level of the tax 
or the number and value of permits, the market is left to operate freely. The second 
are supply-side incentives, which are financial subsidies provided by government for 
particular types of technology and/or specific types of industrial activity. These are 
distinguished from broad-based instruments in that there is a much higher level of 
government prescription. The third is that of legal liability whereby firms can be held 
financially responsible for cases of environmental harm.
Self-regulation
This is not a precise concept, but, for present purposes, self-regulation may be 
defined as a process whereby an organised group regulates the behaviour of its 
members. Most commonly, it involves an industry-level organisation (as opposed to 
the government or individual firms) setting rules and standards (codes of practice) 
relating to the conduct of firms in the industry. one can further categorise industry self-
regulation in terms of the degree of government involvement (‘pure’ self-regulation, 
without any form of external intervention, is relatively uncommon).
Voluntarism
In contrast with self-regulation, which entails social control by an industry association, 
voluntarism is based on individual firms undertaking to do the right thing unilaterally, 
without any basis in coercion. Commonly, voluntarism is initiated by government and 
may involve government playing the role of facilitator and coordinator. At a general 
level, this category embraces voluntary agreements between governments and 
individual businesses taking the form of ‘non-mandatory contracts between equal 
partners, one of which is government, in which incentives for action arise from mutual 
interests rather than from sanctions’ (oECD 1994: 7). However, the variety of such 
agreements makes precise classification difficult.
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Information strategies
The range of educational and information-based instruments is broad and, in many 
cases, these instruments may overlap. For present purposes, information strategies 
may be taken to include: education and training; environmental reporting; community 
right-to-know; freedom of information; proactive public disclosure; pollution inventories; 
and product certification.
Certain combinations of the above instruments are inherently 
complementary.  That is, their effectiveness and efficiency are enhanced 
by using them in combination, irrespective of the circumstances of the 
environmental issue being addressed. As such, policymakers can be 
confident in choosing these combinations over others. An illustrative 
example can be drawn from the combination of voluntarism (in which 
individual firms without industry-wide coordination voluntarily seek 
to improve environmental performance) and command-and-control 
regulation.
Voluntarism (when genuine rather than tokenistic) will complement 
most forms of command-and-control regulation, particularly where levels 
of environmental performance ‘beyond compliance’ are desired. In the 
case of performance standards, a minimum performance benchmark is 
established, with voluntary-based measures encouraging firms to achieve 
additional improvements. The 33/50 program of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) is an example of this approach (Aora and Cason 
1995). Under the 33/50 program, firms were encouraged to reduce the 
levels of their toxic chemical releases, often at substantial cost, on a purely 
voluntary basis. Existing command-and-control regulations that applied 
to toxic chemical releases remained in force, with the 33/50 program 
delivering additional benefits in terms of reducing unregulated emissions. 
The combination of the two instruments means that participating 
firms are encouraged to go beyond a minimum standard, while non-
participating firms must still comply with this performance baseline. 
If voluntarism were introduced alone, there would be no guarantee that 
non-participating firms would contain their levels of toxic chemical 
releases, thus freeriding on those committed to higher levels of reduction. 
The combination of voluntarism and performance-based command and 
control in this instance has produced environmental improvements 
additional to those that could have been achieved in isolation. In contrast 
with beyond compliance activities, if voluntarism and performance-based 
standards were targeting the same level of behaviour then, at best, they 
would be a duplicative combination and, at worst, counterproductive.
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Voluntarism can also work well with process standards—for example, 
where the adoption of environmental management systems (such as 
ISO 14001) has been mandated (Thomas 1997). As process-based 
prescriptions tend to be qualitative in nature, and therefore more difficult 
to measure quantitatively than performance or technology standards, 
their full potential is difficult to enforce externally unless the regulated 
firm is committed to the concept. Voluntary measures that seek to 
change the attitude of managers and the prevailing corporate culture 
may serve to underpin a commitment to process standards.
In contrast, technology standards are unlikely to produce complementary 
outcomes when used in combination with voluntary measures. 
This is because they are highly prescriptive: firms can either comply or 
not comply, resulting in little room for beyond compliance achievements. 
In effect, technology standards restrict the way in which firms respond 
to an environmental imperative in terms of the method of environmental 
improvement, whereas voluntary measures are, in principle, designed to 
provide additional regulatory flexibility.
Certain other combinations of regulatory instruments are either 
inherently counterproductive or, at least, suboptimal. Their efficiency 
and effectiveness are significantly diminished when they are employed 
in combination. The example of command-and-control regulation 
and economic instruments is illustrative. Most command-and-control 
instruments—namely, performance standards and technology standards—
seek to impose predetermined environmental outcomes on industry. That 
is, even if the standards are not uniform (in that different requirements 
apply to different sectors or firms), individual firms are not free to make 
independent judgements as to their preferred method of environmental 
improvement (in the case of technology standards) or their overall level 
of environmental performance (in the case of performance standards). 
Economic instruments, in contrast, seek to maximise the flexibility of 
firms in making such decisions: government influences the overall level of 
environmental performance by providing a price signal relative to the level 
of pollution or resource consumption desired, or by creating a purchasable 
right to pollute or consume resources within an overall cap.
If a command-and-control instrument were to be superimposed on an 
economic instrument targeting the same environmental issue, or vice versa, 
to the extent that the command-and-control instrument limits the choice 
of firms in making individual decisions, the economic instrument would 
be superfluous (unless acting as a revenue stream for government). That is, 
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there will be a suboptimal regulatory outcome. Economic instruments are 
designed to exploit differences in the marginal cost of abatement between 
firms. It makes economic sense for those firms that can reduce their levels of 
pollution most cheaply to carry a greater share of the collective abatement 
burden, and for those for whom it is most expensive to carry a lesser share 
of the same burden. The result is that the net cost of reducing the overall 
level of pollution (or resource consumption) will be lessened. Alternatively, 
for a given level of expenditure, a greater level of pollution reduction will be 
achieved. By simultaneously applying a prescriptive command-and-control 
instrument (be it a performance or a technology standard), free market 
choices would be artificially restricted, thus undermining the basic rationale 
of the economic instrument. An example of this might be mandating 
specific energy efficiency technologies for firms in tandem with a carbon tax.
One way of avoiding potentially incompatible instrument combinations 
is to sequence their introduction. That is, certain instruments may 
be held in reserve, to be applied only if and when other instruments 
demonstrably fail to meet predetermined performance benchmarks. 
One type of sequencing is when an entirely new instrument category 
is introduced where previous categories have failed. Another version is 
when only the enforcement component of a pre-existing instrument 
is invoked to supplement the shortcomings of another. Logically, such 
sequencing would follow a progression of increasing levels of intervention. 
As such, considerable utility can be derived from otherwise dysfunctional 
instrument combinations and, in the process, the dependability of an 
overall policy mix can be improved. 
So far, we have confined our discussion to bipartite mixes. There is, 
of course, no reason why mixes should not be multipartite, and they 
commonly are. The benefit of our examination of bipartite mixes has been 
to identify complementary and counterproductive mixes, with the result 
that we know, in the case of multipartite mixes, which combinations to 
avoid and the complementary combinations on which we might build. 
The possible permutations of multipartite mixes are very large indeed, 
and it is not practicable to consider them here.
4. Smart regulation in practice
A substantial number of policy approaches are consistent with the 
precepts of smart regulation. In Canada, smart regulation became the 
principle focus of federal government–driven regulatory reform in 
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the mid-2000s and continued under a different name for some time 
thereafter.2 There  it  has been characterised by ‘a restructuring of the 
process of assessing, reforming and improving the regime in which 
regulations are developed, managed, enforced and measured’ (Wood 
and Johannson 2008: 361). A few years later, the European Union (EU) 
promoted smart regulation as a vehicle to achieve a ‘cleaner, fairer and 
more competitive Europe’ (Danish Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs et al. 2010). Indeed, according to Toffelson et al. (2008: 257), 
‘the smart-regulation critique has also resonated in potentially sweeping 
law and policy reforms in many other Western liberal democracies’.
At a more specific level, EU and Dutch regulators have invoked smart 
regulation to combat the global problem of e-waste, and as a vehicle 
for effective governance of the globalised shipping industry (Bloor et 
al. 2006). It has also been contemplated for other emerging globalising 
industries. The European Community regulation on chemicals and their 
safe use, which deals with the ‘registration, evaluation, authorisation and 
restriction of chemical substances’ (REACH), is also built on similar 
principles (Farber 2008). 
Having said this, it must be cautioned that while ‘many governments 
have adopted the term [smart regulation] to provide intellectual 
justification for a wide range of public-sector regulatory reform initiatives’ 
(Toffelson et al. 2008: 357), the way the term is used by politicians and 
policymakers bears only a loose resemblance to the original academic 
concept. For example, while the authors of smart regulation emphasised 
the importance of designing complementary policy mixes, of harnessing 
third parties as surrogate regulators and of sequential combinations of 
public and private enforcement, policymakers have often paid little heed 
to this advice. They have, for example, been: a) reluctant to ascend an 
enforcement pyramid for fear of offending business; b) unwilling to 
cooperate with NGOs for fear of losing control; and c) more inclined 
to embrace a ‘grab bag’ of tools than a judicious combination of 
complementary ones. Overall, what passes for smart regulation in policy 
circles is more akin to a regulatory stew from which policymakers have 
selected particularly juicy morsels that appeal to the political rhetoric of 
their masters, largely irrespective of their likely effectiveness or efficiency.
2  See, in particular, the Canadian Government’s regulatory reform program under this banner 
(Government of Canada 2005) and Leiss (2005).
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If political acceptability was closely tied to evidence-based policymaking 
then the gap between such acceptability and effectiveness should 
be a relatively narrow one. Unfortunately, this is usually not the case. 
Governments, of whatever variety, seem far more concerned with 
political and economic rhetoric than with rational and evidence-based 
decision-making. For example, in Australia, the former Rudd Labor 
Government went beyond the Blair Government’s various ‘reducing 
regulatory burdens’ initiatives by establishing a Department of Finance 
and Deregulation. It was no longer necessary to debate the complexity 
of public policy, the options involving varying degrees of government 
intervention or how to achieve an efficient and effective policy mix. 
Rather, the answer in each case was apparently clear: regulation bad; 
deregulation good. Indeed, so resistant was the department to any hint 
of new regulation that a smart regulation initiative was nipped in the 
bud, emerging finally in a much-diluted form as ‘smart policy’.
Finally, smart regulation has not been immune from academic criticism. 
Some authors have claimed that it does not address institutional 
issues, compliance-type specific responses, performance sensitivity and 
adaptability of regulatory regimes (Baldwin and Black 2008; Böcher and 
Toller 2003). Van Gossum et al. (2010: 245) suggest that these shortcomings 
can be resolved by ‘by merging the smart regulation theory with the policy 
arrangement approach and the policy learning concept’ under what they 
call a ‘regulatory arrangement approach’ (RAA). The aim of the RAA is:
to constrain the almost infinite smart regulatory options by: the national 
policy style; adverse effects of policy arrangements of adjoining policies; 
the structure of the policy arrangement of the investigated policy and 
competence dependencies of other institutions. (van Gossum et al. 
2010: 245)
We take this as a constructive and nuanced means of preserving the 
essence of smart regulation, while extending its practical reach to 
a broader range of circumstances.
In conclusion, while there has been considerable progress in the 
development of smart regulation as a theoretical construct, its attempted 
translation into regulatory policy and practice has been mixed. This is 
because policymakers appear eager to embrace pluralism without the 
necessary constraints of choosing complementary combinations, and 
display an unwillingness to move from the base of the pyramid and/or 
to engage a range of third parties as surrogate regulators. In this regard, 
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it may be that the complexity and sheer number of possible instrument/
party permutations dissuade policymakers from doing the necessary 
empirical research to effectively implement a smart regulation approach 
suitable for a given circumstance. If this is the case then, as van Gossum 
et al. (2010) suggest, a streamlining and tailoring of key complementary 
approaches to particular institutional circumstances will be of assistance. 
In any case, the lack of appetite among many governments to confront 
an armada of significant environmental problems confronting society 
today—such as greenhouse gas emissions, unsustainable water use, 
diffuse pollution, species loss and habitat destruction—suggests that the 
principles of smart regulation are still pertinent. Certainly, a  redesign 
of patently inadequate policy responses, such as the Australian 
Government’s so-called direct action initiative—which is all voluntary 
‘base’ and no enforcement ‘peak’, lacks third-party engagement and 
contemplates uncomfortable policy combinations—would be a good 
starting point from which to re-engage with smart regulation. 
Further reading
Gunningham, N and Sinclair, D 2005. ‘Policy instrument choice and 
diffuse source pollution’, Journal of Environmental Law 17: 51–81. 
doi.org/10.1093/envlaw/eqi003.
van Erp, J and Huisman, W 2010. ‘Smart regulation and enforcement of 
illegal disposal of electronic waste’, Criminology and Public Policy 9: 
579–90. doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2010.00652.x.
References
Aora, S and Cason, TN 1995. ‘An experiment in voluntary regulation: 
Participation in EPA’s 33/50 program’, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 28: 271–86. doi.org/10.1006/
jeem.1995.1018.
Baldwin, R and Black, J 2008. ‘Really responsive regulation’, The Modern 
Law Review 71: 59–94. doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2008.00681.x.
147
8 . SMART REGULATIoN
Bloor, M, Datta, R, Gilinsky, Y and Horlick-Jones, T 2006. ‘Unicorn 
among the cedars: On the possibility of effective “smart regulation” of 
the globalized shipping industry’, Social and Legal Studies 15: 537–54. 
doi.org/10.1177/0964663906069546.
Böcher, M and Toller, AE 2003. Conditions for the emergence 
of alternative environmental policy instruments, Paper presented at 
the Second European Consortium of Political Research Conference, 
Marburg, Germany, 18–21 September.
Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, The Netherlands 
Regulatory Reform Group and UK Better Regulation Executive 
2010. Smart Regulation: A Cleaner, Fairer and More Competitive EU. 
Copenhagen: Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. 
Farber, DA 2008. Five regulatory lessons from REACH, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 1301306/2008, University of California, Berkeley. 
Available at: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301306.
Government of Canada 2005. Implementation Plan for Smart Regulation. 
Ottawa: Government of Canada. Available at: tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/
ps-dp/2005/0324-eng.asp. 
Gunningham, N, Grabosky, P and Sinclair, D 1998. Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gunningham, N and Sinclair, D 1999a. ‘Integrative regulation: 
A principle-based approach to environmental policy’, Law & Social 
Inquiry 24: 853–96. doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1999.tb00407.x.
Gunningham, N and Sinclair, D 1999b. ‘Regulatory pluralism: Designing 
environmental policy mixes for environmental protection’, Law & 
Policy 21: 49–76. doi.org/10.1111/1467-9930.00065.
Gunningham, N and Sinclair, D 2002. Leaders and Laggards: Next 
Generation Environmental Regulation. Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf 
Publishing.
Hamilton, JT 1995. ‘Pollution as news: Media and stockmarket reactions 
to the capital toxic release inventory data’, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 28: 98–103. doi.org/10.1006/
jeem.1995.1007.
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
148
Leiss, W 2005. Smart regulation and risk management, Paper prepared 
at the request of the Bureau du Conseil Privé/Privy Council Office, 
Comité Consultatif Externe sur la Réglementation Intelligente/
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation. Ottawa: 
Government of Canada. Available at: leiss.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2009/12/smart_regulation_and_risk_management.pdf. 
McAvoy, PW 1977. OSHA Safety Regulation: Report of the Presidential 
Task Force. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
McDermott, C, Cashore, B and Kanowski, P 2010. Global Environmental 
Forest Policies. London: Earthscan.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
1994. Meeting on Alternatives to Traditional Regulation. Paris: OECD.
Rees, J 1988. Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self Regulation in 
Occupational Safety. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
doi.org/10.9783/9781512809541.
Rees, JV 1994. Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear 
Safety Since Three Mile Island. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226706894.001.0001.
Thomas, WL 1997. ‘Using IS0 14001 to comply with the management 
system requirements of the US EPA’s RMP Rule and the EU’s 
Seveso II Directive’, European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review 6: 337–43.
Toffelson, C, Gale, F and Haley, D 2008. Setting the Standard: Certification, 
Governance and the Forest Stewardship Council. Vancouver: UBC Press.
United States Environment Protection Agency (US EPA) 2014. TRI 
Around the World. Washington, DC: EPA. Available at: www2.epa.
gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/tri-around-world. 
van Gossum, P, Arts, B and Verheyen, K 2010. ‘From “smart regulation” 
to “regulatory arrangements”’, Policy Science 43: 245–61. doi.
org/10.1007/s11077-010-9108-0.
Wood, S and Johannson, L 2008. ‘Six principles for integrating non-
governmental environmental standards into smart regulation’, 






Among scholars of regulation, the term ‘meta-regulation’ has meant 
different things to different people. Its explicit use in regulatory 
studies appears to date back at least as far as 1983. Early uses of the 
term embraced one of two meanings, each referring to the oversight or 
governance of regulation. Political scientist Michael Reagan (1983: 165) 
referred to cost–benefit analysis of regulatory activity as ‘a kind of 
meta-regulation of regulation’. This connotes a kind of performance 
monitoring of regulatory institutions. Reagan’s conceptualisation was 
reflected in Bronwen Morgan’s later use of the term to refer to a ‘set 
of institutions and processes that embed regulatory review mechanisms into 
the every-day routines of governmental policy-making’ (Morgan 1999: 50, 
emphasis in the original). 
About the same time as Reagan’s article, Gupta and Lad (1983: 146) 
referred to ‘the meta-regulatory role that some agencies might play 
in regulating self-regulation by the industry’ (emphasis in the original). 
This observation was preceded by Braithwaite’s work on enforced self-
regulation, which described this form of meta-regulation without using 
that specific term (Braithwaite 1982).
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There is, however, much more to the regulatory process than the activities 
of governments. A second, much broader conception of meta-regulation 
would embrace activities occurring in a wider regulatory space, under the 
auspices of a variety of institutions, including the state, the private sector 
and public interest groups. These institutions may operate in concert or 
independently. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) broke new ground when 
they adopted this more expansive conception of meta-regulation—
one that embraces a diversity of state and non-state institutions. They 
explicitly refer to their work as meta-regulatory theory, observing that 
regulation can be delegated, and such delegation can be monitored, 
by the state (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 4). They offer glimpses of 
the rich diversity of regulatory space and its cast of characters, actual 
and potential. At one point, the authors muse about a model for the 
regulation of the sex industry that might involve representatives of the 
women’s movement, churches and sex worker trade unions (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992: 60). They envisage a constructive role for public interest 
groups and other non-governmental actors to monitor the behaviour not 
only of businesses, but also of government regulatory agencies. Ayres 
and Braithwaite demonstrate how an active public interest sector can 
energise state regulatory authorities and thereby reduce the likelihood 
of capture by the private sector. Third parties can also bring influence 
directly to bear on companies, by mobilising adverse publicity in the 
aftermath of a significant violation or by dealing in a constructive manner 
with the firm, beyond the regulatory gaze of government. 
Reliance on non-state institutions to assist in achieving the objectives 
of government is hardly a new idea. The ancient Chinese philosopher 
Lao Tzu (1963) refers to governing by ‘making use of the efforts of others’ 
and ‘not being meddlesome’. Before the rise of the modern state, many 
activities that today are widely regarded as core government functions 
were undertaken in whole or in part by private interests. These included 
defence, tax collection, the provision of health services, education and 
social welfare, overseas exploration and colonisation and the major 
institutions of criminal justice: policing, prosecution and imprisonment 
(Grabosky 1995b).
One issue that appears to have been overlooked in contemporary 
discussions of meta-regulation is the extent to which a regulatory system 
is (or could be) coordinated and, if so, by whom. One might envisage a 
regulatory system involving a variety of public and private institutions, 
tightly scripted and closely monitored by state authorities. Such an 
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extreme interpretation of Ayres and Braithwaite’s state-centric model is 
more an ideal type rather than a real-world experience; one doubts that 
even the world’s archetypal command economies ever really functioned 
in this manner. Other scholars, before and since, have observed less 
choreography in regulatory systems. Hayek (1991) observed that while 
some orderings are designed and coordinated, others are spontaneous. 
More recently, Scott (2004) observed that regulatory power can be 
widely dispersed, and that the state is no longer the main locus of control 
over social and economic life (if it ever was). Black (2008) speaks of 
‘polycentric’ regulatory regimes that may be ungovernable.
2. Regulatory pluralism
The concept of regulatory pluralism is derived from that of legal 
pluralism, which is based on the recognition that the law exists alongside 
a variety of lesser normative orderings. Galanter (1981: 20) observed 
that the legal system is often a secondary rather than a primary locus of 
regulation. Griffiths (1986: 4) referred to legal reality as not monolithic, 
but rather an ‘unsystematic collage of inconsistent and overlapping parts’. 
Black (2001) referred to a ‘postregulatory world’ in which governments 
no longer monopolise regulation, and later noted the complexity and 
fragmentation of regulatory systems (Black 2008).
Ayres and Braithwaite were acutely aware of these ‘inconsistent and 
overlapping parts’. Despite the state-centric nature of their model, they 
observed a wider number of actors involved in influencing the social 
control of organisations. Mindful of the corporatist policymaking 
models characteristic of Northern Europe, they acknowledge the work 
of Streeck and Schmitter (1985), referring to the power wielded by 
markets, communities and associations, as well as by states. They quote 
Michael Porter’s (1985: 16) observations on the power of markets, 
suggesting that sophisticated buyers will demand products of a higher 
standard and sophisticated firms will achieve a competitive advantage 
by heeding these signals. 
Ayres and Braithwaite saw an important role for regulatory tripartism, 
devoting an entire chapter to the concept. Tripartism had become 
a feature  of some regulatory settings, most notable of which was 
occupational health and safety. In this regulatory domain, trade 
union safety representatives in some jurisdictions were empowered 
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to accompany state inspectors and to report safety violations. These 
were, however, but  one manifestation of third-party involvement in 
the regulatory process. A key message of Responsive Regulation is the 
potential role of third parties more generally, and specifically the role 
of public interest groups. To the extent that self-regulation and markets 
function in a positive manner, state intrusion is unnecessary. It is 
nevertheless clear to Ayres and Braithwaite that the state remains at 
the centre of the regulatory space. They thus set the stage for those who 
would explore the wider variety of participants in the regulatory space, 
and the ways in which they interact with each other.
The location and role of the state in this pluralistic regulatory space can 
vary. At one extreme, the state can be an active director. Private actors 
may be commanded by law to assist in the regulatory process. In most 
Western nations, banks have been transformed into agents of the state 
and have become instruments of policy to combat tax evasion and money 
laundering generally. To this end, banks are required by law to routinely 
report transactions over a certain threshold and those transactions that 
are of a suspicious nature, irrespective of their amount, to a governmental 
authority. 
In addition to mandating certain conduct on the part of the regulated 
entity, the state may require that it engage with a number of external 
institutions that are in a position to exercise a degree of vigilance and 
control over its behaviour. These might include, for example, requiring 
the company to obtain certification by an independent auditor or 
requiring that the company be insured. 
Less coercively, the state can proffer rewards and manipulate 
incentives to  induce compliance by a regulated entity. Incentives may 
be conferred on a specified target of regulation or on third parties for 
assistance in achieving compliance on the part of the regulatory target 
(Grabosky 1995a). 
States may also delegate regulatory authority to private parties. 
In many common law jurisdictions, the investigation and prosecution of 
alleged cruelty to animals are conducted not by government employees, 
but by societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals. Licences to 
practise medicine or to deal in securities may be conferred and revoked 
by professional associations. Regulatory activity, from motor vehicle 




A less state-centred approach would see the state acting as a facilitator 
or a monitor of corporate social control exercised by non-governmental 
institutions. Governments have begun to ‘steer’ rather than to ‘row’, 
structuring the marketplace so that naturally occurring private activity 
may assist in furthering public policy objectives. The term ‘leverage’ 
can be employed to refer to this approach. For example, through their 
own purchasing practices or by the strategic use of industry subsidies, 
governments may create markets for recycled products. Governments 
may confer standing on private citizens to sue polluters or fraudulent 
contractors (Coplan 2014).
At the other extreme, the role of the government would be one of 
a passive observer, where regulatory functions are performed to a greater 
extent by non-state institutions. The role of the state may be limited to 
constituting a playing field on which non-state regulatory institutions 
can operate.
For example, the state may play a role in ensuring the integrity of 
information that is conducive to the functioning of a healthy market. 
Governments may develop or authorise labelling and organic certification 
schemes and allow consumer preferences to dictate producer behaviour. 
Securities regulators, for example, require disclosure of significant 
information to stock markets. 
Market forces may themselves be powerful regulatory instruments. 
Consumer preferences for certain products may dictate corporate 
behaviour. Large retailers are in a position to register their product and 
process preferences with suppliers, and the very substantial purchasing 
power that large retailers command often carries considerable influence. 
A buyer for a large supermarket chain may, for example, seek to 
examine the pesticide application audit records of a winery’s contract 
grape growers. If the buyer is not satisfied with the nature of chemicals 
applied to the vines, the concentration in which they were used and the 
duration between application and harvest, they will go to another winery. 
The buyers are thus in a position to wield more regulatory power than 
are government officials. Vandenbergh (2007: 1) reports that ‘more than 
half of the largest firms in eight US retail and industrial sectors impose 
environmental requirements on their domestic and foreign suppliers’. 
Such private contractual requirements trump state regulatory activity. 
Vandenbergh (2007) referred to this form of private regulatory power as 
‘the new Wal-Mart effect’.
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Similarly, large fast-food chains are in a position to assess their suppliers 
and to refuse to purchase meat products that have been administered 
hormones or antibiotics for purposes of growth promotion. Industry 
associations can withdraw accreditation or certification from a member 
who does not conform to required performance standards. In industries 
such as organic agriculture or meat export, certification may give a 
producer a competitive edge. Indeed, where certification is a sine qua 
non of access to a market, denial of such certification by an industry 
self-regulatory regime can put a company out of business.
Institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies and pension 
funds, may require standards of corporate governance, employee 
relations and environmental management by the companies in which 
they invest. In addition to their activities as institutional investors, 
banks and insurance companies may exercise considerable influence 
over their clients. Lenders and insurers now recognise the risk to their 
own commercial wellbeing posed by questionable practices on the part 
of a borrower or policyholder. Beyond the lender’s obvious interest in 
the commercial viability of the borrower, banks must now be concerned 
about the environmental risks posed by any assets that they might hold 
as security for a loan. In the event of foreclosure, banks could end up 
owning a liability rather than an asset. The pressures the banking and 
insurance industries can exert in furtherance of corporate citizenship 
can be considerable. An environmental audit report is increasingly 
becoming an integral part of a loan application. Banks may refuse to 
lend to a prospective borrower with a poor record of health, safety 
or  environmental  performance; insurers may refuse to insure them 
against loss. 
Entire industries have developed to assist businesses in achieving 
compliance. Many can justifiably claim that they can increase profit 
as well. Susan Shapiro (1987: 205) refers to ‘private social control 
entrepreneurs for hire’, while Reinier Kraakman (1986) refers to 
‘gatekeepers’. This  is   perhaps nowhere more evident than in the 
environmental services industry, where consultants are able to assist 
clients in reducing the use of raw materials and energy, and in reducing 
emissions and waste. Not only do they help client companies achieve a 
better bottom line, they can also contribute to a positive corporate image 
that may in turn be valuable in its own right. 
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3. The rise of meta-regulation
Three general trends—themselves interrelated—have emerged or 
intensified over the past half-century. The first is the weakening 
or, at  the very least, symbolic withdrawal of state regulatory activities, 
in both developed and developing countries. Whether driven by 
ideology, voter resistance, fiscal constraint or some combination of 
these, governments around the world have been seen to shed or devolve 
activities that they once monopolised. In addition, many, if not most, 
states have sought to reduce impediments to domestic economic activity. 
One of the most prominent departments of state in Australia’s federal 
government is the Department of Finance and Deregulation, renamed 
as such by a Labor government. 
Second—and arguably a reaction to the emergence of an apparent 
regulatory vacuum—is the increase in the number and activity of 
non-governmental participants in the regulatory process. Bartley 
(2007) observed that non-state initiatives are often inspired, if not 
provoked, by state inaction. At the same time, governments may 
seek to govern at a distance by actually encouraging compensatory 
initiatives of a quasi-regulatory nature on the part of private actors. 
Bartley attributes the rise of private certification schemes (such as those 
operating under the  auspices  of the Forest Stewardship Council or 
the Marine Stewardship Council) to the failures of governments and 
intergovernmental organisations. However, he observes that, in some 
instances, governments have provided financial assistance to non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to facilitate the development of 
private certification programs (Bartley 2003, 2007). When the visible 
hand of the state is absent or weak, the once invisible, but now quite 
apparent, hand of the market may compensate.
The third general trend may be seen in the growth and diffusion of 
technology that has significantly increased the regulatory capacity of 
non-state actors, no less than of governments. Means of surveillance, 
information storage and retrieval and product testing that were once 
exclusive instruments of the state (if they existed at all) are now within 
the reach of ordinary citizens. Mobile telephones now serve as video 
cameras. Private testing of forest products was noted above. Satellite 
remote sensing can detect unauthorised land clearance (Bartel 2005). 
DNA testing can determine the provenance of marine, forest or 
agricultural products. Global positioning system (GPS) devices can track 
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the movement of waste materials. Chemical analysis can identify product 
content with increasing specificity (Auld et al. 2010). Conservation 
activists use unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor endangered species 
(McGivering 2012). 
We are now well into the information revolution, and one is beginning 
to see the enormous potential for digital technology to enhance 
the regulatory capacity of ordinary citizens. The potential of social 
networking to build social capital has been noted by Ellison et al. 
(2007). As envisaged by Ayres and Braithwaite, before the onset of the 
digital age, citizens can exercise vigilance directly over the performance 
of regulatory agencies or over the behaviour of corporate actors. 
Digital technology has empowered individual citizens in a manner 
that was unimaginable three decades ago. Among the more dramatic 
manifestations of the democratisation of technology is the emergence 
of social media. Technology greatly facilitates communications between 
widely dispersed individuals, without editorial or governmental 
mediation. Communication has become democratised and information 
made accessible to an unprecedented extent, and the potential for citizen 
involvement in the regulatory process is greater than ever.
The environmental impact of Chinese economic development has led 
to a number of protest demonstrations, facilitated by technologies 
such as the internet and text messaging. Some of these have been 
successful in forcing the cancellation or postponement of development 
projects (Wang  2010). The flurry of online criticism of rail transport 
safety following the crash of a ‘bullet train’ in July 2011 triggered state 
censorship of the media, which was also criticised in online forums. 
Across the Pacific, one sees online encouragement of consumer 
boycotts and websites that monitor particular industries or companies. 
Thus, technology facilitates the mobilisation and sustainability of mass 
action to an extent unimaginable before the coming of the digital age.
Citizens may also assist in labour-intensive investigation of 
noncompliance. The Chinese examples referred to above include one 
case involving the perpetrator of a wanton act of animal cruelty who was 
traced to a remote corner of the country and identified. In the United 
Kingdom, The Guardian newspaper posted hundreds of thousands of 
documents relating to expenses claimed by Members of Parliament, 
inviting members of the public to review them for questionable claims. 
Over 25,000 citizens did so. 
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Crowdsourcing also lends itself to policy development and to 
investigation under state auspices. The US Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) has established an online forum for the public to 
voice ideas for the enhancement of the national broadband infrastructure. 
In an entirely different regulatory domain, roadkill observation systems 
invite members of the public to report species and location data to assist 
in wildlife management. Mobile phone apps have been developed to 
facilitate reporting of suspected illegal wildlife trafficking (Safi 2014). 
Sharesleuth.com, a website concerned with exposing securities fraud and 
corporate misconduct, encourages readers to send in tips and comments. 
The full potential of ‘wiki-regulation’ has yet to be determined, but the 
accountability problems posed by such extreme democratisation cannot 
be easily discounted. Self-appointed moral entrepreneurs may be driven 
by personal interest, misconceptions or malice rather than the public 
good. One recalls the persistent allegations that the logo of consumer 
products manufacturer Procter & Gamble was a satanic symbol. 
The sword of citizen participation is two-edged, and one would not wish 
to see the advent of wiki witch-hunts.
4. Conclusion
The lack of state capacity is not necessarily a good thing, especially 
when non-state regulatory institutions are themselves weak. Van der 
Heijden (forthcoming) studied over 50 market-driven approaches to 
urban sustainability and found their effects to have been negligible. 
From the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, to the collapse of once-
plentiful fisheries, examples of regulatory failure abound. These failures 
have defied not only state regulatory actors but also private regulatory 
systems and markets. Vogel (2010) suggests that civil regulation is not 
a substitute for the exercise of state authority, and argues that it should 
be reinforced by and integrated with state regulatory systems (see also 
Buthe 2010).
The rich variety of institutional orderings that pluralistic regulatory 
systems entail might lend themselves to graphic depiction. One might 
envisage models of regulatory systems not unlike molecular models 
used in drug design and materials science (see Grabosky 1997). Such 
models might enable one to visualise a regulatory system’s constituent 
institutional as well as coercive properties. The next generation of 
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regulatory scholars may include those who wish to undertake more 
precise description or modelling of regulatory systems. This could permit 
a degree of hypothesis testing and theory building, which has thus far 
been largely absent from the literature on regulation.
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A nodal perspective of 
governance: Advances in nodal 
governance thinking
Cameron Holley and Clifford Shearing1
For centuries, regulatory thinking has been inspired by the powerful 
story of a benign giant, made up of the bodies of people, beautifully 
depicted in the frontispiece by Abraham Bosse, with input by Thomas 
Hobbes for his Leviathan, published in 1651 (Hobbes 1951). This giant 
stands over a landscape that he rules on behalf of these people. In his 
left hand, he carries a crosier that symbolises his legitimacy as a ruler. 
In his right is a sword that symbolises his ability to overcome resistance 
to his rule. This great leviathan—whose contemporary incarnation is the 
nation-state—was conceived as being so powerful that he would be able 
to shape the wills of ‘his’ people in ways that would ensure peace at 
home as well as aid against enemies abroad. This story, told with much 
acumen by Hobbes, has provided an influential and compelling way of 
thinking about and creating arrangements for governance in the West 
(Burris et al. 2005)—in particular, the governance of security through 
the institutions of criminal justice. 
1  This work is, in part, based on research supported by the South African National Research 
Foundation (NRF), an Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Early Career Researcher 
Award (DE140101216) and an ARC Linkage Grant (LP130100967). Any opinions, findings, 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and the NRF 
does not accept any liability in this regard.
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The contours of this story have, at different times and places, taken different 
shapes (Braithwaite 1999), from Weber’s (1946) ‘human community’, 
which claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory, to the minimalist nightwatchmen state (Nozick 1974) 
and the more active welfare state associated with Keynesian thinking 
(Keynes 1933). Despite their differences, these stories all embrace a 
unified vision of governance that was nicely captured within the terms 
of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, in which the parties to this treaty 
conceived of sovereign states as enjoying exclusive authority within their 
geographic regions (Krasna 2001; Shearing and Johnston 2010). 
Although modern versions of this vision have long dominated 
governance  thinking, this persuasive image has never constituted a 
satisfactory empirical account of the realities of governance. Scott 
(2009) draws attention to this in his historical study of the 2,000-year 
history of the hill-people of Zomia in South-East Asia, who have 
deliberately and consistently strategically organised themselves to keep 
the state at arm’s length. This more polycentric view of governance has 
been confirmed by a host of other studies within political science and 
criminology (see, for example, Rhodes 2007; Brodeur 2010; Dupont 
2004). Criminology and related discussions of ‘crime control’ have long 
noted the presence of both public and private ‘auspices’ and ‘providers’ 
(Bayley and Shearing 2001) as well as the role of non-human ‘actants’ 
(Latour 2013)—for example, Shearing and Stenning’s (1984) analysis 
of the governance of security within Disneyworld and Lessig’s (1999) 
analysis of the regulation of cyberspace. 
A variety of decentred theories of governance has been developed to 
capture this reality of governance beyond the state (see, for example, 
Castells 2000; Black 2002; Rhodes 2007; Ostrom 2010; Bisschop and 
Verhage 2012). These theories do recognise explorations of state-focused 
forms of ‘command and control’ governance that often involve coercion 
exercised through hierarchy. However, they have also told an alternative 
story of governance as having multiple sources and many forms that 
appreciate, to use Foucaultian language, that: ‘Power is everywhere; not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere’ 
(Foucault 1984: 93). 
While some of these stories of decentred or polycentric governance 
(Ostrom 2010) have focused on ‘flows’ and ‘networks’ (Castells 2000), 
others have focused attention on nodes as sites of governance and have 
recognised the possibility of Robinson Crusoe nodes that can and do 
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operate in relative isolation from other sites (Burris et al. 2005). In this 
understanding, nodes—as ‘auspices’ and ‘providers’ of governance (Bayley 
and Shearing 2001)—are understood not simply as points established by 
the intersection of flows within networks (Castells 2000: 15–16, 22), but 
rather as sites of capacity, knowledge and resources relevant to ‘shaping 
the flow of events’, to use Parker and Braithwaite’s (2003: 119) simple 
and succinct definition of governance. 
In developing this perspective, Wood and Shearing (2007: 149) define 
nodes as follows:
Governing nodes are organisational sites (institutional settings that 
bring together and harness ways of thinking and acting) where attempts 
are made to intentionally shape the flow of events. Nodes govern under 
a variety of circumstances, operate in a variety of ways, are subject to a 
variety of objectives and concerns, and engage in a variety of different 
actions to shape the flow of events. Nodes relate to one another, and 
attempt to mobilise and resist one another, in a variety of ways so as 
to shape matters in ways that promote their objectives and concerns. 
Nodal governance is diverse and complex.
Within this decentred conception of governance, there are multiple ‘tops’ 
and many ‘downs’ and they ‘overlap’ (Wood and Shearing 2007: 149). 
In  Brodeur’s (2006: ix) terms, the pluralisation of security ‘does away 
with the single stuff mythology’ (for discussion of boundaries within 
complex systems, see Cilliers 2005). 
Within political science this emerging ‘governance perspective’ (Rhodes 
2007) conceives of governance as extending beyond government in 
much the same way as policing, within criminology, has come to be 
understood as extending beyond police (Brodeur 2010). Explorations of 
nodal governance and networked governance have become increasingly 
commonplace. Within this polycentric perspective, while states are 
recognised as significant governors, they are conceived of as existing in 
a broader context of other auspices and providers of governance. 
This conception considers the questions of who governs and how they 
govern as issues that cannot be determined a priori, but that require 
careful exploration through empirical and context-specific research. 
Johnston and Shearing (2003: 22–30) have developed an eight-point 
framework to be used in guiding such explorations (for an example of its 
use, see Kerr 2015). Crucial to the empirical inquiries that this polycentric 
conception of governance has generated have been the issues of how 
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different auspices and providers of governance relate to one another and 
how, and when, they enrol the capacities and resources of others as they 
seek to realise their governance objectives (Nakueira 2014). 
These empirical ‘post-Foucauldian’ (McKee 2009) inquiries into 
‘multilateral’ (Bayley and Shearing 2001) or ‘multidimensional’ (Rhodes 
2007) forms of governance (for a recent example, see Kerr 2015) are to 
be distinguished from the normative arguments of political philosophy 
that consider who should govern, how they should govern and to whom 
they should be accountable (for a discussion, see McLaughlin 2007: 
Chapter 4). Within the context of nodal systems of governance, these 
normative explorations often argue that, for governance to be legitimate, 
it should, in Loader and Walker’s (2007) terms, be ‘state-anchored’. 
That is, governance, it is argued, should, if it is to be legitimate, be both 
overseen and authorised by states who are themselves authorised, via 
legitimate political processes, to govern.2 
Many differing policy advocates have employed and developed the 
normative position that governance should be overseen and authorised 
by states. For instance, Osborne and Gaebler (1993) have drawn 
specifically on the normative thinking of economists such as Frederick 
Hayek (1945, 2007) and Milton Friedman (1962) to support ‘neoliberal’ 
governance arrangements organised around the outsourcing of the 
provision of governance by the state to private and civil-sector nodes. 
This issue of how ‘plurality needs to be managed and whether, in fact, 
it needs to be’ (Kerr 2015: 26) is a significant topic of discussion and 
debate within nodal governance (see, for example, Bayley and Shearing 
1996; Ayling et al. 2009).
Much exploration of nodal forms of governance took place at the 
Regulatory  Institutions Network (RegNet), including work at 
The Australian National University (ANU) before RegNet came into 
existence (Grabosky et al. 1993). Several scholars based at RegNet 
have made important strides in developing polycentric understandings 
of governance—for example, Julie Ayling, John Braithwaite, Val 
Braithwaite,  Peter Drahos, Peter Grabosky, Neil Gunningham, 
Monique  Marks and Jennifer Wood (see also Holley, Chapter 42, 
this volume). One of the most recent of these has been Russell Brewer’s 
2  For a discussion of the practical implications of ‘anchored pluralism’ (Loader and Walker 2006: 
194), see Ayling et al. (2009); and for a comparison of nodal governance and anchored pluralism, see 
White (2011: 90–5).
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(2014) work on the governance of security within waterfronts and 
his chapter in this volume (see Chapter 26) that analyses patterns of 
connections within security networks. 
While much of the research exploring nodal ordering has taken place 
within criminology—work that uses a polycentric nodal framing both 
explicitly and implicitly3—increasingly, the nodal governance idea is 
being developed and explored by scholars within other areas.4 
Nodal governance thinking has to date been centred primarily on the 
twin concepts of nodes and networks. Both concepts are grounded in 
a constitutive understanding (Shearing 1993) that sees governance as 
layered. In this understanding, worlds that present themselves as given 
are understood as being constituted through subterranean governing 
processes that have shaped events to produce these worlds. 
Coordination between nodes is made possible via networks. When this 
happens, governance becomes ‘the property of networks rather than 
… the product of any single centre of action’ ( Johnston and Shearing 
2003: 148); under these conditions, governance is said to be ‘coproduced’ 
and collaborative (Holley et al. 2012). Crawford (2006: 466) writes of 
networks linking nodes into ‘horizontal partnerships’ with a presupposed 
‘element of coordination’. In reflecting on such arrangements, Johnston 
and Shearing (2003) insist that, within networks, there is no necessity 
for a single locus of control. Nor, they argue, do nodes within networks 
necessarily work together to promote shared outcomes. Furthermore, 
who does what within these networks can, and does, change across 
space and over time. Certainly, some nodes can be fixed and wield power 
by regulating other nodes (Burris et al. 2005). In such cases, networks 
will often need to enrol these nodes to ‘capture’ their power or their 
access to other nodal networks (Drahos 2004). Even so, networks are 
very often fluid and rarely fixed. In the words of Wood and Dupont 
(2006: 4), networks and the nodal assemblages constitute ‘temporary 
hubs of practices’ involving iterative processes carried out by a range of 
actors who occupy different positions of influence. Networks may exist 
within and across sectors such as environment, policing, health or other 
regulatory issues (Wright and Head 2009).
3  See, for example, Ericson and Doyle’s (2004) groundbreaking work on insurance and Pat 
O’Malley’s (2010) work on risk.
4  See, for example, Burris (2004) and his research on public health and Peter Drahos and John 
Braithwaite’s (2002) work on developments within intellectual property issues.
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Nodes are regarded as ‘any formal or informal institution that is able to 
secure at least a toe-hold in a governance network’ (Burris et al. 2008: 
25). For Braithwaite (2008), nodes are what make governance ‘buzz’. 
While nodes, like networks, are typically not fixed, they are nonetheless 
conceived of as ‘point[s] in time and space’ (Braithwaite 2004: 312), where 
actors mobilise pooled resources to tie together strands in networks of 
power. They may comprise individuals, groups (or parts of groups), 
organisations (or parts of organisations) or states (or parts thereof ); 
they may be large or small, tightly or loosely connected and inclusive or 
exclusive; they may engage in similar activities or they may be specialised 
(Shearing and Johnston 2010). Nodes can function separately or jointly 
as sponsors of governmental actions and/or as providers who supply 
governmental services such as security (Shearing and Wood 2003). 
Consistent with a constitutive conception of governance, the boundaries 
of networks, and the nodes within them, are not a given. They may 
be defined with clear boundaries or their boundaries may be blurred; 
organisationally, they may be decentralised or hierarchical. While nodes 
and networks are constantly reconstituting themselves to form new 
structures, nodes typically do too much planning for their governing 
activities to be considered purely spontaneous in a Hayekian sense 
(Baumgartner and Pahl-Wostl 2013). Indeed, with such flux—and with 
neither the state nor any other set of nodes given conceptual priority—
understanding how certain nodes plan and interact with other nodes, 
and then form assemblages and networks, requires considerable research 
(Shearing and Wood 2003). 
Such an empirical analysis, it is argued, requires the investigation of 
four principal elements: mentalities (relating to how nodes think about 
a governance outcome—for example, security, or a safe environment); 
technologies (relating to the methods they might use to facilitate it); 
resources (relating to the social, cultural, economic or other means 
they might deploy in its furtherance); and institutions (relating to the 
structures that enable the mobilisation of resources, mentalities and 
technologies in pursuit of governance outcome) ( Johnston and Shearing 
2003; Burris et al. 2005). Mapping these elements typically requires 
the compilation of data by a variety of means, including documentary 
analysis, observation, qualitative interviews and focus groups, as well as 
the quantitative techniques that currently dominate network analysis. 
In particular, ethnographic methods are used to deepen more quantitative 
analyses (Shearing and Johnston 2010). In accord with the constitutive 
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conception noted earlier, nodal governance recognises that every ‘world’ 
is ‘a human invention and reinvention’ ( Johnston and Shearing 2003: 
148) that is accomplished through governing processes.
The nodal governance framework has been used by a variety of scholars to 
shape and guide their analyses of governance processes. A good example 
of this is John Braithwaite’s (2008) insightful discussion of Timor-
Leste, where he uses nodal governance thinking in conjunction with a 
responsive regulation framework to map and understand post-conflict 
security governance. He considers how the governance of security within 
this context involves a variety of nodes, each with access to different sets 
of resources, authority and mentalities, each of which engages the other 
in realising security agendas. 
Particularly valuable in this exploration is the way Braithwaite enhances 
nodal governance thinking by including ‘things’ as ‘actants’ (Latour 
2004) as he explores the resources that nodal agents deploy as they seek 
to shape the flow of events. In this analysis, he contrasts the way in 
which two public sector nodes (the Australian Federal Police and the 
Guarda Nacional Republicana from Portugal) brought to the governance 
of security in Timor-Leste very different governing sensibilities. 
While Braithwaite’s focus is principally on formal nodes, James Martin 
(2012), in contrast, focuses his attention on nodes within the informal 
sector. He draws on Dupont’s (2004) integration of Bourdieu’s (1986) 
notion of a variety of ‘capitals’ to explore the mentalities and resources 
of nodal action. In particular, he explores the way in which ‘force capital’ 
is used in exercising control over physical spaces. 
A third example of the systematic use of a nodal conception to explore 
security governance is provided by John Kerr (2015), who uses the 
analytical framework for nodal mapping developed by Johnston and 
Shearing (2003) to explore the complex set of public, private and 
civil arrangements involved in the coproduction of ‘art security’. As is 
common across nodal analyses, Kerr focuses on the ways in which nodes 
attempt to enrol others to achieve their governing objectives. 
Peter Drahos, in his work on the governance of intellectual property, 
has also utilised a nodal analysis to explore ‘nodal concentrations 
of power and knowledge’ (Drahos 2005: 21). Drahos utilises a 
nodal framing and enhances it with his analysis of what he terms 
superstructural nodes: ‘Super-structural nodes are the command 
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centers of networked governance’ (2004: 405). Yet another example, at 
the boundary of established security governance, is the use of a nodal 
governance framework to explore normative ‘good governance’ agendas 
within public  health (see, for example, Burris et al. 2007). For Burris 
(2004), a  nodal analysis is useful in finding innovative institutional 
arrangements for the delivery of key social goods. 
One strength of the nodal approach, as applied by these and many other 
authors, is that it reveals the complexity of governing processes while at 
the same time opening up new avenues for explanatory and normative 
thinking. As Wright and Head (2009: 207) note: ‘The potential strength 
of such models could be their ability to map interactions and capacities 
of nodes, both as sites of continuity and of contestation.’ 
Nodal analysis opens up opportunities for first describing, and then 
transforming, networked relations that produce governance outcomes. 
As Johnston and Shearing (2003: 160) write, in drawing attention to the 
normative implications of nodal thinking:
Our point is merely that with demonstrable evidence of nodal 
governance becoming more and more apparent, opportunities may 
arise to transform networked relations in ways that could, under the 
right conditions, advance just and democratic outcomes.
Braithwaite (2004), in discussing ‘methods of power’, suggests how 
global governance processes might be reshaped through reshaping 
nodal relations (see also Ayling et al. 2009). As Braithwaite (2004: 330) 
explains, ‘weak actors, wielding only puny sanctions, can escalate to 
enrolling more and more actors of increasingly greater clout to a project 
of network confrontation with the strong’.
Given the history of nodal governance thinking, many of the scholars 
who have used it have done so within the fields of policing and security, 
and it is here that much of the debate over its value as an analytical 
framework has taken place. Within this context, nodal governance 
thinking has been deployed to explore the ‘pluralisation’ (Loader 2000) 
of security provision through private, community, public and hybrid 
forms of providers; the role of voluntary service agencies (Martin 2012; 
Huey 2008); and the development of ‘mass private property’ (Shearing 
and Stenning 1981) in the form of shopping malls, gated communities 
and the like (Wakefield 2003). 
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A number of scholars have questioned what they regard as the tendency 
of a nodal framework—given its history as an alternative to state-
centred analytical frameworks—to neglect vertical relations in favour 
of horizontal ones. Kerr (2015: 159) draws attention to this when he 
writes that:
Although it is necessary to avoid state fetishism (Shearing 2006) when 
analysing art security in London, it is also important to eschew private 
fetishism because of the huge amount of art in London for which the 
public sector takes responsibility and the manner in which public and 
private nodes work together (even if only temporarily).
In a similar vein, Cook (2010: 456) has argued that: 
[S]tudies of nodal governance suffer from excessive localism inasmuch 
as they almost always focus on ‘horizontal’ networks, ignoring the more 
‘vertical’ connections to actors and institutions that operate at other 
spatial scales. 
These critiques echo concerns expressed by Loader and Walker (2007; 
see also Boutellier and van Steden 2011) that nodal governance thinkers 
are inclined to treat states as ‘idiots’ and, in so doing, have lost sight 
of the important role states play in ‘civilising’ governance processes. 
This critique is also taken up by Crawford and Lister (2004), who 
argue that the state should be conceived of as more than merely one 
node among many, as the role of states remains pivotal in respect of 
both symbolic power and its regulatory capacity. According to this line 
of critique, nodal governance thinking runs the risk of unintentionally 
weakening state institutions and ceding legitimacy to nodes of uncertain 
virtue (Wright  and Head 2009). Similarly, Zedner (2009: 161) notes 
that, instead of being part of the solution, the emphasis that some 
nodal thinkers place on empowering communities may encourage 
vigilantism,  the pursuit of private vengeance and the vilification of 
particular groups of individuals. In the view of these scholars, nodal 
governance’s decentring of states, and what is interpreted to be a denial 
of the need for strong state institutions, is regarded as unwise for both 
explanatory and normative reasons. By emphasising the plural locations 
of power and legitimacy, so the argument goes, nodal governance 
thinking risks denying the need for strong state institutions and ceding 
influence to nodes of uncertain legitimacy (Wright and Head 2009). 
Even so, there is still much work to be done to resolve such debates. 
For instance, as Drahos’s (2010) work on patent office governance has 
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shown, thinking in a nodal manner can in fact strengthen weak developing 
states’ patent offices, which can compete with multinationals only when 
they enrol outside actors to help with the examination of patents, and 
thus increase their legitimacy.
Other scholars have used their critiques to shift terminologies—
for example, Brodeur (2010), with his notion of ‘the policing web’, 
Abrahamsen and William’s (2011) use of the idea of ‘security assemblages’ 
and Baker’s (2007) notion of ‘multi-choice policing’. Others have sought 
to expand on the range of nodes that nodal governance recognises (for 
example, Brewer 2014, in his study of waterfronts). Yet other scholars 
have sought to recognise other theoretical possibilities—for example, 
Drahos (2004), with his notion of ‘superstructural nodes’. Still others 
have sought to extend the normative repertoire of nodal governance 
thinking. Marks and Wood (2010), for example, use the ‘minimalist and 
minimal police perspective’ in seeking to extend previous explanatory 
and normative accounts of nodal governance. 
While policing and the policing arena have been the principal empirical 
terrain of nodal governance thinking, this terrain is now broadening. 
In the environmental area, for instance, there has been growing use 
of the nodal governance framework (Holley et al. 2012). Similarly, 
Baumgartner and Pahl-Wostl (2013) have used a nodal governance 
theoretical framework to study global water governance, while Burris 
and his collaborators have used a nodal governance framework within 
public health (see, for example, Burris 2004; Burris et al. 2007). Within 
a security umbrella, nodal governance thinking has been applied to 
harbours and port security (van Sluis et al. 2012; Brewer 2014), the 
security of taxi drivers (Paes-Machado and Nascimento 2014) and 
child protection (Harris and Wood 2008). Another area of expansion 
of nodal thinking has been in relation to the governance of cyberspace 
(Wall 2007; Huey et al. 2013; Nhan 2010). 
In conclusion, the nodal governance perspective has done much to 
encourage an emerging body of empirical research, across a range 
of  different social contexts, which has explored the shifting shape of 
policing and security governance, as well as an increasingly wide variety 
of public problems, including the environment, health and intellectual 
property. While nodal governance may ‘lack’ a normative model, it 
provides a valuable means for describing the dynamics and structures of 
regulatory networks including non-state actors. Its fundamental benefit, 
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then, is its capacity to open space for new normative responses otherwise 
closed to traditional state-centric governance perceptions (Wright and 
Head 2009).
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Risk often appears ubiquitous in modern life. We are inundated with 
news of terrorist attacks, environmental catastrophe and the emergence 
of diseases such as swine flu and Ebola, brought to us through a never-
ending media stream. Conceptualising these threats through the 
language of risk enjoys widespread popularity and currency—a language 
that embodies ideas of rationality, probabilistic reasoning and modernity 
(Zinn 2009; Bernstein 1996). In this way, we are made conscious of 
our individual and collective vulnerability. Yet it is also within these 
overlapping paradigms that we understand our capacity to reduce the 
risks we face and to enhance our wellbeing. In this context, effective 
regulation appears as the antidote to many, if not all, contemporary risks. 
Risk and regulation are brought together through scientific and technical 
assessments combined with economic analyses to determine when, what 
kind of and how much regulatory control should be forthcoming to 
reduce a particular risk to an acceptable level. Arguably, it is by virtue 
of regulation that those in the industrialised world have come to expect 
safe food, safe consumer goods and safe buildings. Certainly, regulatory 
reforms that follow the realisation of a particular risk—whether an 
industrial disaster, financial collapse or some other event—suggest that 
our vulnerability to a wide variety of risks can be ameliorated through 
regulation. Regulation, realised in the form of a wide variety of policy 
instruments, including legal and quasi-legal strategies (Freiberg 2010), 
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is developed and enforced to shape everyday behaviours, technologies and 
organisational processes in a manner aimed at reducing the possibility 
of disaster. 
This narrative of effective regulation as a response to an unwanted risk 
represents a dominant way of understanding the connection between 
risk and regulation. It is one, though, that requires complication to make 
sense of when regulation is forthcoming and why, and why some risks 
bring a significant regulatory response and others languish for want of 
attention. This chapter teases out this complex relationship by drawing 
on the literature on risk in the context of regulation—a broad remit 
that encompasses psychology, sociology, politics and law, among others. 
Many of these literatures are well represented in this edited collection 
and so the analyses of different aspects of regulation by a number 
of contributors are relevant to the analysis presented here. 
A major puzzle for what might be termed the modernist narrative of 
the significant capacity of regulation to reduce risk, highlighted above, 
is the casting of regulation as a burden. Surely, the reduction of risk 
through regulation should be a cause for celebration? Yet this is only 
part of the story since, despite its promise of protection, regulation is 
often castigated as burdensome. ‘Too much regulation’ raises concern. 
Disparate actors voice their opposition to ‘red tape’, ‘green tape’ and the 
overweening influence of ‘the nanny state’. Business voices are prominent 
here. Governments respond by undertaking various campaigns aimed at 
sweeping away this ‘regulatory burden’ and freeing the creativity of private 
enterprise (see, for example, Government of the Netherlands n.d.). 
This debate that oscillates between too much and too little regulation 
provides a critical insight into the way that regulatory reform and the 
challenges of compliance are part of an ongoing political discourse. It is 
a discourse infused alternately with a language of protection from risk on 
the one hand and of stifling creativity, agency and responsibility on the 
other. 
When risk and regulation are understood as embedded within a 
political discourse, differences between jurisdictions, with their 
disparate conceptions and sensitivities to risk, become apparent. 
For  example, the European Union is well recognised as a jurisdiction 
within which the precautionary principle can hold considerable sway. 
Under the guidance of the precautionary principle, a risk-averse stance 
is recommended where uncertainty about the potentially damaging 
long-term consequences of a particular chemical or side effects from 
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a pharmaceutical drug, for example, leads to a presumption that such a 
substance or process should not be allowed on to the market unless and 
until its safety is assured (Tosun 2013). In contrast, the pharmaceutical 
drugs regulatory approach in the United States tends towards a regime 
based on an iterative feedback model where products can be released 
on to the market without a full understanding of the consequences of 
that action. A preliminary approval process is undertaken and warnings 
are provided for the individual to make their own decision regarding its 
suitability for them. The aim is that the product will be redesigned as 
any negative consequences come to light (Davis and Abraham 2011). 
Similar risks and uncertainties arising within different contexts can 
generate disparate regulatory outcomes.
2. Three risks, not one?
The relationship between risk and regulation appears to be somewhat 
of a paradox. It makes regular media appearances with regulation being 
obvious and necessary for our protection against risk and, at the same 
time, onerous, unnecessary and burdensome. One way to make sense 
of this paradoxical relationship is to interrogate and break apart the 
concept of risk. This can be done by asking key questions about what 
kind of risk is at issue and how different risks may shape the imperative 
to regulate and deregulate. The first question to ask is who or what is at 
risk and from what source? In light of this, the second question is what 
is the relationship between this particular form of risk and regulation 
itself ? The answers to these questions allow us to understand that risk 
in the context of regulation can be usefully understood as comprising 
three separate ideal types (Haines 2011: especially Chapter 2), which 
have a different subject at, or vector of, risk, which helps explain the way 
regulation is patterned. The  interaction between these ideal types also 
helps explain the contested territory regulation often inhabits. 
The first of these conforms to the idea of risk as presented at the 
beginning of the introduction. Here, what is at risk is the possibility of 
harm to an individual, collective or the environment arising out of an 
unwanted event. The vector precipitating this event can be apprehended 
as external to those individuals or groups affected or the natural 
environment that is threatened. This ideal type I term ‘actuarial risk’. 
A disease, a fall from a height at a worksite and an unintentional release of 
toxic effluent from a factory would all fall within this conception of risk. 
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Natural, medical, engineering and their allied sciences are often used to 
determine the probability and impact of this kind of harmful occurrence 
being realised. Superficially, it would appear that actuarial risk is the 
one most commonly associated with regulation, exemplified by regimes 
concerned with infection control, public health, occupational health 
and safety and environmental protection. Yet, we know that scientific 
concern  can often fail to produce the necessary social and political 
motivation for regulation to emerge. A prominent example here is that 
of climate change. Despite the scientific consensus on the catastrophic 
consequences of our impact on the climate for both humans and the 
environment, effective regulation remains elusive, as social, political 
and economic concerns shape what regulation is forthcoming and 
why. Two other ideal types capture these social, political and economic 
concerns and reframe them within the language of risk. These two allow 
us to better interrogate the political discourse around risk and regulation.
The second ideal type, ‘sociocultural risk’, comprises threats to the human 
collective. Sociocultural risks are those that threaten to harm collective 
wellbeing, comprising the social interactions that are part of everyday 
life—interactions that generate tangible needs, such as food, and the less 
tangible, such as a sense of security and belonging. This risk captures the 
reality that humans are social beings, and our concern with the health 
of the collective is a logical consequence of this (Douglas  1966). 
Social order, and hence events that heighten sociocultural risk, is also 
likely to be context specific. The introduction of a new technology 
(such  as digital technology) may raise sociocultural risks, particularly 
when this technology mediates relationships (such  as dating sites). 
New  technologies, processes and relationships may be perceived as 
threats more in one context than in another and are certainly subject 
to changing perceptions over time. The point, however, is not that a 
particular social order is moral and desirable, or immoral and undesirable; 
rather, it is that, as social beings, we need some form of social order for 
our survival. For this reason, human beings are uniquely attuned to group 
wellbeing and their place within the group. Hence, those who voice their 
concerns and draw attention to what they perceive as being harmful to 
the social group not only raise issues of social concern but are also making 
a statement of belonging to that group. It is important to recognise that 
this reality of our interdependence does not preclude either significant 
conflicts in values within a society (expressed in different views about 
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what is a concern) or the presence of significant inequalities (Haines 
2011: 44). The inescapable reality, though, is the need for a requisite level 
of sociality for a society to sustain itself (cf. Carson 2007).
The third ideal type—‘political risk’—brings together within a single 
risk frame threats to political legitimacy and risks to the economy 
or, more accurately, to capitalist accumulation. The subject at risk can 
be understood not only as risks to the government of the day, but 
also to the legitimacy of a political system within a particular setting. 
This understanding of political risk is framed by the central task of 
government to sustain capital accumulation while also maintaining its 
own legitimacy, with an understanding that those imperatives may be 
in conflict with one another (Offe 1984; Habermas 1979). Threats to 
political risk, then, are, on the one hand, economic and, on the other, 
sociocultural and actuarial. Managing political risk involves ensuring 
the requisite conditions for capitalist economic activity to flourish 
and, through taxes and other charges, providing the necessary income 
for government itself to function. This economic requirement is met 
by the need for governments to reassure the citizenry of their security. 
The maintenance of legitimacy often involves governments protecting, 
or promising to protect, citizens from a wide variety of risks, most often 
in the form of threats to collective wellbeing. While some of these threats 
may be actuarial in origin, dealing with actuarial risks is not sufficient, 
or even necessary, to retain political legitimacy. Reassurance is a political 
dynamic framed towards sociocultural risk roots. What becomes obvious 
here is the way that sociocultural risks are inevitably drawn into political 
debates and governments positioning themselves to maintain their own 
legitimacy (cf. Clarke and Short 1993). Indeed, these political debates 
may actually deflect attention away from particular actuarial concerns. 
The debates around climate change provide an excellent example of the 
way political risk can be managed (at least in the short term) without 
addressing the actuarial risk problem.
As ideal types, none of the three—actuarial, sociocultural or political—
will ever be found independently from one another. They exist in 
combination and in complex interaction. Nonetheless, their relative 
independence allows us to understand how and why regulation may 
concentrate on one area where, arguably, a problem of limited actuarial 
risk may lie, and yet concentrate on another where the actuarial risks 
may be real, but limited.
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3. Risk, uncertainty and risk assessment
When each of these three ideal types of risk is examined, what becomes 
clear is that each has integrity. That is, a sociocultural risk to collective 
wellbeing (a serious undermining of the social fabric) or a risk to 
political legitimacy (the presence of serious political unrest or a military 
coup) can give rise to an equally problematic and harmful outcome as 
an actuarially based risk. Put simply, each risk is real and fears of their 
realisation may be entirely rational. But what is also clear is that the basic 
assessment of a particular risk can be partial, distorted or virtually non-
existent. Levels of uncertainty and the contours of that uncertainty differ 
(Renn 2008). Actuarial, sociocultural and political risks are all subject to 
risk assessment—an assessment that must grapple with varying levels 
of uncertainty.
The relationship between risk, risk assessment and uncertainty is 
itself the  subject of a considerable literature. On the one hand, some 
psychologists point to the frailty of human beings in their capacity 
to assess risk as well as differing appetites for taking particular risks 
(Slovic 1987). Here, regulation may well depend on the particular biases 
of the policymakers themselves. It may also depend on how a particular 
risk challenge is framed. As human beings, we are better able to apprehend 
the potential impact of a given risk than a finegrained appreciation of 
wide differences in the probability of its occurrence (Sunstein 2003). 
Further, certain risk events seem to garner greater attention because of 
their visceral nature (Sunstein 2005). Regulations, then, can be expected 
to cluster around events where the potential impact is severe even where 
the probability is remote. 
Many writers also draw out the inevitability and even desirability 
of uncertainty. From the perspective of the natural sciences, science 
understands itself as an uncertain enterprise (Bedsworth and Kastenberg 
2002). In the classic Popperian view of science, a scientific fact remains 
a hypothesis, waiting to be replaced with a more accurate analysis. 
Problems can arise, though, when science is brought into political debate 
and legal processes. Political debates look for certainties even as they 
exploit uncertainties for political gain. Politicians draw on evidence to 
support their own predetermined political positions in what has been 
termed ‘policy-based evidence’ as opposed to its more respectable cousin, 
evidence-based policy (Strassheim and Kettunen 2014). From a different 
perspective, Pat O’Malley (2004) argues that the very language of risk 
and risk assessment is an exercise in taming the uncertainty of governing 
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through risk while acknowledging that some level of uncertainty is 
desirable. It allows governments and authorities to act in the face of 
what may be essentially (and properly) unknowable. Risk technologies 
such as risk assessment, risk management and the like resonate with our 
understanding of ourselves as rational and risks in the world as calculable. 
Here, the connection with regulation is that it provides visible evidence 
that a risk has been tamed even as uncertainty remains.
This discussion of the relationship between risk assessment and 
uncertainty highlights the way a risk assessment ostensibly based 
on one form of risk—most often actuarial risk—may be driven by 
sociocultural or political risk concerns. Discounting an assessment 
as ‘irrational’ does not help us understand the complex nature of this 
dynamic. To  be sure, there are some bureaucratic techniques that try 
to tease apart the actuarial from the social and the political to make 
good regulatory decisions. Their success or otherwise is often subject to 
intense debate. Cost–benefit analysis is one such example. Proponents 
argue that political priorities are essential and legitimate, but should be 
informed by a cost–benefit analysis or equivalent approach to encourage 
reflection (Sunstein 2005). However, attempts to capture social priorities 
are brought into the process. In the first instance, a cost–benefit analysis 
rests on a scientific or technical assessment of a particular actuarial risk 
in terms of its potential impact and the likelihood of its occurrence. 
The risk assessment here is based on an actuarial frame. The next step 
involves estimating monetary costs associated with reducing this risk 
followed by a formal or less formal process of understanding whether 
the societal benefits of the regulatory regime outweigh its costs. This 
involves a social calculus. In some cases, a monetary value is included 
that comprises a given society’s willingness to pay for its reduction, and 
to what level. This may be calculated according to some value placed on 
a statistical human life. Value of a statistical life (VSL) calculations are 
subject to intense debate regarding their validity and their appropriateness 
(Fourcade 2009; Robinson 2009; Viscusi 2009a, 2009b). The substance 
of this debate often rests precisely on the degree to which sociocultural 
and political risk concerns are, or are not, made transparent through this 
process. 
Even outside a formal cost–benefit analysis process, the way political 
or sociocultural risk concerns shape assessments of a given actuarial 
risk is often in evidence. A common example used here are those risk 
assessments made of the likelihood and impact of a terrorist attack 
within the context of Australia, the United States and the United 
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Kingdom. Considerable legislative and regulatory changes have taken 
place in these three jurisdictions following the terrorist attacks in the 
United States on 11 September 2001. These reforms, including those 
designed to reduce the impact and likelihood of an attack in a public 
place, such as an airport, rest on an uncertain and highly politicised 
risk-assessment process (Sunstein 2003, 2005). Indeed, it is possible to 
argue that regulatory reforms in this area have been designed as much 
to reduce political risk or enhance political legitimacy as to reduce the 
actuarial risk of a terrorist attack (Haines 2011: 115–23).
4. Risk management and regulation
This final section explores the connection between risk management 
and regulation; keeping in mind the three ideal types of risk is also 
illuminating. To illustrate this, this section begins with an approach that 
aims to enhance the self-regulatory capacities of organisations together 
with regulatory oversight—what Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite (1992) 
term ‘enforced self-regulation’, and others have labelled co-regulation 
(Wardrop 2014) or meta-regulation (see Grabosky, Chapter 9, this 
volume). As with other regulatory styles, co-regulation is most explicitly 
connected through the lens of the need to manage an actuarial risk, but 
its design seeks to engender a particularly conscious form of compliance. 
It requires a given regulatee, such as a chemical plant or oil refinery, to 
put in place its own regulatory strategy. This is designed explicitly for 
that site and is able to reduce or eliminate the potential for a catastrophic 
explosion. The site is then required to comply with the regulatory strategy 
it has developed. Within the major hazards area, this is labelled the ‘safety 
case approach’ (Haines 2011: 101–8). This form of regulation combines 
the risk management strategy of the regulator with the self-regulatory 
capacity engendered by an internal risk management process. Enforced 
self-regulation draws on the knowledge of actors inside an organisation 
to ensure risks are properly controlled while retaining external regulatory 
oversight to ensure this process has ongoing integrity. To be effective, it 
must be sensitive to sociocultural, and not just actuarial, risk concerns 
(Haines 2011: 149–54). While the relationship between the internal 
organisational actors and external oversight can vary (Wardrop 2014), 
the ultimate aim is the effective management of risk through engaging 
the conscious efforts of actors within the organisation to ensure risks are 
properly controlled.
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This process of eliciting conscious effort in the pursuit of risk reduction, 
such as the safety case regime, has consequences in terms of the efforts 
needed for an organisation to comply. A conscious, thoughtful and 
systematic approach to the management of a potentially catastrophic risk 
engendered by a particular regulatory regime may be appropriate. But, in 
other cases, attempts by a regulator to elicit significant conscious effort 
may have significant impacts on other functions of an organisation—
that are, arguably, more important. A good example of this problem is 
provided by Carol Heimer’s (2008) analysis of AIDS clinics and the 
regulatory regime of government funders designed to ensure the proper 
use of government funds. What her research shows is that the onerous 
nature of this regime could have a significant impact on the capacity of 
AIDS clinics to provide effective treatment. Further, it appeared that 
political risk considerations about potential scandal to government from 
the inappropriate use of government funds, or at least use in an area 
not allowed for, drove the regulatory regime and increased the effort 
required to comply.
To be sure, various regulatory regimes have been conscious of the 
need to   target resources and moderate the level of effort required 
by regulated sites to the level of risk posed. Risk-based regulation is 
the name given to  this  particular strategy. Here, regulators assess the 
impact and likelihood  of noncompliance across their regulatees to 
decide where their resources are best employed. The greatest attention—
arguably, demanded by a meta-regulatory approach—is directed to 
where problems  are likely to be the most significant (see Grabosky, 
Chapter 9, this volume). The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA)—the regulatory authority responsible for banks, insurers 
and superannuation funds—has designed its regulatory approach in 
this way. In doing so, it hoped to reduce the risk of financial collapse 
of one of these institutions or a serious inability to meet its ongoing 
liabilities. Its  regulatory effort was framed to target those institutions 
with potentially the greatest impact should they fail (Black 2006; 
Haines 2011).
A major challenge, though, is that regulatory regimes are multiple 
not singular. Regulation and compliance are each aimed at removing 
different forms of risk from an overall beneficial and socially desirable 
activity. Regulation is an instrumental, problem-focused and narrowly 
targeted form of policymaking. It is supported by a risk-based approach 
to regulation—a modernist paradigm characterised by separating out, 
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analysing, assessing and managing discrete risks. As such, it highlights 
the  significant challenge of a regulatory approach in managing 
a potentially broad array of disparate threats. 
With a focus on compliance from the perspective of the regulated entity, 
as opposed to the regulator, particular challenges with a risk management 
approach associated with regulation come into view. Organisations are 
likely to be subject to multiple regulatory regimes, each with a particular 
risk and risk management process in mind. For example, compliance 
with various forms of regulation relevant to a for-profit business may 
entail the reduction of a diverse range of risks, from financial fraud, 
occupational health and safety risks, product safety and environmental 
concerns to risks of anticompetitive conduct, among others. In general 
terms, for-profit business is desirable not only in terms of the products 
and services it may provide, but also in terms of the employment it 
creates. An even more complex array of regulations may be associated 
with hospitals and schools. Both serve significant areas of human need, 
their activities are desired and sanctioned by governments and they 
often enjoy considerable public support. But their activities encompass 
a broad array of potential risks each of which is likely to be subject to 
regulation. Even where each of these risks has been carefully assessed 
and regulations have been designed to be as effective as possible, the 
capacity to achieve these outcomes without negatively affecting the 
public benefits inherent within a given activity may be difficult. To be 
sure, there are also examples where regulatory compliance enhances 
organisational outcomes—for example, good accounting practice may 
both reduce the potential for fraud as well as enhance the pursuit of 
good business opportunities, but this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, 
there may be examples where the aims of compliance in one area are in 
considerable tension with those in another (Haines and Gurney 2003). 
Further, the policy emphasis on internal risk management processes by 
regulated sites may simply be understood as part of political strategy 
to ensure governments protect their political risk liabilities at the 
expense of overall public benefit (Haines and Sutton 2003). Regulation 
remains critical to enhancing public benefit, but we should be alert to its 
inherent problems.
The problem of too much regulation—or what is sometimes called 
‘juridification’ (Teubner 1998)—needs careful attention. A focus on 
political risk highlights why. The call for a reduction in the regulatory 
burden is common, particularly in the context of private enterprise, 
as highlighted above. The paragraph above explains why this may be 
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a problem. However, part of the task of political risk management is 
responding to this call from business to reduce ‘red tape’ in the hope 
and expectation that business activity will flourish. The reality is more 
complex. First, the impact of regulation on capital accumulation itself 
is not straightforward. Indeed, certain forms of regulation can engender 
business in their own right in terms of not only consultancies and risk 
management specialists but also technological innovation and industrial 
processes designed to reduce both human and environmental risk 
(Grabosky 1994; Jaffe et al. 1995). It is likely, however, that regulation 
will benefit some industries, and businesses within industries, more than 
others. The risk assessment process undertaken by governments in relation 
to the impact of regulation on conditions for capital accumulation may 
well be influenced by some businesses more than others. For example, 
the impact of the fossil fuel industry in weakening regulation aimed 
at mitigating carbon pollution and transforming energy production 
is recognised (Gunningham 2012). In other industries, too, such as 
regulatory reform in the context of the Global Financial Crisis, public 
concerns may be lost (Krawiec 2012). Further, the impetus towards 
reducing the regulatory burden in some areas such as corporate law may 
engender a positive feedback loop when any regulation, irrespective of its 
public benefit, is seen as suspect (Chen and Hanson 2004). 
Finally, we turn to risk management in the context of sociocultural risk. 
The management of sociocultural risk can be seen to draw on interpersonal 
and, arguably, leadership skills rather than on technical acumen. The 
psychological literature on procedural justice and that on responsive 
regulation provide some insight here. Tom Tyler’s work (2003), for example, 
shows how interpersonal skills are essential to ensuring acceptance of a 
given judicial or other form of authoritative outcome (see also Murphy, 
Chapter 3, this volume). Where people are treated fairly, listened to and 
their opinions respected, they are more likely to accept a given outcome 
even if that outcome is, on the face of it at least, not in their material 
interests (Tyler 2003; Braithwaite 2009). This suggests that procedural 
justice and responsive regulation tap into sociocultural risk management 
themes (Haines 2011: 44–5). At an organisational level, one can also look 
to the social licence literature. Research here points to the need for social 
acceptance of a given industry for it to function effectively. However, social 
oversight and acceptance may have different implications for particular 
actuarial risks depending on political context and the levels and contours 
of political risk. So, social oversight has, alternately, been argued to raise 
industry standards in some cases (for example, reducing pollution levels) 
(Gunningham et al. 2005), while other studies point to a social licence 
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being somewhat independent of actuarial concerns (Haines 2009) or even 
that social acceptance or a social licence (that is, successful sociocultural 
risk management) can be accompanied by ongoing and serious actuarial 
concerns (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Culley and Hughey 2008).
5. Conclusion
This chapter has teased apart the complex relationship between risk 
and regulation through an analysis of the three different ideal types of 
risk at play. Risk is captured not only by actuarial risks—those threats 
able to be calculated through a scientific or technical frame. Critically, 
sociocultural risks, risks to collective wellbeing and political risks framed 
by the dual challenges for governments of maintaining the conditions 
for capital accumulation and for legitimation are also important to 
understand. Each of these risks has real consequences should they be 
realised, but they differ in who or what is at risk. Each ideal type is 
also subject to a risk assessment—judgements that grapple with varying 
levels of uncertainty and the influence of concern about other risk types. 
Risk assessment of actuarial risk, for example, is often influenced by 
political risk such as that discussed above in the debates about science. 
Sociocultural risk assessments are often political in nature.
The analysis above on uncertainty also points to risk as a modernist 
framework for understanding the world. A modernist paradigm sees 
threats analysed, teased apart and dealt with through multiple assessment 
processes that result in discrete risk management imperatives. Risk 
management is made visible in disparate regulatory regimes that cover 
a broad array of different threats. With this in mind, it is not surprising 
that there are common complaints of overregulation. Yet, uncertainty 
always remains and regulation may be as much about governments’ need 
to demonstrate their mastery over uncertainty as it is about the capacity 
of a particular regulatory regime to reduce a particular actuarial risk.
A sustained interrogation of the connection between risk and regulation 
demonstrates the essential nature of regulation, yet also its limitations 
in enhancing our wellbeing. Ultimately, the dynamic of regulation may 
be best illuminated by the particular challenge of the management of 
political risk. Government assessment of the need to enhance capital 
accumulation may see it respond to business demands for deregulation, 
particularly by those businesses seen as central to a given economy. 
Arguably, capital accumulation and business acumen need some level of 
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uncertainty to flourish. But this imperative is met by a competing demand 
for governments to tend to their legitimacy—a demand more easily met 
by putting in place new or reformed regulation to manage disparate 
threats. Regulation as a solution to a political problem explains in part 
why regulation varies from place to place despite the similarity of the 
actuarial risk. The significant problem, however, is that meeting various 
demands for reassurance and juggling this with economic demands may 
not, in fact, mean that significant actuarial risks are responded to. 
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Public accountability: Conceptual, 
historical and epistemic mappings
Michael W Dowdle1
1. Introduction: On the crisis in public 
accountability
Many in the Anglo-American world perceive a growing crisis in 
public accountability. They fear that privatisation and globalisation are 
breaking down the traditional accountability arrangements that give us 
confidence in our government—for example, by devolving important 
political authority and power to private actors who are able to operate 
outside the public accountability mechanisms designed for civil 
servants, or by shifting governmental powers and responsibilities on to 
transnational actors, both public and private, who operate outside the 
jurisdictional reach of domestically formulated accountability systems 
(see Drahos, Chapter 15; Tusikov, Chapter 20, this volume).  All this 
leads to suspicion about whether the political forces affecting our lives 
are really acting in the interest of the public.
1  Adapted from Dowdle, M 2006. ‘Public accountability: Conceptual, historical, and epistemic 
mappings’, in MW Dowdle (ed.), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–32.
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This crisis is further exacerbated by the fact that different people seem 
to have different and often conflicting ideas as to what constitutes or 
satisfies a meaningfully ‘public’ accountability. Economic development 
agencies, for example, tend to see public accountability primarily in terms 
of rationalised and transparent systems of bureaucratic control. Human 
rights activists see it primarily in terms of popular participation in and 
supervision of political decision-making. Legal development agencies 
often see it in terms of judicial enforcement of legal norms. Many 
regulatory reformers in the United States and the United Kingdom see 
it in terms of market-like competition and discipline. Thus, while there 
is common perception of an accountability problem, there is also deep 
division about its exact causes and nature and about what our appropriate 
response to that problem should be.
As will be explored in this chapter, this is because different visions of 
public accountability reflect different histories, different experiences and 
different concerns. Historically, these differences have been harmonised 
somewhat by the conceptual predominance of what we will call the 
bureaucratic mode of public accountability. Recent events, however, 
have weakened this predominance and, in so doing, have catalysed 
inconsistencies between and among these various ways of experiencing 
public accountability. 
Part 2 of this chapter looks at the historical roots of present-day Anglo-
American understandings of public accountability. As we will see, 
that understanding is very much the product of historical accretion, 
embedding within it different ways that generations past perceived 
and responded to accountability crises. As we will see in Part 3, what 
stabilised this accretional collection of historical experiences and 
responses until recently was the relative conceptual dominance of one 
particular kind of public accountability: bureaucratic accountability. 
Part  4 will explore how recent evolutions in global and domestic 
governance have reduced the appeal of bureaucratic accountability and, 
in the process, catalysed conceptual inconsistencies with and among 
these other conceptualisations, resulting in a growing fragmentation of 
our present-day notions of public accountability—the ‘crisis’ referred 
to in the opening of this chapter.
In Part 5, we will see that underlying this fragmentation is the fact 
that we  as individuals actually experience accountability in a number 
of different ways: as subjects of state power; as evaluators of state 
institutions;  as citizen participants in the state itself (as popular 
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sovereigns, in other words); and simply as human beings interacting 
with other human beings. Each of these ways of experiencing 
public accountability has its own distinct logic and its own distinct 
epistemology. This suggests that the key for a more robust understanding 
of the nature of public accountability lies in a consilience involving 
these different kinds of experience, as will be explored in Part 6. Finally, 
Part 7 concludes by exploring what all this might have to tell us about 
where the ‘responsiveness’ in ‘responsive regulation’ really lies.
2. An intellectual history of public 
accountability
In beginning our exploration of the diverse structural and experiential 
facets of the notion of public accountability, we might first ask ourselves 
what is public accountability? At its heart, the idea of public accountability 
seems to express a belief that people with public responsibilities should 
be answerable to ‘the people’ for the performance of their duties (see also 
Mashaw 2006). But there are problems with this conceptualisation.
This standard conceptualisation of public accountability is really simply 
a metaphor that borrows very imperfectly from a number of other 
discourses about ‘accountability’ per se. From the private law, it borrows 
from the notion that accountability is a product of a particular kind of 
relationship existing between two individuals—namely, the principal 
and her agent, in which the agent is required to demonstrate that 
her actions conform to the demands, intentions and interests of the 
principal. It then borrows from political theory the idea that the ‘public’ 
itself can be analogised to an individual (in this case, the individual of 
principal in private law). The problem is, of course, that the ‘public’ is 
not an individual. As an inherently collective phenomenon, the ‘public’ 
is only vaguely identifiable in space. Its corpus is diffuse and contestable, 
and its internal dynamics are often so complex as to be opaque. As a 
collective, it rarely can be said to have mental-state intentions, as what 
‘intentions’ it might be meaningfully said to have are often internally 
inconsistent (see Loughlin 2010).
Perhaps because of this conceptual conundrum, Anglo-American political 
and legal society has tended to define public accountability primarily 
in terms of discrete institutional architectures. Most prominent among 
these have been elections, rationalised bureaucracies, judicial review, 
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transparency and ‘markets’. These different architectural modalities 
originally emerged as contingent responses to various legitimacy crises 
that have periodically beset Anglo-American governance. In other 
words, as implemented in the Anglo-American legal system, public 
accountability is more a spontaneous aggregation of experiences than 
a structural extrapolation of foundational principles.
Elections have been a key component of Anglo-American conceptions 
of public accountability ever since the founding of the American 
constitution. In the United States, electoral recall originally represented 
the principal sanction by which the citizenry was to hold politicians 
accountable for errant political frolics (Keyssar 2000; see also 
Madison 1961).
But even in the Anglo-American world, intellectual and political 
support for electoral democracy has always been decidedly mixed. 
In the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, the ability 
of machine-style, patronage-based politics to thrive in democratic 
competition, at the seeming expense of the public good, caused many 
to become sceptical of the electorate’s capacity to hold politics to true 
public account. Reformers sought, instead, to hold political behaviour 
to such account via the construction of rationalised, professionalised 
bureaucratic frameworks. To these reformers, devices such as meritocratic 
recruitment, tenure and promotion; professionalisation; and scientific 
administration offered a more satisfying vision of public accountability. 
It was a vision of public accountability that worked by subjecting political 
behaviour to the oversight of an organisational environment specifically 
designed to recognise and pursue the public good as opposed to that 
relying primarily on corruptible electoral impulses (Lee 2011). 
But, about the same time as Americans were turning to bureaucracy 
as a cure for perceived accountability problems of electoral democracy, 
constitutional scholars in England began turning to the judiciary as a 
cure for the perceived accountability problems of both democracy and 
bureaucracy. In the 1880s, the influential English constitutional law 
scholar Albert Venn Dicey became concerned—some might even say 
obsessed (see, for example, Schneiderman 1977)—with both the expanded 
administrative capacities of the British state and the expansion of the 
franchise. Dicey (1982) advanced an idea—what he famously called ‘rule 
of law’—that the only way to secure constitutional constraints in the face 
of these twin expansions was to preserve and strengthen the political-
legal oversight of bureaucratically and democratically insulated courts.
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In the 1930s, American jurists also became increasingly concerned about 
perceived constitutional threats brought about by the emergence of the 
American administrative state, and they were strongly influenced by 
Dicey’s description of the need for a strong judicial check on the growing 
administrative bureaucracy (Horowitz 1992: 225–8). But Dicey’s vision 
saw judicial review primarily as a substantive constraint of bureaucratic 
decision-making. The American vision, in contrast, adopted a more 
process-focused approach (White 1978: 136–63). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, rising disillusionment in government 
generated first by American participation in the Vietnam War and 
later by the Watergate scandal caused many to become sceptical about 
the degree to which either professionalised rationalisation or judicial 
review could encourage public officials to work in the public interest. 
This occasioned the appearance of a yet another architectural modality 
for political accountability—that of ‘transparency’ and ‘open government’ 
(Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996: 8, 23–6). Open government sought to 
make governmental decision-making as visible as possible—not simply 
to those who directly involve themselves with government, but also to 
the larger, uninvolved portion of the polity. This new vision of open 
government promised to allow our increasingly remote civil society 
to nevertheless hold public officials to account even without directly 
participating in political decision-making.
But soon thereafter, in the 1970s, economic stagnation in the United 
States and the United Kingdom caused growing concern about 
governmental waste, inefficiency and unresponsiveness. This caused some 
reformers to look to market-like mechanisms—which they believed to 
be more efficient in the allocation and usage of resources—as a means 
of promoting responsible use of public resources. In some cases, these 
reformers advocated devolving public responsibilities directly to private, 
market-based actors (Savas and Schubert 1987). Beyond this, reformers 
in the United Kingdom also invented new governance architectures 
that replicated market-like forces of competition by having different 
public departments ‘compete’ in the development of effective regulation 
(Hood 1995), while American reformers developed architectures and 
procedures, such as cost–benefit analyses, that sought to replicate market-
like pricing and demand mechanisms (Layard and Glaister 1994). 
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3. Stability and contiguity
In sum, the Anglo-American idea of public accountability is not so 
much the product of extrapolation from core conceptual principles as 
an accretional layering of responses to periodic legitimacy exigencies 
experienced by Anglo-American societies. But why and how did these 
successive modalities aggregate into a singular conception of public 
accountability, rather than simply producing a sequence of competing 
conceptual paradigms?
For most of the twentieth century, the stability of this accretional 
layering has been due largely to the fact that one particular modality 
of public accountability—bureaucracy—has enjoyed a privileged, primus 
inter pares status when it came into conflict with other modalities 
(Rubin 2006). Of course, this predominance was not always the 
case. We noted above that elections were the principal recognised 
source of public accountability for the first 100 years of American 
constitutional government. When American reformers began promoting 
bureaucratisation as an accountability alternative to democracy, however, 
they triggered a corresponding reconceptualisation of the nature of 
democracy itself. ‘Democracy’ came to be thought of in the more 
limited terms of elections and suffrage, as opposed to the more robust 
notion of ‘participation’ famously described by Tocqueville (1969) in 
1835. Reorienting the idea of democracy in this way avoided conflict 
with growing norms of bureaucratisation and professionalisation, both 
of which sought to remove the more day-to-day, technocratic matters of 
public administration from the partisan politics that a more participatory 
vision of democracy seemed to unleash (Keyssar 2000: 117–71).
A similar clearing of space occurred when the expanded capacities of 
bureaucratised administrative government also brought it into conflict 
with judicial review. As described above, constitutional scholars in both 
the United Kingdom and the United States had originally hoped that 
pre-existing processes of judicial review could be used to put a brake 
on the inherent dangers of bureaucratic administrative governance; 
however, this was not to be the case. Both UK and US courts have 
adopted a vision of judicial review that was largely deferential to the 
substance of bureaucratic decision-making. During the first two-thirds 
of the twentieth century, the UK courts’ deference to the administrative 
state has been so complete that there was a real question whether judicial 
review in the United Kingdom had any real meaningful impact on the 
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actual operations of administrative governance ( JUSTICE-All Souls 
Review Committee 1988). On the other side of the Atlantic, the US 
courts have also decided—wisely, in the eyes of many—to generally 
defer to bureaucratic judgement, at least when it follows proper processes 
(Kagan 2001: 2383).
Nor have the more recent modalities of public accountability—for 
example, open government, deregulation, privatisation and contracting 
out—seriously challenged bureaucratisation’s dominance as our main 
paradigm for public control. The ‘open government’ movement of the late 
1960s and early 1970s quickly subordinated itself to the perceived needs 
of bureaucratic government. For example, the Freedom of Information 
Act is qualified by its famous Exemption 5, which allows an agency to 
lawfully withhold ‘inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters 
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in 
litigation with the agency’ (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)). The exemption was 
thought necessary, in the words of the US Supreme Court, to protect the 
innately bureaucratic ‘decision making processes of government agencies’ 
(NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 421 U.S. 132 (1975) 150). 
More recent, market-inspired governmental reforms such as contracting 
out, devolution and ‘streamlined government’—despite often being 
motivated by expressly antibureaucratic impulses—have, for the most 
part, simply substituted one (often less visible) bureaucracy for another. 
In the United States, for example, an overall decrease in the size of the 
federal bureaucracy during the 1990s has been offset by corresponding 
increases in the size of state government bureaucracies (Diiulio, jr, 
and Kettl 1995). Decreases in public bureaucratic responsibilities due 
to ‘contracting out’ have been counterbalanced by increased private 
bureaucratic responsibilities within contracting firms (Light 1999: 4). 
Thus, despite their often expressly antibureaucratic intentions, this 
most recent round of regulatory reforms has not so much challenged 
bureaucratic accountability as it has shifted it around.
4. Fragmentation
More recent events, however, have disrupted the stability of this 
‘accretional’ vision of public accountability. We noted above that 
this vision has been sustained in part by the pride of place it gives to 
bureaucratic structuring. One of the reasons bureaucratisation has 
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been able to enjoy this position is because it was most consistent with 
the evolving organisational trends of what we might call ‘modernised’ 
Anglo-American society as it emerged in the early twentieth century 
(Piore and Sabel 1984: 49–104). Industrialisation occasioned a 
massive rationalisation, regularisation and centralisation of social life. 
The rationalisation, regularisation and centralisation that characterise 
bureaucratic administration worked in significant part by paralleling this 
development (see also Dowdle 2006). However, recent developments 
have caused both domestic and international regulatory environments 
to become increasingly volatile and fragmented. As a result, regulatory 
systems are being reoriented to emphasise flexibility and adaptability, at 
the expense of bureaucratic predictability and control (Sabel 1994).
Another reason for the disruption of the Anglo-American vision of 
public accountability has to do with recent developments in the global 
environment. During the last half of the twentieth century, what we are 
calling the Anglo-American ‘model’ of public accountability also became 
increasingly transnationalised, due in significant part to the United 
States’s dominant position within the global geopolitical arena (see, for 
example, Mazower 1999: 294–6; cf. Erkkilä 2007). This transnational 
tolerance of America’s intellectual dominance with regards to issues of 
public accountability had been sustained in part by the First World’s 
perceived need to present a united front against communism in general 
and the Soviet Union in particular. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, however, this united, US-led vision of what constituted good, 
or even democratic, governance has come under increased scrutiny. 
At the same time, new technologies have enabled formerly isolated, 
localised activists to join international networks of like-minded resistors 
and activists. A  growing number of self-consciously ‘local’ interests 
are now increasingly able to contest, both normatively and practically, 
their assimilation into centralising, bureaucratic regulatory frameworks 
(see,  for example, Morgan 2006). For both these reasons, the Anglo-
American vision of public accountability, which used to be seen as a 
bulwark for liberal political stability, is now seen by many as an instrument 
of political hegemony ( Jayasuriya 2001).
The result has been a ‘fragmentation’ in public accountability discourse. 
As the harmonising dominance of bureaucratic modernisation is 
delegitimised by newer and more localised organisational logics that 
stress flexibility and local knowledge, formerly latent tensions among 
the diverse architectural modalities that make up the Anglo-American 
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vision of public accountability become more manifest. Different kinds 
of political interests tend to be attracted to different modalities of 
accountability. Trade unions, for example, whose impact on political 
decision-making historically has come in large part from their ability 
to mobilise voters, tend to prefer electoral modalities of accountability. 
International human rights organisations, whose staffs generally include 
a high number of people with legal training, tend to prefer juridical 
modalities of public accountability. Economically oriented interests 
seem to be more comfortable with what Weber (1947: 328–39) called 
the ‘legal-rational model’ of public authority, which meshes with their 
own institutional practices and makes it easier for them to navigate 
the diversity of transnational and domestic regulatory environments in 
which they must operate.
At the same time, globalisation has generated growing demands 
for more public accountability. The more willing participants in 
globalisation processes—for example, international business, trading 
interests, labour activists and environmental activists—are demanding 
an evermore expansive scope of public accountability from domestic 
government actors, whom they suspect to be illegitimately impeding 
the implementation of emerging public international norms (see, for 
example, Rodrik 1999: 151; Human Rights Watch 1999; AFL–CIO 
2001: 47, 60). At the same time, more reluctant, involuntary and 
localised participants in the globalisation process demand increasing 
public accountability from transnational regulatory actors, whom they 
see as illegitimately interfering with what should be ultimately domestic 
political matters (see Tusikov, Chapter 20; and Tienhaara, Chapter 38, 
this volume). 
5. Experiences and epistemologies
Compounding this fragmentation of the ideal of public accountability 
is the fact that we as individuals encounter public accountability in 
a variety of ways, due to the fact that our individual experience with 
public accountability is inherently fragmented (Pinker 2002: 220–1). 
For example, one way in which we encounter public accountability is 
as ‘subjects’ of the state’s dominium and authority. Here, our experience 
with public accountability is passive and positivist. We are concerned 
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primarily with what the existing demands of public accountability mean 
to us, as beneficiaries of others’ conformity to these demands and/or as 
subjects who must conform to its demands.
Alternatively, we encounter public accountability as critical 
conceptualisers of political institutions—what we might refer to as an 
‘architectural’ perspective. Of course, few of us ever have the opportunity 
to actually set up a public accountability system, but that does not stop 
us from thinking about how such a system should be designed or how 
it should work. Thus, when we think about the viability of electoral 
term limits or the problems of judicial activism, political lobbying or 
campaign finance, we generally think about these issues from a largely 
architectural perspective. We are not so much concerned about the 
subjective implications of these mechanisms—that is, how they affect 
us personally. Rather, we wonder more abstractly and objectively about 
what sort of implications these devices might have on mechanisms and 
dynamics of government.
We also encounter public accountability as citizens or as participants 
in the state. Here, ‘accountability’ itself is an inherently participatory 
experience. To give an account is to communicate, it is not to completely 
surrender control. Accountability is therefore a discursive condition, 
something that sets up a dialogue between the public and public servants. 
As members of the public, we actuate public accountability by deciding 
for ourselves whether the accounts offered by public officials are proper 
and in our interest, and how exactly we should respond in our actions to 
the officials offering these accounts.
Finally, we also encounter public accountability through direct experience 
(see, generally, Braithwaite 2006b). Consider, for example, our experience 
of being treated with respect and kindness. Such experience implicates a 
particular form of public accountability: it indicates to us that some other 
person is taking our own concerns into account. Another example would 
be when we experience ourselves behaving responsibly and accountably. 
Even as wholly private citizens, we still recognise that in certain aspects 
we, too, are and should be held accountable to a larger public (Gardner 
2006). Our experiences with regards to both these examples rarely depend 
on our contemplated appreciations of the dynamics of political coercion 
or how our actions implicate institutional design. They are feelings that 
operate prior to our rational understandings of larger political contexts, 
and hence represent an encounter with public accountability that is 
distinct from the other kinds of encounters described above.
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Moreover, each of these different ways of encountering public 
accountability has its own, distinct logic. As ‘subjects’ of state dominium, 
we see public accountability primarily in terms of formal and positivist 
powers, authority and duties on the one hand; and rights, privileges 
and capacities on the other. These are the constructs that ‘the state’ uses 
to portray and define the scope of its coercive might (see, for example, 
Hohfeld 2001), and we therefore find these constructs useful in helping 
us negotiate our way along the state’s institutional pathways. 
When we look at the institutional architecture of public accountability, 
we  use another kind of epistemic logic. Here, our concern is 
primarily with  understanding institutional possibilities for promoting 
accountability, rather than simply with the demands of its positivist 
legalism (Foley  1990). Here, our epistemology is one that resembles 
scientific positivism, rather than the legal positivism of the above 
described state-subject perspective.
When we encounter public accountability as citizens—that is, as 
participants in, rather than simple subjects of, the state—we perceive 
our environment in more discursive terms. The epistemology of 
this perspective is dialogic (Habermas 1989; cf. Bakhtin 1986). This 
perspective sees accountability in terms of cooperation and agreement. 
The knowledge that governs this realm is more intimate, more nuanced 
and less conducive to positivist or scientific structuring. It is, in 
significant part, conventionalist and political—embedded in the stories 
and symbologies that we are forever sharing with other participants 
(Dunn 2000; Berger and Luckman 1966: 92–103).
Finally, the epistemic logic of what we are calling the experience of 
public accountability is primarily perceptual and phenomenological. 
It  is  largely pre-theoretical, founded in the irreducible complexities 
of tacit or practical knowledge. Like the dialogic logic of participation, 
the logic of experience has an emotive quality, often appearing in 
the form of intuition and gut feeling. But, unlike that dialogic logic, 
the logic of this realm can be personal and private. It need not depend 
on conventionalist confirmation (see Polanyi 1958). 
The importance of recognising the fragmented nature of our experience 
with public accountability lies not in the possibility that it will help us 
resolve our disagreements about what accountability demands. Indeed, 
just the opposite. The fragmented nature of our own experience with 
public accountability would seem to mean that, at the end of the day, 
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the hunt for a single, grand unified theory of public accountability is 
likely to be futile. The simple fact that we all individually have experience 
of a diversity of kinds of encounters with public accountability—
each encounter governed by a distinct logic—suggests that at some 
fundamental level, these differences are not completely reducible to 
a single common experiential referent. 
But, paradoxically, the inherently fragmented, accretional nature of our 
vision of public accountability could actually be a source of strength, 
rather than a weakness. While a unified theory of public accountability 
might provide some degree of Kantian psychic comfort, it would not and 
could not reflect the full diversity of our actual experience. No matter 
how it was structured, a unified theory would invariably delegitimise 
some experiences that contribute to our thriving. We need to embrace 
our multiplicity of epistemically conflicting approaches to public 
accountability if we are to make sense of that phenomenon.
6. Consilience
Although distinct, our differing realms of experience and knowledge 
are not insular. In fact, they are highly interdependent. New experiences 
and understandings in one realm can often be translated into new and 
useful understandings in another—a process Edward O. Wilson (1998) 
famously termed ‘consilience’. Consilience refers to the generation of 
new, robust understandings of the human condition that occurs when 
different experiences and epistemologies come in contact with and learn 
from one another (on regulatory pluralism and local epistemologies, 
see Forsyth, Chapter 14, this volume). The fragmented and accretional 
nature of our vision of public accountability can work to help catalyse 
this kind of dynamic: by simultaneously legitimating a wide diversity 
of not entirely harmonious experiences, such fragmentation ultimately 
facilitates an especially inclusive discourse about the experience of public 
accountability. Our task, in this regard, should not be one of finding ways 
to dissolve this epistemic diversity, but one of finding ways to harness 
it—to use it to catalyse these new, more robust understandings of the 
human condition (cf. Looney 2004).
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Take bureaucratic accountability as an example. We saw, initially, that 
underlying the accountability crisis is a widespread dissatisfaction 
with a possible overreliance by modern governments on bureaucratic 
accountability. This dissatisfaction would seem to stem primarily from 
our experiences as subjects of state power, since it is as subjects of state 
power that we feel the coercive oppression of bureaucracy most directly 
and keenly (Rubin 2006). A more architectural perspective, however, 
suggests that the dichotomy between bureaucracy and other forms of 
accountability need not be as hard and fast as is commonly portrayed—
that the state-subject’s perception of bureaucracy can be dissolved 
somewhat by a more microanalytical approach to organisational design 
(see, for example, Braithwaite 2006a).
A citizen-participant’s perspective, on the other hand, suggested that 
there were critical aspects of bureaucratic accountability that are likely 
to escape detection by design-based perspectives—aspects that lie in 
the irreducible complexities of social interaction (see Scott 2006). Some 
effective responses to the state-subject’s dissatisfaction can therefore be 
found in collective learning from these experiences (see, for example, 
Courville 2006). But, to be useful, this new learning often has to be 
folded back into existing understandings and expectations. Therefore, 
our collective capacity to learn—or to learn effectively—is itself vitally 
informed by existing broad conceptual mappings that are captured 
primarily in what we have called the subject-oriented perspective 
(see, for example, Dorf 2006; cf. Dowdle 2006). 
In other words, no single perspective captures the full dimension of 
public accountability. Effective understanding of, and responses to, 
the ‘crisis’ in public accountability must be epistemically collaborative. 
As noted above, our crisis in accountability is in some sense perpetual. 
Our disagreements about accountability are therefore also in some sense 
perpetual. Perhaps paradoxically, our best hope for the future may lie 
precisely in the fact that this perpetual disagreement provides an endless 
supply of raw material with which we can continually triangulate new 
and more robust understandings of the nature of public accountability.
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7. Conclusion: From ‘consilience’ to 
‘responsive regulation’
The dynamic described above—what I have been calling ‘consilience’—
has special resonance with John Braithwaite’s notion of ‘responsive 
regulation’. Consider, along these lines, Braithwaite’s ‘responsive-
regulatory’ critique of Gunther Teubner’s and Niklas Luhmann’s notions 
of law as a normatively autonomous epistemic system:
In this regard my conception of responsiveness differs from Teubner’s 
(1986) reflexiveness and Niklas Luhmann’s autopoiesis. I do not see 
law and business systems as normatively closed and cognitively open. 
In a society with a complex division of labor the most fundamental 
reason as to why social systems are not normatively closed is that 
people occupy multiple roles in multiple systems. A company director 
is also a mother, a local alderman, and a God-fearing woman. When 
she leaves the board meeting before a crucial vote to pick up her infant, 
her business behavior enacts normative commitments from the social 
system of the family; when she votes on the board in a way calculated to 
prevent defeat at the next Council election, she enacts in the business 
normative commitments to the political system; when she votes against 
a takeover of a casino because of her religious convictions, she enacts 
the normative commitments of her church … So much of the small 
and large stuff of organizational life makes a sociological nonsense of 
the notion that systems are normatively closed. Nor is it normatively 
desirable that they be normatively closed … there is virtue in the justice 
of the people and of their business organizations bubbling up into the 
justice of the law, and the justice of the law percolating down into the 
justice of the people and their commerce. (Braithwaite 2006b: 885)
In this light, responsive regulation can be seen as the regulatory face 
of consilience. But recognising the distinctive cognitive processes of 
consilience also helps give us a deeper understanding of the dynamics 
that must underlie responsive regulation. As described above, consilience 
requires us to see the other side in its own light—not as an existential 
competitor but as a repository of some distinct, highly impacted ‘local’ 
knowledge. This suggests that to be truly responsive, responsive regulation 
must be able to see the world from the perspective of its subjects and, in 
particular, from the perspective of those subjects who resist its imperium. 
For it is there that the seeds of true responsiveness are to be found.
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Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen1
1. Introduction
Political rhetoric often implies that regulation can be quickly 
implemented to achieve policy goals, but its effectiveness depends on the 
responses of individual citizens and businesses. Research in ‘compliance’, 
by contrast, directs attention to the complexities of implementation. 
The impact of regulation, compliance researchers show, depends on the 
responses of individual businesses and citizens.
The explanation and understanding of compliance in regulatory studies 
draw on a bewildering array of concepts from different disciplines. 
These include the psychology of individual motivation, organisational 
and institutional theories of the firm in its environment, criminological 
understandings of the causes of law-breaking and sociological and 
anthropological studies of the interaction of law with plural social 
orderings (see Braithwaite, Chapter 2; Murphy, Chapter 3; Harris, 
Chapter 4; and Forsyth, Chapter 14, this volume). 
We begin this chapter by briefly setting out the range of meanings 
of compliance. We go on to synthesise the lessons of these different 
literatures into a holistic set of 14 compliance questions. We propose 
1  We acknowledge the assistance of Dr Kym Sheehan, who helped the first author work up 
this material into an earlier version of this chapter for the purposes of a consultancy for Consumer 
Affairs Victoria in 2011.
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these 14 questions as a set of prompts that policymakers, practitioners 
and applied researchers can use to identify and understand the many 
facets of behaviour and meaning that influence ‘compliance’ in each 
specific situation. 
2. What is compliance?
In regulatory studies, ‘compliance’ refers to the panoply of behavioural 
and attitudinal responses that individuals and firms make to regulation. 
Parker and Nielsen (2011: 3–8) distinguish between ‘objectivist’ and 
‘interpretivist’ approaches to compliance studies. 
Objectivist approaches to compliance (Parker and Nielsen 2011: 3–6) 
identify and explain how, why and in what circumstances individuals 
and firms comply with regulation, and when and why they do not 
(for example, Simpson 2002). The core meaning of compliance in 
this context is behaviour that is obedient to a regulatory obligation. 
Objectivist compliance studies also seek to explain compliance and 
noncompliant individual intentions and attitudes, firm-level systems 
and management processes and the consequences of rule adherence 
for the accomplishment of policy goals (such as whether a policy goal, 
like pollution reduction, was actually achieved, as distinct from whether 
a firm complied with mandatory technology requirements). Many 
objectivist studies of compliance point out that rule adherence is often 
supported by commitment to the principles and values behind the 
rule (for example, Braithwaite 2009; Gunningham et al. 2003) and a 
democratic and fair process of regulatory rule-making and enforcement 
(for example, Tyler 2006). 
Interpretivist approaches to compliance (Parker and Nielsen 2011: 
3,  6–8) understand compliance to be a complex, ambiguous process 
in which the meaning of regulation is transformed as it is interpreted, 
implemented and negotiated in everyday life by those to whom it is 
addressed (for example, Edelman et al. 1999; Silbey 2011). Here 
compliance can refer to meanings and interpretations, social habits and 
practices and interactions and communications between different actors 
in the implementation process.
A broad and multifaceted understanding of compliance can help 




3. Background and origins of the 
14 questions
Our 14 questions are based on the ‘Table of Eleven’ (T11) developed 
by Dr Dick Ruimschotel for and in collaboration with the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice to assist the government in determining whether 
new legislation could be enforced in a way that would lead to compliance 
(Law Enforcement Expertise Centre 2004). The table lists 11 factors 
that behavioural science research showed influenced compliance. The 
designers of the T11 recommend that it works best where single target 
groups and one or more very specific core obligations are assessed one 
at a time. 
We have adjusted the original T11 by reference to Nielsen and Parker’s 
later review and synthesis of the interdisciplinary empirical literature 
explaining compliance (Nielsen and Parker 2012; Parker and Nielsen 
2011).2 The original T11 was particularly strong on delineating the 
different aspects of government enforcement that are relevant to 
compliance defined in the objectivist sense. In contrast, Nielsen and 
Parker’s ‘holistic compliance model’, shown in Figure 13.1, is particularly 
strong at seeking to understand how individuals’ and businesses’ everyday 
motivations, characteristics and business models interact to influence 
their perceptions of their regulatory obligations, enforcement and, 
ultimately, their compliance. 
The Nielsen–Parker holistic compliance model emphasises the 
interaction between the different factors and the different actors that can 
enforce or encourage compliance. Some factors might have a short-run 
effect, while others might slowly build up (or eat away at) compliance, 
depending on their interaction with other factors.
2  A table comparing the original T11 with our model is available from the first author on request. 
We have added one dimension (number 8) to the original six ‘enforced’ compliance dimensions. 
We have reorganised the original five dimensions of ‘spontaneous’ compliance into seven dimensions 
in three subcategories informed by a more expansive understanding of compliance. Finally, we have 
reworked the questions and descriptions to emphasise the need to identify interactions between the 
various factors influencing compliance.













Figure 13.1 The Nielsen–Parker holistic compliance model
Source: Nielsen and Parker (2012).
4. Purpose and use of the 14 questions 
in practice
The purpose of the framework is to guide the collection of information 
about potential reasons why people do or do not comply with particular 
obligations. It can be used prospectively to help design effective legislation, 
to predict where there might be compliance issues in the future if new 
obligations are introduced and how policy purposes can most effectively 
be put into regulatory design to promote compliance. It can also be 
used during the implementation phase to help design and target effective 
regulatory education, compliance monitoring and enforcement strategies. 
At this stage, it can be a useful way of developing a risk assessment of target 
populations to help determine which regulatory strategies (education, 
monitoring, enforcement) should be used with which subgroups. Finally, 
it can be used in the post-implementation monitoring and evaluation 
phases to examine the impact of existing regulatory strategies. This might 
prompt ideas for changes in compliance and enforcement strategies, 
reforms to the regulation itself and strategic alliances with other parties 
to assist in improving compliance.
It is important to use all 14 factors to guide information gathering. 
The  reasons people behave the way they do in society, including in 
relation to their regulatory obligations, are often complex and it is 
important to avoid overly simplistic explanations. The 14 questions are 
intended to be comprehensive and holistic enough to pick up all salient 
and significant issues. 
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Table 13.1 The 14 compliance questions
Spontaneous compliance factors Enforced compliance factors
Economic, social and normative motives 8. Respect for the regulator
Does the target group respect the regulator and 
how it goes about its tasks? Do they have a 
relationship with the regulator? Do they respect 
the judgement of those responsible for law 
enforcement? 
1. Social and economic costs 
and benefits
Does the target group believe that it 
costs too much time, money and effort 
to comply? Does the target group believe 
that there are tangible advantages to be 
gained from breaking the rules? Does the 
target group see any advantage to them in 
complying with the rules? 
2. Degree of acceptance of this regulation
Does the target group agree with the 
policy objectives and the principles that 
underpin the rules surrounding their 
licensed activity? Do they agree with how 
the policy and principles have been put 
into practice—for example, do they think 
particular obligations are unacceptable?
3. Respect for the law in general
Does the target group generally believe 
in abiding by the law; do they believe that 
complying with the law is a good thing to 
do regardless of whether they agree with a 
specific obligation? 
4. Existence of non-official influence 
over the targeted group’s compliance 
Do industry groups and other regulatees, 
customers, investors, trading partners, 
local communities, industry groups, non-
governmental organisations or other 
stakeholders facilitate compliance?
Deterrence factors
9. Risk that any violations of the rules will 
be reported to the authorities 
Is there a high risk of violations being reported 
to the authorities, either by members of the 
target group’s community or by the public? Is 
the target group deterred from noncompliance 
because they fear they will be complained about 
or reported if they do not comply? 
10. Risk of inspection
Is there a low risk of particular businesses being 
inspected by the regulator, either by a physical 
inspection or by a records inspection? Do 
members of the target group perceive themselves 
as likely to be subject to inspection?
11. Risk of detection
Is there a high risk of any violations of the rules 
being detected if there is an inspection or some 
other monitoring (such as an audit)? What is the 
impact of factors such as an inspection only 
selectively examining records, particular violations 
being difficult for inspectors to detect or the ease 
of falsification of records? How does the target 
group perceive the risk of detection?
12. Selectivity of inspection and detection 
by the regulator 
Is the regulator selective in identifying and 
prioritising targets for inspection? Do some 
members of the target group perceive themselves 
as falling outside the priority targets for inspection? 
Are they aware of how the regulator ‘screens’ for 
breaches when inspecting or investigating? 
13. Risk of sanction 
Is there a major risk of a violation, once detected, 
being sanctioned? Does the regulator have a 
practice or policy of dismissing charges or not 
enforcing charges? Does the target group believe 
that the risk of being sanctioned is low even if they 
are caught and the breach can be proved? 
14. Severity of sanction 
Does the target group believe that the sanction 
they will face for a particular violation is severe, 
that it will be imposed quickly and will have 
other tangible disadvantages for the person 
concerned? For example: does the person suffer 
a loss of reputation from being sanctioned that 
has a negative impact on their business activities?
Characteristics and capacities of 
members of the target population 
5. Business model
Is compliance relevant to the target group’s 
business model or is it an ‘afterthought’, or 
even irrelevant?
6. Knowledge of the rules
Is the target group aware of their 
obligations? Do they know the rules that 
govern the particular activity? Are the rules 
comprehensible or are they too complex to 
understand? 
7. Capacity to comply 
Does the target group have the capacity 
to comply with the rules? Or do they lack 
the money, time, education or expertise to 
become aware of their obligations, decide 
to comply and implement compliance? 
Do they have good enough management 
systems to implement compliance? 
Source: Authors’ work.
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Not all 14 factors will be equally important in any particular situation. 
When these 14 dimensions are used to gather information, it will 
usually become obvious that a subset of factors (either individually or 
in interaction with each other) is of particular salience in explaining and 
understanding compliance and noncompliance. The 14 questions act as a 
checklist that expands thinking to ensure all potentially important issues 
are considered, and to determine which ones are of particular salience in 
relation to a particular target group and regulatory obligation. They are 
summarised in Table 13.1. 
5. The 14 questions
Spontaneous compliance dimensions
The spontaneous compliance dimensions are the factors that would 
influence people to comply even if no government education and 
assistance activities, complaints handling, monitoring, inspection 
and enforcement were in place. 
Dimensions 1–3: Economic (material), social and normative 
motives
1. Social and economic costs and benefits
Does the target group believe that it costs too much time, money and effort to 
comply? Does the target group believe that there are tangible advantages to be 
gained from breaking the rules? Does the target group see any advantage to 
them in complying with the rules? 
The costs and benefits of compliance relate to people’s social and 
economic motives for compliance (see Braithwaite, Chapter 2, this 
volume).
How does compliance fit with a person’s economic (material) motives—
that is, their commitment to maximising their own economic or 
material  utility? For example, to what extent is a regulated business 
or individual motivated by expanding the business, making (and selling) 
more products and services, earning more money and returning 
a greater profit to its owners? Does compliance fit well with those goals 
or derogate from them?
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How does compliance fit with a person’s social motives—that is, 
their  commitment to earning the approval and respect of others? 
For  example, to what extent is a regulated individual or business 
committed to earning the approval and respect of significant people with 
whom an actor interacts including other businesses, trading partners, 
employees, customers, local communities, the wider public, family 
and friends? To what extent do these other people value compliance 
or noncompliance?
This dimension will interact with the existence of social control over 
the target group (Dimension 7) since other parties are generally the 
ones who will control economic and social resources that motivate the 
target group. So, the extent to which the regulated individual or business 
perceives there to be costs and benefits to compliance and noncompliance 
depends on whether or not various other parties see compliance as 
relevant. For example, will some businesses or customers refuse to deal 
with another business that does not comply? Will peers stigmatise an 
individual who does not comply? 
2. Degree of acceptance of this regulation
Does the target group agree with the policy objectives and the principles that 
underpin the rules surrounding their licensed activity? Do they agree with 
how the policy and principles have been put into practice—for example, 
do they think particular obligations are unacceptable? 
This relates to people’s normative motives—that is, their commitment 
to obeying the law because doing so helps them realise their normative 
understanding of what it is to ‘do the right thing’. This dimension is 
concerned with the extent to which the individual or business accepts 
the specific policy goal of the specific regulatory regime and obligation 
under consideration. That is, they can see that it is aimed at effectively 
addressing an issue that they agree would be a problem if it were not 
regulated.
There may be some interaction with knowledge of the rules 
(Dimension 5) since people who understand the rules might also have 
a better understanding of why the rules exist and therefore why they 
should support them. There might also be an interaction with social 
motives (Dimension 2) and social control to comply (Dimension 7) 
since, over time, people often come to accept and internalise the values 
of their peers and trading partners. 
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3. Respect for the law in general
Does the target group generally believe in abiding by the law; do they believe 
that complying with the law is a good thing to do regardless of whether they 
agree with a specific obligation? 
This is another dimension of normative motives. Here the concern is 
whether the individual or firm is committed to obeying the law and 
respecting authority in general, regardless of whether they agree with 
the specific regulatory regime and obligation under consideration. Some 
people will want to obey the law and comply with official authorities 
regardless of whether they agree with the specific law because they have 
a high degree of trust in the legitimacy of the government and the law 
(see Tyler 2006; Murphy, Chapter 3, this volume). 
4. Existence of non-official influence over the target group’s compliance 
Do industry groups and other regulatees, customers, investors, trading partners, 
local communities, industry groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
or other stakeholders facilitate compliance? 
The Nielsen–Parker holistic compliance model shows that economic, 
social and normative motives to comply or not comply are ‘activated’ 
through the behaviour and attitudes of the many individuals, firms 
and organisations that surround each business or individual. Official 
regulators also activate these motives, as indicated by the ‘enforced’ 
compliance dimensions below.
Identifying and understanding the various parties that can exercise 
non-official influence over compliance require a detailed and sensitive 
inquiry into that individual’s or firm’s everyday social and business world 
(see Harris, Chapter 4, this volume). It involves asking about key parties 
who might influence them and key events where that influence could be 
or is regularly exercised. It might also involve asking about perceptions 
of the general social, economic and political environment and what the 
relevant individuals and firms perceive this to require of them in terms 
of compliance and noncompliance. 
Dimensions 5–7: Characteristics and capacities of members 
of the target population
5. Business model
Is compliance relevant to the target group’s business model or is it an 
‘afterthought’, or even irrelevant? 
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The ‘business model’ sums up the whole way an individual or business 
thinks about their everyday business life. It sums up what they are trying 
to achieve—that is, which motives or interests are most important to them 
and how they will try to achieve them; which stakeholders are important 
to them in terms of business dealings and reputation (for example, which 
customer segment do they target, how will they get investment into their 
business, who are the peers whom they want to respect them). How do 
they relate to their social, economic and regulatory environment? 
The constraints of production and service provision are particularly 
relevant—that is, what does the trader have to do to actually make 
a living in their business and according to their business model? 
Does  this  leave  enough time and resources for compliance with 
obligations? Does  it put pressure on them to cut corners? Or does it 
make compliance with certain obligations a key to business success? 
Thus, the ‘business model’ interacts with all the other spontaneous 
compliance dimensions. If a business’s regulatory obligations are 
irrelevant to its business model, it is less likely to always comply. 
6. Knowledge of the rules
Is the target group aware of their obligations? Do they know the rules that 
govern the particular activity? Are the rules comprehensible or are they too 
complex to understand? 
People who are unaware of the rules may unintentionally violate them. 
This might be because they are unaware that there is a rule that applies 
to the situation or the rules may be too complex or inaccessible for them 
to understand how they apply to their own situation. Some members of 
target groups will not have the capacity to know and understand their 
regulatory obligations (Dimension 6), especially if there are complex 
and changing obligations.
People do not always need to know what the rules are to comply with 
them. Sometimes other parties might make sure that compliance is 
integrated into standard industry or organisation practice so that most 
people do not need to think about compliance explicitly—that is, 
knowledge of the rules can interact with social control over the target 
group (Dimension 7) through other parties and environments that make 
compliance natural and easy.
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Often people become aware of rules and the need to know about their 
regulatory obligations only when they find out about enforcement 
action against peers or are the subject of enforcement action themselves 
(Dimensions 9–14). People are often capable of denying or rationalising 
away ignorance or incorrect knowledge until they are forced to confront 
enforcement against themselves or their peers (see Parker 2012).
7. Capacity to comply 
Does the target group have the capacity to comply with the rules? Or do 
they lack the money, time, education or expertise to become aware of their 
obligations, decide to comply and implement compliance? Do they have good 
enough management systems to implement compliance? 
It is well established that regulated firms vary in relation to fundamental 
characteristics such as economic resources, technical knowhow, managerial 
capacity and oversight and the personal and professional backgrounds of 
the people who make up the firm, and that these differences to a large 
degree explain differences in their compliance behaviour (Parker and 
Nielsen 2009). Similarly, an individual’s capacity to comply with the law 
can be greatly influenced by their general cognitive capabilities, social 
capital and interpersonal relational skills. It is important to note that 
all these characteristics of a firm or individual can give them a greater 
potential capacity to know the law (Dimension 5), to decide whether it 
is in their interest to comply (Dimensions 1 and 4) or whether they value 
compliance for its own sake (Dimensions 2 and 3) and then be capable 
of putting the commitment to comply into practice through procedures 
and advice. 
This can also give individuals and firms greater capacities to evade or 
game the law (see Braithwaite 2009; McBarnet 2003), and greater 
capacities to use their resources to fight or negotiate with regulators and 
law enforcement agencies to prevent enforcement of the law if they do 
not want to comply or disagree with the regulator’s interpretation of the 
law (Edelman et al. 1999). Therefore, greater capacity and resources may 
or may not lead to greater compliance. 
Enforced compliance dimensions
The enforced compliance dimensions are the various government 
activities that influence compliance and noncompliance and how they are 
perceived by the obligation-holders. This includes compliance education 
and assistance activities and activities to deter noncompliance. 
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It is important to compare and contrast the objective and subjective 
(or perceptual) aspects of these dimensions—that is, a regulator might 
have sophisticated compliance education, monitoring and enforcement 
strategies, and an array of sanctions designed to educate and deter. 
However, these sophisticated tools and strategies will only make 
a difference to the behaviour of members of the target population if 
they are perceived in the right way. For example, the existence of heavy 
penalties will not make a difference if regulatees are not aware of them 
or if they perceive the chances of being caught in noncompliance as 
slight. Similarly, a comprehensive program of educational visits might 
not have the desired effect if the target population perceives them as 
heavy-handed and unnecessary ‘inspections’ (Waller 2007). 
8. Respect for the regulator
Does the target group respect the regulator and how it goes about its tasks? 
Do they have a relationship with the regulator? Do they respect the judgement 
of those responsible for law enforcement? 
Whether the regulatee is aware of and respects the regulator will 
influence the way they perceive all the other dimensions of enforced 
compliance. Regulatees’ assessment of the legitimacy and procedural 
fairness with which the regulator goes about its task will influence their 
trust in the law and the regulatory process, their belief in whether the 
regulatory regime will meet appropriate objectives and, hence, their 
normative commitment to comply (Dimensions 2 and 3). 
Moreover, regulatees will likely only pay attention to advice and guidance 
(Dimension 6) if they respect the expertise and bona fides of the person 
seeking to educate them. 
Respect for the regulator will also influence the way regulatees’ perceive 
the seriousness and effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement efforts 
(Dimensions 9–14).
Dimensions 9–14: The deterrence dimensions
The remaining dimensions of ‘enforced’ compliance all relate to the 
various ways in which regulators seek to deter noncompliance through 
enforcement. 
Deterrence theory proposes that people will be deterred from breaking 
the law when the legal penalty they would receive for a breach multiplied 
by the likelihood of swift detection and conviction outweighs the gain—
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that is, they fear financial penalties, the loss of livelihood (for example, 
by losing a licence to trade or being put out of business because of a 
compliance scandal) and possibly imprisonment (if the offence is 
a criminal one for which jail sanctions are available). It is often the 
perception more than the objective risk of deterrence that influences 
regulatees. 
Enforcement can activate social and normative motivations for 
compliance because it stigmatises and shames those who are caught 
in noncompliance and acts as a reminder to others that the general 
community values compliance. On the other hand, enforcement that is 
not effective, that is ignored by the community or that seems pointless 
can encourage noncompliance. Moreover, the targets’ perceptions of 
the likelihood and severity of enforcement and of economic and social 
penalties are what are more likely to influence behaviour than the mere 
existence of penalties and enforcement that are disregarded.
9. Risk that any violations of the rules will be reported to the authorities 
Is there a high risk of violations being reported to the authorities, either by 
members of the target group’s community or by the public? Is the target group 
deterred from noncompliance because they fear they will be complained about 
or reported if they do not comply? 
10. Risk of inspection
Is there a low risk of particular businesses being inspected by the regulator, 
either by a physical inspection or by a records inspection? Do members of the 
target group perceive themselves as likely to be subject to inspection?
11. Risk of detection
Is there a high risk of any violations of the rules being detected if there is an 
inspection or some other monitoring (such as an audit)? What is the impact 
of factors such as an inspection only selectively examining records, particular 
violations being difficult for inspectors to detect or the ease of falsification of 
records? How does the target group perceive the risk of detection?
12. Selectivity of inspection and detection by the regulator 
Is the regulator selective in identifying and prioritising targets for inspection? 
Do some members of the target group perceive themselves as falling outside the 
priority targets for inspection? Are they aware of how the regulator ‘screens’ 
for breaches when inspecting or investigating? 
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13. Risk of sanction 
Is there a major risk of a violation, once detected, being sanctioned? Does 
the regulator have a practice or policy of dismissing charges or not enforcing 
charges? Does the target group believe that the risk of being sanctioned is low 
even if they are caught and the breach can be proved? 
14. Severity of sanction 
Does the target group believe that the sanction they will face for a particular 
violation is severe, that it will be imposed quickly and that it will have other 
tangible disadvantages for the person concerned? For example: does the person 
suffer a loss of reputation from being sanctioned that has a negative impact on 
their business activities? 
6. Collecting information about compliance 
using the 14 questions
The information used to make these assessments can be gathered in 
several different ways.
First, the 14 factors can be used to develop a set of questions for 
qualitative in-depth interviews with the targets of regulation to determine 
how they understand and work with the compliance in relation to a 
particular obligation. If an appropriate and sufficiently varied sample is 
chosen, this method provides deep insight into the nature of obstacles 
and opportunities for compliance. However, this method will not 
necessarily give a good indication of the absolute quantitative levels 
of these obstacles and opportunities for compliance. 
Second, the 14 factors can be used to develop a quantitative survey 
of a  group targeted for regulation to gain information about the levels of 
obstacles and opportunities for compliance among that group. Since it 
can be difficult to design a good and engaging survey that is also long 
enough to cover every factor that might be relevant to compliance, it 
will usually be more appropriate to do a pilot study first using in-depth 
interviews and then design a survey that gathers information from a large 
representative sample about the main issues identified in the qualitative 
interviews.
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Third, this framework can be used as a prompt for expert review of 
compliance obstacles and opportunities. Here, rather than going directly 
to the target group to collect information about compliance, the 
researcher or policymaker can gather a group of experts in the area 
(such as inspectors, complaints handling staff, industry association 
representatives or consultants to the relevant industry) and use the 
framework as a basis for gathering together all the relevant information 
and insight about compliance that is available. This will be most valuable 
where representatives from as many different angles on the particular 
compliance issue are included in the conversation (for example, those 
from the relevant industry, regulators and professional advisers to the 
relevant industry). This may be done in person via interviews or a focus 
group/roundtable, or it might be done ‘on the papers’ simply by eliciting 
opinions and information from a range of experts. 
7. Conclusion
The 14 questions do not set out a single unified model that explains 
compliance in every context and for every obligation. Rather, they 
form a checklist of potentially relevant factors that can enlarge one’s 
view of compliance to comprehend the complexity of regulatory policy 
implementation. The 14 questions are the raw materials that can be used 
by regulators, policymakers and anyone interested in how regulation is 
implemented in everyday life to collect information and build models 
and understandings of how compliance works in their own field.
The 14 questions do not necessarily prescribe solutions to regulatory 
implementation problems. Rather, they prompt understanding and 
insight into the multifarious actors and mechanisms that interact with 
one another to influence and create compliance. It is foolhardy to assume 
that just because one or two factors have been addressed (for example, 
a comprehensive education campaign has been launched or penalties have 
been increased), compliance will automatically increase. There may be 
other factors (for example, a business model that does not allow time for 
keeping oneself updated on newsletters from the regulator; a perception 
that noncompliance will never be discovered by the regulator; or a social 
milieu in which messages from authority are disregarded in favour 
of messages from peers) that will influence compliance intentions, 
behaviours and outcomes. Our 14 questions prompt consideration of 
these different factors and the ways they interact. As other regulatory 
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studies scholars have pointed out, it is up to regulators to have the skill 
and ultimately the courage (Perez 2014) to craft solutions and alliances 
that are responsive to the complex social, economic and political contexts 
in which they work (Baldwin and Black 2008; Braithwaite 2013). 
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Legal pluralism: The regulation 




This chapter examines the role and power of law in development in 
countries with plural regulatory orders through a case study of the 
regulation of traditional medicine in Cook Islands. This case study gives 
rise to a series of observations relevant to regulatory theory in general—
in particular, concerning the utility of legal pluralism as a theoretical 
framework in developing states, the need for detailed empirical research 
to understand the operation of non-state regulatory orders and the way 
in which different regulatory orders permit and foreclose different levels 
of agency, empower different stakeholders, reflect different institutional 
realities and draw on varying underlying values and principles. This 
chapter is based principally on fieldwork conducted in Cook Islands 
in November 20141 and, more broadly, on fieldwork conducted since 
2011 in Samoa, Fiji and Vanuatu investigating the impact of intellectual 
property laws on development in Pacific Island countries.
1  Thirty-two in-depth interviews were conducted with a range of key stakeholders including 
heads of government agencies, local artists, traditional healers and customary authorities.
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2. Legal or regulatory pluralism
Before delving into the fascinating details of the regulation of traditional 
medicine, it is helpful to set out some of the basics about the theory 
of legal pluralism. This is a theory that has proven extremely useful in 
studying regulation in Pacific Island countries (Forsyth 2009). It emerged 
in the 1970s as a response to what its proponents saw as an ideology 
of state centralism—namely, the assumption that all discussions about 
the law necessarily concerned only the state (Griffiths 1986). This state 
focus, while the basis of a positivistic account of law, was increasingly 
recognised  as too limited, particularly in the postcolonial era. 
Like regulatory theory, of which it can be seen as a relative, the theory of 
legal pluralism is founded on the observations that, in many social fields, 
state law is just one system of ordering that exists, and other systems 
of ordering, such as customary norms or entrenched business practices, 
may have just as much or more impact on how people’s conduct is actually 
regulated (Moore 1973; Merry 1988). The early users of the theory were 
largely legal anthropologists, and the emphasis of their scholarship was 
on producing thick descriptions of the particular ordering systems at 
play in certain geographic contexts—often postcolonial countries. 
Much  of the research on regulation of the Regulatory Institutions 
Network (RegNet) has involved using anthropological methods to 
study corporate regulatory culture (see Henne, Chapter 6, this volume; 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).
In the past decade, however, the theory of legal pluralism has been 
expanded on and has been taken in a number of different directions.2 
There has been a move away from the purely descriptive use of the theory 
to an exploration of how it can be used in a normative or instrumentalist 
way. This new direction has been most extensively explored in the law 
and development context, especially in countries just emerging from civil 
wars, where state institutions are weak and, often, lacking in legitimacy 
(Albrecht et al. 2011). This approach involves a change of mindset 
from seeing non-state orders as disorderly, corrupt, unimportant or 
potentially subversive, to viewing them as indispensable components of 
2  For example, Berman (2012: 10) argues that at an international level there is a whole range 
of legal orders that are regulating people’s lives in an increasingly complex and networked way, and 
that, rather than attempting to subsume them all within higher and higher systems of global order, 
‘we might deliberately seek to create or preserve spaces for productive interaction among multiple, 
overlapping legal systems’. Legal pluralism is also being used in the analysis of the regulation of 
minority communities, such as Muslims, in First World countries (see Kutty 2014). 
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reform processes (Faundez 2011: 18–19). In this use of legal pluralism, 
non-state justice systems are viewed as another regulatory tool to be 
galvanised and coopted into particular regulatory agendas. There are two 
advantages to such an approach. First, it provides a number of different 
options when considering what type of regulation may work best in a 
particular context, meaning that responses can be more creative—and 
possibly more widely implemented, responsive and legitimate for the 
relevant community. Second, it raises awareness of the fact that focusing 
a regulatory strategy through just one legal system involves a high risk 
that it may be undermined by the other ordering systems. For example, 
creating mandatory jail sentences for rape in state courts may mean 
that chiefs or local leaders ensure that such cases stay outside the state 
criminal justice system. 
There has been a degree of criticism of the new instrumentalist use of 
legal  pluralism. One commentator criticises what he calls ‘executive 
shortcuts’ to liberal developmentalism, arguing that working with non-
state actors allows donors to circumvent the state in countries where 
governments are reluctant to change, and thus undermines state-
building (Porter 2012). Another common criticism is that it has led to 
donors working with non-state justice systems to try to reshape and 
transform them to fit in with global norms and standards, which negates 
the ostensible purpose of engaging with them in the first place—
namely, that they respond to local and community understandings of 
and demands for justice. It has also been observed that any intervention 
by a donor will have an impact on the power balance existing between 
the state and the non-state justice system, and thus can prove deeply 
destabilising. Finally, there are frequent claims that non-state justice 
systems are reified and essentialised by both external and internal agents, 
that their patriarchal nature is overlooked and that empowering them 
undermines state guarantees of human rights.3
As in most theories and trends, there are lessons to be learnt from 
both the proponents and the critics of the instrumentalist use of legal 
pluralism. The challenge for users of the theory is to be mindful of the 
pitfalls that too narrow a conception of legal pluralism can lead to, 
such as romanticisation of non-state systems and unawareness of the 
different levels of politics at play in all levels of regulatory ordering. 
3  Many of these criticisms and more are set out in the edited collection by Tamanaha et al. 
(2012).
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Overall, however, the fundamental insights of legal pluralism remain 
relevant today, as is demonstrated in the case study below. As with meta-
regulation, legal pluralism involves building awareness that there are 
numerous non-state sources of regulation in any given field that interact 
with and impact on each other and state regulation in ways that can be 
both emancipatory and oppressive.
3. The regulation of Māori medicine in 
Cook Islands: A regulatory challenge
Cook Islands is in the heart of Polynesia in the South Pacific. Several 
hundred years ago it was the centre of a busy trading route between 
Samoa and what is currently known as French Polynesia, but today it is 
more often conceived of as isolated and remote. Cook Islands comprises 
12 inhabited islands spread over 2 million sq km of ocean, with a 
population of approximately 15,000 people. It has been self-governing 
since 1965 and is in free association with New Zealand. All Cook 
Islanders have New Zealand citizenship, making depopulation a serious 
issue; and there are roughly 70,000 Cook Islanders living in Australia 
and New Zealand.
Cook Islands is a modern state with a Westminster parliamentary 
system and a justice system based on a New Zealand model. However, 
it is also a pluralistic society whereby power and authority also reside 
in customary authorities and customary laws, particularly in regard to 
issues of land and intangible valuables such as traditional knowledge. 
Each tribal area in Cook Islands has its own Aronga Mana, which 
comprises the head chiefs, the Ariki, and their subchiefs, the Mataipo 
and Rangatira. There are also state-created institutions that represent the 
customary authorities: the House of Ariki4 and the Koutu Nui, a house 
for the subchiefs.5 In practical terms, the role of customary authorities is 
very reduced, particularly in the urban centre, although there is still great 
respect for their mana (power and prestige) and ceremonial functions. 
Pluralism is also a significant feature of health and medicine in the Cook 
Islands. Traditional medicine (known as Māori medicine) has always 
been a vital component of Cook Islanders’ wellbeing and it continues 
4  Created by the House of Ariki Act 1966.
5  Created by an amendment to the House of Ariki Act 1966 in 1972.
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to play an important role today, even in the capital island of Rarotonga, 
where modern medical care is relatively accessible. In every community 
throughout the country there are expert healers (ta’unga) with specialised 
knowledge in regard to certain ‘recipes’ for traditional medicines 
based on plants and particular methods of preparation. In general, the 
knowledge and rights to be a ta’unga are passed down through families, 
with new apprentices chosen after careful observation of their character 
and interest. Knowledge is transmitted in a series of stages, with the 
different layers of specialisation and secrecy kept until the apprentice 
has proved him/herself worthy. The ta’unga’s powers do not come just 
from the knowledge of the medicinal ‘recipes’; they are also related to 
their spiritual power. This, in turn, is associated with the notion that they 
have been ‘chosen’ as a worthwhile recipient of the knowledge or have 
inherited certain skills through their bloodline.
Far from being static, Māori medicinal knowledge is continually evolving 
and responding to new influences. New recipes are regularly being 
developed, often as a result of detailed dreams, and new ingredients 
incorporated; I was told of one recipe that included carrot and potato 
juice and also aloe vera—all introduced ingredients.6 The diverse 
influences of different types of Christianity also have an important 
effect on the spiritual dimension of the healing practices, and even 
on knowledge transmission—in some instances, church ministers are 
required to give a blessing to the end of the knowledge transfer when an 
apprentice becomes a ta’unga. 
The practice of Māori medicine is currently regulated by a combination 
of customary norms, beliefs and established practices, such as secrecy. 
The fundamental guiding principle is that ta’unga cannot be paid for 
their services; rather, they are motivated ‘from their hearts’ with a desire 
to cure the sick. As such, any request for payment is said to undermine 
the potency of the medicine and make it fail, although healers can be 
gifted with food or other goods. In return for their services, ta’unga also 
gain prestige and respect—both extremely highly valued commodities in 
Polynesian societies. Similar beliefs regulate the transfer of knowledge 
over the medicinal recipes: those without the rights to make the 
recipes are thought to be unable to make the medicine actually work, 
even though they may know as a matter of practice how to make the 
6  Vougioukalou (2009: 109) describes how on the island of Atiu it is common for people 
to experiment with the properties of newly introduced plants.
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medicine. It is also believed that those who do not have the rights to 
make medicines will simply not be able to ‘see’ the medicinal plants that 
are growing when they go to forage for them (‘their eyes and their mind 
are blocked’). As elsewhere in the Pacific Islands, here, the power to heal 
is closely linked to the power to harm. In the Cook Islands, this takes 
the form of the ability to ‘curse’—another important regulatory tool that 
healers can utilise to keep control over their knowledge (until relatively 
recently, ta’unga were often referred to as ‘witchdoctors’). One ta’unga 
told me that she had taken on someone as her apprentice and had then 
found out that he was selling his services; in response, she cursed him by 
removing his powers. This same story was recounted to me from various 
perspectives; in one version, the man’s hands were afflicted with blisters 
such that he could not work.
There are very strong narratives around the importance of secrecy and 
a common belief is that all recipes are ‘owned’ by certain individuals 
and families. However, the exchange of medicinal knowledge is in fact 
characterised by considerable fluidity. One of the most well-known 
ta’unga in Rarotonga told me that all of her knowledge originally came 
from her grandmother, who was from Tahiti. She also explained that 
she in turn had passed on the knowledge to at least six different people 
on various islands, none of whom she was related to, through a series 
of workshops. Her motivation for doing so was that ‘if you are a true 
ta’unga you have to pass to the people who can do it’. Of great concern 
to her, and indeed the general population, is the lack of interest from 
the younger generation in receiving the knowledge, together with the 
rather onerous burden it places on people to make medicine for those 
who come for help. Another ta’unga commented: ‘I am all for it to be 
shared, then if I am not available someone is there to help a person 
in need.’ The sharing of knowledge and recipes has also occurred due 
to the considerable mixing of communities since missionisation, with 
many Cook Islanders today referring to themselves as ‘a fruit salad’ of 
different islands and also European ancestry. Difficulties in determining 
the origin of knowledge and who has rights over it are compounded as 
well by the long history of voyaging and trading between Cook Islands, 
Samoa and French Polynesia, resulting again in considerable diffusion 
of concepts of plant preparation, usage and delivery across Polynesia 
(see Vougioukalou 2009: 49).
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This degree of disjuncture between the common narrative about the 
importance of secrecy and close control over medicinal recipes and 
the actual rather porous processes of transmission is also observed in 
a detailed ethnographic study of traditional medicine on the island of 
Atiu, Cook Islands, in 2009. Vougioukalou (2009: 133) observed that 
the ‘importance of family ownership of individual recipes was intensely 
stressed by all the informants that I spoke with’. However, she also 
recorded eight different types of ethnomedical knowledge transmission, 
including through training sessions, transmission of knowledge to 
the diaspora (and back again) and as required by emergency medical 
situations, which did not always follow strict family lines, concluding 
that there are ‘adapting mechanisms in place that allow for knowledge 
to be transmitted among highly fragmented populations’ (Vougioukalou 
2009: 147). These findings accord with other fieldwork I have done 
in regard to traditional knowledge in Pacific Island countries over the 
past four years: simplistic narratives about knowledge transmission and 
geographical boundedness of knowledge are belied by the reality of 
its dynamism, diffusion and recirculation. I have also observed a trend 
among the actual practitioners of traditional knowledge to take a far 
more open approach to the need to share and pass on knowledge than 
the policymakers in the capitals and regional organisations, who instead 
stress the need to document and assign rights over it (Forsyth 2012b).
There have been several new developments in regard to Māori medicine 
in recent years that demonstrate both its adaptation and new challenges 
for its regulation. The most significant of these has been an initiative 
to develop a range of medicinal and skincare products based on Māori 
medicine, led by an Australian-based company, CIMTech.7 In a nutshell, 
the story of this development is that the director of the company, who 
grew up in Cook Islands and whose paternal grandmother is a Cook 
Islander, became interested in the bone regeneration properties of 
Cook Islands herbal remedies. His tertiary training in medicine made 
him reflect on his childhood experiences of injuries sustained on the 
rugby field mending astonishingly quickly. In 2003, he therefore 
returned to Cook Islands and conducted extensive research into the 
properties of plants commonly used by healers in Cook Islands to 
treat broken bones. While no one shared their particular recipes with 
him, he drew on their collective knowledge of particular plants and 
preparation and conducted a great deal of his own experimentation. 
7  See: cimtech.com.au/index.html.
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Early in his research he entered into a benefit-sharing agreement with 
the Koutu Nui, whereby they would be major shareholders in CIMTech. 
His motivation for entering into the agreement was a combination of 
factors, including his knowledge of the customary understandings that 
knowledge about Māori medicine is considered to be ‘owned’ by Cook 
Islanders in general, a desire to establish a business to benefit the people 
of the Cook Islands and recognition that Cook Islands is his family’s 
home and positive relationships are crucial for everyday life and for 
the success of the business.8 To date, the venture has filed a number of 
patents but it is still seeking funding to make it an operating commercial 
enterprise. As such, no actual benefits have been paid to the Koutu Nui. 
While there is a degree of concern raised about the lack of payment, 
and  also questions about why the Koutu Nui was chosen to be the 
benefit-sharing partner rather than individual ta’unga or the House of 
Ariki, there are no widespread concerns about the initiative or narratives 
about biopiracy. 
The point of this discussion has been to demonstrate that adopting a 
legal pluralist perspective to regulation enables us to ‘see’ and appreciate 
the existence of the non-state regulatory order around Māori medicine 
in Cook Islands today. This forms a relevant background to the questions 
of how traditional knowledge can and should be regulated, which, as we 
will see below, is an area with which the region is currently grappling. 
4. The push to regulate traditional knowledge
There has been a strong push in the Pacific Islands for almost 
two decades  to regulate traditional knowledge through legislation 
(Forsyth 2012a, 2013). However, Cook Islands is one of a few countries 
in the region to have actually passed legislation to date. The Traditional 
Knowledge Act 2013 establishes a system whereby those claiming to 
be rights-holders can register their traditional knowledge and, as a 
result, are granted certain exclusive rights, including ‘to use, transmit, 
document or develop the knowledge in any way (whether commercial 
or not)’.9 The rights-holders of the knowledge are those who either 
created the knowledge or are the customary successor to the knowledge. 
8  See: cimtech.com.au/news-and-events.html. 
9  Section 7(1)(a).
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The register, which records a general description of the knowledge, is to 
be maintained by the Secretary of Cultural Development and be available 
for inspection at the offices of the Ministry of Cultural Development.10 
There are certain features of the Act that reflect a pluralistic approach 
to the regulation of traditional knowledge. For example, it delegates 
decisions over questions of who are the true rights-holders to a local 
institution called the Are Korero (‘House of Knowledge’). Are Korero 
used to exist in all communities to facilitate the sharing of specialised 
knowledge of healing, fishing, navigation, chanting, weaving and so 
forth. The Act envisages that the Are Korero will be re-invigorated and 
that the relevant paramount chiefs will decide who constitutes the Are 
Korero for their particular island or area. This provision for making 
determinations about rights over traditional knowledge at local levels is 
a major improvement on previous frameworks that give such decision-
making power to state or regional authorities (see Forsyth 2011, 2012a). 
However, it is unlikely that the Traditional Knowledge Act in its current 
form will satisfy many of the expectations set for it. The general nature 
of the description of the knowledge to be recorded in the register and 
the register’s relative inaccessibility make it very doubtful there will be 
any clarity over what traditional knowledge is actually being claimed and 
by whom, especially for those living in Australia or New Zealand or on 
the outer islands. The slight variations in knowledge from one island to 
another make it likely that many different variations could be registered, 
also making it hard to determine who the rights-holders actually are. 
A further problem with the Act is that it is limited in its jurisdictional 
reach to Cook Islands, and so will have no ability to impact on any 
misappropriations taking place outside the country, which was the 
main reason Members of Parliament and the general public wanted the 
legislation.11 In and of itself, the Act also does not create any mechanisms 
to preserve or record traditional knowledge or to perpetuate its use, 
which was another feature desired of it. Indeed, there is a danger that 
these types of initiatives will be undermined by the lack of clarity around 
the Act, creating apprehension in all future dealings with traditional 
knowledge by Cook Islanders themselves that what is being done may 
contravene the law and attract a substantial award of damages. 
10  Section 60(1). 
11  Although there have been negotiations for an international treaty to protect traditional 
knowledge since 2000 (see: wipo.int/tk/en/igc/), it seems unlikely that it will be finalised any time 
soon.
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5. What regulatory insights does the case 
study offer us? 
The case study demonstrates the crucial need to take non-state orders 
into account when developing new regulatory frameworks over areas 
currently regulated by non-state orders, such as traditional knowledge. For 
instance, as we saw above, the non-state regulatory system that governs 
Māori medicine in Cook Islands is a complex system of beliefs, norms and 
practices that is largely self-regulating. Neither customary institutions 
nor the state have traditionally been called on to make determinations 
of ownership of medicinal recipes or to regulate the proscription about 
receiving payment, making it ideally suited to a small population with 
limited human and financial resources. This regulatory framework has 
in fact operated astonishingly well in promoting the valuing and mana 
of ta’unga, protecting people’s claims over their traditional recipes and 
facilitating the continual transmission of Māori medicinal knowledge, 
especially given the changes and challenges occasioned by depopulation. 
It has even been used to deal with the emergence of new commercial 
enterprises, such as those by CIMTech, by creating a strong normative 
expectation of benefit-sharing and yet being flexible enough to allow the 
details of how that occurs to evolve organically. 
Second, when non-state regulatory orders are supplanted by state regulatory 
orders—as is potentially the case with regard to Māori medicine as a 
result of the Traditional Knowledge Act—it is important to be aware of the 
different values and assumptions that are also introduced. In this regard, 
the distinction between accounts of how systems are imagined/supposed 
to operate and how they actually work in practice is critical. From an 
idealised and relatively generalised position, the introduction of a register, 
the requirement to receive written authorisation for the use of traditional 
knowledge and the support of state courts and the force of law can be seen 
as merely a useful complement to the existing system of ordering. This is 
because in such an account there are clear owners of certain discrete parcels 
of knowledge and the transmission processes are straightforward. However, 
once we burrow into the rich ethnographic detail of transmission of Māori 
medicinal knowledge, it becomes clear that making determinations of 
rights-holders is likely to be extremely fraught. Moreover, transforming 
a dynamic, oral, community-based regulatory system into a fixed written 
system is likely to make it less responsive and adaptable. This is particularly 
problematic because this system is concerned with the regulation of 
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knowledge, which requires a balance between protecting the rights of 
current holders of knowledge and those of future users of the knowledge. 
The global intellectual property system is constantly evolving in response 
to these competing objectives and has important balancing features, such 
as time-limited monopoly rights and fair use, to ensure public access 
to knowledge. A  similar balance is achieved in the current non-state 
regulatory system through its inherent flexibility, leading to what has 
been referred to as the porosity of the system. However, the Traditional 
Knowledge Act contains neither type of balancing mechanism, raising the 
real danger that it will fundamentally alter the ability of the general public 
to access and use traditional knowledge.
Third, it is important to be aware of the fact that different regulatory orders 
permit and foreclose different levels of agency, reflect different institutional 
realities and are based on a variety of underlying values. These differences 
are, however, often covered up by the ostensible neutrality of state law. 
For instance, the Traditional Knowledge Act is likely to benefit those who 
have the closest access to the state to register their claims. Those most 
likely to be disenfranchised by this process are the Cook Islanders living 
outside Cook Islands, who are unlikely to be aware of claims made over 
traditional knowledge and the need to contest them. As the registration 
of traditional knowledge is in perpetuity, this potentially has ramifications 
for generations to come. The mere involvement of the state judicial system 
in the regulation of traditional knowledge also empowers those who are 
financially advantaged. The Traditional Knowledge Act is also based on a 
state regulatory framework that implies a degree of human and funding 
resources that is often not available for small island nations. The values 
introduced in the Act through Western mechanisms, such as the need 
for written documentation and clear assignment of rights, are in many 
ways at odds with the values espoused by the ta’unga about the need to 
heal with all your heart and the importance of passing on the knowledge 
to those who are willing to learn. It also ignores the deeply ingrained 
importance of secrecy; a number of informants expressed certainty that 
many ta’unga and other experts in traditional knowledge would refuse to 
have their knowledge recorded in writing in a publicly accessible register. 
Identifying individual rights-holders who are given absolute rights over 
the knowledge also facilitates the commercialisation of that knowledge 
by a select few, thus disenabling the more diffuse community-based use 
of the knowledge. Similar neoliberal presumptions about the importance 
of registering customary land have had devastating consequences across 
much of Melanesia (see Anderson and Lee 2010).
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Finally, the Māori medicine case study is an example of the problematic 
emphasis that many in the development industry place on drafting 
legislation, which stems from a positivistic approach to regulation that 
ignores the importance of non-state regulatory orders. Legislation is 
widely seen as being a solution to almost every developmental problem, 
regardless of whether or not there are the resources to implement it and 
regardless of its effect on existing non-state regulatory orders. Although 
the Traditional Knowledge Act was passed in 2013, by the end of 2014, 
there were still no processes in place for its implementation and, indeed, 
knowledge of the Act itself was limited. As commonly occurs, the funding 
for the drafting of the legislation came from a regional source, but did 
not extend to implementation. The danger with focusing attention on 
legislation is that it diverts resources from actual knowledge-revival 
projects, sidelines existing regulatory mechanisms and gives a (sometimes) 
misleading impression that something is actually being done.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has identified and discussed a number of regulatory 
challenges surrounding the protection of traditional knowledge, and 
how an approach informed by legal pluralism can assist. It argues 
that there is a need to engage respectfully with non-state orders in 
developing regulatory frameworks in plural legal orders. Such respect 
can only come from an appreciation of the complexity of non-state 
orders, and a willingness to understand the contexts in which they have 
evolved, the principles and values underlying them and the various 
mechanisms by which they operate. The discussion above should not be 
taken as dismissing the need for a legislative response to the protection 
of traditional knowledge. The desire for some ‘real’ or hard protection 
from the dangers of misappropriation of traditional knowledge springs 
from a long history of exploitation of Cook Islanders, and, indeed, other 
Pacific Islanders, by foreigners who unfairly extracted, and continue 
to extract, both natural and human-made resources. Such a feeling of 
vulnerability can and should be addressed in a nuanced and well-designed 
regulatory framework, in which legislation can play a supporting role. 
However,  regulatory responses in this area need to be very carefully 
tailored and adopt a light hand with regard to their impact on existing 
non-state regulatory orders. 
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Section 3: 
The state and regulatory 
transformations
A significant part of RegNet’s scholarship has focused on understanding 
the dynamics of change at different levels of regulation (global, regional, 
national, local) and how these levels are connected. The globalisation 
of regulation (see Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) has been a major 
project employing a distinctive micro–macro methodology aimed at 
understanding how individuals as actors use domain-based webs of 
influence to obtain change, including of a structural kind (on the micro–
macro method, see Henne, Chapter 6, this volume). 
The chapters in this section analyse different dimensions of the state 
and regulatory change. Peter Drahos synthesises the findings of Global 
Business Regulation, showing how even weak actors, if they understand 
the possibilities of global webs of coercion and dialogue, may entrench 
principles that pattern regulatory outcomes in ways that serve their 
interests. Scott focuses on the role of the state in regulation, tracing 
the changes in the state’s oversight of rules and delivery of services and 
goods, as well as analysing the implications of responsive regulation 
for harnessing the regulatory capacity of non-state actors. David Levi-
Faur’s chapter shifts the perspective from the regulatory state to the rise 
of regulatory capitalism. Using the idea of constitutive rules, he presents 
an argument for why the long-term adaptability of capitalism may lie 
in regulation (on this theme, see also Drahos, Chapter 43, this volume). 
Terry Halliday takes on the neglected variable of time in regulatory 
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transformations, arguing that time may be a resource that favours 
the weak in regulatory contests. Christian Downie assesses the 
transformative possibilities of international negotiation for regulatory 
capitalism (webs of dialogue), focusing in particular on how prolonged 
negotiations may affect state preferences, melting frozen positions and 
thereby revealing possible paths to change. In the final chapter, Natasha 
Tusikov explains how non-state actors and states cooperate to forge 
transnational non-state regulatory regimes (new webs of influence and 
nodes of decision-making)—regimes that, unlike many treaties, are not 
a dead letter but operate to change behaviour.
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1. Globalisation, but of what?
Globalisation was one of the buzzwords of the 1990s. But almost as 
soon as it buzzed into the social sciences, it provoked a sceptical 
reaction (Hirst and Thompson 2003). In one view, globalisation referred 
to processes of economic integration in which national markets were 
becoming a part of regional or global markets, in which multinational 
firms were dominant players. The capacity of states to influence these 
markets was seen as radically diminished. However, it soon became 
clear that the economic data could be made to tell different stories. 
Technical debates arose around whether the indicators used to 
measure globalisation, such as the rising ratio of merchandise exports 
to gross domestic product (GDP) using constant prices as a measure, 
exaggerated the effects of globalisation (Sutcliffe and Glyn 2003). 
Similarly, depending on how one defined a multinational corporation, 
there were either tens of thousands (based on a firm with one or more 
foreign subsidiaries) or very few (based on a firm with an integrated 
chain of global production). The clearest area of globalisation was the 
financial sector, where cross-border financial flows between banks and 
investment in bonds and equities had increased dramatically in scale. 
Even here, however, in the very heartland of globalisation, there were, 
and are, stark country differences. For example, expressing foreign assets 
and liabilities as a ratio to GDP, Lane (2012) points out that advanced 
economies went from 68.4 per cent in 1980 to 438.2 per cent in 2007, 
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while emerging markets in the same period went from 34.9 per cent 
to 73.3 per cent. In other words, the cross-border financial integration 
of the latter group was considerably less.
These debates about globalisation, at least to some extent, were referring 
to different processes rather than just one process of integration and 
interconnection. Globalisation cannot really be understood without 
distinguishing among the globalisation of markets, the globalisation of 
firms and the globalisation of regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 
8–9). These are distinct processes with contingent rather than necessary 
connections among them.
a) Market globalisation without regulatory globalisation
Markets can globalise even though national regulation remains in place. 
Amazon, eBay and Taobao are examples of substantially globalised 
marketplaces that are still regulated nationally. 
b) Regulatory globalisation without market 
globalisation
The globalisation of regulatory standards may end up impeding 
the integration of national markets. For example, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements on phytosanitary standards and 
technical barriers to trade were intended to create some convergence of 
standard-setting in these areas, with the goal of this convergence being 
to facilitate trade.1 But the evidence suggests that developing countries 
face problems in achieving the level of scientific capability required by 
these standards (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2005). The upshot is that 
developing countries may lose rather than gain markets as a result of the 
standards. The increasing globalisation of prescription drug regulation 
and intellectual property rights has had a varied effect on prices for 
pharmaceuticals because some states act as monopsony buyers and 
pharmaceutical companies use intellectual property rights as an aid to 
price discrimination. 
1  The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures.
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c) The globalisation of firms without the globalisation 
of markets or regulatory standards
Pharmaceutical multinationals such as Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline 
operate in prescription drug markets that have not globalised. Media 
companies such as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation have globalised 
even though the regulation of the media remains substantially a national 
affair. 
2. Explaining regulatory globalisation: 
Is parsimony possible?
The explanatory approach to regulatory globalisation that is sketched 
in  this chapter draws on the argument by Jon Elster (1989) that 
connections between events are best explained in terms of mechanisms 
rather than general laws. Elster is concerned with higher-order 
mechanisms such as evolution, rationality and reinforcement, whereas 
here we will be discussing lower-order mechanisms such as coercion and 
reward. The reason is simple. These kinds of lower-order mechanisms 
are often observable, so verifying evidence for their operation can be 
sought. For those who attach weight to parsimony in theory building, 
a potentially long list of lower-order mechanisms might be seen as 
unwieldy. Those who work in the political economy tradition, for 
example, might seek an explanatory framework that reduces rather than 
multiplies causal variables (see, for example, Mattli and Woods 2009). 
Can Occam’s razor be applied to reduce the number of mechanisms? 
Can we develop a more general theory that, for example, unites lower-
order mechanisms under a master mechanism of some kind? 
A possible candidate for a master mechanism might be a dialectical one 
based on materialism (Marx) or non-materialism (Hegel). The difficulty 
is moving beyond some vague general formulation of the mechanism 
(in  the case of the dialectic, thesis, antithesis, synthesis) to something 
that strongly relates to all the evidence and allows conditions for its 
testability to be formulated. The push for parsimony in theory building 
runs the risk of turning the chosen explanatory variable into a defensive 
and narrow-lensed paradigm. For example, it might be argued by a realist 
that states and power are the only variables that one needs to explain 
regulatory globalisation. It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to define 
realism. Realism describes a ‘general orientation’ rather than a specific 
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theory—an orientation that emphasises the developmental egoism of the 
state and the centrality of power in advancing its developmental goals in 
a world of competing egoists (Donnelly 2000: 6). If, under the guise of 
a single variable, one includes other forms of power such as soft power 
then parsimony is more or less out the window, as it is when realism and 
constructivism are combined (see, for example, Barkin 2010). The fact 
that we may choose to weaken the principle of parsimony in our search 
for explanations is itself not a problem. The explanation may still continue 
to connect in important ways with the phenomenon we are studying. 
The multiplication of explanatory entities may create the conditions 
for a grander conceptual transformation of our understanding of the 
world than a parsimonious theory ever could (see Losoncz, Chapter 5, 
this volume for a discussion of these broader issues).
3. Regulatory globalisation: Key concepts
Three concepts are central to the account of regulatory globalisation that 
is presented in this chapter: actors, principles and mechanisms. The basic 
claim is that this form of globalisation is a nonlinear dynamic in which 
actors contest various domains of regulation by using mechanisms to 
support principles that best fit their goals in the relevant domain.
Actors
States have been and remain important to explaining the spread of 
regulation across borders. Since World War II, the US state has been 
the single most important actor in the spread of regulatory models, 
including in nuclear power regulation (through its role in the formation 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency), financial regulation 
(a manifold influence through, for example, Wall Street innovation and 
the International Monetary Fund), intellectual property (its influence in 
bringing intellectual property into the trade regime), competition law 
(the export of antitrust principles after World War II to countries such 
as Germany and Japan) and the regulation of illicit drugs (its support for 
prohibition and its capacity to influence in various ways other countries to 
take the same approach). Other states have been important as well, such 
as the United Kingdom in financial and insurance regulation or Germany 
in environmental regulation; but, for breadth and depth of influence, no 
state has rivalled the United States. Critical to an understanding of US 
regulatory power is the role of US multinationals, which can, for example, 
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through the juridical prowess of their many lawyers, provide the US state 
with detailed information on the shortcomings of a developing state’s 
intellectual property law—information that US Government officials 
can leverage in various ways in international negotiations. It is this 
capacity to deploy combinations of hard and soft power that has made 
the United States such a central player in the globalisation of regulation. 
Regulation does not begin with the modern state, if by the modern 
state we mean a union of people in which ultimate power resides not 
in the formal head of the union but in the people—a conception of 
the state that gathers critical momentum in the seventeenth century 
(Skinner 1997). The regulation of commerce and trade in medieval 
Europe cannot be explained without reference to the customary and 
contractual practices of merchants (the use of bills of exchange and 
promissory notes). There are debates over the extent to which merchant 
custom (as opposed to contractual practice) produced a genuinely 
transnational body of rules (Law Merchant) (see Kadens 2012), but 
it is clear that it provided states with principles (such as looking to 
merchant custom to solve disputes) that exercised a lasting influence 
on state commercial orders. The influence of canon law on medieval 
law, the role of the Church in the regulation of slavery and the rise 
of the antislavery movement in late eighteenth-century Britain all 
provide examples of why a typology of non-state actors is required 
in any explanatory account of regulatory globalisation. Confining the 
actions of corporations to the realm of domestic politics and assuming 
that only states can act in the international sphere ignores the  many 
ways in which corporations act directly as causal agents in creating and 
globalising regulatory norms (see Tusikov, Chapter 20, this volume). 
Such a typology should include organisations of states (for example, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
the WTO), business organisations (for example, national chambers of 
commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce), corporations, 
non-governmental organisations (for example, Consumers International, 
Greenpeace, International Accounting Standards Committee), mass 
publics (especially as constituted by reactions to disasters such as nuclear 
accidents) and epistemic communities (a group of actors united by 
common regulatory discourse and technical expertise).
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Principles
If we think of the word ‘norm’ as referring to a general category, we can 
distinguish different kinds of norms, all with regulatory effect, such as 
legal, social, moral and customary norms. There are other ways in which 
to draw distinctions between regulatory norms, including between rules 
and principles or performance standards and prescriptive standards. 
Different types of norms have different effects in processes of regulatory 
globalisation. Customary norms may not be transferable in the way that 
statutory-based systems of regulation are, but different customary norms 
may sometimes give rise to a unifying principle such as the recognition 
of indigenous peoples’ laws and customs. Principles are recurrently 
important in the globalisation of regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000: Chapter 21). One way in which to draw the distinction between 
rules and principles is to argue that principles are open-ended as to the 
range of actions they prescribe, while rules prescribe specific actions. In 
the process of regulatory globalisation, actors will often promote some 
principles and other actors wishing to contest the practices grounded by 
those principles will counterpoise different principles. By way of example, 
transnational corporations may defend principles of deregulation and 
lowest-cost location to be able to arrange the management of their 
labour force, their tax affairs and their environmental obligations, while 
green groups, for example, may argue for corporate regulation based on 
principles of regulation and sustainable development. Framework treaties 
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity or the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change articulate core principles 
that then drive the evolution of detailed rule-based national regulatory 
schemes. Principles do not need the vehicle of law to have regulatory 
impact, as demonstrated by the practices in corporate culture based 
on principles of lowest-cost location, total quality management and 
continuous improvement. Aside from the principles already mentioned, 
a list of key principles that has been important across many domains 
of regulation includes harmonisation, rule compliance (doing no more 
than the rules require), transparency, reciprocity, national treatment, 
most favoured nation, national sovereignty, strategic trade and world’s 
best practice. 
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Mechanisms
The spread of regulation across borders involves different types of actors 
and different types of norms and is linked to the operation of different 
kinds of mechanisms. For present purposes, mechanisms can be thought 
of as devices or tools that are consciously used by actors to bring about 
their desired ends. For example, in a bilateral trade negotiation between 
the United States and a developing country, intellectual property will 
always be on the table. In reality, the principle of strategic trade is at 
issue since the United States will be pushing for intellectual property 
forms of regulation that advantage its exporters and avoiding those that 
do not (for example, the greater protection of traditional knowledge). 
The US negotiator will never refer to strategic trade, but will, rather, 
make rhetorical use of a principle such as world’s best practice (meaning 
US practice), arguing that the developing country should adopt higher 
standards of intellectual property protection. A standard move by a 
developing country negotiator is to say that the developing country is 
not obliged to follow these higher standards (the principle of national 
sovereignty) and, in any case, it does not have the capacity to implement 
the administrative and judicial infrastructure to run a high-standard 
intellectual property system. A US negotiator may offer some financial 
assistance (the mechanism of reward) as well as indicating that various 
experts will be found to instruct the developing country in the mysterious 
arts of intellectual property (the mechanism of capacity building), or, 
if the US negotiator is losing patience, he may dangle the threat of 
trade sanctions, suggesting that the country is in fact in breach of its 
international obligations on intellectual property (the mechanism of 
economic coercion).
Historically, the transfer of entire systems of rules from one country 
to another has generally travelled along paths of military conquest 
and colonisation. British laws were applied to Australia after Britain 
invaded Australia and crushed the resistance of Indigenous people. 
Aspects of Japanese domestic law ended up applying to Korea as Japan 
progressively integrated it into its empire, annexing it in a treaty in 1910. 
Japan was on the receiving end of this process of regulatory imposition—
its  antimonopoly law of 1947 being the product of US occupation. 
The globalisation of regulation through the conduit of military coercion 
is not just a matter of antiquarian interest. After the US invasion of Iraq, 
the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, 
promulgated an order that brought aspects of Iraq’s patent law up to 
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international standards.2 There are many other examples of a conqueror’s 
regulatory systems following the conqueror into a territory and, more 
often than not, remaining there well after the conqueror has departed or 
been thrown out. The continuing influence of Roman law is perhaps the 
most spectacular example of how regulatory conquest outlives military 
conquest.
Another mechanism of central importance to regulatory globalisation has 
been modelling. In the abstract, this is a process of observational learning 
in which an actor sees, interprets and reproduces the actions of a model 
(Bandura 1986). Learning and interpretation distinguish modelling 
from simple imitation. Within the regulatory context, a number of 
variables affect the direction in which the modelling mechanism causes 
the diffusion of regulatory models. Having the status of a hegemonic 
superpower increases the probability of having one’s regulatory models 
adopted. Other countries study the regulatory models that underpin US 
innovation even if the scale of the US economy means that those models 
are likely to be inappropriate for most countries. A shared ideology 
increases the likelihood of a modelling interaction between countries. 
China, in the early years of its planned economy, looked to the former 
Soviet Union for regulatory guidance in the implementation of its 
five-year plans. The influence of US telecommunications deregulation 
captured the attention of UK policymakers because of a shared interest 
in deregulatory models. 
Models begin life as prescribed actions in symbolic form, meaning that, 
among other things, they are relatively cheap to devise. The barriers to 
entry to using modelling as a mechanism are not as high as they are for 
military or economic coercion or for systems of reward. Modelling is a 
mechanism within the reach of many weak actors. The weak, through the 
invention of models, can contest the models of the powerful. Consumer 
groups, women’s groups, indigenous groups and poor farmer groups 
can, through modelling, offer countervailing regulatory prescriptions 
(consumer protection laws, antidiscrimination laws, land rights, rights to 
save seeds, and so on) to the models of the powerful—prescriptions that 
evoke different identities and values. On a structural account of power, 
the consumer reforms proposed by the activist Ralph Nader in the 1960s 
that led to safer cars, safer airline travel and rising safety standards for 
2  Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 81: Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed 
Information, Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety Law, 26 April 2004. Available at: www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=229977.
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many other products should not have succeeded in the United States, 
let alone globalised to other countries. A raft of social science theory 
ranging from class power to the logic of collective action would have 
predicted Nader’s failure rather than what transpired: his astonishing 
success and the modelling of his crusader approach by activists in other 
countries. 
Modelling is at its most influential in moments of disaster and crisis. 
It is when, for example, there has been an accident at a nuclear power 
plant that models for the regulation of nuclear power are likely to have 
an attentive political audience or when, after a global financial crisis, 
states are facing fiscal hard times that they are likely to pay much more 
attention to models for combatting the global tax evasion strategies 
of multinationals. Crises on this scale trigger media frenzies and 
mass demand for a response. Those individuals and organisations that 
have a regulatory solution to the problem are presented with a global 
modelling opportunity. The successful diffusion of modelling depends 
on the involvement of a range of actors: model missionaries who preach 
its virtues, model mercenaries who see how they might profit from its 
adoption, model mongers who float models as part of political agendas, 
model misers who adopt rather than invest in models of their own 
and model modernisers who support the model because they seek to 
come under its halo of progressiveness (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 
Chapter 24).
4. Regulatory webs, network enrolment 
and forum shifting
Actors, principles and mechanisms are categories that lay the foundation 
for an explanatory framework for globalisation. Which actors, 
mechanisms and principles have been important in a given domain is 
a matter of empirical investigation. This explanatory framework can 
be deepened by the addition of three more concepts: regulatory webs, 
network enrolment and forum shifting. The addition of these concepts 
provides a better explanation of how individual agents may and do 
intervene in globalisation processes to affect their outcomes. Instead 
of confining globalisation to macro–macro processes (systems or states 
acting on other systems or states), it becomes possible to detect and 
explain micro–macro processes (individual agents acting to bring about 
changes in systems). Regulatory webs can be thought of as connected 
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strands of weak or strong influence or control, with actors in a regulatory 
domain having one or more such strands at their disposal. Regulatory 
webs can be divided into webs of coercion and reward and webs of 
dialogue. In webs of dialogue, actors meet informally or formally to talk 
or deliberate about their interests and the interests of others. Dialogue 
is a general mechanism—one of persuasion rather than control. 
In  regulatory contexts its efficacy is often dismissed on the grounds 
that where sanctions are not involved talk is cheap. However, even in 
contexts where a dialogic web is not intertwined with a web of coercion 
and reward, dialogue may help actors to better understand their interests, 
enabling them to understand that they may be in a situation where 
reciprocal coordination makes sense (for example, to settle a common 
technical standard). Those who operate within global regulatory circles 
generally prefer to work through dialogue—one obvious reason being 
that coercion and reward are both costly. Following through on, for 
example, the threat of trade sanctions, which must be done from time to 
time if the threat is to remain credible, generates diplomatic, economic 
and domestic political costs for the coercer country. The United States 
has a lot of countries on its various trade watch lists, but the instances 
of where it moves to sanctions are comparatively rare. Those in US 
government would think hard about responding to every demand from 
US business groups to impose trade sanctions on, for example, India 
because India is an important partner on security issues. 
Dialogue is also important to understanding how power in global 
regulatory contests is harnessed and exercised. Social science theorising 
has moved away from seeing power exclusively as a static property of 
X to theorising it as something that flows through networks (Foucault 
1980) or is translated into action by networks (Latour 1986). Influencing 
the course of global regulation requires multiple capacities and resources 
at technical, legal and political levels—capacities that no one actor 
possesses. Power in global regulatory contests is harnessed by enrolling 
the capacities of others into a network that works towards a common 
purpose. These networked flows of power explain the emergence of 
different regulatory standards such as a food standard at a committee 
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission or technical wi-fi standards 
by a private standard-setting body, as well as the imposition of trade 
sanctions that coerce a developing country into a compliance strategy. 
Network enrolment is fundamental to understanding the processes and 
outcomes of regulatory globalisation.
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An equally fundamental strategy is forum shifting. Forum shifting 
is made up of three basic strategies: moving an agenda from one 
organisation to another, leaving an organisation and pursuing agendas 
simultaneously in more than one organisation (for the general theory of 
forum shifting, see Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: Chapter 24). A classic 
example of forum shifting is the way in which the United States was 
able to shift the issue of intellectual property into the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations, despite developing country opposition to such a 
move (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). Forum shifting can occur across 
regimes or within a regime. An example of the latter is the WTO in 
the trade regime. It has become subject to forum shifting as states have 
become highly active in preferential trade negotiations while the pace of 
multilateral trade has slowed. The basic reason for forum shifting is that 
it increases the forum shifter’s chances of victory. The rules and modes 
of operation of each international organisation constitute the payoffs 
that a state might expect to receive if it plays in that particular forum. 
Forum shifting is a way of constituting a new game. Facing defeat or a 
suboptimal result in one forum, a state may gain a better result by shifting 
its agenda to a new forum. Sometimes forum shifts are transparent, 
but, on other occasions, they can be far less visible, as in the case of the 
transnational non-state regulatory regime that is evolving for the global 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in movies, music and brands 
based on trademarks (see Tusikov, Chapter 20, this volume). 
To initiate and develop a global forum-shifting sequence is a hugely 
resource-intensive exercise that requires the coordinated deployment 
of webs of coercion and reward. For the most part, forum shifting has 
been used by powerful actors. That said, in today’s world, which is dense 
with non-governmental organisation (NGO) networks, forum shifting 
rarely goes unnoticed or uncontested. During the 1990s, the use of 
bilateral trade agreements by the United States to achieve its intellectual 
property agenda was largely ignored by NGOs, as they were primarily 
focused on the effects of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This has changed, with 
preferential trade negotiations such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
being closely tracked and analysed. Big business coalitions deploying 
forum-shifting strategies have to confront a lot more horizontal and 
vertical complexities, with the payoffs from forum shifting being much 
less certain. NGOs reframe earlier losing contests of principles (such as 
private property versus piracy, which helped produce TRIPS) using other 
principles (monopoly privileges versus access to medicines or monopoly 
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privileges versus farmers’ right to save seeds). One response of big 
business is to retreat to less transparent forums (the case of transnational 
non-state regimes). 
For weak actors, there are payoffs from forum shifting, but they can be a 
long time coming. Indigenous groups were among the first practitioners 
of forum shifting after colonisation. Unable to find land rights justice 
at the hands of settler societies, some indigenous groups from countries 
such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries took their cause to seats of power in Europe, 
generally with very little success (Drahos 2014: 74–5). But in the second 
half of the twentieth century, indigenous movements and their leaders 
became much more successful, using the United Nations (UN) system to 
articulate principles for indigenous people, entrenching them in treaties 
and employing them in domestic litigation and negotiating strategies. 
5. Intervening in regulatory webs
As argued above, the globalisation of a given regulatory domain can never 
be understood in terms of a one-actor, one-mechanism model. Instead, 
actors find themselves in moments of historical legacy, enmeshed in 
regulatory webs about which they have imperfect information, using 
principles that have been fashioned in previous contexts and with varying 
access and capacities to enrol other actors into the networks needed to 
alter the standards of regulation. There is a measure of indeterminacy 
in historical legacy such that individuals with an understanding of 
webs of influence can become agents of profound regulatory change. 
Behind some cases of regulatory globalisation lie inspirational stories 
of individual moral agency such as that of Raphael Lemkin, the Polish 
lawyer who invented the term ‘genocide’ and then became the ‘one-
man, one-globe, multilingual, single-issue lobbying machine’ that 
drove states into drafting, signing and then ratifying the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 
(Power 2003: 61). 
More often than not, though, coalitions of business elites are the ones 
to exploit the indeterminacies of historical legacy, creating monopolies 
where citizens would like competition and finding ways to restrict 
or evade regulation where citizens would like it. The globalisation 
of intellectual property rights was the work of a small group of 
Washington-based policy entrepreneurs who, in the 1980s, were able 
to convince the chief executive officers (CEOs) of some major US 
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companies such as Pfizer, IBM and DuPont to back the idea of creating 
an agreement on intellectual property in the trade regime. Once these 
CEOs were on board, they were able to begin the processes of network 
enrolment and inner circle consensus building that culminated in one of 
the most powerful business coalitions ever assembled, backed in the end 
by the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan. 
Yet this case also reveals how in a world where the exercise of power is 
deeply contingent on network enrolment and dialogic webs of influence, 
power can ebb away and be made to flow through different network 
architectures. By 2001, a network of health activists and developing 
countries had managed to create a consensus around the importance of 
public health that led to adoption at the 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial 
Conference of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (Odell and Sell 2006).
The scale and scope of these kinds of successful interventions in global 
regulatory webs by civil society groups will, of course, vary. The important 
point is that they are possible. Taking as their goal the defence or recapture 
of people’s sovereignty against business sovereignty, Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000) outline five basic strategies of intervention that weak 
actors might use to ratchet up regulatory standards where business might 
oppose higher standards and four strategies to counter the entrenchment 
of monopolies by business.
Strategies for ratcheting up standards:
1. exploiting strategic trade thinking to divide and conquer business
2. harnessing the management philosophy of continuous improvement
3. linking Porter’s (1990) competitive advantage of nations analysis to 
best available technology and best available practice standards
4. targeting enforcement on ‘gatekeepers’ within a web of controls 
(actors with limited self-interest in rule-breaking, but on whom 
rule-breakers depend)
5. taking framework agreements seriously.
Strategies to counter monopoly:
1. using competition policy to divide and conquer business
2. harnessing continuous improvement in competition law compliance
3. building epistemic community in competition enforcement
4. transforming the consumer movement into a watchdog of monopoly.
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Since the publication of Global Business Regulation in 2000, the 
relevance of these strategies has increased rather than decreased. Aided 
by increasingly powerful information communication technologies, 
networks, as Castells (2000) has argued, have become the organisational 
form of choice to manage complexity. The world has become saturated by 
NGOs that are involved in continuous processes of network formation 
and alliance creation. The networks of state power that Braithwaite 
and Drahos found to be most relevant to explaining global regulation 
were, at their core, based on a US–EU duopoly. In the past decade, this 
duopoly has had to confront new circuits of power, as the importance of 
its traditional partners has faded and new state players and alliances have 
emerged. In the 1980s, the ‘Quad’ (the United States, European Union, 
Japan and Canada) dominated the negotiations around the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In 2008, Pascal Lamy, then Director-
General of the WTO, pointed out that: 
the QUAD is dead and we talk about the G-4 (US, EC [European 
Commission], India, Brazil). Moreover, it is not possible to propose any 
new rule without testing the waters with countries like China, South 
Africa and Indonesia just to name a few of them.3 
Since Lamy’s words, new and potentially powerful nodes of financial 
governance have appeared in the global web of financial regulation. 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa established in 2015 
the New Development Bank, and China in the same year established 
the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIDB). The New 
Development Bank is headquartered in Shanghai and the AIDB in 
Beijing. The air may not be as clean in these cities as in Washington, 
DC, where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
are headquartered, but perhaps potential borrowers may get better terms 
than in Washington, DC.
Summing up, the categories of actors, mechanisms and principles provide 
the basis for a more finegrained causal account of global regulatory 
processes. A conceptualisation of regulatory webs, network enrolment 
and forum shifting provides an understanding of how actors intervene 
in these processes.
3  See: wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl94_e.htm.
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The regulatory state and beyond
Colin Scott
In John Braithwaite’s remarkable set of contributions to ideas about and 
the practice of regulation over four decades, the state is one of the central 
organising concepts. This is true for much thinking about regulation more 
generally, but for a variety of reasons. In Braithwaite’s case, the focus on 
the state may lie with his original interests as a criminologist, where 
there is a strong consensus that the responsibility for regulating criminal 
behaviour not only lies with the state, but also provides a core rationale 
for the existence of the state as monopolist over legitimate use of coercive 
power. Just as that consensus has broken down with the privatisation 
of some aspects of prisons and policing systems in various countries, 
so the agreement around the centrality of the state in regulation has been 
challenged. In this chapter, I argue that while some, including myself, 
have seen in Braithwaite’s early and highly significant research on the 
role of the state in regulation a tendency to neglect the wider community 
and market context, in fact, the seeds of a more broadly based analysis 
of regulatory capitalism may be found throughout Braithwaite’s oeuvre. 
Policy and scholarly communities were less receptive to understanding 
the key role of community and market actors set out from an early stage 
in Braithwaite’s work and more fully developed in his later work. In this 
chapter, I attempt to locate Braithwaite’s major contributions to the 
theory and practice of the regulatory state and the broader concept of 
regulatory capitalism within the wider context of contemporary thinking 
about regulatory governance.
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1. Introduction
I first encountered the scholarship of John Braithwaite when I  read 
his article on enforced self-regulation (see Braithwaite 1982). The 
significance of this article was that it recognised the significant role of 
businesses in contributing to regulatory success while at the same time 
according to the state a central role in setting norms, monitoring and 
enforcement. That article set the stage for the later collaboration with 
Ian Ayres, Responsive Regulation (1992), which set out to ‘transcend the 
deregulation debate’ by showing the scope for finding common objectives 
and shared instruments between state, business and civil society in the 
development and implementation of regulation. John Braithwaite’s 
scholarship, in common with professional life more generally, has 
constantly sought to take advantage of ways of working that prioritise 
the potential for collaboration and dialogue over other modes, which 
emphasise rivalry or coercion. This is reflected in his commitment to 
republican thinking about the state and civil society actors (Braithwaite 
1997: 309) and his claim that ‘most regulation can be about collaborative 
capacity-building’ (Braithwaite 2011: 475). 
In my own earlier readings of Braithwaite’s scholarship, and of Responsive 
Regulation in particular, I have been critical of the central emphasis he 
places on the state (Scott 2004). However, in this chapter, I substantially 
revise this critique, as I think my earlier analysis was a misreading. 
While  there is no doubt that Responsive Regulation has been most 
influential for what it has to say about the role and modes of operation 
of the state in regulatory governance, I suggest this has been because of 
a neglect of other important aspects of the work that have taken rather 
longer to take root in both scholarly and practice communities. 
In particular, we find in Braithwaite’s work, from the earliest days, 
a  concern  to identify capacity across state, business and civil society 
sectors,  and to work out how shared capacity can be utilised in 
developing effective ordering. This more nuanced view of the role 
of the state in collaborative or network modes of governance is seen 
strongly in Braithwaite’s more recent work on regulatory capitalism 
(Braithwaite  2008) and elsewhere. In this chapter, I aim to offer an 
evaluation of how Braithwaite’s scholarship emphasises both the 
centrality of and the limits to the role of the state in regulatory governance.
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2. Responsive enforcement and design 
in the regulatory state
The regulatory state
The core idea of the regulatory state is that there is a distinctive mode 
of governance oriented towards the promulgation of rules that engages 
more or less systematic oversight of compliance with those rules by 
public agencies operating at arm’s length from those they are overseeing 
(Levi-Faur 2013; Loughlin and Scott 1997; Majone 1994b). We might 
think of independent regulatory agencies’ oversight of businesses as 
offering the core case of regulatory state governance (Selznick 1985). 
However, it is clear that the shift towards arm’s-length oversight 
of compliance with rules as a governance mode extends well beyond 
independent regulators of business, and takes in also the separation and 
oversight of delivery functions within the public sector (Majone 1994a). 
To take the example of the utilities and network industries, such as 
communications, the regulatory mode of governance has been reflected 
in the corporatisation of telecommunications and postal services, which 
at one time were operated by government ministries and are now subject 
to regulatory oversight, whether the services are now offered by private 
companies, as is overwhelmingly the case with telecommunications, or 
by public bodies, as occurs in many countries in respect of postal services 
(Thatcher 2007). The communications sector actors have in common 
a trend towards oversight by reference to rules, displacing discretion, 
whether the rules and oversight are coming from ministries or agencies. 
Furthermore, the deployment of regulatory state mechanisms is not 
restricted to economic sectors, but also includes the redistributive 
functions of the state (Levi-Faur 2013, 2014; Mabbett 2011). 
Arguably, the United States was a well-developed regulatory state 
by the 1930s, when the ‘New Deal’ agencies, such as the Federal 
Communications Commission, were introduced to subject a wide range 
of business activities to independent arm’s-length oversight by reference 
to rules (Schultz and Doern 1998; Moran 2003). The terminology of the 
regulatory state was used extensively in comparisons of the administrative 
arrangements of the United States with those of countries which chose 
different models (Levi-Faur 2013). European attempts to address 
similar problems—of making utility services available and affordable as 
widely as possible—adopted public provision models, with a high degree 
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of discretion, which came to be characterised as aspects of welfare state 
governance (Esping-Andersen 1990). Giandomenico Majone identified 
a trend towards convergence between Europe and the United States 
over regulatory state governance in the 1980s. This trend emerged both 
from a tendency towards prioritising regulatory governance modes in 
European Union (EU) policymaking (the EU institutions lacking the 
cash and the organisational capacity for substantial direct provision) 
and from the take-up of neoliberal policymaking (which tends to favour 
regulatory over welfare state modes of governance as representing a less 
intrusive and smaller state) in the United Kingdom and, progressively, 
in other European states from the 1980s (Majone 1994b). Significantly, 
the regulatory governance mode—often thought to focus on the exercise 
of public law power—places a significant emphasis on contractual 
instruments such as licences and bilateral contracts to set, monitor 
and enforce regulatory norms, both by governments and by others, 
on organisations that encompass state, market and community actors 
(Collins 1999; Scott 2002).
Braithwaite’s own take on the development of the regulatory state starts 
with the nineteenth century and the idea of the state as a nightwatchman, 
providing the rules and enforcement through the courts to guarantee 
property rights and the enforcement of contracts sufficient to underpin 
the growth of enterprise (Braithwaite 2000). For Braithwaite, the Great 
Depression of the 1930s led to disenchantment with markets as the chief 
mode for organising and delivering services, and growth in the ambitions 
and capacity of the state both in direct provision of services and in its use 
of command capacity—the former perhaps more in European states and 
the latter perhaps more in North America (Braithwaite 2008: 15–16). 
The Keynesian welfare state, on both sides of the Atlantic, evidenced 
a belief that the state could deliver sufficient ordering generally and, 
for Braithwaite the criminologist, policing for society in particular. 
Braithwaite saw his home discipline of criminology as being closely linked 
to the rise of the welfare state and as coming under significant challenge 
from ideological and governance changes since the 1980s (Braithwaite 
2000). A key change associated with the neoliberal reforms of the new 
regulatory state has been the privatisation of key elements of public 
service delivery and the establishment of new regulatory mechanisms to 
oversee them. This pattern ranges between network service providers—
for example, in energy and communications (Prosser 1997)—and core 
elements of the criminal justice system including prisons (Harding 1997), 
security and policing (Crawford  2006; Loader 2000; White 2014). 
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The  separation of policymaking from operations across a wide range 
of public service activities, with privatisation of some and hiving off 
to separate public agencies of others, is a key element in establishing 
more formal and rule-based oversight relationships than were typical 
in welfare state arrangements. The nature of the fragmentation that 
accompanies the creation of arm’s-length agencies for both delivery 
and regulation in rule-based governance regimes is demonstrated in 
the simplified model of the UK experience in the 1990s in Figure 16.1. 
What we see is not simply a shift from legislative discretion to the 
setting down of goals and expectations in rules, licences and contracts, 
but also the diffusion of responsibility for activities that had previously 
been managed directly by government ministries to executive agencies, 
linked to departments, to companies (some of them privatised) and to 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). We see also, frequently, the 


























Figure 16.1 Simplified model of the United Kingdom’s shift from welfare 
state to regulatory state
Source: Author’s research.
Braithwaite’s ‘new regulatory state’ is marked by its deployment 
of responsive techniques, which place greater emphasis on the steering 
of private and self-regulatory capacity over the aspiration to direct 
command and control (Braithwaite 2000: 224–5). Thus, the new 
regulatory state combines state oversight with marketisation of service 
provision and, in the responsive model, considerable responsibility for 
businesses to cooperate with state oversight. Thus, when considering the 
role of the state in regulation, there is a focus on the variety of modes 
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of engagement with businesses and others, and how they may deliver 
on public interest objectives. This aspect is considered in the next two 
subsections of the chapter. However, it is clear that Braithwaite’s focus 
has always been broader, and, reflecting on this, the following section 
takes us beyond the core focus on the state to consider more fully the 
roles of the widest range of actors within contemporary regulatory 
capitalism. 
Enforcement practices
Braithwaite’s research has been central to enhancing the range and 
quality of techniques available within the regulatory state. His 1986 
study, with Peter Grabosky, of the enforcement practices of a wide 
range of Australian regulators was seminal in offering a systematic and 
empirically informed analysis of how regulators enforce the rules. A core 
theme of the study was captured in the book title, Of Manners Gentle 
(Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986). Grabosky and Braithwaite provided 
systematic evidence for observations made by others in more limited 
contexts (Cranston 1979) that enforcement agencies tend to rely to 
a large degree on education, advice and persuasion to secure compliance 
with regulatory rules, reserving formal and more stringent sanctions 
to egregious and persistent breaches. They gave empirical weight also to 
Donald Black’s observation that the stringency of enforcement is shaped 
not only by instrumental considerations, but also by cultural factors, such 
as the degree of shared social history and engagement between enforcer 
and enforcee (expressed and measured in terms of ‘relational distance’) 
(Black 1976; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986; Hood et al.  1999). 
There  have been numerous attempts to reduce relational distance 
through such measures as rotating inspectors so that they do not get to 
know regulatees too well through regular visits and the appointment of 
outsiders, with no previous history with regulated firms or relevant social 
networks, to key regulatory roles. 
Braithwaite further theorised these empirical observations in his 
collaboration with Ian Ayres, combining his research data with Ayres’s 
game theoretical analysis to construct an enforcement pyramid that 
demonstrated the dependence of low-level persuasion on the capacity 
to escalate up the pyramid towards more stringent sanctions (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992). In game theoretic terms, the theory of responsive 
regulation suggested that regulators should start at the base of the pyramid 
with education and advice and escalate where there was noncompliance, 
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but should be contingently forgiving and move back down the pyramid 
where regulatees fell into line (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 62–3). 
Such  practices were advocated on the basis that the perception of 
fairness and responsiveness would build commitment among regulatees, 
while at the same time ensuring that regulators escalated sanctions 
where necessary. Such high-level sanctions might go as far as removing 
regulatees from the market through licence revocation, where they 
lacked either the will or the capacity to comply.
The concept of the enforcement pyramid takes as a starting point the 
presumption that regulators have a range of sanctions available to them. 
However, a key observation is that the ‘sanctions’ at the base of the 
pyramid are frequently not referred to in legislation or even conceived 
of as formal sanctions at all. It is only as we escalate up the pyramid 
that we invoke the formal sanctions. From this observation we may 
glean that regulators have a good deal of discretion in the deployment 
of their powers, which they use to construct their enforcement practices. 
This is true to the extent that regulators that lack formal enforcement 
powers may, nonetheless, be able to construct a form of enforcement 
pyramid. UK research that reads across the core literature on the 
regulation of businesses to examine the regulation of public sector 
bodies has demonstrated this potential, observing that organisations as 
diverse as the prisons inspectorate, the ombudsman and the National 
Audit Office lacked formal powers to apply sanctions to public bodies 
they found to be in breach of the rules. Nevertheless, they engaged in 
education and advice, sometimes offered warnings and then created 
a further level of sanction by drawing in the capacity of the media to 
name and shame those they found in breach (Hood et al. 1999). Others 
have noted that naming and shaming are, for some, more punitive than 
a fine (Baldwin and Black 2008: 86). In  this instance, publicity was 
the top-level sanction, which is not the same as being able to fine or 
revoke a licence, but nevertheless is an action with considerable capacity 
to change behaviour in those agencies for whom the risk of adverse 
publicity was a significant deterrent. We may additionally note that the 
publicity sanction is dependent on the capacity of others (in this case, 
privately owned media organisations). 
The example of the regulator that can build an enforcement pyramid 
from few materials, in terms of formal sanctions, should not be taken 
as a  model. Rather, it is an example of necessity being the parent of 
imperfect invention. There can be no doubt that, other things being 
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equal, a regulator with the capacity to escalate to more stringent 
sanctions will be better able to ‘speak softly’, because, in the quotation 
attributed to Theodore Roosevelt, they ‘carry a big stick’. However, the 
nature of the big stick and its relationship to the gentle talking are 
important. A regulatory regime in which the formal enforcement powers 
contain only the most draconian measures, such as licence revocation 
and nothing else, will struggle to establish a credible enforcement 
pyramid. This is because draconian measures can only be used for the 
most persistent, wilful or egregious breaches. Most breaches do not fall 
into this category and, accordingly, the threat of formal sanctions will 
not be credible if the sanctions larder is bare of all but the most stringent 
sanctions. The pyramid with a large gap between the warnings level and 
the next level is a ‘broken pyramid’ and possibly not much better than 
the pyramid built by the regulator with no formal sanctions, and is, 















Figure 16.2 Enforcement pyramid under the Irish Consumer Protection 
Act 2007
Source: Adapted from Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).
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Governments have, increasingly, learnt this lesson and pay considerable 
attention to the array of levels of sanctions that may be invoked, building 
ever more responsive character into them—for example, by including 
voluntary commitments around compliance and consent to enforcement 
actions within the sanctions that may be deployed. An example is provided 
by the Consumer Protection Act 2007 in Ireland, which constitutes a well-
structured enforcement pyramid in which formal sanctions include the 
issue of compliance notices by the regulator, the securing of written 
undertakings to comply from the regulatees, prohibition orders and fixed 
payment notices before the top-level sanction of criminal prosecution is 
reached. There is, additionally, the possibility of consumers pursuing an 
action for damages (see Figure 16.2).
A key component of the pyramidal approach to enforcement is that it is 
responsive to its environment (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 4). While it 
is traditional to view regulatory enforcement as a bilateral process in 
which enforcement is imposed on regulatees by regulators, the responsive 
approach recognises that the characteristics and posture of the regulatee 
are also relevant to how enforcement actions will be received and acted 
on. Kagan and Scholz (1984), for example, have distinguished the 
political citizens (who are fundamentally committed to being compliant 
with their legal obligations), the amoral calculators (who comply only 
where this aligns with their financial interests) and the organisationally 
incompetent (who lack the capacity to comply even if they wish to). 
The pyramidal approach responds with the insight that the first group 
will generally comply with education and advice, the second will require 
credible threats of escalation to comply and the third group should be 
removed from the market with licence revocation or equivalent. More 
recent work has built on this sensitivity to the enforcement environment 
to argue for ‘really responsive regulation’ (Baldwin and Black 2008), 
which seeks to understand better the cognitive frameworks within 
which enforcement takes place (legitimate and illegitimate enforcement, 
for example), and the broader institutional environment (for example, 
which other actors may shape tendencies towards compliance—such 
as NGOs and consumers boycotting firms perceived as immoral) and, 
more generally, the limits of traditional regulatory tools. 
Among lawyers, a central legitimacy concern with the model of responsive 
enforcement is that it argues for treating similar or identical transactions 
in different ways, apparently breaching a fundamental tenet of the rule of 
law concerned with generality of applications of laws (McDonald 2004; 
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Westerman 2013). A further challenge to rule-of-law ideals arises from 
the opacity that may result from the exercise of broad discretion around 
enforcement decisions ( Job et al. 2007: 94). Both these challenges can 
be addressed simultaneously by requiring regulators to publish details of 
their enforcement policies, practices and activities. It is in the interests of 
all involved that regulatory enforcement is predictable, as this promotes 
compliance for the regulator and creates a stable environment for 
regulatees.
The use of the insights around responsive regulation to make a more 
transparent and responsive enforcement structure is demonstrated by 
measures taken in the United Kingdom. In 1998, the UK Government 
adopted a soft law instrument called the Enforcement Concordat, in 
which signatory agencies in central and local governments agreed 
to follow a set of principles for regulatory enforcement that included 
consultation over standards, openness over enforcement policies and 
practices, helpfulness (for example, in assisting with compliance), the 
development of user-friendly complaints systems, proportionality and 
consistency (Department of Trade and Industry 1998). The concordat 
set down a partnership approach between regulators and businesses for 
securing regulatory compliance and was linked to the wider objectives 
of the government’s ‘Better Regulation’ program, which was concerned 
with reducing the cost of regulation to businesses. The UK Government 
built on this approach with reviews of regulation generally (Hampton 
2005) and enforcement in particular (Macrory 2006), which led to a 
more general and statutory application of responsive enforcement 
principles in the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 and the 
statutory Regulators’ Compliance Code. In one view, these measures have 
made a responsive and cooperative approach to regulatory enforcement 
transparent and linked it to core principles of proportionality and 
consistency. For some, however, this approach represents the application 
of a neoliberal agenda and the degradation of regulatory enforcement 
because of the priority given to softer measures, even where more 
stringent enforcement would be merited (Tombs and Whyte 2013; 
cf. Braithwaite 2008: Chapter 1).
Regulatory design
It is clear from the discussion of the well-structured and broken pyramids 
that there is a significant element of design involved in creating an 
effective enforcement pyramid. A more obvious aspect of design is put 
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forward in another section of Responsive Regulation. Alongside the 
enforcement pyramid, Ayres and Braithwaite also developed a pyramid 
of technique, which offers a theoretical prescription for regulatory 
design. It is this aspect of their book, Responsive Regulation, which 
perhaps most justifies the subtitle, Transcending the Deregulation Debate. 
The insights of this analysis underpin the now standard statements in 
regulatory design and better regulation discourse to the effect that with 
any policy problem for which regulation offers itself as a solution we 
should, first, consider the option of doing nothing, on the basis that any 
intervention may make matters worse and, second, consider the option 
of depending on or seeking some form of self-regulation. Only when 
these options have been considered and rejected should more intrusive 
regulatory techniques be proposed, involving, for example, civil penalties, 
criminal sanctions or licensing.
A central argument of the pyramid of technique is that governments 
should recognise the scope for delegating regulatory tasks to businesses 
and business associations but frequently with the oversight role of 
enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: Chapter 4). From 
this important idea, originally put forward in 1982 (Braithwaite 1982), 
has come a stream of literature from Braithwaite, his colleagues—notably, 
Peter Grabosky and Christine Parker—and others, developing the idea 
of meta-regulation. In this perspective, a key role for the state lies in 
observing and steering self-regulatory capacity (Gilad 2010; Parker 
2002; Parker and Braithwaite 2003). Rather than simply delegating, this 
involves the state in trusting more, but also verifying more, requiring 
considerable expertise and capacity (Gilad 2010). 
Taken together, the pair of responsive regulation pyramids—the first on 
enforcement and the second on technique—has significantly enhanced 
the capacity for understanding and implementing some of the key tools of 
the regulatory state and, in particular, the promulgation and enforcement 
of rules. With enforcement, my own experience asking regulators about 
how they enforce their rules is that most describe something like the 
enforcement pyramid, many have been schooled in it and those who have 
not mostly recognise an outline pyramid and can discuss in articulate 
fashion the particular components of their own pyramid and how they 
relate to each other (see also Braithwaite 2011: 480; Mascini 2013; Parker 
2013: 3–4). Many regulators have engaged directly with the enforcement 
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pyramid and, increasingly, governments drawing up legislation have 
become cognisant of the importance of making available a range of 
gradated sanctions to avoid the risk of the broken pyramid.
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO), for example, worked directly 
with Val Braithwaite, John Braithwaite and colleagues in the Australian 
Centre for Tax System Integrity to redesign their enforcement practices 
in line with the responsive recipe of a two-way process of learning from 
which Val Braithwaite was able to learn more about the significance 
of motivational posture for designing enforcement techniques, while 
at the same time opening the ATO to learning about how to enhance 
compliance. Key aspects of the project were to engender cultural change 
in the ATO through training and reflection, enabling it to build and 
implement a responsive enforcement pyramid ( Job et al. 2007: 90).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has embraced policies of regulatory reform and better 
regulation since the 1980s, drawing both implicitly and explicitly on the 
pyramid of regulatory design to suggest how states should address the 
challenge of regulatory responses to policy problems (OECD 2012). 
While the high-level recommendations of the OECD reflect Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s policy prescription, the practice among states has been 
quite mixed and, arguably, whatever commitments have been made in 
theory have overwhelmingly rejected the proper implementation of 
the pyramid of technique approach. The European Commission (EC) 
appointed in 2014 recommitted itself to the development of better 
regulation strategies and made an explicit commitment to including 
well-designed self-regulation and co-regulation among the instruments 
to be deployed (EC 2015: 6).
There are, of course, exceptions. Perhaps the most developed is the pattern 
of private regulation of the advertising industry, which has swept Europe 
since the early 1960s. The advertising industry was concerned about its 
credibility following the sensational lifting of the lid on its techniques 
in a widely read book (Packard 1957). The UK industry responded with 
private regulation, which has been progressively enhanced, often with 
both encouragement and threats from government to legislate. The peak 
European organisation for private advertising regulation today represents 
effective private regulatory bodies across the EU and beyond, and has 
significant trust not only from national governments, but also from the 
European Commission (Verbruggen 2013). Similar stories might be 
told about press regulation in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where 
277
16 . THE REGULAToRY STATE AND BEYoND
self-regulation has been a significant element of control in respect of 
press content, and governments have responded with threats and reform 
where the self-regulatory measures were found wanting (O’Dowd 2009).
More typically, however, European governments, and the EU legislature 
itself, have tended to make regulatory rules without proper evaluation of 
alternative techniques in terms of their capacity both for more effective 
outcomes or for reducing costs to regulatees (Brown and Scott 2011). 
The weakness in implementing the pyramidal approach to technique 
may be partly because the research base for the prescription has been less 
well developed. Relatedly, we do not know enough about what motivates 
governments to reach for rules to address policy problems rather than 
try other techniques that can harness the capacities and commitments 
of other actors. There is, of course, a significant concern that only the 
state is well equipped to deliver the public interest in public policy. 
Such concerns require a careful inquiry into the extent to which public 
and private interests are or can be aligned within a regulatory or meta-
regulatory context (Gunningham and Sinclair 2009).
So, the scorecard thus far suggests that the enforcement pyramid has been a 
highly successful policy idea; the pyramid of technique, less so. Why should 
this be? It may be that expert regulatory agencies are better able to respond 
to ideas and innovations whereas governments as a whole,  in their 
legislative function, are, first, less expert and, second, overcome by political 
imperatives to adopt measures that indicate at least symbolic commitment 
to an aspiration to control matters. This  may  provide an explanation 
for other core ideas in responsive regulation, beyond the enforcement 
pyramid and technique pyramid, receiving an even poorer reception, with 
the consequence that much in responsive regulation theory that was most 
insightful about the relationship of the state to other key actors has been 
neglected (Mascini 2013).
3. Regulatory capitalism beyond the state
I have previously suggested in my own work that Braithwaite’s work 
overemphasises the role of the state in contemporary regulatory 
governance (Scott 2004; see also Grabosky 2013). Having considered 
Braithwaite’s response and his later work, I now believe I was wrong. 
While many and perhaps most of Braithwaite’s readers took from 
his work chiefly to understand and to develop state regulation, it has 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
278
been shown they, like me, have given the work only a partial reading. 
Rereading Responsive Regulation in light of the work that follows it 
suggests that the scholarly and policy readerships of the 1990s were more 
ready for what Braithwaite had to offer in terms of the development 
of the state’s capacity for regulation and willing to neglect the other 
aspects of Braithwaite’s work that show how he conceives of the role 
and relationships of all social actors, state, market and community in 
creating effective regulatory regimes. The introduction to the concept of 
responsive regulation in the 1992 volume focuses centrally on delegation 
of regulatory tasks to regulated businesses, to competitors and to interest 
groups (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 4), yet the primary influence of 
the book has been concerned with its prescriptions for state regulatory 
agencies. I have noted already that the pyramid of technique has been 
less influential particularly in its advocacy of greater use of self-regulation 
and enforced self-regulation. Other aspects of the book, which call for 
greater dependence on market and civil society actors within regulatory 
regimes, have been even less noted. 
The central, neglected theme of Responsive Regulation concerns the 
potential for delegating regulation to others and embracing such 
delegated regulators within wider networks within which state authorities 
are liable to be key actors. We have noted already the importance of 
enforced self-regulation (and subsequently meta-regulation), in which 
the state oversees businesses and business associations in regulating 
themselves. A further technique offered by Ayres and Braithwaite, 
regulatory tripartism, involves drawing the commitments and resources 
of interest groups into regulatory roles. This analysis explicitly recognises 
that regulation of business is frequently not a bilateral game and that 
state, business and civil society actors within any policy setting are likely 
to be fragmented and diverse (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: Chapter 3). 
The empowering of civil society actors such as interest groups draws 
in alternative capacity both for contributing to policymaking and for 
monitoring the actions and motivations of business actors pursuing 
self-interest and state actors at risk of capture. While acknowledging 
such risks, the analysis does not preclude the possibility of misbehaviour 
by interest groups. Thus, while some interest groups will be well aligned to 
the public policy objectives of measures with which they may be involved 
in enforcing, others may be captured by firms or may be overzealous 
in their tasks, irrationally pursuing symbolic rewards from enforcement 
activities that do not promote compliance (or cooperation) (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992: 74–7). The theoretical case for tripartism put forward 
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by Ayres and Braithwaite is very strong, but, admittedly, not so well 
developed empirically. A second aspect of Responsive Regulation that has 
been neglected is the model of asymmetric regulation developed under 
the rubric of ‘partial industry intervention’, under which both firms and 
government learn from comparing the effects of regulation on market 
actors with the conduct of firms that are substantially unregulated (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992: Chapter 5). This model effectively delegates to 
the firms—regulated and unregulated—aspects of the application of 
regulation to the unregulated firms. 
So, Responsive Regulation sets down core roles in building regulatory 
regimes for both community and market actors, but these aspects of the 
work have been little observed and acted on. Others have sought to extend 
the theory of responsive enforcement to directly address the fragmented 
character of contemporary regulatory governance. The elaboration of the 
three-sided enforcement pyramid attributes a role in enforcement not 
only to state agencies but also to civil society and market actors (Grabosky 
1997). The idea of parallel enforcement capacity for other actors, using 
market power or private or public enforcement rights, offers the advantage 
of harnessing more wide-ranging monitoring and enforcement capacity, 
similar to Ayres and Braithwaite’s concern to recognise the enforcement 
potential of public interest groups to reduce dependence on the diligence 
of public regulators. Indeed, Braithwaite himself, in a central passage 
of Regulatory Capitalism, has demonstrated the potential for ‘networked 
escalation’ to address weaknesses in enforcement capacity (Braithwaite 
2008: 94–108). However, the recognition of this capacity also has the 
potential to be disruptive of responsive enforcement, since measured 
approaches by public regulators might be disrupted, as Ayres and 
Braithwaite acknowledge, by overzealous interest groups or others.
For the majority of readers in scholarly and policy communities, 
especially me, who failed to get the core themes of Responsive Regulation 
concerned with recognising and taking advantage of fragmentation 
in regulatory policy settings, Braithwaite’s subsequent work offers 
increasingly insistent pointers. These works include a major statement 
on how a new theory of a separation of powers might envisage state, 
market and community actors holding each other in check through their 
overlapping capacities and interests (Braithwaite 1997). Braithwaite’s 
work with Peter Drahos on global business regulation explores how 
standards with international reach are set through regulatory webs 
or networks of participants, each bringing different aspects of highly 
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fragmented capacity (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). Braithwaite’s 2008 
book, Regulatory Capitalism—titled following a term developed by Jacint 
Jordana (2005) and David Levi-Faur (2005)—is important not simply 
for the novelty of its ideas, but also, and perhaps more significantly, for its 
restatement of a position that could be found in the earlier work through 
a response to critics (Braithwaite 2008). We see clear indications of his 
interest in addressing the decentring of regulation (Black 2001) and of 
nodal governance (Burris et al. 2005), and the identification of the more 
limited role for the state in securing effective regulatory outcomes. 
The fundamental problem within this decentred world is how to address 
key problems of ordering, not only for the state, but also for communities 
and markets. Within the EU, a novel approach to the regulatory 
challenges of the digital society has been to establish a community of 
practice concerned with self-regulation and co-regulation, drawing in 
governmental, market and community actors to deliberative processes 
that examine the relationship between governmental authority and self-
regulatory capacity. A key objective for this group might be to rewrite 
the protocols on lawmaking in the EU to give recognition and legitimacy 
to appropriate self-regulatory and co-regulatory instruments (EC 2015).
4. Conclusions
The rise of the regulatory state has been a central trend in public 
policymaking within the OECD member states since the 1980s. While 
regulatory science has offered much to enhance the capacity of states 
to design and implement effective regulatory strategies, the advice to 
policymakers is as often ignored as it is implemented. Nevertheless, 
a core area of influence of John Braithwaite’s work has been on enhancing 
public regulation, especially in the dimension of enforcement, where his 
fingerprints may be found on the numerous enforcement agencies around 
the world that use some version of the enforcement pyramid as a guide 
to action. The centrality of the state to discussions of how to address key 
public policy challenges has tended to obscure the importance of market 
and community actors in developing and implementing solutions to 
key ordering problems. As we consider how to enhance the capacity 
of  the regulatory state, we should simultaneously give greater priority 
to techniques that draw in the capacity of others, and which locate the 
state as one of a number of key actors in making regulatory governance 
effective. John Braithwaite offers a vision of how we may enhance a 
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more nuanced version of state regulatory capacity, oriented not only to 
recognising the limits of the state, but also to devising mechanisms for 
learning within implementation processes (Braithwaite 2011: 512–18) 
and a wider deliberative democratic experimentalism (Braithwaite 2008: 
206–7). Such an approach takes us beyond state actors and draws in both 
market and community actors, and the range of mechanisms through 
which they may act, to achieve public interest objectives and more 
generalised wellbeing. These concerns are not limited to the industrialised 
countries (the traditional territory of the regulatory state), but apply 
equally and increasingly to the challenges arising from globalisation 
(Abbott and Snidal 2013) and the governance of developing countries 
(Braithwaite 2013; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Ford 2013), in each 
case demonstrating significant and often interrelated challenges for 
state capacity.
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Governance in capitalist polities is increasingly evolving as a patchwork 
of regulatory institutions, strategies and functions. This patchwork varies 
widely across regions, nations, regimes, sectors, issues and arenas, but the 
increase in the role of regulation in shaping policy and politics is evident 
almost everywhere. Regulatory processes condition the operation, 
manipulation and deployment of political, social and economic power. 
The penetration of regulation as an institutional design, as a practice 
and as a discourse to all spheres is captured by the concept of regulatory 
capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005; Braithwaite 2008). Regulatory capitalism 
tells us simply that capitalism is a regulatory institution—one that is 
being constituted, shaped, constrained and expanded as a historically 
woven patchwork of regulatory institutions, strategies and functions. 
It asserts that regulation made, nurtured and constrained the capitalist 
system and capitalism creates the demand for regulation. In doing so, 
the concept reasserts the inseparable, intimate and interdependent 
relations between politics, society and the economy. This, in turn, allows 
us to think about basic institutions of capitalism such as the corporation 
(Parker 2002) and explore risk management as a public function that 
both constitutes and mediates capitalism (Moss 2004; Shearing 1993). 
1   Sections of this chapter draw on Levi-Faur (2005, 2011b). I acknowledge with thanks 
comments from Peter Drahos, Christine Parker and Colin Scott.
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Capitalism is understood in this perspective not simply as a system of 
commodity accumulation via markets, in which things with use values are 
converted into things that have exchange value. Instead, it is understood 
as a patchwork of institutions that constitute and govern the triplet 
of markets, society and state and the imaginary borders between them. 
Shifts in commodity accumulation depend on redefinitions of property 
rights, the latest and most important of these being the evolution of 
intellectual property rights (property rights are constitutive regulation). 
Constraining and empowering regulation are ways in which capitalism 
stabilises and adapts to the consequences of its main mission of 
commodity accumulation—for example, limiting patent duration 
means that monopolies over medicines come to an end. However, this 
is not a restraint on commodification, but rather eliminates one type 
of commodification (the patent on the invention) while allowing other 
property rights (for example, a trademark over the medicine, the property 
in the tangible product) to continue. 
The concept of regulatory capitalism builds on and extends the 
observations on the rise of a particular form of state—the regulatory state 
(Majone 1997; Levi-Faur 2014)—and social governance via rule making, 
rule monitoring and rule enforcement (Braithwaite 2000; Scott 2004). 
At the same time, it strives to do more—namely, to embed the notion of 
the regulatory state in the literature on the capitalist state (Offe 1984; 
Jessop 2002; Hay 1999) and the literature on the autonomy of the 
democratic state (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009; Nordlinger 1987). While 
the regulatory state literature captures the extent, scope and direction 
in which regulation shapes national-level institutions, the concept of 
regulatory capitalism allows us to explore the relations between the state, 
on the one hand, and the capitalist order, on the other. When we say 
or write ‘regulatory capitalism’, we look beyond the state as a domestic 
political institution, and, at the same time, make a theoretical judgement 
about the relations between states and markets. This, in turn, helps advance 
a ‘constitutive interpretation’ of the role of regulation—a perspective that 
focuses on the role of regulation in the continuing expansion, adaptation 
and transformation of capitalism. In this interpretation, states constitute 
markets and markets constitute the state. The chicken starts with the egg 
and the markets with the state. Not only are the state and its regulation 
necessary conditions, they are also the causal factors behind the creation 
and institutionalisation of markets. Commodification via new regulatory 
designs that shape incentives and choice—rather than deregulation—
is the major characteristic of our changing politics, economic and society. 
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Redistribution is increasingly determined in the regulatory arena and, 
thus, we should think about the welfare state and about redistribution 
as a system of regulatory rather than fiscal transfers (Levi-Faur 2014; 
Mabbett 2011; Leisering 2011; Haber 2011). The expansion of capitalist 
governance is primarily regulatory rather than simply and solely via 
fiscal means. This means that the expansion of the welfare state (and the 
state more generally) is best captured via measures of regulatory impact 
rather than via accounts of state budget.2 
Why regulatory capitalism? Why not work our way through the maze 
of social, political and economic changes with the help of perhaps more 
modest and more widespread concepts such as the state, capitalism or 
even the regulatory state? The concept of regulatory capitalism offers a 
broader and more rewarding understanding of what is going on around 
us—certainly, more than the idea that the current order is about the ‘free 
market’ or that liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation are about the 
retreat of the state or depoliticisation. In addition, it has the advantage 
over the concepts of both the regulatory state and regulatory governance 
in the sense that it requires us to think not only about institutions in 
general but also about capitalist institutions in particular. In other words, 
it brings capitalism back in (Streeck 2011). One should remember in this 
context that capitalism is rarely analysed from a regulatory governance 
point of view. It is the elephant in the room of scholarly literature on 
regulatory governance as much as regulation is the elephant in the room 
in the literature of the political economy of capitalism. The concept of 
regulatory capitalism aims to move beyond the walls that separate the 
two bodies of literature and the two scholarly communities. This move 
should make both capitalism and regulation more central and more 
legible than they are now. 
2. Regulation, the state and beyond 
The regulatory state is one morph of the capitalist state (Dryzek and 
Dunleavy 2009; Levi-Faur 2014). This means that one of its primary 
roles—perhaps secondary only to internal and external security—
is to nurture a process of capitalist accumulation and commodification 
2  Of course, longitudinal annual national accounts of regulatory impact—national accounts that 
will redefine and extend what a national budget really is and provide international statistics similar 
to those of gross national product—have not been developed so far.
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via various regulatory means, but most critically via regulation for 
competition (Offe 1984; Levi-Faur 1998). Note that both internal 
security (policing) and external security (military might) depend on 
plenty. Therefore, the economic logic of capitalism and the security 
logic of the state go hand-in-hand—that is, power and plenty are 
interdependent (see Katzenstein 1977). The state depends on a process 
of accumulation, which, in turn, depends on its power and capacity to 
nurture the process of commodification, nowadays mainly by active 
promotion of competition and ‘competitiveness’. To fulfil its role as 
guardian of the capitalist economy, the regulatory state has to be relatively 
autonomous. The resilience of the capitalist system itself, especially in 
times of rapid change, depends on this systemic autonomy, where the 
process of capitalist accumulation sets the limits on autonomy. The state 
has to protect the functioning of the capitalist system and even nurture 
it. In this sense, it is not fully autonomous but only partially so. 
These limits on the autonomy of the state are sometimes taken for 
granted by analysts who focus on the interpersonal and intersocial 
interdependencies between the state’s elected and nominated officials 
and business. The literature on the relative autonomy of the state 
contrasts these two dimensions of relative autonomy in conflicting terms 
as if one is more important than the other. In my account, these are 
two important dimensions of the relative autonomy of the regulatory 
capitalist state. Still, the interdependent relations between the state’s 
elected and nominated officials, on the one hand, and the capitalists, on 
the other, are a secondary feature of a more systemic dependency of the 
state on the process of capitalist accumulation. When conflicts occur 
between the demands of capitalists (for example, subsidies or favourable 
regulations) and the demands of capitalism (for example, competition 
or creative destruction and economic transformation), autonomous 
state officials are expected to favour capitalism over the interests of the 
capitalist class. The autonomy of the state and its officials is nonetheless 
relative, since the requirements of capitalism will prevail over other 
demands and needs. 
The autonomy of the regulatory state is expressed in its claim for a 
legitimate monopoly over the deployment and distribution of power 
through rule making, rule monitoring and rule enforcement. It is this 
claim of monopoly—which may be delegated or shared, practised or not, 
at will or under constraint—that matters. In this way, the regulatory 
state is distinguished from the police and warfare states that are defined 
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by their claim of a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; and 
from the welfare state, which is defined by its aim of welfare for all 
citizens. Of  course, the claim of a monopoly does not suggest actual 
monopoly either now or in the past. A claim is just a claim, no more and 
no less, and there are gaps with regard to the actual monopoly over the 
regulatory distributional authority just as there are gaps with regard to 
the actual monopoly of the means of violence. 
While it is tempting to focus the discussion on the regulatory state, it 
should be recognised that regulatory globalisation, on the one hand, 
and domestic centres of regulatory powers, on the other, augment 
and compete with the regulatory state (Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000). Here,  the concept of regulatory capitalism is useful as well. 
It  suggests that regulation and rule making are major instruments in 
the expansion of global governance, and takes regulation theory and 
regulatory analysis beyond national boundaries (hence, also beyond the 
nation-state). The locus of the analysis is simply shifted from the state 
to capitalism and the perspective is expanded—up, down and to the 
side(s)—to envelop not only the capitalist state but also the capitalist 
society (or  market society) and the capitalist economy (or simply the 
economy). The agents of objects of regulation are not merely state actors 
anymore, and the regulatory space is extended beyond national borders 
and traditional administrative law. The concept also moves regulatory 
analysis beyond formal state-centred rule making and therefore towards 
civil and business regulation and decentred analysis of regulatory 
systems (see Levi-Faur 2011a). It also denotes a world where regulation 
is increasingly a hybrid of different systems of control, where statist 
regulation coevolves with civil regulation, national regulation expands 
with international and global regulation, private regulation coevolves 
and expands with public regulation, business regulation coevolves with 
social regulation, voluntary regulations expand with coercive ones and 
the market itself is used or mobilised as a regulatory mechanism. 
3. Regulation of/for/and/with 
commodification 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, governance in capitalist 
polities is increasingly designed as a regulatory system—that is, as a 
patchwork of  regulatory institutions, strategies and functions. One  of 
the most useful ways to understand the relations of regulation and 
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capitalism is via the concept of commodification. Commodification is 
increasingly taking over key concepts such as accumulation, exploitation 
and alienation in the lexicon of critical theory. 
Commodification was first systematically introduced into the social 
sciences by Claus Offe in the 1970s (Offe 1984). Inspired by both 
Marx and Polanyi (1944), Offe’s work uses commodification to refer 
to processes of the transformation of non-wage labourers into wage 
labourers. In a more general manner, it refers to the transformation of 
social relations to commodity relations. The term suggests its meaning is 
being extended from the properties or characteristics of labour to a set of 
human relations, which encompasses all human relations without regard 
to their class or status. Thus, commodification specifies the conditions 
under which every citizen becomes a participant in commodity 
relationships (Offe 1984). Offe goes on to discuss—indeed, develop—
two more concepts: decommodification and recommodification. 
Decommodification is ‘the withdrawal and uncoupling of an increasing 
number of social areas and social groups (surplus labor power) from market 
relations’ (Offe  1984:  61). Recommodification is the administrative 
and political reform of human commodification processes where they 
become obsolete (Offe 1984: 124). 
True to critical tradition in the social sciences, the current literature on 
commodification emphasises the commodification of labour and, more 
recently, that of nature itself. Implicit in this critical approach is the idea 
that capital and investment are natural commodities or at least that some 
institutions, subjects and objects are less ‘fictitious commodities’ than 
others. At the same time, this tradition has a tendency to assume away 
or limit the analysis to the commodification of everything but capital. 
I contend, however, that ‘capital’ and ‘accumulation’ processes are not 
inherently ‘commodities’. There is no reason to assume that capital keeps 
a dynamic form and investment and innovation logically follow from 
the profit motive. The role of regulatory organisations in promoting the 
commodification of capital itself is critical. Forms of capital failure and 
stagnation of investment are abundantly captured by concepts such as 
rentier capitalism, crony capitalism and monopoly capitalism. Rentier 
capitalism is a term that denotes profits and investment that are generated 
by the privileged position of having capital without contestation of 
position, rights and gains (as is also the case with the terms monopoly 
capitalism and crony capitalism). De/re/commodification should be 
conceived as institutional strategies that are directed at capital as much 
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as they are at labour, meaning they ought to be adopted in the context of 
domestic developmental aims as well as in the context of international 
economic competition. The design of regulatory regimes in general 
and the regulatory state in particular should allow public actors, inside 
and outside the state, to opt for commodification, decommodification 
and recommodification strategies according to autonomous preferences.
A key element in the theory of regulatory capitalism depends on the 
relations between regulation and commodification. To fully grasp 
these relations, we need to make some conceptual distinctions between 
strategies and types of regulation. Regulation is a form of bureaucratic 
legalisation (Levi-Faur 2011a). As such, and not unlike commodification, 
it has two conceptualisation siblings: deregulation and reregulation. 
Deregulation became the favoured strategy for economic and political 
renewal by neoliberals in the United States. It often conveys the idea 
that regulation is a major problem and that deregulation—that is, the 
removal and elimination of regulation—is the solution. Reregulation, 
on the other hand, suggests that the content, instruments and outcomes 
of many of the reforms that were put in place in the name of deregulation 
reflect a new mixture and balance between the political, the economic 
and the social—that is, new types of regulation rather than simply 
deregulation.
It is useful to distinguish between three types of regulation: constraining, 
empowering and constitutive. Regulation as a constraint is probably the 
most intuitive and frequent way in which we think of it. Regulation as 
a set of prescriptive rules specifies prohibitions and mandates behaviour. 
It is expected that failure to comply will be followed by punishment 
as a deterrent or will incur a social and political extraction of payment 
by the rule maker. Yet, regulation is sometimes, and in important ways, 
also about empowerment or the allocation of rights. Regulation may 
empower and thus acquire positive associations with values such as 
liberty and freedom, rather than the negative association with constraints. 
Yet, constraining someone is often empowering others and vice versa. 
Boundaries are blurred and can be distinguished with reference to 
primary and secondary effects. This is also true for constitutive regulation 
that constitutes categories of action, entitlements, identity and normative 
behaviour. Some regulations do not merely regulate but also create or 
define new forms of behaviour, rights and identity. This is, indeed, the 
basis of Kant’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. 
The regulative rules overlap in constraining and empowering regulation. 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
296
What is interesting is the notion of the constitutive rules as developed 
by Searle. Let me start with a borrowed example before defining the 
constitutive type of rules. The rules of chess, Searle tells us: 
do not merely regulate an antecedently existing activity called playing 
chess; they, as it were, create the possibility of or define that activity. 
The  activity of playing chess is constituted by action in accordance 
with these rules. Chess has no existence apart from these rules. 
(Searle 1964: 55) 
While regulative rules regulate activities whose existence is independent 
of the rule, constitutive regulation constitutes forms of activity whose 
existence is logically dependent on the rules. Rules of polite table 
behaviour regulate eating, Searle further suggests, but eating exists 
independently of these rules and therefore the regulation of eating 
should be considered regulative rather than constitutive.
The distinctions between different types of regulation allow us in turn to 
distinguish between regulation of capitalism and regulation for capitalism. 
The first reflects the common understanding of regulation as inherently 
different and exogenous to capitalism. Regulation here is either an 
external constraint or an external empowerment—in other words, the 
first two types of regulation described above. The term ‘regulation for 
capitalism’ refers to a more endogenous understanding where regulation 
is a constitutive element of capitalism. As in chess, here, capitalism and 
its rules are inseparable. So far, I have distinguished between three of the 
manifestations of regulation and decommodification: de/re/regulation 
and de/re/commodification. I have also distinguished between regulation 
of and for capitalism and between three types of regulation: constraining, 
empowering and constitutive. It is now time to link them together. 
Table 17.1 brings capitalism and regulation together but distinguishes 
between them via the notions of de/re/commodification. Note that the 
distinctions made in Table 17.1 are much harder to draw clearly in reality 
and require detailed case analysis. For example, limiting patent duration 
means that monopolies over medicines come to an end. One can treat 
this action as decommodification. However, this is not a restraint on 
commodification but rather eliminates one type of commodification 
(the patent on the invention) while allowing other property rights 
(the trademark, the property in the tangible product) to continue. Thus, 
it  is better to understand this action as recommodification. Still, the 
action itself should also be understood with reference to the larger context 
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of the economic value of the trademark. If the trademark is protected 
strongly and widely, the balance tends towards recommodification, but, 
if it is not, the balance tends towards decommodification.
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The notion of regulation of capitalism captures regulation as a reactive 
response that sets ex-ante rules and institutions that either constrain 
or empower actors. These rules basically accommodate and moderate 
the negative and positive externalities and internalities of capitalism. 
Both constraining and empowering regulation fall within the category 
of regulation of capitalism. Constitutive regulations, by contrast, are part 
of a second category, regulation for capitalism, where regulation serves 
not just as a moderating affect, but also as the set of constitutional rules 
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of capitalist institutions and as a facilitative force—framing, nurturing 
and steering capitalism. When this happens, the disciplinary and allocative 
functions of regulation are secondary to its constitutive functions. 
The constitutive approach to the regulation of capitalism requires rules 
whose constitutive effects are the building blocks of capitalist institutions. 
The intersection between these different dimensions allows us to point 
to nine different ways in which regulation and capitalism are linked and, 
in effect, to demonstrate how variegated order is made possible. These 
links provide much more room for regulation than the analytical ‘market 
failure’ approach because there is room for ‘empowering regulation’ and 
for applying it in a constitutive manner.
The emphasis here on the many faces of regulation helps us to understand 
not only the variegated nature of the current order but also that regulation 
is both a progressive policy instrument (for example, empowering 
minorities) and a regressive policy instrument (for example, various forms 
of conditionalities and caps that aim to discipline the poor). Change in 
capitalism is strongly linked to the progressive and regressive uses of both 
regulation and commodification. The term itself should be seen—much 
like the notion of the regulatory state—as a constitutive element of other 
morphs of capitalism rather than as a competing morph. It is possible 
to use regulatory institutions—state, civil and economic—to extend the 
other institutional morphs of capitalism such as the developmental, the 
welfare, the financial and the risk; such extension and expansion do not 
necessarily represent trade-offs but may represent trade-ins. This applies 
not only at the level of the so-called tensions between equality and 
efficiency, growth and welfare and development and regulation. It also 
holds with regard to the relations between global and regional regulation 
and can expand where there is a good infrastructure of regulation via the 
state. This also is the case with private and public regulation—which can 
expand in tandem to enhance the effectiveness of regulation or simply 
to enhance the legitimacy and powers of the regulators and regulatory 
institutions. Because regulation entails the delegation of power and 
has distributive implications, the expansion of regulation to global and 
private realms can also simply represent a system of checks and balances 
by which the reproduction of regulatory controls allows a wider number 
of actors and institutions to keep some control over processes of rule 
making, monitoring, enforcement and interpretation. 
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4. Conclusions
Regulation changes the way politics is carried out, how society is organised 
and the governance of economic production and exchange. Thus, the 
term ‘regulatory capitalism’ denotes the importance of regulation in 
defining and shaping the capitalist systems of governance in a way 
that the regulatory state or the concepts of ‘free markets’ or ‘capitalism’ 
do not. It points to: a) the intertwining of society, the economy and 
politics via regulatory instruments and institutions; b) the growth in 
scope, importance and impact of regulation at the national and global 
levels; c) the growing investments of political, economic and social actors 
in regulation in general and regulatory strategies in particular; d) the 
emergence, extension and consolidation of hybrid forms of regulation 
that shape diverse and more complex forms of regulatory regimes; 
and e) the critical role of regulation in the constitution of other forms 
of states and capitalism—for example, the welfare state and welfare 
capitalism. So, regulatory capitalism is about regulation as a defining 
feature of the capitalist mode of production and about the mutual 
embeddedness of the social, economic and political (Polanyi 1957). 
The concept interlinks economics and politics, the market and the state 
and allows us to understand them all as spheres of power. Power, both 
in its structural and in its relational dimensions, is embedded in and 
operated via regulatory designs—that is, systems of rule making, rule 
monitoring and rule enforcement. So important is regulation that even 
alternatives to power such as rational, traditional and charismatic forms 
of authority are mediated and conditioned by a regulatory discourse and 
regulatory institutions.
To demonstrate and extend the theoretical arguments about the role 
of regulation in capitalism—an interpretation that might best be called 
‘constitutive’—we need to build up an analytical space for the study 
of the relations between regulation and capitalism, suggesting the 
distinctions between de/re/regulation of/for de/re/commodification, 
de/re/regulation of/for capitalism and de/re/regulation of/for capitalists. 
These distinctions extend our analytical terminology and therefore may 
help liberate our imagination as to what are capitalism and the relations 
between capitalism and regulation. Regulation is not necessarily ‘socialist’ 
(decommodifying), ‘mercantilist’ (recommodifying) or ‘neo/liberal’ 
(commodifying), but it is an instrument that can be used by various actors 
for diverse purposes: neoliberal as well as social-democratic, risk-taking 
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and risk-averse, sustainable growth and unsustainable growth. It can 
be used for private interest purposes and for public interest purposes. 
Whatever your purpose, you need regulation. 
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The politics of global governance and regulation occur in time. To say 
so is a truism, even ingenuous. To disentangle the manifestations 
of  temporality, however, is another matter. The intricacies of political-
legal action too often are taken for granted. They lie beneath the surface 
where undercurrents influence processes and products of globalisation 
and resistance, where their invisible dimensions hide sweeps of history, 
imprints of events and manifestations of power. To understand how global 
norms and standards are produced, to anticipate when transnational legal 
1  I express my indebtedness to my co-authors in five research collaborations that inform this 
essay: Lucien Karpik and Malcolm Feeley on struggles through grand time and events by the 
legal complex for political liberalism in South Asia, South-East Asia and Africa (Halliday et al. 
2012); Bruce Carruthers on international lawmaking and national reforms in East and South Asia 
following the East Asian Financial Crisis (Halliday and Carruthers 2009); Michael Levi and Peter 
Reuter on global regulation of money laundering and the financing of terrorism (Halliday et al. 
2014); Susan Block-Lieb on the making of trade and commercial law for corporate insolvency, 
secured transactions and carriage of goods by sea by the UN Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) (Block-Lieb and Halliday, forthcoming); and Gregory Shaffer on the rise and 
fall of transnational legal orders in financial regulation, business law and human rights (Halliday and 
Shaffer 2015a).
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orders will rise or fall, to anticipate if the power of global hegemons will 
succeed, it is imperative to develop systematic approaches to time and 
temporality in all studies of globalisation, governance and regulation. 
The sociological significance of time has a rich heritage, from the sweep 
of historical sociology over the very long term (Braudel 1996; Karpik 
1998; Putnam et al. 1993) to the microdynamics of power in queuing 
(Schwartz 1975) and the manipulation of sequences through time 
(Abbott 2001). To bring time more integrally into the understanding 
of governance and regulation in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, I make two principal arguments. First, it is necessary to 
distinguish between grand time (longue durée) and events (événements) 
because each entails a different scale of explanation and each offers 
complementary methods of inquiry (Halliday and Karpik 2012). Second, 
despite the apparent constancy and fixity of time, its seeming metrical 
precision and rigidity, the manipulability of time and temporality is 
integral to the micropolitics and macropolitics of global norm making 
and resistance. To support both propositions, I draw on reanalysis of my 
empirical research at the centres and peripheries of the global North and 
global South.
2. Grand time 
In their magisterial work, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) show 
repeatedly that global business regulation in the late twentieth century 
has roots in ancient or medieval common law or continental civil law. 
Their imprints may not be seen, yet they continue to be felt on bankers 
in Frankfurt or Tokyo, on shippers in China and West Africa and on 
traders in the southern cone of Latin America. 
The scale of grand time varies enormously. In its most expansive form, the 
longue durée can be attached to epochs of history, whether the contours 
of great empires (Roman, Mughal, Ottoman, British, Spanish), the 
reigns of religions (medieval European Christianity, South-East Asian 
Buddhism), pervasive ideologies (for example, liberalism in politics 
and economics) or the shape of regions over many centuries (Braudel’s 
Mediterranean). 
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Grand time may be punctuated or bracketed by great historical moments, 
such as the fall of the Roman Empire, the Protestant Reformation, the 
collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the Spanish Conquest of Latin America, 
the Great War or the long postlude to World War II that ushered in 
decolonisation and eras of human rights. 
When students of global governance or national regulation and local 
legal consciousness seek understanding of the contemporaneous in 
Burma or Brazil, New York City, Geneva or Washington, DC, the theory 
and methodology of grand time compel them to situate the present in 
the deep currents of ideological and material continuities, long-enduring 
fundamentals of political and economic institutions and persistent 
configurations of superordination and subordination, whether of politics, 
markets, social relations or mentalities. The methodology of grand 
time attends to the long arcs of history, which leave enduring residues. 
Understandings of property or trade, of protection and freedom, of 
rights and duties, of probity and corruption, not to mention institutions, 
which entrench such understandings, can enable or constrain global 
governance and the permutations of international regulation. 
Within these epochs of grand time lie episodes of lawmaking and 
regulation that stretch over many years or decades. Recent theory on 
legal change in global contexts (Halliday and Carruthers 2007b) and 
transnational legal orders (Halliday and Shaffer 2015a) proposes that 
any given issue of governance or regulation on human rights, the 
environment or financing of terrorism cannot be properly understood 
without comprehending earlier episodes of efforts to solve longstanding 
issues of environmental degradation, violence against women, 
dehumanisation of races and religion, genocide, taxation across borders, 
bankrupt companies or financing of trade—to name but a few. To make 
sense of what is happening now, it is necessary to map temporally and 
dynamically those earlier episodes of norm making and implementation 
that produced or failed to produce lasting transnational legal orders. 
For  instance, the powerful impetus from the World Bank to reframe 
the rule of law as an institution to construct vibrant markets will be 
grossly misunderstood unless it is seen to be in tension with earlier 
episodes of global norm making and implementation that are grounded 
in universal human rights and protections against predatory rulers. 
Without knowing about prior episodes of maritime legal orders that 
stretched from the nineteenth century to the 1980s, it is impossible to 
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recognise either the significance or the contingencies of the Rotterdam 
Rules—a set of current global reforms applying to carrying goods to 
market across oceans. 
Halliday and Shaffer (2015c) posit that episodes of lawmaking that 
lead to the rise or fall of transnational legal orders will be situated in 
unfolding temporalities where impulses for change emerge, frequently 
over long periods. To look back and explain the onset of a new episode of 
global norm making and regulation, or to look forward and predict why 
a longstanding regulatory order might disintegrate, scholars in politics, 
law and sociology point to facilitating factors that may include: 
(1) a growing mismatch between national regulation and global 
markets in light of changes in economic interdependence; (2) changes in 
the interests and power configurations of nation-states and other actors 
regarding the demand for and content of transnational legal ordering; 
(3) shifts in ideas and the conceptualisation of problems shaping the 
regulation of economies and political institutions; (4) technological 
change, industry inventions, and developments in the organisation of 
business; and (5) the unintended consequences of existing transnational 
legal orders. (Halliday and Shaffer 2015b: 32) 
Within the nation-state, developmental political scientists have 
construed the embeddedness of current national political options in terms 
of a long sequence of earlier events as path dependency. The longer the 
sequence, roughly speaking, the more entrenched is the configuration of 
institutions and behaviour. This treatment of states corresponds in broad 
contours with studies on organisations. The form of an (international) 
organisation at the time of its founding, and the reinforcement of its 
natal form over time, can render organisations inertial and inflexible, 
thereby inhibiting their capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, to 
new competition or to a drying up of resources. The liability of newness 
for a neophyte organisation, such as the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in the 1960s, has its analogue 
in the liability of age for an entrenched organisation, such as the UN 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 
which was founded in 1926 (Block-Lieb and Halliday 2016). 
While grand time exerts a long effect, those impacts can be mixed. It is 
true that national path dependency and organisational inertia, reinforced 
by accretions of time, can strictly limit parameters for contemporaneous 
decision-making. Imaginations may be stunted, organisational processes 
can be ossified, bases of legitimation can be outdated and the dead 
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hand of history stunts adaptation and threatens even survival. At the 
same time, history can provide its own legitimation. A competitor to 
the International Maritime Committee, for instance, is unimaginable. 
Entrenched infrastructures elaborated over decades present potential 
competitors with start-up costs that can be impossible to bear. 
3. Events
Any given episode of global lawmaking occurs also in compact time 
or discernible events (événements) (Halliday and Karpik 2012). These 
interludes, even if they unfold over several years, represent a short span 
in which particular actors and their strategies and tactics can be carefully 
observed and parsed. Studies of key events make it possible to: 
delve deeply into issues of language and power, of dramaturgy 
and discourse, of narratives and counter-narratives, of nuance and 
interpretation, of scripts and actors, of doctrine and cases, of national 
currents and local variations. (Halliday and Karpik 2012: 17) 
Here the long sweep of grand events can be traced through intricacies 
of  particular moments. The seeming inexorability of the longue durée 
yields to the actuality and appearance of human agency. 
Intensive studies of moments in time may be artificially segregated into 
interactions of exterior and interior components. Exterior components 
are readily identified in episodes of legal change as precipitating events, 
frequently in the form of crises. Although financial reforms were 
increasingly needed in South-East Asian countries during the explosive 
economic growth of the Asian Tigers during the 1980s and 1990s, 
it was financial crisis—the East Asian Financial Crisis—that spurred the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, together with 
the Asian Development Bank, international lenders and global financial 
powers, to trigger entire new episodes of global financial regulation. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall demonstrates the shock value of a geopolitical 
crisis for reconstruction of Central and Eastern European economies, just 
as the Nuremburg Trials and the genocides in the Balkans, Sudan and 
Rwanda spurred erection of international institutions of humanitarian 
law. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and AIDS epidemics 
of the 1990s and 2000s stimulated responsive regulatory orders to health 
crises just as the slower moving but much more fundamental environmental 
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crisis, signalled by growing evidence of the disappearance of the ozone 
layer over Antarctica, energised international norm entrepreneurs who 
crafted the Montreal Protocol.
But less momentous events can also trigger the rise or fall of new 
regulatory and legal orders. Sometimes it occurs when a powerful state 
experiences a shock, such as the 11 September 2001 attacks, or the far 
less remarkable but nonetheless far-reaching influence of an unexpected 
judicial decision, such as the US Supreme Court decision in Sky Reefer,2 
which precipitated a powerful worldwide movement to redesign the rules 
governing international trade by sea. Even less perceptible are outbreaks 
of competition among international organisations, as when, for instance, 
the World Bank and the UNCITRAL almost came to diplomatic blows 
over whose international principles or rules would constitute the ‘gold 
standard’ for governance of business failures within states or across 
national jurisdictions. 
When empirically grounded theory of globalisation combines analyses 
of grand time and events, powerful, layered explanations of legal orders 
emerge. The worldwide struggles of the legal complex over the ideals of 
political liberalism, which can be observed explicitly in early modern 
Europe—whether in seventeenth-century Britain or eighteenth-
century France—became internalised in contradictory ways within 
Britain’s colonial Raj, and ramified across decades of postcolonial India, 
punctuated by critical events, such as Mrs Gandhi’s ‘Emergency’ in 1973. 
Indeed, the historically contextualised struggles of British post colonies 
to institutionalise legal orders that can be characterised as politically 
liberal or despotic all turn on interplays of movements and events arrayed 
on temporal scales of varying length and speed (Halliday et al. 2012). 
4. The micropolitics of time and power: 
Making global norms3
Grand time and momentous events (as history and event) can appear 
inexorable and substantially unalterable, subject to minor direction by 
individual and collective actors, but nonetheless flowing in such broad 
and strong currents that their own momentum carries most prospects of 
2  Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A.v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
3  This section draws heavily on Block-Lieb and Halliday (forthcoming: Chapter 5). 
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human agency before them. But actors in global governance do exercise 
agency and they can do so in part through creative adaptations to the 
finitude of time. 
In the United Nations, for instance, norm making confronts two sets of 
scarcities of time. On the one hand, much UN production depends on 
volunteers—activists, professionals, industry leaders—who are prepared 
to devote long unpaid hours to drafting and meeting, quite apart from 
their costs of travel and accommodation. On the other hand, the United 
Nations itself has a scarcity of space and translation capacities. There are 
only so many meeting rooms in New York and Vienna, and all official 
proceedings must be translated into the six official UN languages: 
English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic. The constraints 
of space and translation affect how much time the United Nations can 
afford to devote to the governance efforts of any its agencies and groups. 
Much of the micropolitics inside global lawmaking, therefore, is directed 
towards the transformation of time as a rigid metric or temporal 
constraint into a resource that is malleable and manipulable. Individual 
and collective actors in global lawmaking exercise power by converting 
clock or calendar time into new constructions of temporal action. 
They seek to circumvent the constraints of space and language by finding 
time in other places and mitigating costs for volunteers by proceeding 
at other paces. 
Research on lawmaking in a global quasi-legislature (UNCITRAL) 
reveals at least five temporal tactics. 
Staging time
Staging time refers to the influence on the moment of onset of a 
lawmaking episode. Here, actors may be able to speed up or slow the 
temporal moment of beginnings to negotiations and lawmaking—to 
hurry when competitors threaten to preempt jurisdiction or to delay 
when prudence requires that some other event occurs or set of norms be 
released before an actor proceeds with its own.
For instance, in the late 1990s, UNCITRAL sped up the onset of its 
lawmaking on secured transaction law when it became aware that a rival 
lawmaking body, UNIDROIT, based in Rome, might claim that it was 
the legitimate international organisation (IO) to write new global law 
of very wide legal scope across a huge spectrum of secured financial 
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transactions. UNIDROIT had already had great success in developing 
new global norms on a narrow front: the Cape Town Convention 
on Security Rights in Mobile Equipment. Energised by its success, 
UNIDROIT might preempt UNCITRAL, its friendly rival global 
legislature. Anticipating this move, UNCITRAL sprang into action, 
‘commissioned’ a private US industry body to draft global norms of 
wide legal scope and placed this draft before its standing working group 
essentially to stake out territory before UNIDROIT had time to act. 
By contrast, UNCITRAL’s working group on corporate insolvency felt 
compelled to slow its official take-off of deliberations on a legislative 
guide for nation-states across the world. Energised by their rapid 
drafting consensus on the Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, norm 
entrepreneurs set their sights on a quick pivot towards a much more 
ambitious effort of expansive legal scope. A colloquium to reconnoitre the 
prospects for a comprehensive legislative guide exceeded all expectations 
of reaching international consensus. At that very moment, however, the 
World Bank signalled that it was drafting its own norms. Afraid that the 
World Bank might preempt or marginalise the much weaker UN body, 
UNCITRAL essentially put its take-off on hold until it could take the 
measure of how the ‘territory’ of lawmaking might be divided between 
the bank and UNCITRAL. 
The power to alter staging in this and similar cases rests principally 
with the strong: high-impact delegations, the availability of resource-
rich non-governmental organisations (NGOs) ready to offer extensive 
expertise and an agile IO secretariat with a broad repertoire of legal 
technologies from which to choose. 
Compressing time
Compressing time is a tactic for shortening the period of decision-
making. Here, actors who control a calendar or who exert substantial 
power can reduce the amount of time available to inject urgency, to 
reduce the probability of alternative agendas or solutions and to exclude 
actors who are not at the centre of communication networks or whose 
problems of collective action preclude rapid mobilisation. 
One form of compressing time, the fast start, can be observed in UN 
deliberations. At UNCITRAL, it was conventional to begin a new 
episode of global lawmaking with a colloquium at which issues were 
put on the table and an agenda was mapped out. Then a working group 
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would begin to divide up a lawmaking area into separate categories, 
discussions would begin that would lead to drafting, then refinement of 
drafts and ultimately consensual acceptance of drafts. But the transport 
working group decided that any new convention—which in the past 
had taken an average of six years to develop—might be marginalised or 
overtaken by regional fragmentation or by the emergence of a radically 
new concept of governing the carriage of goods from manufacture 
to market that was preferred by the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). UNCITRAL’s secretariat, with the support 
of some leading delegations, including that of the United States, charged 
a private organisation, Comité Maritime International (CMI), the 
acknowledged leader in international lawmaking for carriage of goods 
by sea since the late nineteenth century, with supercharging the start of 
proceedings by developing a draft treaty or convention that was placed 
on the UNCITRAL working group’s agenda at its very first meeting. 
Some delegates believed this potentially controversial move shaved years 
off negotiations.
Another fast start was enabled when UNCITRAL’s working group 
on insolvency divined through a colloquium that a surprising degree 
of consensus already existed across legal families on the core principles 
of bankruptcy norms for the world. 
The power to compress time in UNCITRAL likewise relied on a coalition 
of strong delegations and a well-established non-state organisation. 
To the extent that such compression required a reallocation of resources 
within the United Nations—access to scarce meeting rooms, increased 
secretariat infrastructure—it also required effective bureaucratic politics. 
The stimulus to compress time, however, may lie within the power of the 
weak, because if coalitions of states or initiatives of regions to fragment 
global norms made credible threats to ‘exit’ from the primacy of a given 
global lawmaking proceedings, a prime adaptive response by the global 
body would be to speed up proceedings. 
Expanding time
Expanding time involves lengthening the period of decision-making in 
calendar time from a three-year project, for instance, to five or six years. 
This may occur to ensure a result when issues are particularly divisive, 
to attenuate proceedings in the hope they will stalemate or to provide 
a more elaborate product with layers of norms or wider reach. It may be 
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that the projected deliberations that have extended the Doha Round 
on intellectual property illustrate the threat that without appropriate 
concessions a large bloc of states can extend indefinitely the prospect of 
global consensus. 
However, the absolute quantum of actual hours spent in deliberation can 
also be achieved by expanding the number of hours available in formal 
proceedings while holding calendar time constant. Leading delegations 
in UNCITRAL’s Transport Working Group realised quite quickly that 
their formal meeting sessions, which occurred each year for one week in 
New York and one week in Vienna, were simply too infrequent to handle 
the volume of work and intensity of negotiations required to get out a 
new multilateral treaty before it was preempted by competing efforts. 
Hard-driving delegations and the UNCITRAL Secretariat persuaded 
the working group and commission that it must meet for two weeks, 
twice a year, to achieve in three years what might otherwise have taken 
six years.
Another way of expanding time is a variant on segmenting time 
(see below). If negotiations prove particularly difficult on a topic then 
it can be excerpted from negotiations and held over for some future 
regulatory or lawmaking project. Deferral essentially transforms one 
block of lawmaking time into two sequential blocks.
Segmenting time
Segmenting time involves the temporal partition of global governance 
and regulation making so that norm-making responses are segmented 
and sequenced. Segmentation sometimes serves a strategy of 
incrementalism in global lawmaking (Hathaway 2005). While both 
the empirical consequences and the normative debates over the merits 
of incrementalism continue in lively fashion across all domains of 
global norm making, it is useful to distinguish among three types of 
incrementalism: pyramidal, vertical and horizontal (Block-Lieb and 
Halliday 2007). Vertical incrementalism follows a strategy of small but 
successful steps that build on earlier successes at lawmaking to thereby 
develop confidence in the lawmakers, to forge collegiality in lawmaking 
communities and to obtain legitimation. 
The area of corporate bankruptcy law had for decades been considered 
too  challenging for global legislatures because bankruptcy law was 
thought to be too deeply entrenched in the particularisms of national 
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legal cultures and economic histories. Globalisation of trade and markets, 
however, proceeded in tandem with the expansion of multinational 
corporations that owned assets in many countries. Further growth in 
world trade, it was said, required orderly ways to handle corporations 
in financial distress, especially when they were involved in cross-border 
trade. Rather than take on the full spectrum of issues that comprehensive 
national bankruptcy laws conventionally embrace, UNCITRAL’s 
secretariat, international professional societies and some hard-driving 
delegations from Australia, the United States and France decided 
UNCITRAL must begin with a very small first step: a procedural model 
law that would not be binding on countries and would simply provide 
some rules about how a cross-border corporate bankruptcy might be 
handled by companies, professionals and courts. The relatively quick 
success of the Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency emboldened its 
norm entrepreneurs and UNCITRAL to consider a more ambitious 
second step. UNCITRAL’s insolvency working group decided to 
write a legislative guide for domestic corporate bankruptcy law. In so 
doing, however, it deferred until step three a risky project where law 
was quite underdeveloped—that is, on how to handle corporate groups 
in financial distress. And it delayed further to step four and beyond 
areas where controversy was likely to be intense—for example, whether 
company directors should be liable for the debts of their companies 
in some circumstances. The partition and sequencing of global norms 
thereby have led to five products, each building on the other and each 
punctuating time with periodic successes to maintain momentum and 
fuel norm-making ambitions. 
Segmentation sometimes serves forces of reaction, because breaking 
a larger task in a finite period into many smaller products or decisions 
invariably amplifies the time for each and thereby extends the decision-
making process. This can be a useful strategy of resistance by the weak, 
as we see below.
Multiplying time
Multiplying time involves slicing decision-making episodes into finer 
tracks. This approach offers a creative adaptation for IOs with few or 
no options to extend time or which have severe constraints on the 
costs of  deliberation. Time can be multiplied by creating parallel or 
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simultaneous tracks so that different topics are allocated to different 
groups, unofficial meetings parallel official meetings or deliberations in 
formal chambers are supplemented by deliberations in offshore meetings. 
After a few sessions of deliberation, the leaders of UNCITRAL’s 
Transport Working Group realised that even with their fast start the pace 
of deliberation was so slow that any multilateral agreement would take 
many years to complete. The head of the US delegation pressed delegates 
to come up with a way to fast-track proceedings. The solution? Divide 
the issue area into separate topics, each of which prefigured a separate 
section in a prospective treaty. Ask a country delegation to lead an issue 
area. Invite delegates to join a network of people to work on that topic. 
And give every topical group/network a deadline to produce a draft set 
of issues and lawmaking responses. Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, 
the United States and other countries each led a group that operated 
‘offline’ and informally, far from UNCITRAL’s formal proceedings, but 
which ultimately fed into formal deliberations and prefigured working 
group consensus on topics.
The move to multiply time might ordinarily be yet another opportunity 
for power to be exercised by large states or expert NGOs with the 
capacity to mobilise. Yet the means of multiplying time also provides an 
opportunity for weaker players on the global stage, not least when smaller 
informal groups and networks can offer a vocal delegate persuasive 
powers less readily exercised before the entire panoply of delegates and 
delegations. 
5. Time as resistance
The ultimate arbiters of global convergence on norms are national states 
and local actors. Worlds of governance and regulation are replete with 
examples of elegant and ambitious global standard-setting efforts that 
remain global in name only. Norms and laws, regulations and standards 
remain on the books of IOs and fail to be adopted or implemented 
locally. The theories of recursivity of law and transnational legal orders 
are premised on the contingencies that inhibit settling of globally 
transmitted norms in local situations and that institutionalise not 
conformity but discordance between transnational and global norms, on 
the one hand, and national and local laws, regulations and ultimately 
behaviour, on the other (Block-Lieb and Halliday 2015). 
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Comparative research demonstrates that so-called weak states have 
greater powers to foil the hegemons than is often supposed (Halliday and 
Carruthers 2007a). In fact, the efficacy of weapons of the weak frequently 
turns on the temporal qualities of lawmaking and implementation. 
Research reveals at least six ways that a politics of temporal manipulation 
gives supposedly weak states considerable power to determine their own 
fates in worlds of putative global governance. 
Delay
The classic response of weak states to unwanted global norms and 
regulation is to adopt externally mandated or authorised norms in 
slow motion. States with limited infrastructure capacities, weak public 
administration, scarce supplies of expert civil servants and tiny private 
clusters of expertise can protest effectively to international monitors 
and IOs that state officials are very willing to comply, but, due to state 
incapacities, they simply cannot proceed very rapidly. Inspection of IMF 
quarterly reports on Indonesia’s adoption of agreed-on reforms after the 
1997–98 East Asian Financial Crisis reveals repeated postponements of 
progress on adopting and implementing reforms. 
Comply symbolically
Symbolic compliance has long been identified as a means by which the 
objects of regulation or lawmaking gesture compliantly towards the 
regulators and lawmakers but, in practice, act deviantly. In effect, these 
methods are another way of playing for time. 
• Implement partially: Here states implement something but not 
everything and that can lead to externally or internally (for example, 
interest groups, NGOs, social movement pressure) induced iterative 
rounds of further lawmaking, monitoring, feedback or regulatory 
tightening, all of which elongate time to implementation.
• Implement perversely: For example, hidden or detailed 
recommendations that come to light slowly and begin to take hold 
before international monitors, regulators or governors perceive their 
subversive capacities. 
• Enact statutes, subvert through regulations: Statute books are more 
visible to global lawmakers and international monitors. Regulations, 
written in local languages, spread sometimes among multiple agencies 
and recorded in a shadowland far less accessible to IOs, which 
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track up to 200 states across the world. As China’s 1996 Criminal 
Procedure Law demonstrated, a new law with vague and potentially 
inconsistent terms, interpreted in disparate ways by multiple agencies 
(police, courts, prosecutors, and so on), draws out any likely settling 
of national norms and practice in accordance with global norms, 
and thereby offers local interests diverse ways to confound local or 
international norm-setters intent on legal change. 
• Enact law, fail to enforce: Some global regulatory systems, such 
as the vast transnational legal order erected to combat money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, place a premium on 
national compliance through law on the books or the creation of new 
administrative agencies, such as financial intelligence units. Every 
five years or so every country must undergo a country assessment. 
Knowing that five-year cycles provide windows of time in which law 
might become practice, countries can comply with law on the books, 
but the number of arrests, convictions, sentences or confiscations of 
funds can lag dramatically. By the time a country responds partially to 
its lagged law-in-practice, another five years may go by with marginal 
increments, which a country can then promise to improve in the next 
five years. All the while, countries buy time to implement selectively. 
• Enact statutes, subvert courts: A similar logic can occur via the courts. 
Prosecutors may bring charges for money laundering but judges 
can fail to convict, sentence lightly or not at all or release convicted 
persons. 
Fragment international regulators and norm makers 
This tactic, when possible, provides another temporal challenge to national 
convergence on transnational norms. An effective foiling tactic for a 
state intent on noncompliance is to appeal to alternative or conflicting 
sets of transnational norms or standards. The most sophisticated of those 
international actors understand that conflicting norms and confusing 
signals from global centres will slow the impetus for change—certainly 
national and local change—towards convergence on standards or rules. 
This incipient power of weak states thereby contributes impetus for 
veteran IOs of all sorts to take more time in global lawmaking and 
regulation to achieve global consensus. An overt struggle between the 
World Bank and UNCITRAL, for instance, over whose global norms 
would constitute the gold standard for bankruptcy systems took years 
to resolve (Halliday and Block-Lieb 2013). In the final analysis, their 
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agreement was induced because of strong pressure from the IMF and 
the US State Department and Treasury, who feared precisely the lack of 
certainty that would accompany competing global standards. In other 
words, to enable a faster pace of national and local implementation, 
global lawmakers had to tolerate a slower pace of negotiations among 
contesting IOs along the path to consensus. 
Segment reforms
Just as IOs may break a potential stream of norms into a sequence 
of incremental products, so, too, states can segment reforms not only 
for progressive and deliberate implementation but also for delaying 
implementation. In the latter case, state lawmakers may break a single 
comprehensive reform into many small parts, each of which must then 
go through recursive cycles of lawmaking, partial implementation, 
further adaptive reforms and new efforts at implementation, until 
either new practices emerge or the legal change is abandoned as 
ineffective. International financial institutions suspected that this 
was South Korea’s tactic following the 1997–98 East Asian Financial 
Crisis. The  Government of South Korea enacted small statutory and 
administrative reforms at the pace of about one a year for several years, 
all the while postponing drafting and enactment of a comprehensive 
bankruptcy law that the international financial institutions believed they 
had been promised at the height of the crisis. Of course, the government 
might construe these small steps as prudent and incremental. To impatient 
global standard-setters, however, the promise of comprehensive reform 
seemed to be subtly receding into a dimly uncertain future. 
Invoke cultural incompatibilities
From China to Indonesia and across the world, national and local 
lawmakers and law implementers make the argument—frequently 
true—that externally induced norms are so foreign to local customs 
and practices that formal adoption or practical implementation presents 
a formidable barrier to concordance with transnational and global 
norms. This argument can take an absolutist form—namely, that an 
overseas practice simply will not work, which was an argument made 
by Indonesian reformers who declared that adversarial tactics between 
debtors and creditors in corporate bankruptcy proceedings simply would 
not work in a conflict-averse Javanese or Indonesian culture. Such an 
argument can also take a temporal form—namely, that a country might 
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be willing to try to bring its law and institutions into concordance with 
global norms, but it will take a very long time for it to seep into local 
legal and other consciousness, and therefore IOs should lower their 
expectations about the timing and scope of global regulatory impacts. 
Substitute a solution
Any state may plausibly make the case that it concurs with the general 
principle of a reform concordant with global norms, but the specifics 
of implementing it might be better reconceived by national and local 
alternatives. Germany made this argument, for instance, to assessors 
from the Financial Action Task Force, which demanded that Germany 
adhere to the letter of the anti–money laundering international standard 
and not substitute an alternative it had asserted would be much better 
in local circumstances. Whatever the merits of Germany’s case in this 
circumstance, the logic of alternative solutions remains plausible, even 
desirable. But, here again, time intrudes because global regulators, 
with their toolkits and templates in place, are inclined to retort: yes, 
your alternative might make sense, but how long can we wait until we 
find out? If you are wrong, and facts prove you are mistaken, years of 
regulatory impact are effectively lost. And, of course, in the realpolitik 
of regulatory conformity, the claim made by states for substitutionary 
alternatives may itself be a cynical attempt to play for time. 
6. Conclusion: The politics of time
Time offers one of the most powerful weapons to be wielded by the 
weak in struggles over global governance, lawmaking and regulation. 
If  the manipulation of time enables the strong to jockey for power at 
the global lawmaking centre, the politics of time endows the weak with 
a resource that is very difficult to overpower in global peripheries. 
International lawmakers, the IMF and World Bank, regional 
development  banks and international rights organisations are all 
impatient. For them, virtue inheres in the immediacy of action, in rapid 
conformity, in fast concordance of norms and short-term convergences 
of practice. In part, such impatience is a virtue borne of necessity—
IOs  lose interest, shift priorities, lose resources or are dragged away 
to new paradigms or fresh crises. Their prospects for global impact are 
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frequently momentary. And, even when they can be sustained for decades, 
IOs are never fully a match for the tactical powers of the so-called weak, 
whose patience by intent or incapacity invariably will outlast the strong. 
Here, then, we are compelled to return to the varieties of grand time 
and events. Given epochal influences over the longue durée, ideologies 
or systems of coercive power or pervasive beliefs reinforced century 
after century will leach directly and indirectly into the localities of 
their spheres of influence. Even epochal events—a great war, horrific 
genocides, a worldwide depression—cast long temporal shadows, 
certainly of decades, occasionally of centuries. Global governance and 
regulation play themselves out in varieties of time. Historical time, 
organisational time and decision-making time—all are both backdrops 
to action and variously manipulable by differently situated actors. 
Research must consciously situate its subjects inside time of varying 
scale as it concomitantly searches for temporal agency by all the players 
in the great game of global governance and regulation. 
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1. International negotiations in a 
globalised world 
Since the 1980s, globalisation has been on the march. The process has 
been broader than just economic integration where national markets 
become part of global markets and multinational firms are the dominant 
players. There are separate, distinct processes, including the globalisation 
of markets, the globalisation of firms and the globalisation of regulation 
(see Drahos, Chapter 15, this volume). The new global order is well 
characterised as ‘regulatory capitalism’ (see Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, this 
volume)—that is, an era in which states have become more preoccupied 
with the regulation part of governance and steering the flow of events 
than with providing and distributing. It is also an era that has witnessed 
the rise of not only state-based regulation, but also non-state regulation, 
which has grown even more rapidly.
One of the defining features of the globalised world that is less 
commented on is international negotiation. International negotiations 
are by no means a new phenomenon. After all, it was almost 100 years 
ago that the victors of World War I sat down in Paris to negotiate a new 
map of the world, as countries were simultaneously erased and created 
at will. However, since the 1980s, international multilateral negotiations 
have proliferated across regulatory domains to harmonise legislation and/
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or to create rules that can be applied by and to states. Witness the law of 
the sea negotiations, the world trade negotiations and the international 
climate change negotiations, to name a few. 
One of the striking characteristics of these examples is that each has 
been prolonged, stretching for years and sometimes decades. Yet, 
despite seeking to address some of the most critical problems facing 
the globe, prolonged international negotiations are not well understood. 
Although international negotiations have been an important area of 
study in the social sciences and much research has focused on explaining 
how and why states cooperate, remarkably, almost none of this work 
has considered prolonged international negotiations (Downie 2012). 
For example, extensive work has been done on the role of state and non-
state actors in international negotiations, on the influence of domestic 
interests and institutions and on the role of transnational activities of 
state and non-state actors. Yet very little work has been undertaken 
on how these factors vary over time in protracted negotiations and what 
the implications of these variables are for regulatory capitalism.
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to consider why 
international negotiations matter to regulatory capitalism. In particular, 
to assess the means by which international negotiations act to globally 
diffuse regulatory capitalism. Second, and most importantly, the aim 
is to draw attention to the temporal dimension of long international 
negotiations. In so doing, this chapter argues that the preferences of 
actors, including states, are fluid, not fixed, and fluctuate over the course 
of a long negotiation. It also argues that once the variables that affect 
the preferences of actors and hence outcomes in long negotiations are 
identified, there are specific strategies that state and non-state actors, 
including traditionally weak actors, can employ to steer prolonged 
international negotiations towards their preferred outcome.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief 
introduction to negotiation studies before considering international 
negotiations as a means of global diffusion of regulatory capitalism. 
The  principal sections then focus on the temporal dimensions of 
prolonged international negotiations, both the variables that explain 
their outcomes and the strategies that can be used to alter those 
outcomes. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of this 
phenomenon for regulatory capitalism.
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2. Negotiation studies 
Traditionally, international relations have been viewed as a world 
dominated by unitary states with stable and coherent preferences, 
especially in the realist and liberal traditions. Yet, in an era of regulatory 
capitalism, such a view is clearly too narrow to capture the myriad states 
and non-state actors that operate, often in networks, at the domestic, 
international and transnational levels. Multinational corporations, 
civil society, individual state agencies, international organisations and 
trade associations, among others, have become important regulators. 
For example, chemical producers put in place a global self-regulatory 
regime called ‘Responsible Care’ to avert another disaster like the Bhopal 
tragedy in India (see Holley, Chapter 42, this volume). 
Based on the pioneering work of William Zartman and others, a body 
of scholarship has emerged to capture the role of these various state and 
non-state actors in negotiations. In particular, it has sought to examine 
the negotiation process and the effect it has on the behaviour of actors 
and global outcomes. In analysing the negotiation process, scholars 
assume bounded rationality, where there are limits to an actor’s capacity 
to process information and make complex calculations (March 1978). 
The process is also viewed as a positive-sum game, where the parties’ 
underlying interests are distinguished from the issues under negotiation, 
on which their negotiating position is based. Scholarship in this tradition 
has also explored how the negotiation process evolves. Zartman and 
Berman (1982) identified three principal phases in the negotiation 
process in which parties move from a diagnostic phase, through to a 
formula phase and, ultimately, to a details phase, where parties send signals 
to each other, exchange points, arrange details and attempt to bring the 
negotiations to an end using deadlines. Others have argued that many 
negotiations continue after the detail phase into what has been termed 
the ‘post-agreement’ or ‘compliance bargaining’ phase, which refers 
to the negotiations post agreement over the terms and obligations of 
international treaties (Smith and Tallberg 2005; Zartman 2003).
Ultimately, in international negotiations, an agreement can include 
an informal settlement or a more explicit agreement, and the focus is 
invariably on the outcomes for the parties, be they tangible or intangible. 
In multilateral international negotiations, such as those noted above, the 
outcome rarely results directly in the distribution of tangible goods, as is 
more common in bilateral negotiations. Instead, the principal goal is to 
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harmonise national legislation or to create rules that can be applied by 
and to states. The effects of rule-making agreements such as conventions 
and protocols are often uncertain, long range and universal, and the 
adoption of a rule depends more on a convincing justification than on 
a material exchange of concessions, though these are often required as 
well, especially from developed to developing countries (Susskind 1994; 
Zartman 1994).
3. International negotiations as a means 
of diffusion of regulatory capitalism
In contrast with older forms of capitalist governance, such as laissez-
faire capitalism, the development of regulatory capitalism has come 
to rely on rules, principles, standards and other norms and their 
enforcement.   In  a  globalised world, these regulatory norms, often in 
the form of concrete models, are diffused across different countries 
and sectors, rather than being reproduced independently as discrete 
events. The focus on diffusion in regulatory capitalism has centred on 
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ approaches. Vertical approaches consider 
top-down explanations, such as national policymakers responding 
to international pressures, or bottom-up explanations, such as rules 
reflecting the balance of domestic politics. Horizontal approaches, on 
the other hand, emphasise diffusion of rules across borders via social 
interactions and networks (Levi-Faur 2005: 24–7).
These discussions have built on and paralleled efforts in negotiation 
studies to understand international negotiation outcomes, which, to the 
extent that they produce rule-making agreements, play an important 
function as a means of diffusion. First, in the negotiation literature there 
has long been a distinction between domestic interest-based explanations 
of negotiation outcomes (bottom-up approaches) and an international 
bargaining explanation of negotiation outcomes (top-down). However, 
these explanations are not very good at explaining negotiation outcomes 
when domestic politics and international relations are in play, as they 
invariably are in international negotiations. One of the most fruitful 
attempts to integrate these explanations is Robert Putnam’s (1988) 
‘two-level game’, which stresses the interaction of actors at both the 
domestic level, such as interest groups, and the international level, such 
as heads of state. In short, it incorporates elements of a bottom-up and 
top-down understanding of diffusion.
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However, much like the emphasis of horizontal approaches to diffusion, 
scholars of the transnational turn in international relations take a 
different view on negotiation outcomes. They argue that state behaviour 
in international negotiation outcomes cannot be understood without 
taking account of the cross-boundary activities of subunits of government 
and non-state actors (Risse-Kappen 1995a). Accordingly, scholars in this 
tradition focus on the role of ‘trans-governmental relations’ to describe 
‘sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments’, 
and on the role of transnational networks of non-state actors, such 
as ‘epistemic communities’ and ‘transnational advocacy networks’ 
(Keck  and  Sikkink 1998; Slaughter 2004). For example, Peter Haas 
(1989) has argued that epistemic communities, which have recognised 
expertise and competencies in a particular domain or issue area, can affect 
how states’ interests are defined and hence how rule-making agreements 
at the international level are produced.
4. Variables in prolonged international 
negotiations
While these explanations capture the main factors that explain the 
process of diffusion via international negotiations, it is not clear 
how these dynamics affect outcomes over time. In other words, they 
ignore the temporal dimension in long negotiations. For example, 
the two-level perspective is valuable for understanding how domestic 
politics and international relations interact in a one-off negotiation. 
But, if one is to inquire into how domestic political dynamics change 
to affect international outcomes—such as in the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations, which lasted eight years, or the Kyoto round of the 
international climate change negotiations, which lasted 10 years—
the two-level approach is limited. 
Further, empirical studies of long negotiations that stretch for years and 
sometimes decades highlight how, over time, state preferences become 
fluid, not fixed. In long negotiations, the preferences of actors are not 
like neutrons; rather, they are positively charged one year and negatively 
charged the next. Take the cases of the United States and the European 
Union (EU), two of the most important parties during the Kyoto round 
of the climate negotiations. In both cases, their negotiating positions 
changed, as did the type of agreement they were prepared to sign. 
This, in turn, affected the type of regulations that were diffused via the 
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international climate change negotiations. In 1995, the United States 
and the European Union agreed to the Berlin Mandate, which stipulated 
that countries could not use emissions trading—a market-based trading 
system for greenhouse gas emissions—to meet their international 
climate objectives. Then, in 1997, the United States and the European 
Union agreed to the Kyoto Protocol, which supported emissions trading 
and the diffusion of the concept of market-based flexibility mechanisms. 
Yet, by 2000, the United States and the European Union refused to 
sign an agreement that would have fleshed out the detail of the Kyoto 
Protocol already agreed to in 1997 (Downie 2014). Almost two decades 
later, the experiments that the United States and European Union took 
with emissions trading have been diffused around the globe, in large part 
due to these negotiations.
However, the important point here is that once the temporal dimension 
of prolonged international negotiations is taken into account it becomes 
clear that the preferences of states fluctuate over the course of an extended 
negotiation—in contrast with what realist and liberal scholars would 
contend. The questions, then, are how and why? Drawing on an analysis 
of existing theories of international negotiations and a large empirical 
study that was undertaken of the United States and the European Union 
during the Kyoto phase of the climate negotiations (see Downie 2014), 
two sets of factors appear important to explaining variations in state 
behaviour: internal factors and external factors. 
Internal factors refer to variables that precipitate a direct shift in state 
behaviour via the national, international or transnational level. Internal 
factors include the level of engagement or mobilisation of actors, 
changes in the strategies of actors or changes in networks of actors, 
among others. The increased engagement of a treasury department in 
domestic discussions is an example of such an internal factor. External 
factors, on the other hand, refer to variables that shift multiple internal 
factors and operate independently of the stage of the negotiation—that 
is, they operate without regard to whether the negotiation is over an 
informal settlement or an explicit agreement with tangible outcomes. 
External factors include exogenous shocks, changes in the state of 
expert knowledge and challenges from other international regimes. For 
example, a global financial crisis, a nuclear meltdown and a catastrophic 
hurricane are all possible external shocks that may change state behaviour. 
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In general, internal factors are more proximate than external factors and, 
as a result, it is easier to draw inferences from internal factors than from 
external ones.
Internal factors 
One of the most important internal factors is the level of engagement 
of actors. In prolonged negotiations when actors mobilise there is the 
potential for new networks to develop between actors and changes in the 
distribution of the power and preferences of coalitions. As Schattschneider 
(1960) first pointed out, which stakeholders are mobilised and which are 
not matter because it affects the balance of forces between actors. As a 
result, as actors engage and disengage, it will create the conditions for 
new winning and veto coalitions to emerge at the domestic, international 
and transnational levels. This might mean the intervention of a treasury 
department into bureaucratic debates, a new environmental non-
governmental organisation (NGO) into international discussions or a 
business group engaging at the transnational level. Each new actor could 
directly precipitate a shift in state behaviour. 
Or, take another example of an internal factor, such as the strategic 
choices actors make about where and how to negotiate. If they choose 
a new strategy, this could shift state behaviour and the outcome. 
For example, some authors use the terms ‘forum shopping’ (Braithwaite 
and Drahos 2000) or ‘different pathways’ (Risse-Kappen 1995b) to 
describe how actors take actions in different forums or at different 
levels to influence state behaviour and the outcome of a negotiation. 
For example, traditionally less powerful actors, such as environmental 
NGOs, may decide to shift their activities to the international level 
because of limited access to government at the domestic level, whereas 
strong actors may not need to do so because of their powerful position at 
home. Or, business groups may supplement their domestic lobbying by 
engaging in transnational actions as well. 
While these internal factors are critical, a key question in the case of 
prolonged international negotiations is: why do these factors change? 
In  other words, why do new actors mobilise? Why do actors change 
their strategies? Why do networks among actors change? And, what is 
it that shifts the distribution of coalitions over time? The short answer 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
330
is that these changes are the function of the following internal factors: 
domestic political incentives, the stage of the negotiations and the 
preferences of government leaders.
Domestic political incentives and the stage of the negotiations are 
interrelated. As negotiations progress, the domestic political incentives 
for government agencies, non-state actors or government leaders will 
change and, with it, their level of engagement. The political incentives for 
these actors will, in turn, be a function of how they perceive the tangible 
costs and benefits of the agreement under negotiation, which, as others 
have pointed out, is directly related to the stage of the negotiations. 
For example, in elaborating on the two-level game, Moravscik (1993) 
and Evans (1993) note that, as negotiations move from the bargaining 
to the ratification stage, the costs and benefits of an agreement become 
clearer, and, as a result, domestic groups will mobilise in defence of their 
interests. This, in turn, will bring new actors into the game. In other 
words, as some actors push for an agreement, it engages other actors to 
push against it (Spector 2003). 
Further, in protracted negotiations government leaders are crucial 
to explaining the type of agreement that states are willing to sign. 
In protracted negotiations, there is the potential for changes in the 
preferences of leaders if there is a change in government or a change 
in the beliefs or political incentives of existing leaders. While a change 
in government is possible in shorter negotiations, it is almost inevitable 
in protracted negotiations and can lead to a fundamental change in the 
preferences of the leader. Yet even when there is no change in government, 
there is the potential for the preferences of a government leader to change 
with a change in their beliefs or political incentives. As voter interest 
changes, so will the domestic political incentives of the government 
leader. In the same fashion, the capacity of leaders to manipulate these 
domestic constraints will also vary over time. Evans (1993) concludes 
that as international negotiations move from the bargaining to the 
ratification stage, the relative autonomy of the government leader to 
manipulate these pressures decreases. This is because, as discussions focus 
on ratification and tangible costs and benefits, more actors mobilise to 
advance or defend their interests, and,  hence, the constraints on the 
government leader increase.
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External factors
Whereas internal factors precipitate a direct shift in state behaviour, 
external factors, as noted, indirectly shift state behaviour by reshaping the 
context in which the negotiations take place. To be clear, external factors 
are independent of the stage of the negotiations—that is, they operate 
without regard to the negotiation process itself. Take just one external 
factor, an exogenous shock—that is, an event that has the potential to 
transform the context in which international negotiations take place 
(Zartman 2003). The most common pathway is where a dramatic event 
or series of events captures the imagination of mass publics, after media 
organisations dramatise the event and state actors are forced to act 
to placate the public and the media (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
The Bhopal accident in 1984 and Chernobyl accident in 1986 are classic 
cases of exogenous events that catalysed mass publics and forced states to 
act both domestically and internationally. Such events, which are more 
likely in a long negotiation, can shift multiple internal factors as new 
actors mobilise in response to new political incentives, which, in turn, 
affect the distribution of coalitions and so on. In short, an exogenous 
shock will indirectly shift state behaviour.
5. Strategies in prolonged international 
negotiations
The complex processes that shape prolonged international negotiation 
outcomes provide opportunities for highly networked actors to 
influence state behaviour by making strategic choices at the domestic, 
international or transnational level to mobilise other actors, establish 
coalitions, manipulate government leaders’ preferences and, in turn, 
shape international negotiation outcomes. In other words, it provides 
them with an opportunity to engage in what might be referred to as 
‘constructive management’. This recognises that, because preferences are 
fluid in a long negotiation, actors have considerable agency to influence 
state behaviour and hence the nature of the rule-making agreements that 
diffuse regulatory capitalism. The fact that preferences are fluid in a long 
negotiation means that actors will always have a degree of agency no 
matter how weak they are. There is a series of strategies that actors can 
employ to constructively manage international negotiations, which are 
likely to be uniquely effective when they are used to exploit the strategic 
opportunities that arise in long negotiations. 
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Exploiting the minimal mobilisation 
of interested actors
When other actors are disengaged, there is a unique strategic opportunity 
for traditionally weak actors to dominate discussions because more 
powerful actors are not mobilised. As discussed above, which actors 
are mobilised and which are not matter because it affects the balance 
of forces between actors. This is particularly pertinent in international 
environmental negotiations where key actors—environment agencies 
and environmental NGOs—are often the weakest actors. Accordingly, 
when interested actors are not mobilised, weak actors should actively 
engage in the discussions as early as possible to exploit the circumstances. 
In other words, weak actors should go in hard and early to influence state 
behaviour. Weak actors who exploit these circumstances will therefore 
have a first-mover opportunity to frame the discussions. One of the most 
effective ways that actors can affect state behaviour is by strategically 
framing debates to draw attention to their concerns. The actor or 
coalition of actors that succeeds in establishing a frame that is consistent 
with its goals is likely to reap the greatest gains from negotiations.
Infiltrating and manipulating networks and coalitions
In a networked world, as discussed, where the state acts as an agent for 
the interests of non-state actors and other actors act as agents for states, 
highly networked actors have the capacity to shape state behaviour 
(Rhodes 2006: 426). For traditionally weak actors, this is often difficult 
given that policy networks, for example, are often inaccessible. However, 
when a tentative agreement is being negotiated, the costs and benefits 
of which are not yet tangible and, as a result, interested actors are 
minimally mobilised, domestic networks and coalitions are likely to be 
fluid. This will provide a strategic opportunity for weak actors to move 
in and out of this space with greater ease. As a result, a second and 
related strategy for weak actors is to infiltrate and manipulate domestic 
networks and coalitions when they are most fluid.
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Targeting a government leader’s capacity 
to manipulate domestic constraints
While the preferences of government leaders are crucial to explaining 
state behaviour, their capacity to manipulate domestic constraints is 
greatest when the international negotiations are in the bargaining 
phase. The lesson for actors, especially weak actors who have fewer 
alternative pathways to influence state behaviour, is to target leaders in 
the bargaining phase. If an actor is successful in influencing a leader’s 
preference at this point in the negotiations, it is more likely that these 
preferences will be reflected in a state’s negotiating position given the 
greater relative autonomy of the government leader. A leader’s preferences 
will be informed both by personal beliefs and by the desire to enhance 
their domestic political position. Accordingly, actors should target both 
these avenues to persuade them to adopt a position consistent with their 
interests. 
Facilitating the flow of expert knowledge 
to policy elites
The basic premise of constructive management is that state preferences 
matter to international outcomes, they are fluid and they can be socially 
constructed. When government leaders and policy elites have not 
developed firm preferences on the issue under negotiation, weak actors 
can facilitate the flow of expert knowledge to these actors to inform their 
beliefs and, in turn, their preferences and negotiating position. Again, 
this will work best in the early phase of negotiations because networks 
are more fluid and leaders have a greater capacity to manipulate domestic 
constraints based on their beliefs. 
Exploiting exogenous shocks
Exogenous shocks have a very real potential to shift state behaviour by 
catalysing mass publics and forcing states to act both domestically and 
internationally. In such an atmosphere, actors who have a prepared model 
to address the crisis will have an enormous appeal to state actors looking 
for a solution. For example, if a nuclear meltdown forces a state to act, 
such as the German Government’s decision to close its nuclear power 
plants following the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011, the actors with 
a prepared model to reregulate energy production and phase out nuclear 
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power will be in a powerful position. Indeed, the key for weak actors 
is that their influence depends on the power of the model, not on the 
power of the advocate (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 589). Accordingly, 
where weak actors have been outmanoeuvred by more powerful actors 
and are closed off from policy networks, an exogenous shock can provide 
a strategic opportunity, if they have a model in hand, to influence state 
behaviour and steer the negotiations towards their preferred outcome.
Leveraging other international regimes
Further, where powerful interests dominate, weak actors, where 
possible, should engage with other international regimes to influence 
state behaviour. As we have seen, one international regime, such as the 
ozone regime, can provide an exogenous challenge to a second regime, 
such as the climate regime, if they are involved in competing efforts 
to deal with aspects of the same problem (Zartman 2003). Where this 
occurs, strategic opportunities may exist for weak actors whose influence 
has been muted in one international regime to shift their attention to 
a second regime and use it as leverage. If possible, actors should engage 
a stronger regime as this is likely to have a greater capacity to provide an 
exogenous challenge. For instance, environmental NGOs participating 
in the climate negotiations may seek to affect the rules and boundaries 
of the international trade regime with the hope of spurring changes in 
the climate regime. 
Building transnational coalitions
Finally, as the transnational perspective points out, ‘transnational relations 
matter in world politics’, and state behaviour in international relations 
cannot be understood without taking account of the cross-boundary 
activities of subunits of government and non-state actors (Risse-Kappen 
1995b: 280). When powerful interests begin to dominate domestic 
networks and coalitions, a good option for weak actors is to develop 
transnational networks. The evidence from the climate negotiations 
indicates that transnational networks are most effective at influencing 
domestic and international policy outcomes when they include state and 
non-state actors. Further, weak actors in one country can enrol more 
powerful actors in another to help push for or veto agreements that they 
do not have the influence to do alone. 
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6. Conclusion 
Regulatory capitalism has come to rely on rule and rule enforcement. 
In a globalised world, these rules are diffused, they are not reproduced 
and international negotiations have proven to be a principal means 
of diffusion. International multilateral negotiations have proliferated 
across regulatory domains to harmonise legislation and/or to create 
rules that can be applied by and to states. Regulatory solutions that are 
often shaped in the United States or the European Union are broadcast 
globally via international negotiations. For example, as this chapter has 
discussed, the international climate change negotiations diffused the 
concept of emissions trading around the globe as a regulatory solution 
to rising greenhouse gas emissions. A solution that originated in the 
United States has now spread via international negotiations to be one of 
the most common regulatory responses to climate change.
Accordingly, to understand diffusion in an era of regulatory capitalism 
it is necessary to understand the international negotiation process. 
Fortunately, negotiation studies is well developed and it has expanded 
our understanding of the negotiation process beyond top-down and 
bottom-up approaches by drawing attention to the myriad state and non-
state actors that operate, often in networks, at the domestic, international 
and transnational levels. Yet many of the most significant rule-making 
agreements are the product of negotiations that stretch for years and 
sometimes decades. The international climate change negotiations, 
already mentioned, are a good example. But one does not have to look 
far to discover the significant impact the almost decade-long rounds of 
trade negotiations have had on globalising international trade rules or 
the international law of the sea negotiations, which govern our oceans.
Recent empirical studies have started to uncover the dynamics of such 
negotiations and how the negotiation processes that diffuse and enforce 
rules vary over time. As this chapter has shown, first, it is clear that 
the preferences of actors, including states, are fluid, not fixed. And, as 
a result, there are internal and external factors distinctive to prolonged 
international negotiations that explain how and why the rule-making 
agreements that negotiations generate change, such as the different levels 
of engagement of actors and the preferences of government leaders. 
Second, because preferences are fluid, actors, including traditionally weak 
actors, have considerable agency to influence state behaviour. Indeed, 
there are strategic opportunities in the course of a protracted negotiation 
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for actors to steer negotiations towards their preferred outcomes if the 
right strategies are employed. Of course, the means by which long 
international negotiations diffuse and enforce rules need to be tested 
across a wide range of cases, and across multiple sites of regulation, but 
negotiation studies have much to offer our understanding of the spread 
of regulatory capitalism.
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What do Apple’s Supplier Responsibility program, the UK-based 
Internet Watch Foundation and the campaign against unauthorised 
downloads of movies by the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA) have in common? They are examples of transnational non-
state regulatory regimes. This type of regulation encompasses a broad 
array of regulatory arrangements carried out by corporate actors, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups working 
alone or in collaboration. It is a form of meta-regulation that operates at 
a global level (see Grabosky, Chapter 9, this volume). Regulation in this 
context refers broadly to the means that guide any activity, individual 
or institution to behave according to formal or informal rules (Picciotto 
2002: 1). Given the diversity of actors and activities making up this type 
of regulation, there is no standard definition for transnational non-state 
regulation. It can be broadly understood as non-state actors making, 
implementing and/or enforcing rules and standards across national 
borders. Transnational non-state regulation connects with theories of 
globalisation—most obviously regulatory globalisation (see Drahos, 
Chapter 15, this volume).
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Some arrangements may comprise a single company or industry, while 
others cut across industry sectors or involve multiple business and civil 
society stakeholders who represent a range of interests. Actors may 
employ formal legal mechanisms, such as national or international laws, 
as well as informal processes such as non–legally binding certification 
programs or codes of conducts. They may have different motivations and 
interests for becoming involved in regulatory endeavours and diverse 
goals. Participants may have profit-oriented goals, such as reducing 
regulatory duplication to strengthen corporate performance, or efforts 
may be publicly oriented to target problems such as pollution or child 
labour. Apple’s Supplier Responsibility program, for instance, in which 
the company may terminate its contracts with suppliers that do not 
comply with its labour and environmental standards, is designed to 
burnish Apple’s credentials as a good corporate citizen. The MPAA 
pressures internet firms, particularly Google, to make it more difficult 
for people to find and download unauthorised versions of copyrighted 
movies. In contrast, the Internet Watch Foundation is a non-profit 
organisation that works with internet firms like Google and PayPal to 
remove child pornography from websites around the world. 
The rest of the chapter explores how transnational non-state regulation 
operates, particularly the ways in which non-state actors can make 
and enforce rules, and then outlines the challenges raised by this type 
of regulation. First, the chapter introduces the concept of regimes to 
provide a way to understand this type of regulation and then describes 
how non-state actors interact with states. Then the chapter outlines why 
transnational non-state regulation emerges before turning to discuss 
how non-state actors draw on varying forms of authority to regulate. 
Third, the chapter explores the varying degrees of involvement states 
may have with transnational non-state regulatory regimes. The chapter 
then discusses the benefits and challenges of this type of regulation 
before providing a brief conclusion.
2. Regimes and states
Given the diversity of actors, rules and interests making up the many 
instances of transnational non-state regulation, the concept of regimes 
provides a useful analytical framework. Regimes can be understood as 
‘the full set of actors, institutions, norms and rules’ making up a particular 
regulatory arrangement (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 91). Scholars from 
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the fields of international relations, socio-legal studies and regulatory 
theory employ the concept of regimes to explain the ways in which 
non-state actors can set and enforce rules and standards transnationally, 
and explore their varying interests in participating in such regimes 
(see, for example, Cutler et al. 1999). The concept is useful because it 
explicitly acknowledges the role of non-state actors and recognises that 
regulation may involve ‘soft law’ or informal governance practices, such 
as certification practices or industry-derived codes of conduct, along 
with other rule-making mechanisms such as contracts or statutory 
laws. As regime analysis considers the full ensemble of actors, interests 
and rules making up regulatory efforts, it is also valuable for tracking 
similarities and differences among actors’ material and ideational 
interests in relation to the governance of a particular issue. Actors may 
have conflicting, sometimes irreconcilable, differences that shape the 
composition and function of governance arrangements. Regulation that 
materially benefits one party can impose costs on the other. 
In terms of their scope, regimes may be considered transnational 
according to the reach of their rule-setting actors, the level of the rule-
setting institutions, the span of the rules themselves or a combination 
of these factors (Mügge 2006: 179). Even though a regime may operate 
transnationally through the scope of its actors or rules, the regime may 
have distinct territorial roots or localised characteristics (Graz and 
Nölke 2008). These local roots may infuse a regime with characteristics 
that shape its character or operation. Prominent rule-making actors, 
for example, may all be based within the global North, creating rules 
that govern how transnational mining companies operate in the global 
South (see Dashwood 2012). Using regimes can help trace the particular 
historical and sociocultural contexts from which actors emerged to form 
particular regulatory arrangements.
From the term, it would appear that the state has very little or even no 
role in transnational non-state regulation. However, this is not the case. 
To understand the role of states in this type of regulation, it is important 
to outline briefly how states can strategically deploy their power 
through regulation. One way to consider how this occurs is through the 
framework of regulatory capitalism, which is prominently associated 
with John Braithwaite and David Levi-Faur, among other regulatory 
theorists (see  Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, this volume). In  regulatory 
capitalism, the state takes on a meta-regulatory role: it directs, oversees 
and spurs on regulation and, in so doing, governs through regulation 
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(see Levi-Faur 2013). The oft-quoted metaphors of ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’ 
aptly describe the state’s meta-regulation. In these nautical images, the 
state strategically ‘steers’ or directs regulatory efforts while non-state 
actors take on the state’s traditional task of ‘rowing’ by creating and 
operating various regulatory arrangements (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 
States may play a strong, direct role by facilitating regulatory efforts, 
prescribing specific goals or mandating the use of certain monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms. They may also govern indirectly by 
empowering non-state actors to enact rules, shaping discourse and 
distributing resources (Levi-Faur 2013: 39). States may also provide 
incentives to corporate and civil society actors to create or enforce certain 
rules and standards (see Gunningham and Sinclair, Chapters 8 and 40; 
and Grabosky, Chapter 9, this volume). When there are conflicts among 
actors or appeals to governments for assistance, states can arbitrate 
among competing non-state interests. Corporate actors, for  example, 
may lobby a state for a particular regulatory approach that is opposed 
by civil society groups that advocate different measures. Not all actors 
have equal resources with which to persuade states to support their 
regulatory preferences or command the same degree of influence in 
shaping state policymaking processes. Some large corporate actors have 
the capacity to lobby for policies that benefit their interests and create 
their own rules and standards, both domestically and transnationally, to 
regulate their individual corporations, their global supply chains or even 
industry sectors. Similarly, not all states have equal capacity to influence, 
stimulate or control regulatory efforts by non-state actors, particularly 
mega-corporate actors. 
To understand why states privilege certain interests, it is helpful to 
consider the state as embedded in the economic and social orders: the 
state and society mutually constitute one another (Underhill 2003). 
Simply put, there is a flow of ideas between the state and society in 
which each shapes the other. States grant a role in policymaking to 
interest groups that put forward competing and complementary ideas 
to articulate problems, propose remedies and shape policies. States 
determine which actors are more authoritative, lend legitimacy to some 
interests over others and privilege certain policies (Hall 1993: 288). 
It  is  important to underline that states retain interests and goals that 
are distinct from their lobbyists even as those actors endeavour to shape 
governments’ priorities and policymaking. States retain a capacity to act 
autonomously even as they accord interest groups opportunities to shape 
policymaking (Hall 1993).
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3. Origins and authority 
One of the principal reasons that non-state actors may form 
transnational regulatory arrangements is because states are perceived 
to be incapable of or unwilling to provide transnational governance on 
certain issues. Corporate actors or civil society groups may also turn 
to non-state regulation if states are not addressing problems in ways 
that the non-state actors consider appropriate. By creating standards 
and rules privately, non-state actors can work to address gaps in 
regulation or harmonise competing or uneven rules internationally to 
make governance efforts more effective (Cafaggi 2012). Multinational 
corporations working alongside civil society groups, for example, have 
created international standards in relation to the commercial use and 
preservation of forests (see Meidinger 2002). Similarly, child protection 
advocates, together with law enforcement and industry groups, created 
the Internet Watch Foundation to target child pornography hosted 
anywhere on the internet. Corporate actors may strategically embrace 
non-state regulation to preempt government regulation or water down 
existing rules (Cutler et al. 1999). There may be normative reasons for 
corporate actors’ adoption of private rules, such as to repair or safeguard 
their reputations. For example, following criticism of Apple’s supply-
chain practices, the company began using third-party auditors to ensure 
the tantalum, which is a valuable metal, used in its products was obtained 
from conflict-free countries in Africa (see Apple 2014).
Transnational non-state regulatory regimes vary widely in the sources 
of  their authority to set or enforce rules and standards. Actors within 
such  regimes generally exercise ‘autonomous regulatory power or 
implemen[t] delegated power, conferred by international law or by 
national legislation’ (Cafaggi 2010: 1). In terms of delegated authority, 
states may designate responsibility for monitoring or enforcing criminal 
or civil laws to non-state actors, or direct those actors to perform specific 
duties such as inspections or audits (see Scott 2002). In many countries, 
private security companies, such as the UK-based multinational Serco 
Group, have state-delegated authority to transport, guard and house 
prisoners. A  common form of autonomous regulatory authority 
comes from contracts. Corporations can set rules or standards within 
their supply chains through contracts with their manufacturers and 
suppliers—for instance, in relation to labour or environmental standards 
(see, for example, Apple 2014). Companies that wish to become suppliers 
to Apple, for example, must abide by its environmental and labour 
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conditions and demonstrate compliance in third-party audits or risk 
losing contracts. States, however, can intervene in commercial contracts 
if they violate laws, such as those prohibiting anticompetitive behaviour. 
Non-state actors may lack a formal legal authority to govern and instead 
must persuade—or pressure—others to accept their rules or comply with 
their regulatory programs. To do so, they can draw on their resources and 
put forward their policies as the best approach. These are examples of 
structural authority and discursive authority and one may be employed 
to strengthen the other. Structural authority, which is based on Susan 
Strange’s (1997) notion of structural power, refers to transnational 
corporate actors’ capacity to influence government policymaking by 
threatening to relocate investment or employment. It also encompasses 
those actors’ ability to control access to or the use of certain markets 
and to govern their supply chains, particularly when they dominate 
markets (see Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010). Visa, MasterCard and 
PayPal, for example, dominate the online payment market, while Google 
commands the search market, which means that these companies have 
considerable capacity to act as online regulators. Discursive authority, 
in contrast, refers to actors’ ability to frame and shape the meaning of 
ideas to affect how people understand issues and influence policymaking 
(Fuchs 2007). Using this capacity to shape ideas, non-state actors may 
also invoke moral  and technical authority to argue for their preferred 
regulatory approach. Moral authority involves drawing broadly 
accepted values, while technical authority involves claims to specialised 
or expert knowledge or skills, or objective advice (Avant et al. 2010). 
The  Internet  Watch Foundation, for instance, claims moral authority 
when it demands that internet firms such as Yahoo and Google 
join its ranks to target the online distribution of child pornography 
(see  Laidlaw 2012). The MPAA, meanwhile, invokes both moral and 
technical authority. It  claims to protect the copyright of its members’ 
movies from ‘theft’1 and, invoking its status as the trade body for the 
movie industry, it designs policies to deter the unauthorised download 
of movies (see Brandom 2014). 
Non-state actors without formal legal authority may create regulatory 
regimes based on informal measures, such as non–legally binding 
certification programs and corporate social responsibility codes. 
1  Proponents of stronger protection for copyright have long successfully framed copyright 
infringement as ‘theft’—an effective strategy that casts infringement as a serious crime that 
necessitates a correspondingly serious enforcement response (see Drahos and Braithwaite 2002). 
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For example, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which comprises 
business, social and environmental interests, certifies forestry companies, 
including manufacturers and retailers, as compliant with the FSC’s 
standards on sustainability and environmental protection (see Meidinger 
2002). Corporate social responsibility codes are often joint agreements 
between civil society organisations and corporations to address certain 
problems resulting from poor industry practices, such as pollution, or 
to improve industry practices in particular areas, such as human rights 
or labour standards (see Dashwood 2012). Certification and corporate 
social responsibility programs are generally intended to marry private 
business interests with public interest goals. They are designed (whether 
or not they are effective) to benefit the interests of the regulated, which 
are primarily business entities, and serve the collective interest through 
efforts to protect human rights, among other programs. 
In addition to the arrangements described above among non-state 
actors, there is another that is gaining prominence: non–legally binding 
‘voluntary’ agreements (see Gunningham and Sinclair, Chapters 8 and 
40, this volume). These agreements are voluntary in the sense that they are 
not based on legislation or legal contracts but on nonbinding guidelines 
or sets of industry-derived ‘best practices’. The term ‘voluntary’, however, 
can be misleading, as states can exert considerable coercive pressure 
to force non-state actors to join the arrangements or abide by their 
decisions. Other non-state actors may also pressure stakeholders to join 
the agreements by threatening legal action or withholding business deals. 
Non–legally binding agreements are increasingly used to regulate digital 
copyright infringement (for example, unauthorised downloads of music 
and movies) and the online sale of counterfeit goods, which is a form 
of trademark infringement. In these nonbinding agreements, rights-
holders of intellectual property—typically large multinational companies 
such as Nike or Sony—work with internet firms such as PayPal to stop 
the online distribution of copyright-infringing and counterfeit goods 
(Tusikov 2016). 
4. Degrees of state involvement
Government involvement in transnational non-state regulation varies 
according to the issue under regulation, the nature of the regulatory 
arrangement and the degree of reliance, if any, on the state. As discussed 
earlier in the chapter, states retain the authority in the regulatory 
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capitalist framework to mandate, shape, endorse or reject non-state 
regulatory efforts, as well as to delegate authority to non-state actors 
(see Levi-Faur 2013; Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, this volume). States may 
not necessarily be aware of or equally attentive to all cases of non-state 
regulation, particularly where its interests are not affected or private 
actors do not seek state involvement. For example, corporate social 
responsibility programs organised among corporations and NGOs to 
strengthen standards relating to environmental protection may not elicit 
attention from governments. As well, states vary widely in their capacity 
to influence and their degree of involvement in transnational non-state 
regulation. 
Transnational non-state regulatory regimes may have little, if any, state 
involvement. Where there is relative agreement among stakeholders 
in relation to the regime, or if there are suitable incentives offered (or 
penalties credibly threatened), there may be few interactions with state 
actors. This is the case when powerful multinational companies, such 
as Walmart or Apple, contractually require their suppliers to adhere to 
specific environmental, labour or quality-control standards. Suppliers are 
under considerable pressure to accept these contracts as they have few 
alternatives given the significant market share commanded by Walmart 
and Apple. Further, the penalties for violation are serious. Suppliers 
found to be in violation of the contracts can be terminated as preferred 
suppliers and, given the market dominance of such firms, this means 
the suppliers essentially lose their licence ‘to participate in the global 
market’ (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010: 3). Contract-based regimes 
require little direct interaction with the state, as the corporations set and 
enforce rules through their supply chains. However, corporations’ use of 
legal contracts to enforce rules and standards means they rely indirectly 
on state legal systems. Similarly, in the case of a disagreement among 
regime participants, actors have recourse to pursue the matter in the 
relevant national legal jurisdiction. 
When non-state actors lack a contractual or statutory basis to their 
regime, they can attempt to persuade or pressure others to conform to 
their rules. They can draw on their structural and discursive authority 
by employing litigation or promising to grant or withhold business 
deals. If these methods fail, actors may turn to the state or its structures, 
although actors may have different preferences as to the degree and 
nature of state involvement (Cafaggi 2010). Faced with noncompliant 
actors, a regime’s actors can, in some situations, turn to national laws or 
public institutions to seek compliance or use the threat of civil or criminal 
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remedies to motivate compliance with the regime’s rules, standards or 
codes. They may also seek direct assistance from state actors. Members 
of a transnational regime may lobby states to support or facilitate a 
particular regulatory agenda, or to prod reluctant actors into cooperating 
with the regime. The success of these requests depends on the state’s 
interests in the regime, as well as the state’s capacity and willingness to 
intervene. The distribution of power among non-state actors, however, is 
temporal as interests may shift over time or different sets of actors may 
assume greater power (see Downie, Chapter 19; and Halliday, Chapter 
18, this volume). Further, the state may weaken or revoke its recognition 
of the regulatory arrangement, non-state actors can lose credibility 
from their stakeholders or those they govern and rivals may contest the 
regime’s legitimacy (Avant et al. 2010). 
Some requests for state assistance resonate with the state or align 
more closely than others with its interests. Both the Internet Watch 
Foundation and the MPAA enjoy a close relationship with the UK 
and US governments, respectively. The UK Government is strongly 
supportive of the Internet Watch Foundation’s enforcement strategy 
in which internet firms, including Google, Yahoo, Twitter and PayPal, 
block access to websites suspected of hosting child pornography content 
to deter individuals from accessing those websites (see Internet Watch 
Foundation 2013). Similarly, the MPAA has a long, successful history 
of shaping US—and international—policymaking in relation to the 
ever-increasing protection of copyright (see Brandom 2014; Drahos 
and Braithwaite 2002). For Apple, in contrast, pressure to improve the 
company’s labour and environmental standards came primarily from 
NGOs and its customers (Apple Press Info 2012). In cases where states 
have interests in the subject of regulation, they may exert direct, even 
coercive, pressure on non-state actors to convince them to participate in 
transnational non-state regulatory regimes. For example, in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, government officials warned internet 
firms that they could expect legislation or legal action to force their 
compliance if they did not adopt non–legally binding agreements with 
rights-holders to address the online distribution of copyright-infringing 
and counterfeit goods (Tusikov 2016). Given this coercion, the non–
legally binding agreements are not voluntary but a form of enforced 
regulation. When state actors intervene in non-state regulation by 
supporting, facilitating or even directly creating a particular regulatory 
arrangement, they legitimise the authority of the non-state actors to 
govern and the regime. 
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5. Benefits and challenges of transnational 
non-state regulation
Transnational non-state regulation can offer certain benefits (see Chang 
and Grabosky, Chapter 31, this volume). Governments may perceive 
non-state actors, particularly corporations, as more responsive, cost-
effective and efficient regulators than government agencies in certain 
areas, or as having specialised technical knowledge, industry or sector 
familiarity and greater access to markets (see Cutler et al. 1999). Such 
regulation can be more responsive and adaptive to changes in technology 
or circumstances than legislation, international law or trade agreements 
(Cafaggi 2012). As contracts and non–legally binding agreements 
can be more flexible than law, non-state actors may be more willing 
to join regulatory arrangements using these mechanisms as they may 
have more of an ability to provide input or amend them to suit their 
needs. The  regime can be expanded or contracted as needed and its 
rules amended to reflect changing circumstances or stakeholders’ needs. 
NGOs and civil society organisations can have greater power to push 
corporate—or even state—actors to address public-oriented goals, such 
as protection of the environment or consumers’ rights, through non-
state regulatory regimes. This is particularly the case when civil society 
actors can capitalise on corporations’ fear of scandal and damage to 
their reputations, as was the case with Apple and criticism of its labour 
practices (see Apple Press Info 2012). 
Working outside more traditional legal processes can enable non-state 
actors to address problems that states are unwilling to or incapable 
of addressing alone, at least in ways that non-state actors may prefer. 
For example, partnerships with internet firms based on nonbinding 
agreements enable the MPAA and Internet Watch Foundation to 
extend their enforcement reach globally through the internet firms’ 
global operations. Working with government officials from various 
jurisdictions using their national laws would be much more time-
consuming and difficult. Transnational non-state regulation can also 
provide ways to harmonise rules and address gaps or inconsistencies in 
national laws (see Cafaggi 2010). Non-state efforts in the forestry and 
food industries attempt to address these problems through the use of 
industry certification programs and supply-chain contracts (see Fuchs 
and Kalfagianni 2010; Meidinger 2002). Although non-state regulation 
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is often associated with soft law, such as certification programs, it can 
deliver formidable sanctions. Suppliers who violate their supply-chain 
agreements, for example, can lose lucrative contracts. 
For states, transnational non-state regulation can be useful as it enables 
them to reach beyond their traditional jurisdictional boundaries 
or to regulate in ways, or at a scale, that are typically unfeasible for 
government agencies. By supporting or facilitating non-state regulation, 
states can capitalise on or influence the production, implementation and 
enforcement of rules in particular sectors or issues that align with their 
interests. Non-state regulation can also provide avenues for states to 
sidestep failed, stalled, unworkable or controversial legislation or trade 
agreements and achieve similar, or even enhanced, regulatory outcomes. 
States can publicly, but selectively, endorse specific efforts or strategically 
distance themselves by emphasising the central role of non-state actors 
in the creation and operation of the regulatory regime.
Transnational non-state regulatory regimes raise significant challenges, 
particularly in terms of accountability and due process. In terms of 
accountability, it is often difficult for those outside the regime to 
determine how rules and standards are drafted, the ways they are enforced 
or by whom. It may also be difficult to evaluate the regime’s effectiveness 
in the context of its goals. Regimes may seek to address these problems 
by publishing annual reports on their activities and achievements 
(see, for example, Apple 2014; Internet Watch Foundation 2013). These 
reports, however, are often little more than public relations documents 
that promote the regimes but do not provide the level of detail necessary 
to evaluate their operation or performance. 
Transnational non-state regimes also raise broader challenges in terms 
of accountability (see Dowdle, Chapter 12, this volume). These regimes 
often reveal global North–South patterns in which influence over 
governance is concentrated in the global North. Regulatory capitalism 
tends to describe regimes that are ‘shaped in North America and 
Europe [and] are increasingly internationalised and projected globally’ 
(Levi-Faur 2005: 13). This means rules and standards that are generally 
set in the global North extend internationally to govern people who may 
have little awareness of the regime’s existence. Further, governments in 
the countries in which the regimes operate may have little knowledge 
of or influence over these regimes, even though their governance could 
affect them. This pattern is echoed in the cases of Apple, the MPAA 
and the Internet Watch Foundation. Apple’s rules—set in its California 
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headquarters—govern its global supply chain, particularly its production 
activities in China. By tapping into internet firms with global operations, 
the MPAA and Internet Watch Foundation are able to carry out 
worldwide enforcement campaigns against the unauthorised downloads 
of movies and the distribution of child pornography. 
The same characteristics that enable non-state regimes to be flexible 
and responsive to changes in circumstance can impede due-process 
mechanisms. Appeals processes may be inadequate or difficult to 
navigate and actors may impose sanctions based on suspicion, not proof, 
of wrongdoing. Regimes’ participants may use technology to identify 
and target potentially suspicious behaviour, which raises challenges of 
wrongful identification and mass policing of legitimate activities and 
innocent people. The Internet Watch Foundation, for example, compiles 
a blacklist of websites suspected of being involved in distributing 
child pornography and instructs the internet firms participating in its 
program to block all sites on the list. However, blacklists can—and do—
incorrectly block legitimate content and thereby thwart legal activities. 
The criteria used to blacklist websites and the process for doing so are 
often closely guarded secrets, as is the case with the Internet Watch 
Foundation, which also blocks examination by outsiders of websites 
it blacklists (see Laidlaw 2012). Regulatory efforts based on secretly 
drafted criteria and unobservable processes raise significant problems in 
relation to accountability and legitimacy. 
6. Conclusion
As transnational non-state regulatory regimes comprise a broad array 
of actors, rules, arrangements, strategies and interests, it is important to 
examine each regime’s constituent components. An important element 
of this analysis is to explore the nature of the regime’s authority, whether 
actors invoke moral, technical or discursive authority, or how they draw 
on their resources to wield structural authority. Further, it is necessary 
to determine how actors set rules: do they primarily use statutory laws 
or contracts, non–legally binding mechanisms or some combination of 
these? Related to this, one must examine the degree to which the regime 
relies on the state or its structures. State actors may play significant 
roles in supporting, facilitating or even directly constructing the regime, 
depending on the degree to which the state’s interests align with those 
of the regime. As states recognise non-state regimes, they legitimise the 
351
20 . TRANSNATIoNAL NoN-STATE REGULAToRY REGIMES
regime and its activities. Not all states, however, have equal influence 
over transnational non-state regimes, nor can all non-state actors equally 
shape public policymaking. Such regimes often follow a global North–
South pattern in which rules are set by actors in the global North and 
then exported worldwide. The three regimes explored throughout the 
chapter—Apple’s supply-chain program, the Internet Watch Foundation 
and the MPAA’s antipiracy campaign—echo this global North–South 
configuration. These examples demonstrate the importance of state actors 
in facilitating and, in certain cases, directly shaping non-state regulation, 
even coercively pressuring non-state actors’ participation. Given the 
diversity of transnational non-state regimes and the important issues 
they regulate, this is a fertile area for future research. 
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Section 4: Rights-based 
regulation
Rights, irrespective of whether they are natural or invented, legal or 
non-legal, have to be made concrete in the world through networks that 
turn rights from script into action. However, there is a danger in leaving 
the responsibility of network coordination exclusively to one entity, 
whether state or non-state. For example, when men coordinate the 
networks, women lose; when states coordinate the networks, migrants 
and refugees lose. 
Each of the chapters in this section takes on a major topic of rights-
based regulation and picks up on one or both of the themes mentioned 
above. Hilary Charlesworth, whose RegNet centre, the Centre for 
International Governance and Justice, has provided much of the focal 
point for RegNet’s work on rights-based regulation, introduces the 
reader to the advantages of reconceptualising the enforcement of human 
rights from a regulatory perspective. Nicola Piper shows how state-led 
managerialism of rights robs subjects of the promise of rights and turns 
powerless groups such as migrants into objects of economic and political 
management. Social movements and transnational advocacy networks 
have to form new organisational strands in the web of influence if rights 
are to truly work for such disempowered groups. The rule of law and 
rights are, or at least should be, intimately linked, but they part company 
when, as Veronica Taylor shows, the rule of law becomes a set of 
institutional products peddled by development aid merchants. The limits 
of networked and smart regulation—forms of regulation described in 
a number of other chapters in this book—are analysed by Gabrielle 
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Simm in the netherworld of sexual crime, private security firms and 
peacekeeping operations. In the last chapter, Michelle Burgis-Kasthala 
probes the capacity of a rights and agency-based international criminal 
law to deliver satisfactory outcomes for crimes of individuals that have 
their roots in the dynamics of state systems.
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A regulatory perspective on the 
international human rights system
Hilary Charlesworth1
1. Introduction
Regulatory theory has paid little attention to international law, and 
international legal theory, in turn, has largely overlooked the field of 
regulation. Given that compliance and implementation are two constant 
anxieties in international law, this lack of engagement with regulatory 
theory is surprising. 
In this chapter, I outline some insights that regulatory theory offers to 
one arena of international law: the protection of human rights. Despite 
its elaborate system of norms and institutions, human rights law often 
appears ineffective. International human rights scholars have tended to 
focus on law as the sole form of regulation in the field and they have paid 
little attention to other forms of human rights influence. This chapter first 
outlines the international human rights system and the disappointment 
it has generated. It sketches some explanations for the perceived failures 
of the system to affect behaviour and then introduces two aspects of 
regulatory scholarship that can enrich approaches to protecting human 
rights. I conclude by considering the value of the concept of responsive 
regulation to the field.
1  Many thanks to Fleur Adcock, Ben Authers, John Braithwaite, Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, 
Peter Drahos and Emma Larking for helpful comments on this chapter.
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2. The international human rights system
The United Nations (UN) is home to the global human rights system. 
It comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and 
nine ‘core’ human rights treaties, including two general treaties—the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) (1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (1966)—and treaties devoted to particular human 
rights and groups: for example, the Convention against Torture (1984) 
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). 
The human rights norms set out in these instruments include rights 
applicable to individuals and to groups. In short, there has been a ‘cascade 
of norms’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) setting human rights standards over 
the past 60 years.
The UN human rights treaties have attracted widespread participation. 
All of the United Nations’ 193 members are party to at least one of the 
nine core treaties, and 80 per cent of states have ratified four or more. 
The most widely accepted treaty is the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, with 194 parties; the two covenants have 164 parties (ICESCR) 
and 168 parties (ICCPR). Compared with other treaty systems—
such  as  environmental, arms control or resource treaties—these are 
impressive figures.
The UN human rights architecture is complex. All the human rights 
treaties require parties to implement the treaty provisions in their 
national legal systems. These obligations are overseen by a system of 
specialist committees, one for each treaty. The role of the human rights 
treaty bodies is to monitor the implementation of the treaties by states 
that have become parties to them, primarily through scrutiny and 
comment on periodic implementation reports submitted by state parties 
to the treaties. Political bodies are a second major feature of the UN 
human rights architecture—most notably, the Human Rights Council 
(HCR). The council, to which 47 states are elected as members for three-
year terms, was established in 2006. Its role is to ensure the primacy 
of human rights within all aspects of UN work. A third element in 
the international human rights system is the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which is responsible 
for the promotion and coordination of human rights throughout the 
UN system, assisting the development of new norms, as well as taking 
preventive human rights action. 
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Three regional human rights systems exist, built around the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950), the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights (1969) and the African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1982). The Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004) and 
the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (2009) of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are less-developed 
regional structures. These systems vary considerably in terms of the types 
of rights covered, the range of implementation mechanisms and the 
extent of regional participation that they have attracted.
On one level, then, the human rights system appears a success story 
of international law: the development of human rights norms and 
institutions at the international level is significant, as is the level of 
participation in the system. But the implementation of UN human rights 
obligations presents a less positive picture: it is partial, inconsistent and 
based on a haphazard system of shaming (Hafner-Burton 2008). States 
may legally commit themselves to human rights standards, but often 
this does not translate into human rights protection at the national level. 
Unlike the European, Inter-American and African systems, the UN 
system offers no judicial scrutiny of breaches of human rights treaties. 
The political organs of the United Nations are generally reluctant to take 
stronger measures, such as sanctions, in response to human rights abuses. 
There is widespread disregard for human rights norms; indeed, treaty 
participation at the global level does not appear to have a clear effect on 
the protection of human rights in a particular country. Human rights 
also  have a precarious status within international  institutions. 
For example, Darrow and Arbour (2009) have examined the way that 
UN operational activities in development take human rights into 
account, concluding that human rights have only an insecure and fragile 
influence on UN practice. A common complaint is that there are great 
gaps between human rights standards set out in treaties and human 
rights protection within states.
Scholars have charted the relationship between treaty acceptance and 
state behaviour, finding little correlation between the two (Hathaway 
2007). Indeed, some studies show that ratification of human rights 
treaties is sometimes followed by increased violations of human rights 
(Hafner-Burton and Tsutui 2007). Hathaway argues that states gain 
legitimacy from treaty ratification, but lose little by failure to implement. 
Variations on this conclusion are that treaty participation improves 
human rights practices in democracies, but not necessarily otherwise 
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(Neumayer 2005; cf. Cole 2012). Overall, the political-science literature 
shows that international human rights law is like a smoke detector that 
stops working whenever a fire is large.
A typical prescription for improving the implementation of human 
rights principles relies on coerced rule compliance. An example is the 
sporadic campaign for a global human rights court to implement the 
human rights treaties when national systems fail to do so. In 2011, 
a  Swiss Government–sponsored panel of eminent jurists called for 
a world court of human rights that would adjudicate complaints of 
human rights violations by both states and non-state actors and provide 
reparations to victims (Panel on Human Dignity 2011: 41). Another 
proposed remedy to strengthen the international human rights system 
is the erection of greater barriers to participation in the system for 
countries that fail to demonstrate genuine commitment to rights, 
making ratification of human rights treaties probationary for states, to 
discourage ‘insincere ratifiers’ (Hathaway 2002). The design or reform 
of monitoring institutions to improve compliance with human rights 
obligations is also a staple of the human rights literature. The work of 
the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies is a popular focus as it is 
cumbersome and inefficient in many ways. 
One problem with this concentration on institutional reform as the 
route to transforming the dismal empirical reality of human rights 
protection is the political context of the human rights system. Attempts 
to streamline institutions and processes are often thwarted by regional 
coalitions, determined to ensure that state sovereignty trumps human 
rights scrutiny. In the case of the Swiss-sponsored proposal for a world 
court, for example, the capacity of the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council to veto enforcement of court rulings would 
undermine the court’s work (Alston 2014: 204). More generally, giving 
priority to judicial mechanisms as a response to human rights violations 
overlooks the limited capacity of international courts to create local 
cultures of respect for human rights (Alston 2014: 210).
3. Regulatory theory
Regulatory theory offers different approaches to the problem of the 
weak implementation of human rights standards. It draws attention to 
how international human rights law shapes behaviour both inside and 
outside international institutions. The concept of regulation has been 
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described as ‘the intentional activity of attempting to control, order or 
influence the behaviour of others’ (Black 2002: 1). A more expansive 
account of regulation includes all forms of pressure to change the 
course of events, even the unintentional effects of agency (Parker et al. 
2004: 2). Regulation thus goes beyond legal rules and mechanisms and 
also comprises political, social, economic and psychological pressures. 
Understood in this way, the notion of regulation is much broader than 
that used in the international law literature to mean governmental 
imposition of public obligations on private parties, such as the direct 
duties on individuals created by international criminal law (Cogan 2011).
The lack of dialogue between the fields of human rights and regulation 
relates perhaps to their differing traditions. The focus of human rights has 
been largely on individual claims to universally applicable rights against 
the state and their capacity to mobilise and promote social change. 
Regulatory scholarship, on the other hand, is often associated with a 
quest for efficiency and rational design of institutions (Morgan 2007). 
Bronwen Morgan summarises the popular perception that rights 
and regulation are antithetical as ‘rights claims act as constraints on 
state discretion while regulation allows the state to flex its muscles’ 
(Morgan 2007: 18). This dichotomy is rather simplistic, as Eve Darian-
Smith and Colin Scott (2009) have pointed out in one of the rare studies 
of human rights and regulation. Human rights standards can be invoked 
by states in an instrumental way to increase their powers, as well as 
by individuals and groups to promote governmental reform. Equally, 
international regulatory institutions can both restrict state power and 
promote human rights. 
My interest here, however, is not so much the relationship between the 
fields of human rights and regulation but how regulatory theory can 
inform human rights. Here, I identify two regulatory concepts that can 
enrich our understanding of how international human rights law works: 
networked governance and ritualism.
Governance through human rights networks
International relations realists often dismiss human rights law as 
idealistic waffle. This is understandable, given the assumptions of realist 
theory, which posit the centrality of one type of actor, states, and a single 
type of motivation, pursuit of interest. Realism is based on assessments 
of national interest from the vantage point of those with political and 
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military power; it discards the more diffuse evidence of what the weak 
are up to. On this analysis, human rights law, which gives priority to the 
interests of individuals and minorities, is unlikely to play a significant 
role in international relations. Regulatory theory, in contrast, draws 
attention to the multiplicity and complexity of both actors and motives 
in the international sphere, deploying the notion of regulatory webs of 
influence (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 550–63). It observes that, at 
the global level, each separate regulatory control tends to be weak, and 
strength comes through the weaving together of frail strands to form a 
web and its animation by networks. Savvy actors discern which strands 
they should tighten at what time to make the web effective (Braithwaite 
and Drahos 2000). The idea of governance through networks explains 
why it is sometimes possible for those in a weak position to prevail 
over the strong. Networked governance is organised from nodes of 
activity or interest; of course, not all the nodes in a network will have 
identical concerns or strategies and there may be deep tensions between 
them. The  strength and success of a network, indeed, depend on the 
management of dissonance among nodes. 
An example of the regulatory power of human rights networks is the 
achievement of independence of Timor-Leste in 2002 (Braithwaite 
et al. 2012). Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony until 1975, when it 
was invaded by Indonesia and was incorporated as the 27th Indonesian 
province in 1976. Although there was some international disapproval of 
Indonesia’s actions—expressed, for example, in resolutions of the UN 
Security Council and the General Assembly adopted between 1975 
and 1982—as the years passed, the legitimacy of Timor’s incorporation 
was widely accepted. The standard, realist analysis, promoted with some 
vigour by successive Australian governments, was that Indonesia’s control 
of Timor should be accommodated as a ‘fact on the ground’ and that 
Indonesia’s vast military and economic resources would make Timorese 
independence impossible. 
The situation in Timor, however, was strongly resisted by a wide range 
of groups without much apparent influence or power, forming networks 
built on human rights claims, particularly the right to self-determination. 
There were highly organised resistance networks inside Timor, including 
guerrilla fighters and the clandestinos (civilian groups organised in cells), 
who formed links with the Catholic Church. The right of the Timorese 
to self-determination is also supported by networks across Indonesia, 
in the former colonial power, Portugal, and other Lusophone countries; 
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by networks of veterans in Australia who had fought in Timor during 
World War II; as well as by the webs created through the tenacious 
diplomacy of José Ramos-Horta at the United Nations. None of these 
groups stood in a hierarchical relationship to another, but, rather, they 
were nodes in a network.
In a surprising move in 1999, Indonesian president BJ Habibie agreed 
to allow a referendum on whether or not Timor should remain a part of 
Indonesia. Most Indonesians expected the referendum would confirm 
Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia. However, the networks of 
Timorese resistance galvanised to make the most of this opportunity. 
Almost 80 per cent of the population voted for independence, sparking 
a violent backlash from the Indonesian army and its local supporters. 
Eventually, under pressure from various international networks, 
Indonesia agreed to the creation of a UN peacebuilding mission to help 
bring the country to independence, which was achieved in 2002.
Some accounts of the creation of Timor-Leste take a realist tack, 
emphasising the shifting positions of powerful states as the explanation 
for the successful move to independence. They give short shrift to 
the role of human rights networks in advocating for the recognition 
of Indonesian human rights abuses at the international level and the 
complex connections between local, regional and international people 
and groups working for Timor-Leste’s independence. 
The idea of networked governance, in contrast, emphasises the need for 
attention to the way that those with little political or military power 
can create networks, often slowly and tentatively, enrolling disparate, 
and sometimes much more significant, groups to work towards an 
inspiring ideal of freedom. Timor-Leste illustrates the complex array 
of connections that came together to allow a tiny country to reach 
independence and the skilful tugging at various strands in the regulatory 
web at different times to achieve self-determination. 
The case of Timor-Leste illustrates not only the power of human rights 
networks, but also their capacity, if successful, to morph into authoritarian 
networks: ‘the networked power that is a force for liberation quickly 
becomes one of oppression when the key node of the oppositional 
network absorbs the commanding heights of the state’ (Braithwaite et 
al. 2012: 4). If there is no network formed to balance and contain newly 
achieved state power, such power will quickly corrupt. Indeed, the skills 
of networked resistance fighters are particularly suited to authoritarian 
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rule (Braithwaite et al. 2012: 5). One way of countering these tyrannical 
tendencies is through creating mechanisms that allow the separation 
of powers within a polity that can be mobilised by networks.
Human rights ritualism
Regulatory theorists have used the term ‘ritualism’ to describe a way of 
adapting to a normative order, building on sociologist Robert Merton’s 
typology of five modes of individual adaptation to cultural values: 
conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion (Merton 1968: 
194). These modes also appear at the level of organisations and among 
collectives. All five modes are evident in responses to international human 
rights regulation, but ritualism is particularly pervasive. It can be defined 
as ‘acceptance of institutionalised means for securing regulatory goals 
while losing all focus on achieving the goals or outcomes themselves’ 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007: 7).
Detailed studies of regulatory ritualism have been conducted in various 
contexts, including taxation and aged care. For example, in a three-
country study, Braithwaite et al. (2007) found that nursing home 
operators rarely actively resisted regulation. It is much more common 
for operators to avoid confrontation with regulators and to agree to 
the language and techniques of regulation—for example, by changing 
a policy. This strategy usually favours the preservation of the status quo 
both because regulators do not have sophisticated follow-up mechanisms 
and because the new plans or policies are observed in a perfunctory way. 
A typology of responses to regulation that builds on Merton (1968) 
and that has resonance in the human rights field is that of ‘motivational 
postures’. Valerie Braithwaite (2009: 77–9) identifies postures towards 
normative systems such as commitment, capitulation, disengagement, 
resistance and game-playing, noting that more than one posture could 
be held simultaneously by those being regulated. Commitment is the 
most likely to lead to the realisation of regulatory goals. Capitulation 
means a certain willingness to abide by obligations and a resigned 
acceptance of the legitimacy of a regulatory regime, in the absence of 
genuine commitment to the regime’s goals. Disengagement entails 
rejection of the underlying legitimacy of a regulatory regime and a refusal 
to participate. Resistance involves the refusal to abide by particular 
obligations but acceptance (even if half-hearted) of the underlying 
legitimacy of a regulatory regime. Both capitulation and resistance can 
represent forms of ritualism. 
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The concept of regulatory ritualism captures an important feature of 
the international human rights system. The high ratification rates of 
human rights treaties illustrate the preparedness of UN member states 
to accept the institutionalised normative order. This may be a response to 
pressures from the international community—for example, ratification 
of human rights treaties may be a conduit for development assistance 
or newly independent countries may accept human rights treaties to 
signal their membership of the international community. Ratification is 
a relatively straightforward step, involving a formal bureaucratic process, 
but implementation is much more costly and complex.
Rights ritualism is a more common response than outright rejection 
of human rights standards and institutions (rebellion, to use Merton’s 
term, or disengagement, in Valerie Braithwaite’s typology). Ritualism is a 
technique of embracing the language of human rights precisely to deflect 
human rights scrutiny and to avoid accountability for human rights 
abuses, while at the same time gaining the positive reputational benefits 
or legitimacy associated with human rights commitments. This is well 
illustrated in Fleur Adcock’s (2012) case study of the ritualism of state 
responses to the work of UN special rapporteurs on human rights. 
Practices of ritualism can include ratifying human rights treaties without 
implementing their provisions domestically, perfunctory reporting to 
international human rights bodies, failing to provide remedies for human 
rights breaches or to develop policy to prevent violations and, in some 
circumstances, invoking claims of culture to undermine international 
standards. 
Take, for example, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a mechanism 
devised by the UN HRC. This involves all 193 UN members being 
subjected to human rights scrutiny every four and a half years. This is a 
significant step in international human rights scrutiny, undermining the 
sense that there are some countries with incorrigibly bad human rights 
records and some countries of impeccable human rights virtue.
The UPR was established in the founding resolution of the HRC (5/1), 
which declares the basis of the review to be the UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration, along with any human rights treaties to which 
the state is a party and any voluntary commitments undertaken by the 
state in international forums. The UPR’s purpose is an assessment of the 
human rights situation in each state in an ‘objective, transparent, non-
selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicized manner’ 
(HRC Res. 5/1). Three documents are central to the UPR: a national 
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report by the state (states are encouraged to consult with members of 
civil society before finalising their state report); a compilation of existing 
treaty body  reports and any relevant reports from special rapporteurs 
prepared by the OHCHR; and a summary of ‘credible and reliable’ 
information received by the OHCHR from ‘other stakeholders’, 
such as NGOs. 
The most dramatic aspect of the UPR is the ‘interactive dialogue’ with 
the state under review, conducted in public in Salle XX in the Palais 
des Nations in Geneva, in which the state presents its report and other 
states can question it and make recommendations. After the dialogue, 
a draft report is prepared. This is essentially a transcription of the 
recommendations made along with any immediate responses by the 
state. The state then has a short period to consider the recommendations 
and respond to them. The final act in this drama is when a compilation of 
these documents is forwarded to the whole HRC as its report, and this is 
formally accepted. At this session, the state under review can again make 
a presentation and states, national human rights institutions and NGOs 
can make observations. The UPR has completed its first full cycle and 
the second cycle will conclude in 2016.
The UPR process has generated a remarkable level of coordination 
and communication on human rights not only between states but also 
among states, other human rights mechanisms and civil society. But the 
UPR can also deflect or postpone human rights observance, providing 
fertile ground for ritualism. In the context of the UPR, ritualism can 
mean participation in the process of reports and meetings, and formal 
acceptance of recommendations, but an indifference to or reluctance 
about increasing the protection of human rights. 
A question is whether ritualism can be transformed into conformity or 
commitment and what role the UPR can play in this. Taking a regulatory 
approach to the UPR allows us to identify some ways of countering 
human rights ritualism that go beyond the standard prescriptions of 
institutional reform or tougher enforcement mechanisms. For example, 
Cowan (2014) has suggested that the repetitive character of the UPR 
provides a less confrontational space in which difficult human rights 
issues can be raised. Using the notion of motivational postures, the UPR 
practice for African states has been analysed as a posture of capitulation 
that can give human rights norms some legitimacy (Bulto 2014). 
And  civil society networks have used the UPR to publicise a state’s 
progress in human rights protection (UPR Info 2014).
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Some scholars have dismissed cooperative peer review in the context of 
human rights as a weak regulatory measure (for example, Neumeyer 2005: 
926). However, although states may initially participate in cooperative 
regulatory regimes in a perfunctory manner, or even for reasons at odds 
with the stated purposes of the regime, they are sometimes drawn into 
more effective commitments simply through their representatives’ direct 
experience of participation and a desire to claim virtue in implementation 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 555–6). There is some evidence of such 
a process at the UPR. For example, states often announce human rights 
initiatives prior to their review, and mission staff in Geneva display a 
marked willingness to engage with civil society throughout the review 
process (Schokman and Lynch 2014). Scrutiny mechanisms such as the 
UPR can discourage states from undermining the legitimacy gained 
initially by signing on to international human rights instruments (Cole 
2012). It is also possible that involvement over time in a cooperative 
regime leads to an internalisation, or socialisation, by participants of the 
regime’s goals (Goodman and Jinks 2004).
Along with recognition of the potential offered by self-regulation and 
peer review in certain contexts, the regulatory literature also offers the 
idea of continuous improvement. This focuses on incremental, constantly 
monitored steps, rather than great leaps forward. It can be achieved 
by moving from a culture of blame to a culture of learning—a move 
that is clearly envisaged by the UPR process, with its emphasis on peer 
review and the ‘sharing of best human rights practices’ (HRC Res 5/1, 
annex., 27 (b)). Even so, the regulatory literature highlights the need to 
guard against the process of continuous improvement itself becoming 
ritualised (Braithwaite et al. 2007: 207–8). This problem is evident in 
some aspects of the UPR’s second cycle, where states have sometimes 
interpreted recommendations from the first cycle in very restrictive ways 
(UPR Info 2014).
4. Conclusion: Responsive human rights 
regulation 
A sense of disappointment besets the field of human rights. Despite the 
inspirational norms and sophisticated architecture of the international 
human rights system, its weaknesses and failures to regulate human 
rights abuses are manifest. Indeed, there is an academic industry in 
announcements of the breakdowns or even the death of human rights 
(for example, Douzinas 2000; Hopgood 2013). 
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Regulatory theory offers a different and more optimistic perspective. 
Its  focus is not so much the strength of the treaty texts, their formal 
methods of implementation or their impact on states who are parties to 
them, but rather on the way that human rights norms as expressed in the 
treaties can be mobilised by non-state actors to regulate states’ and others’ 
behaviour. In other words, regulatory theory is interested in a much 
broader range of influences than traditional legal tools and mechanisms. 
The potential of complex networks of third parties in galvanising 
international standards in the context of transnational environmental 
crime is explored in Julie Ayling’s chapter in this collection (Chapter 29). 
Similarly, Susan Sell has chronicled the success of coalitions of activists 
and developing countries in changing the terms of the World Trade 
Organization’s approaches to intellectual property in pharmaceuticals, 
shifting it from an issue of corporate property rights to one of public 
health (Sell 2003: 142–62).
Regulatory theory suggests the promise of networked governance 
of human rights, which enables the weak to mobilise human rights 
principles against oppression, challenging the realist disdain for human 
rights. Regulatory theory also draws attention to the role of networks in 
designing the architecture of human rights regulation. A good example 
of this is the influence of national and international disability coalitions 
in the drafting of the 2006 Convention of the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (Sabatello and Schulze 2013). A second feature of regulatory 
theory is its identification of types of behaviour, such as ritualism, which 
can undermine the protection of human rights. It suggests the value 
of self-regulation and peer regulation as effective means of countering 
ritualism in the human rights field, even in the absence of commitment 
among participants to the goals of a regulatory regime. 
The concept of responsive regulation is valuable in achieving normative 
goals, such as human rights. The idea of responsive regulation—first 
developed in the context of business regulation—is built on pyramids 
of supports and pyramids of sanctions. The idea is to start by identifying 
the strengths of a particular system or actor, and then to expand them 
through building capacity (Braithwaite 2011: 480). Superlative forms of 
recognition sit at the tip of the support pyramid. Moving up the pyramid 
of supports encourages the growth of an actor’s capacity to respond to 
problems. If particular problems are impervious to regulation through 
the provision of support, a pyramid of sanctions can be deployed. At its 
base are dialogue-based sanctions such as education and persuasion. 
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Increasingly tough measures apply moving up the sanctions pyramid, 
such as shaming, sanctions and, finally, even ejection from the system 
(Braithwaite 2011: 482). Escalating the severity of penalties takes place 
only when the previous step has manifestly failed. 
A pyramid shape has a broad base reaching to a narrow tip, indicating 
progression from general ideas and concepts to highly specific ones. 
It embodies the regulatory insight that it is most efficient to start at the 
base of the pyramid and that, even in the most serious cases, escalation 
is necessary only when collaborative solutions or self-regulation fail. 
In Braithwaite’s words: 
The pyramidal presumption of persuasion gives the cheaper, more 
respectful option a chance to work first. More costly punitive attempts 
at control are thus held in reserve for the minority of cases where 
persuasion fails. (Braithwaite 2011: 484)
This process also has the benefit of imbuing the pointy end of the 
sanctions pyramid with more legitimacy. As Kristina Murphy’s chapter 
in this book (Chapter 3) shows, perceived procedural fairness increases 
the likelihood of compliance with a normative system.
Responsive regulation translates productively in the field of human 
rights, highlighting the value of persuasion, education and capacity 
building as the first steps to achieving compliance with human rights 
norms. The main principles of responsive regulation include flexibility, 
giving voice to stakeholders, engaging resisters with fairness, nurturing 
motivation, signalling but not threatening the possibility of escalation 
and enrolling powerful regulatory partners in networks (Braithwaite 
2011). Thus, laggards may be willing to acknowledge problems complying 
with international human rights standards if they can see that this will 
protect them from more punitive forms of sanctions (Braithwaite 2011: 
496). Other lessons from responsive regulation that are applicable to 
the international human rights system are the value of collaborative 
regulation, of an assumption that the regulatee has the capacity to 
change and of eliciting active responsibility (with passive responsibility 
as a fallback position) for human rights protection. 
Theories of responsive regulation also point to the weak spots in the 
international human rights system. Braithwaite has pointed out that 
regulation works best when there is a firm commitment to escalation 
when dialogic-based sanctions do not work (Braithwaite 2011: 489). 
He notes the paradox that ‘by having a capability to escalate to tough 
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enforcement, most regulation can be about collaborative capacity building’ 
(Braithwaite 2011: 475). Such a capability is difficult to maintain in the 
international legal system, which is highly attuned to the distribution 
of political power and where imposition of formal sanctions is rare. 
However, as the Timor-Leste case shows, it is possible for networks 
of states, aid donors, business, the media and NGOs to create webs of 
informal sanctions in a regulatory pyramid of human rights. These can 
go from publicising human rights abuses to withdrawal of donor support 
to expulsion of a state from an international organisation (Braithwaite 
et al. 2012: Chapter 3).
Through the lens of responsive regulation, the UN HRC’s UPR process 
can be seen as a partial success. It operates at the broad base of a regulatory 
pyramid of supports for human rights compliance but has the capacity, 
through peer review, to increase this support. As a pyramid of sanctions, 
it is, so far, less efficacious, with rather porous systems of scrutiny of 
implementation of recommendations and little risk of penalties for non-
implementation (UPR Info 2014).
Perhaps the most important implication of regulatory theory for 
the international human rights system is the limitation of purely 
legal approaches to the protection of human rights. The concept of 
responsiveness suggests that the popular idea of a world human rights 
court as the answer to weak implementation of human rights standards 
is misguided. The goal of the international human rights system should, 
rather, be providing forms of access to justice for human rights violations 
that respond to particular contexts (Braithwaite and Parker 2004: 285). 
Legal norms and institutions may be of value in this project, but simply 
as strands in a regulatory web. They derive strength from being woven 
with other strands into a fabric of flexible regulation.
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Global governance of labour 
migration: From ‘management’ 




In recent years, international migration has reached a firm place on the 
global policy agenda as evidenced by a flurry of activities and actors 
involved, amounting to what some commentators have come to call the 
‘global governance of migration’ (Grugel and Piper 2007; Betts 2011; 
Koser 2010). 
The idea of global governance in its various conceptualisations has 
emerged to capture the cooperation or coordination of different actors 
(governmental, non-governmental and international organisations) 
within a network made up of formal and informal rules to reform 
institutions of ‘the global’ (Rittberger 2001; Kennedy et al. 2002). 
As a concept that took off gradually after the end of the Cold War, 
global governance has been used not solely for the description and 
analysis of complex structures within a globalising world that is no 
longer subject to classification into ‘first, second and third worlds’. This 
concept is also part of a wider attempt to change this ‘new’ world into 
something different or better in a normative sense (Habermann 2011). 
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Falk (1995) distinguishes between ‘inhumane’ and ‘humane’ governance, 
with the former characterised by unequal distribution of wealth and 
extensive violation of human rights; the latter, in contrast, emphasises 
people-centred criteria of progress—measures such as declines in 
poverty and adherence to human rights. ‘Humane’ governance has been 
reconceptualised as rights-based governance, based on an approach 
to rights beyond the sphere of international law, thus reflecting the 
increasing purchase of rights discourses and rights activism emanating 
from civil society (Grugel and Piper 2007). 
Rights-based governance is essentially and necessarily driven ‘from 
below’—that is, a project that involves or derives from collective activism 
by social movements and transnational advocacy networks. This is even 
more so the case for migrant workers who find themselves marginalised 
as noncitizens or ‘absentee citizens’, and thus in a particularly precarious 
situation in social, economic, legal and political terms. In this sense, 
rights-based governance mirrors other decentred conceptualisations of 
governance, such as networked or nodal governance (see Charlesworth, 
Chapter 21; and Holley and Shearing, Chapter 10, this volume). 
What distinguishes rights-based governance, however, is the struggle 
to advance and promote social justice for noncitizens who not only 
have had their rights seriously restricted but are also facing enormous 
hurdles in politically agitating for their rights. In other words, migrant 
workers—as both noncitizens and workers in primarily low-wage sectors 
or types of work rejected by locals—are increasingly excluded from the 
process of forging organisations with which to network and through 
which to channel their concerns and demands. This is why insights from 
political sociology—a component missing from existing work on global 
migration governance (but see Grugel and Piper 2007)—are vital.
Recognition that, as a policy field, international migration for employment 
requires not only bilateral but also effective global regulation has come 
very late when compared with other issue areas that have been subject 
to global governance for some time, such as trade, health and finance 
( Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Betts 2011; Koser 2010). Yet, international 
migration is among the key features of economic globalisation today 
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(Standing 2008), and, as a truly global phenomenon, migration implicates 
most, if not all, countries in the world in one form or another, as major 
migrant senders and/or receivers.1 
The discourse and concomitant policy prescriptions that have resulted 
so far from this new international cooperation on migration have largely 
centred on what some have referred to as ‘the paradigm of managed 
temporary labor migration’ (Chi 2008: 500). The ‘management of 
migration’ discourse is linked to the renewed interest in migration’s 
contribution to development (the ‘migration–development nexus’), 
placing great emphasis on the design of formal policies by which origin 
and destination states try to assert control over migratory flows and 
access to employment—that is, over income and profit generation as well 
as the securing of livelihoods through migration. In essence, what have 
emerged are attempts at ‘managing migration’ in the sense of peoples’ 
cross-border movements alongside ‘managing poverty’ through access 
to overseas employment. Temporary contract migration schemes are 
attractive as they allow destination countries to adjust their workforce to 
the cyclical nature of economies without further commitments (turning 
migrants into what political economists would refer to as ‘disposable 
labour’), while ensuring a steady flow of remittances on which many 
countries of origin heavily depend. As a result of this scenario, however, 
migrants’ labour and human rights are more and more curtailed. 
Being in practice embedded in an increasingly restrictive policy 
environment based on selective if not discriminatory criteria, current 
policy practices heavily circumscribe the human rights of migrants. 
Despite the existing set of comprehensive international human rights 
instruments for the protection of migrant workers, as low-skilled/
low-wage temporary contract workers, many migrants in fact find 
themselves in highly vulnerable and exploitative situations. As it is 
argued here, migration governance, therefore, continues to fail in several 
key areas, as reflected in decent work deficits with regard to employment 
opportunities, labour rights and social protection. This is so because 
‘management of migration’ is not accompanied by the management 
of working conditions and labour relations. In addition—and related 
to this decent work deficit—many migrants are unable to function as 
‘agents of development’ through the acquisition of skills and savings 
1  Some countries are classified as ‘transit countries’, but often migrants whose original intention 
was to move on remain. In other words, transit countries often become destination countries. 
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that would turn them into ‘entrepreneurs’ on return to their home 
communities (Spitzer and Piper 2014). It is the nascent global migrant 
rights movement, supported by a number of global trade unions, that 
is advocating for an integrated rights-based approach to migration to 
address this disconnect between migration and labour governance. 
This chapter analyses the emerging institutional architecture of 
migration governance from the vantage point of advocacy networks 
that have taken up the concerns on behalf of, or are run by, the many 
marginalised migrants (that is, low-wage/low-skill migrant workers 
employed on temporary contracts), probing into the obstacles to, and 
opportunities for, shaping the direction of policymaking towards a 
rights-based approach to migration within this evolving architecture. By 
introducing a social movement perspective, the elitist project of global 
migration governance is being re-envisioned and resisted. 
2. Global migration governance: Institutions 
and rights activism
In an institutional sense, migration for work is not governed by a formal 
international regime of the kind that exists for refugees, with the United 
Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees as the central node. 
Instead, various UN agencies and international organisations, including 
international financial institutions, are involved in producing data 
about the international migration of workers and the translation of 
such knowledge into policy. It is mainly for this reason that the global 
architecture of migration governance has been described as fragmented. 
Moreover, the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the central 
standard-setting international organisation (IO) in the realm of labour 
(migrant and non-migrant)—and, arguably, the only global institution 
with the potential to combine migration with labour governance—has 
occupied a marginal position within the emerging migration governance 
in terms of its ability to assert influence on the direction of the current 
policy debate (Standing 2008). This may appear somewhat surprising 
given the fact that migration is linked, directly or indirectly, to the 
world of work: more than 50 per cent of the 214 million international 
migrants today are economically active and, together with their families, 
migrant workers make up over 90 per cent of this total (ILO 2013: 3). 
However, the inability of the ILO to push itself to the centre of the 
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migration governance debate and take a leading role has to do with the 
general onslaught on workers’ rights that has come with the spreading of 
neoliberalism alongside enhanced global interconnections of economies 
and production systems. 
Global migration governance has, in fact, come about at a specific, 
historic moment in time when labour in general (that is, migrant and 
non-migrant) has been subjected to the downgrading of standards 
through the loss of traditional union rights, which is attributed to the 
spread of neoliberalism (Standing 2011; Schierup and Castles 2011) and 
economic globalisation characterised by the ‘race to the bottom’ in the 
search for cheaper labour. This trend is reflected in the weakened position 
of the ILO, the key player in the upholding of migrants’ rights in their 
role as workers (Standing 2008). The organisation’s historical success in 
promoting labour standards can be attributed in part to its tripartite 
structure,2 which has allowed for significant input into the standard-
setting process from two specific non-state actors: employers and trade 
unions. 
However, these successes are under pressure from within and from 
without. Pressure from within includes the lack of inclusion of 
organisations beyond the traditional employer–employee nexus that has 
historically emerged from the specific experience of European labourism, 
which has led to the exclusion of other non-union labour organisations 
(migrant and non-migrant) (Standing 2008). There are also new state-
owned processes of deliberation3 that occur outside the UN framework 
and which pose direct competition to standard-setting organisations like 
the ILO. In the migration field, the main competitor for the ILO is 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), whose mandate 
is not based on the United Nations’ human rights framework. It is an 
intergovernmental organisation whose work is project-based and, thus, 
also funding-based (Geiger 2010). In terms of process and participation, 
global dialogue on migration has become subject to extra-UN processes, 
such as the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development 
(GFMD), which is state-led and occurs behind closed doors (apart from 
2  This structure refers to three parties that make up its constituency: worker organisations (trade 
unions), employer associations and governments.
3  In this context, the notion of ‘forum shopping’ has been used to describe states’ choices of 
suitable sites to advance their interests. We would instead refer to this phenomenon as ‘forum 
shifting’ to reflect the perspective of political activist organisations such as trade unions and migrant 
rights groups for whom this choice given to states means fewer opportunities for participation and 
less access. 
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short ‘interspace’ sessions with selected members from civil society), thus 
escaping scrutiny by and input from civil society organisations (such as 
trade unions and other labour rights organisations). These developments 
have led critics to argue that without paying greater attention to 
migrant workers’ rights, the benefits of migration are skewed in favour 
of employers and the ever expanding private recruitment industry4 
that operates across borders, to the expense of migrants’ own benefits 
(Wickramasekara 2009; Piper 2008). Only a rights-based approach can 
ameliorate this situation. 
The institutional fragmentation of migration governance and the 
marginal role of the ILO as the most democratic global organisation in 
procedural terms therein, however, pose serious challenges for the ability 
of migrant rights advocacy organisations to represent the concerns of 
their constituencies. To overcome the challenges of institutional barriers, 
on the one hand, and institutional fragmentation, on the other, migrant 
rights activists have stepped up their mobilising efforts at the global 
level, building on pockets of existing national and regional activism. 
This is well expressed in the following quotation: 
Our biggest asset is the existence of global social movements. Our task 
is to think and work together so that we move beyond advocacy for 
policy changes, and towards a strong process of inter-movement 
building so that we can occupy the relevant spaces and challenge the 
global paradigm. (WSFM 2012: 42)
By embarking on broader social movement building, migrant rights 
activists have come to address not only the consequences but also 
the major causes of international migration. The key concept in the 
development of a comprehensive approach to migrants’ rights thereby is 
‘decent work’ applied in a transnational context—that is, to the ‘here and 
there’. This was taken up in the Final Declaration of the World Social 
Forum on Migration that was held in Manila in 2012; the right not 
to emigrate should be in place in the countries of origin. This implies 
creating the necessary conditions that transform migration into a choice 
rather than a necessity (Clause 31).
4  The key issue with the private recruitment industry is the charging of excessive fees to migrants 
(rather than employers), often in the country of origin and destination countries, which is deemed 
illegal according to ILO Convention 181.
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The concept of decent work has gained prominence because most forms 
of international migration have employment-related aspects attached, 
as cross-border movement of people is largely a response to a lack of 
economic opportunities ‘at home’, often accompanied by conditions 
of insufficient or non-existent social safety nets provided by states 
(Hujo and Piper 2010). Migrants tend to find themselves in a state of 
precariousness on the basis of labouring in low-wage sectors, often in an 
undocumented or contract-tied manner (ILO 2013), and, then, again, 
post-migration when returning home to often still hopeless situations 
that often drive migrants into remigration (Spitzer and Piper 2014). 
Bringing labour back in
The management of migration literature and concomitant policy 
prescriptions are not the only things that have left out concerns for labour 
relations and working conditions. The call for ‘bringing labour back’ into 
academic discourse and conceptualisations of global governance as well 
as into policy has reappeared from various corners and epistemic circles, 
voiced most strongly by labour relationists, sociologists and labour 
geographers (Herod 1995; Munck 2000; Bronfenbrenner 2007 Evans 
2010). Calls to study labour have also appeared in the context of global 
production network analysis—an area of scholarly inquiry marked by an 
‘inadequate incorporation of labour’ (Stringer et al. 2013: 3). 
By studying ‘networks of labour’ beyond macro-structuralist 
perspectives,  such scholars have shifted attention to political agency. 
Increasing calls to ‘bring labour back in’ (Cumbers et al. 2008) are mainly 
driven by the imbalance among overtly structural analyses that have 
shifted worker agency to the back stage (Herod 1995). International 
relations literature on global governance, in contrast, has neglected 
labour and, as a result, has not concerned itself with the role of the ILO 
and trade unions in the study of international organisations and politics. 
This stands at odds with the fact that, historically, the labour movement 
has constituted one of the most significant drivers of social reform 
(Gallin 2000) and an important ally in the struggle for social justice 
in general (Leather 2004) and migrant labour’s rights in particular 
(Ally 2005; Piper 2010). 
Injecting the role of collective agency by social and labour movements 
into the broader literature on globalisation—especially the combined 
appreciation of the organisational dimension of globalisation (regulation, 
governance), the direction global policy is taking in certain issue areas 
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and the way in which the outcome is reshaping the lives of real people in 
the global web of places (cf. Coe and Yeung 2001)—paves the way for a 
‘bottom-up’ perspective on global governance (Grugel and Piper 2007). 
3. Resisting global migration governance 
from the ‘bottom up’
Within the global governance literature, two issues have attracted 
considerable scholarly attention: 1) the issue of democratic deficit and 
transparency, given the lack of opportunities for direct participation by 
civil society organisations (Scholte 2011); and 2) the role of IOs and 
the degree to which they are independent from states, raising the issue 
of IOs’ levels of autonomy (Finnemore 1993). 
The latter strand of the literature questions whether IOs are constrained 
by the sovereign (and financial) power of states or whether they are 
autonomous organisations capable of setting up independent programs, 
and even influencing public policy (Loescher 2001; Finnemore 1993; 
Charnock 2006; on migration, see Geiger 2010). Overall, much of the 
existing scholarship on IOs has focused on the relationship between IOs 
and states, with most analyses of global governance tending to centre 
on the operation of power and changes within the configuration of 
that power in the context of global institutions. Far less is known about 
‘bottom-up governance’ and the relationships of conflict and resistance 
that emerge at the interface between vulnerable groups of people 
(here,  migrant workers), global governance institutions and states, 
especially from the perspective of civil society activists. 
In the realm of human rights theorising, of which labour and migrant 
rights are a subgroup, it is the contradictory role of the state—as 
oppressor or violator of rights, on the one hand, and the primary 
agent of justice or  deliverer of rights, on the other—that constitutes 
a paradox (Pogge 2001; Kuper 2005b). This is the main reason social 
movement scholars argue that the state remains the principal target for 
political action (Grugel 2004; Tarrow 2006). Yet, there is also increasing 
recognition of the role and responsibility of transnational actors in 
global politics ( Jönsson and Tallberg 2010), as both violators of human 
rights (as evident in the increasing prominence of the ‘human rights 
and business’ debate) and those responsible for realising rights (Kuper 
2005a). In this context, the debate on global governance has concentrated 
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on the question of whether cooperation within the international 
system, together with the integration of new private actors, makes it 
more democratic, legitimate and accountable (Zürn 2005; Erman and 
Uhlin 2010). This  last concern has triggered increased interest in the 
contribution of civil society organisations (CSOs) to democratising 
public sector institutions at any level (Scholte 2011). 
In the human rights field, it has been shown that global norms are 
increasingly shaped through interaction between states, international 
institutions and activist networks, many of which (such as peasants, 
farmers, female informal sector workers and so on) today emanate from 
the global South (Rajagopal 2012). The fact that global norms and legal 
enforcement are increasingly influenced by the everyday resistance of 
ordinary people, channelled through collective organisations, points to 
the relevance of social movements and, thus, to a theory of resistance 
derived from the mobilising of hitherto marginal or non-existent political 
constituencies (Stammers 2009; see also Charlesworth, Chapter  21, 
this volume). In this sense, as argued by Rajagopal (2012), it is inadequate 
to analyse human rights from the exclusive perspective of  states 
(as realists/positivists would do) or from the exclusive perspective of the 
individual (as liberals would do).
Hence, a conceptualisation of resistance is put forward here that takes 
transformative mobilisation as its core feature, whereby ‘transformative’ 
is used to refer to changing institutional practices pushed from below 
via activist networks. In this sense, the case of the global migrant rights 
movement falls into the category of ‘overt’ resistance (as per the typology 
developed by Hollander and Einwohner 2004)—that is, a category of 
resistance that involves visible behaviour easily recognisable by targets 
and observers and, thus, includes collective acts such as mobilisation 
by, or into, social movements. However, as social movement literature 
has predominantly concerned itself with grassroots mobilisation, 
constructivist international relations scholarship has to be brought in as 
it highlights the socially constructed nature of international relations (in 
contrast with pure materialism) and, thus, opens up an avenue for the 
role of ideas in international advocacy. Unlike classic social movement 
scholarship, international relations has the benefit of addressing 
political contention in a cross-border context. This allows for analysis 
and conceptualisation of transnational social movements. Transnational 
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advocacy networks are the primary actors in the pursuit of social justice 
and human rights vis-a-vis global governance processes and institutions 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
Importantly, international relations and development studies scholarship 
on global governance have also raised the issue of the democratic deficit 
inherent in supranational policymaking processes. It is, however, not 
sufficient to simply highlight the democratic deficit of international 
organisations in operational and processual terms, but to delve into the 
actual achievement of transformative justice via institutional change. 
In an abstract sense, resistance concerns struggles for human freedom 
and liberation from structural oppression and exploitation (Gills and 
Gray 2012). In relation to migration governance, this relates to greater 
freedom of mobility that would render migration a choice, not a necessity 
(GCIM 2005; UNDP 2009). In concrete terms, transformation of 
institutions has to come from the bottom up—and, in the context of 
global governing institutions, from ‘global justice networks’ (Routledge 
and Cumbers 2009). Given the fragmented nature of global migration 
governance, for resistance to have an effective impact it has to address 
this institutional complexity by engaging in equally complex ‘networks 
of networks’.
Nascent global migrant rights movement
The recent developments around the tabling and subsequent adoption 
of ILO Convention No. 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers 
in 2011 constitute an example of the successful strategy of forming 
‘networks of networks’ between migrant rights organisations and trade 
unions. The adoption of ILO Convention No. 189, which constitutes a 
political victory, is an instrument that regulates a hitherto unregulated 
sector in the informal economy whose workforce is primarily female and 
primarily located in or drawn from the global South, migrant and non-
migrant. Although it was formally adopted by two-thirds of the ILO’s 
185 member states at its annual congress in 2012 and formally entered 
into force as of September 2013, the remaining challenge is to boost its 
ratification record (as of December 2014, there were 16 ratifications).
Importantly, the success of the ILO convention is related to the networks 
of networks. It was the involvement of unconventional unionists and 
migrant worker organisations that, in fact, revived the entire ILO process 
and its usually very routinised and highly technical procedures. Senior 
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ILO staff found this new approach very refreshing and stimulating 
(Personal interviews, conducted in 2011 and 2012). Whether or not 
opening up channels to domestic and migrant worker organisations 
constitutes a breakup of the sacrosanct tripartite structure of the ILO 
by turning this into a consistent feature of the organisation is yet to 
be seen. But it is a step in the right direction, as pointed out by critics 
who have argued for the ILO’s institutional renewal and inclusion of 
non-traditional types of workers (Standing 2008), who make up the 
majority of workers. In this way, the ILO would also become relevant to 
the situation of workers in the global South (Sen 2000).
At the global level, migrant rights organisations and their regional 
networks formed the Peoples’ Global Action on Migration, Development 
and Human Rights (PGA) in response to the state-led process and closed-
door deliberations of the GFMD and the broad-based composition 
of its Civil Society Days. The PGA was established at the first global 
meeting on international migration and development held at UN level, 
the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, in 2006. 
It comprises regional and national migrant rights networks, supported 
by global and a few national trade unions.5 At the PGA in Mexico 
City in 2010, for instance, there were nearly 800 delegates representing 
migrant associations, trade unions, human rights and women’s groups, 
faith-based and anti-poverty organisations as well as academics.
The PGA brings together groups from around the world and provides 
essential space for lobbying and pressuring governments and international 
bodies to look at migration—and development—from a human rights 
perspective and to make governments accountable to their international 
human rights and development commitments. Furthermore, PGA paves 
the way for capacity building and establishment or widening of networks.
Born of the PGA process is the Global Coalition of Migration (GCM), 
the first truly global initiative aimed at the promotion of migrants’ 
rights. It constitutes a formal alliance of global unions, regional and 
national networks of membership-based migrant rights organisations 
from Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and North America as 
well as two academic research networks. It uses the network form of 
operation to share information and resources and to develop common 
5  Those are: Building and Woodworkers International (BWI), Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
(ICTU), Public Services International (PSI), the Canadian Trade Union Council and American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO).
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strategies. One such strategy is to broaden and reach out to other social 
movements—such as Via Campensina, the peasant movement that is 
now part of the GCM—based on the personal experience of displacement 
of many peasants and the subsequent migration of their wives or other 
female family members to work overseas as domestic workers.
4. Concluding remarks
To overcome the challenges posed by multiple institutional deficiencies 
and barriers to participation in decision-making processes at the global 
level, migrant rights activists have begun to step up their mobilising 
efforts around the globe. Building on grassroots migrant activism, 
transnational advocacy networks have been formed and broader social 
movement building, including transnational campaigns for labour 
standards and labour rights, embarked on. In so doing, migrant rights 
advocates have developed a comprehensive approach to migrant rights 
that addresses not only the consequences but also the major causes 
of international migration. Such initiatives are challenging elitist 
(‘top-down’) projects of global governance by articulating alternative 
visions based on international human and labour rights principles 
(‘bottom-up governance’). 
It is through the CSO-led processes that a radical rethinking of 
migration and the socioeconomic development models that surround its 
governance is being pursued. These CSO gatherings are used to deepen 
the analysis of the migration–development nexus and to sharpen their 
counterdiscourse of what they view as a systematised labour export–
import program practised on a global scale. In their interpretation, such 
practice amounts to forced migration and, thus, is replete with human 
and labour rights’ violations. 
The key messages that have emanated from these ‘networks of networks’ 
and cross-sectoral alliances are: guarantee the right to free movement, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the creation of employment/livelihood 
opportunities for people ‘at home’—that is, the right not to have to 
migrate in the first place. The activists are politically savvy enough to 
realise that the ‘right not to have to migrate’ can be misinterpreted and 
abused by anti-migrant constituencies in mostly migrant-receiving 
countries. Instead, they resort to the demand for decent work ‘here’ and 
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‘there’, thus making use of the ILO’s inclusive framework—inclusive of 
migrants and non-migrants as well as of the situation of sending and 
receiving communities. 
In sum, the unified message that has come out of the CSO-led 
initiatives in response to the migration–development nexus and 
‘management of migration’ discourse promoted by global governing 
bodies is that development goes beyond economics and involves 
comprehensive human, or people-centred, development. Instead of 
the current migration–development paradigm that views migrants as 
agents of development in the neoliberal sense of ‘self-help’ in an era of 
increasing privatisation of public goods, the demand is for a refocusing 
on the migration–employment nexus, which combines migration and 
labour governance—and, therefore, puts the ILO at centre-stage in the 
global governance of migration. In this way, an integrated rights-based 
approach to migration is conceptually developed and politically fought 
for that combines migration and labour governance from a holistic 
(that is, transnational) perspective. 
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Regulatory rule of law
Veronica L Taylor
1. Introduction 
For much of the twentieth century, we thought of rule of law as 
being part  of the form and operation of a nation-state, expressed 
through attributes such as uniform application of law, the state’s own 
submission to law and judicial independence from the executive branch 
of government. Domestic rule of law has been theorised in different 
ways within Western democracies (for example, Krygier 2015), but 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 triggered a recasting of both the 
conceptualisation and the practice of rule of law. As the United States 
and its allies sought to democratise Eastern and Central Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, and open those markets to capitalism, the 
so-called ‘revival’ of rule of law unfolded (Carothers 1998). Rule of law 
now emerged in a more obviously ideological and instrumental guise—
as a policy tool intended to advance political goals worldwide, through 
multilateral and bilateral interventions in transitional and developing 
states, official development assistance (ODA), state-building and 
peacekeeping (for example, Sannerholm et al. 2012). 
Twenty-five years later, the conceptual range, regulatory effect and 
geographic reach of rule of law have grown dramatically (Carothers 
1998, 2009). We now acknowledge that its form and function in Asia 
and in authoritarian regimes are very different to our original Anglo-
European definitions (for example, Peerenboom 2004; Mason 2011; 
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Cheeseman 2015). Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the United States, rule of law has been further mobilised to combat 
security risks and terrorism. Today, we label these policy interventions 
in various ways, including ‘rule of law promotion’, ‘rule of law assistance, 
‘law and justice reform’, ‘law and development’, ‘governance’, ‘legal and 
institutional reform’, ‘access to justice’, ‘legal empowerment’, ‘security 
sector reform’, ‘international peacekeeping’ and ‘international policing’, 
but, in this chapter, we will collapse these categories and focus on the 
regulatory character of what I will call ‘rule of law promotion’. 
Regulatory scholars have written extensively on the intersection 
of  regulation and law within domestic legal systems (for example, 
Parker et al. 2004; Freigang 2002). This chapter starts from the premise 
that rule of law projected transnationally is regulatory: it forms part 
of multilateral or bilateral policies designed to change the course 
of events in target states. In this chapter, we look at just two aspects of 
this phenomenon: 1) how rule of law norms are produced, exchanged 
and distributed by transnational actors in a global marketplace; and 
2) the extent to which transnational rule of law actors are themselves 
subject to regulation.
2. Regulatory rule of law defined
Rule of law promotion can be viewed as one of many ways in which 
a transnational legal order (Halliday and Shaffer 2015) is constructed. 
It  involves multiple actors at the international, transnational, national 
and local levels who interact through processes such as diplomacy, ODA, 
military interventions and provision of humanitarian aid. Rule of law 
promotion is transnational because it sits ‘somewhere beyond the reach 
of the nation-state and below the legal regime of international law and 
the authority of international organizations’ (Folke Schuppert 2012: 90).
The projects that become the ‘carriers’ of rule of law concepts and practices 
(for example, Behrends et al. 2014) between these levels of governance 
range from electoral monitoring and support, through post-conflict legal 
reconstruction, to setting up institutions for transitional justice. So, when 
the Australian Federal Police use their International Deployment Group 
to keep the peace and provide police training in the Solomon Islands, 
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this is rule of law promotion; so, too, are projects where faith-based non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are subcontracted by multilateral 
donors to provide legal advocacy for women affected by violence.
Rule of law interventions often follow a crisis—such as the US declaration 
of the ‘war on terror’ in 2001—or a political watershed, such as the 
Burmese military junta’s ‘roadmap to democracy’ announced in 2008. 
These moments create fissures in the borders of otherwise sovereign states 
that admit external actors, using international financing or mandates 
under international law to advance rule of law reform prescriptions. 
They do this through multilateral organisations—for example, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
or the United Nations (UN) and its agencies—or through bilateral or 
regional negotiations, or unilaterally, and often with the help of political 
allies and globalised epistemic communities such as international NGOs 
and rule of law practitioners (Simion and Taylor 2015). 
The legitimating discourse for rule of law interventions is that the 
target state ‘lacks’ rule of law (Mattei and Nader 2008), but the driver 
is undeniably the policy aims of the intervening actors (for example, 
Lancaster 2006), which may include accession to a multilateral trade 
agreement (for example, Humphreys 2010), securing a weak neighbour’s 
porous borders, improving human rights as a means of creating peace and 
security or creating a more supportive climate for foreign investment. 
3. Normative conflict within rule of law 
promotion
Contemporary rule of law projects are now ambitious in scope; they aim 
to do much more than improve the legislative framework or strengthen 
the judiciary in developing economies (for example, Hammegren 2015; 
van Rooij and Nicholson 2013). The World Bank has been a dominant 
actor in pursuing multiple, and often conflicting, rule of law objectives 
(for example, World Bank 2011). Santos (2006) profiles the bank’s 
own use of competing—and conflicting—ideas of the rule of law in its 
reform interventions: Dicey’s separation of powers and submission of 
the state to law; Hayek’s realisation of market transactions with minimal 
state interference; Weber’s substantive focus on norms and personnel 
shaping institutions; and Sen’s (1999) emphasis on institutions and their 
representatives doing distributional equity to citizens. 
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The malleability of rule of law as a concept lends itself to use by dictators 
and progressive reformers alike (for example, Tamanaha 2004, 2006). 
Many thoughtful scholars argue that ‘rule of law’ should deliver a fuller 
set of substantive and procedural justice norms, such as human rights, 
access to justice and distributive justice (for example, Armytage 2012; 
Cane 2010; Mason 2011). Krygier (2010) observes that freighting the 
idea of rule of law with the obligation to deliver security, human rights, 
social equity and market efficiency—as well as the institutions to deliver 
these—has diminished our understanding of the conditions under 
which  the rule of law flourishes and its fundamental purpose, which, 
he argues, is to curb the exercise of arbitrary power by both state and 
non-state actors.
The choice of conceptual foundation matters: how you design security 
sector reform (SSR), for example, depends on what you think its normative 
goals should be. If you see SSR as a technical program designed to 
strengthen the criminal justice sector and provide solutions to specialised 
threats such as narcotics control and counterterrorism, establishing 
US-style high-security prisons in somewhere like Afghanistan will be 
a priority. If human security is your concern, you would ask how SSR 
interventions in that country could reduce the incidence of women and 
children jailed for crimes of poverty, or how to manage opportunistic 
‘forum shopping’ between state justice institutions and those of religious 
and customary law (for example, Jayasuriya 2012). 
4. Rule of law as a transnational 
marketplace 
This apparent goal confusion in rule of law interventions is not 
accidental. Carothers and Samet-Marram (2015) have reimagined the 
post-1989 period of global democracy promotion as a ‘global marketplace 
of political change’. Rule of law promotion is both a symbolic and a 
material marketplace: rule of law programs and norms are created, 
commodified and distributed globally through financial transfers 
totalling billions of dollars. Pinpointing the precise value of rule of law–
related expenditure is difficult; it is only a subset of the world’s ODA, 
defence expenditure on state-building and private philanthropy for 
development (Development Initiatives 2013; IDLO 2010). Australia, 
for example, as a medium-sized donor, was, until recently, spending 
AU$371 million per annum (or 14.7 per cent of its then bilateral aid 
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budget) on law and justice assistance (DFAT 2012: 5). How to effectively 
code and aggregate the many different forms of rule of law financing, 
even by members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD-DAC), are challenging, precisely because the substantive focus 
of the work is fluid.
Notwithstanding the ideological claims that rule of law promotion will 
advance ‘legal empowerment’ and ‘justice for the poor’ (for example, 
Golub 2009, 2010; van Rooij and Nicholson 2013), structurally, the 
money follows the political aims of the funder; it is largely a supply-
driven phenomenon. International development aid agreements 
contemplate ‘partnership’ and ‘local ownership’, but the dominant values 
in those agreements are transparency, efficiency and accountability 
(OECD 2015). The actual disbursement of funds is mediated by 
chains of international and local ‘designers’, ‘implementers’ and 
‘evaluators’—a  crowd of principals and agents who make up what 
I have called the ‘rule of law bazaar’ (Taylor 2010b). Rule of law market 
actors range from state-owned enterprises through to self-employed 
individuals. Across the spectrum are international NGOs, state agencies, 
local NGOs, militaries, churches and corporations. There is considerable 
blurring of profit and non-profit profiles; NGOs, for example, are 
often funded by both public agencies and corporations. The process of 
‘assisting’ target states is thus also a process of siphoning some of the 
development assistance finance back to the global North (for example, 
Ghani and Lockhart 2008). At the same time, Carothers and Samet-
Marram (2015) argue that both the financiers and the implementers 
of democracy promotion are increasingly non-Western and non-liberal; 
we can observe a similar trend in rule of law promotion (for example, 
Taylor 2010a).
Lawyers feature prominently in rule of law’s international, transnational 
and local spaces, even though the work itself is varied and distributed 
across many different occupational groups. Indeed, rule of law 
promotion as a practice has something in common with the professional 
organisation of law in the global North: it declares allegiance to altruistic 
aims (poverty reduction, human rights, access to justice) (for example, 
Halliday and Karpick 1997; Halliday et al. 2007) and pursues these 
in tandem with strategies to secure market share and profitability 
(Dezalay and Garth 2011).
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5. Rule of law as a transnational legal order
Rule of law promotion can be viewed as the formation of a transnational 
legal order (TLO) of the kind theorised by Halliday and Shaffer (2015). 
It functions as one of many ‘global scripts’ promoted within and through 
transnational organisations in the making of ‘soft law’ and regulation 
internationally (Darian-Smith 2013). Rule of law norms are inscribed 
in legal technologies such as conventions and treaties, best practices and 
standards, legislative guides and model laws, international court rulings 
and the rules of global regulatory bodies. 
The paradigm example of a rule of law ‘script’ is the UN promulgation of 
a definition of rule of law in 2004. This can be understood as an attempt 
to assert control over rule of law’s ‘regulatory spaces’ (for example, Scott 
2001), within and outside the UN system. It also shapes the discursive 
production and distribution of rule of law, by injecting ‘laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated’ 
with ‘international human rights norms and standards’ (UN Secretary-
General 2004). This definition, then, becomes a compliance standard for 
the UN system as a whole, embedded within UN agency programming 
and within its rule of law assessment tool. The European Union (EU), 
too, has a new rule of law compliance standard: a ‘pre–Article 7’ warning 
procedure for assessing where there has been ‘a systematic breakdown 
in rule of law’ within a member state of the kind that would trigger the 
suspension of EU voting rights under Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty 
(EC 2014). 
Both the UN and the EU examples show how rule of law operates 
as a multinodal form of transnational regulation. There is no single 
international forum or agency that oversees the production, distribution 
and enforcement of the rule of law by state and non-state entities. Thus, 
the UN system, the EU, the World Bank and other international and 
transnational actors compete for the symbolic and practical ownership 
of rule of law promotion as a means of creating and entrenching their 
desired global norms. 
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6. Rule of law as surveillance and monitoring
Mobilising rule of law promotion as regulation requires some form 
of  enforcement, so rule of law comes packaged with diagnostic, 
surveillance  and evaluative tools with which to measure a state’s 
‘progress’ in rule of law adoption. Many of these are modes of regulation 
that are routine within new public management: outsourcing and 
public procurement, highly detailed contracts, standardised costing 
formulas, standardised forms (including spreadsheets, ‘log-frame’ plans, 
internal reports and ‘communication plans’), audit and monitoring, 
policy ‘toolkits’  and public reports (Natsios 2010). Rule of law is also 
‘performed’ through the practices of rule of law agents and their epistemic 
communities and professional networks, so personnel roles and titles, 
styles of physically organising the workplace, public announcements of 
‘results’, narratives about ‘lessons learned’ and formal monitoring and 
evaluation (for example, Cohen et al. 2011; Cohen and Simion 2013) 
are also important processes in the production and distribution of rule 
of law, as they are in ODA in other domains as well.
Can we measure or quantify ‘rule of law’? The value and impact of rule 
of law promotion programs are typically ‘measured’ by counting their 
outputs (for example, number of lawyers trained, number of cases 
filed) or through proxy ‘indicators’ (for example, Parsons et al. 2010). 
The  short  time horizons of most policy interventions mean that 
longitudinal studies of how rule of law projects affect local actors and 
institutions over time are uncommon. 
The ‘indicator culture’ that has taken hold within organisations that fund 
rule of law policy interventions (Davis et al. 2010; Engle Merry et al. 
2015) is a strategy of global governance in which social phenomena are 
presented in a quasi-scientific form, and where different sets of indicators 
reference and mimic one another to present stylised accounts of the target 
states. Indicators are also combined with other forms of monitoring. 
So,  embedding indicators in procurement contracts, for example, 
means that moving the target country up or down an anticorruption 
or democracy index can become a contractual performance requirement 
(for example, Taylor 2010b). 
Most indicators focus on formal legal systems and the agencies of the 
state (Taylor 2007), rather than on non-state and religious forms of law 
(for example, Forsyth 2009). The gap between this metric representation 
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of rule of law and how citizens experience ‘everyday’ law and legal 
institutions in that country is generally not explained (cf. Deinla and 
Taylor 2015). The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index®, 
for example, uses 47 indicators to evaluate constraints on government 
powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, 
order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal 
justice (WJP 2015). The Regulatory Guillotine™ tool identifies and 
disestablishes duplicative or redundant laws ( Jacobs et al. 2014). 
Some indicator sets are more nuanced. The self-assessment tool for rule 
of law in public administration developed by the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) in 
Sweden (UNDP 2015), for example, is explicit about the political nature 
of public administration and how local political power determines the 
type and quality of public sector services. These kinds of approaches 
are consistent with Braithwaite’s (2011) recommendations about 
responsive regulation and Kavanagh and Jones’s (2011: 25) proposal 
for strengthening the United Nations’ own rule of law capacity, both 
of which emphasise attention to local context.
7. Branding rule of law
As indicators proliferate, they become rule of law ‘products’ in their 
own right: the purchase and distribution of the regulatory tool itself 
become a rule of law intervention. Many of these tools are originally 
developed with public funding; some are fully open access, such as the 
UN Rule of Law Toolkit (UN 2011) and the UNDP–FBA assessment 
tool (UNDP  2015); others are presented as the intellectual property 
of the designing organisation, such as the WJP Rule of Law Index® 
(WJP 2015). What all of these tools have in common, however, is some 
form of ‘brand architecture’—branding that seeks to build an affiliative 
bond between the rule of law commodity and its end-users. 
Australia’s ‘law and justice’ interventions feature a bouncing red 
kangaroo. The Australian Government is clear that this logo ‘represents 
the product we deliver—Australian aid’ (DFAT 2015a). In the United 
States, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
rolled out its new branding in 2004–05 to strengthen its foreign policy 
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objectives, and the ‘favourability of the US nearly doubled in Indonesia 
… thanks to the massive delivery of—for the first time “well branded”—
US foreign assistance’ (USAID 2015).
Other rule of law brands include the World Bank’s ‘Justice for the 
Poor’ ( J4P) and USAID’s ‘Educating and Equipping Tomorrow’s 
Justice Reformers’ (E2J) and ‘People to People Peacebuilding’ (P2P). 
The shorthand brands are intended to distinguish projects that might 
otherwise be confusingly similar. They also seek to direct attention to 
the funder (rather than their agents, which often have their own brands). 
In each case, they seek to suggest to end-users that the project/product 
is more desirable than its unbranded forerunner or competitor.
8. Regulatory rule of law actors 
In sociological terms, when rule of law travels abroad as a set of both 
concepts and practices, it becomes a transnational ‘project’ (Behrends et 
al. 2014). Its rationalities—embedded in epistemic communities, 
knowledge and surrounding institutions—are left behind and the 
model’s concepts and practices must be adapted and reinvented at new 
sites. That reinvention takes place through the people and organisations 
that design and deliver rule of law interventions in developing or fragile-
country settings, within the constraints of a military operation or a 
development aid–funded project. 
We see this when a state seeks to join a multilateral organisation such 
as the EU or the World Trade Organization (WTO). International 
rule of law advisors often substitute for state actors to prepare the state 
for accession (for example, Morlino and Magen 2009). They mobilise 
professional capital, occupational prestige and the power of ideas and 
technical knowledge from abroad (for example, Halliday and Carruthers 
2009; Bosch 2016; Simion n.d.). In so doing, they act as the ‘brokers’, 
‘translators’, ‘mediators’ and ‘agents’ for the organisations advancing the 
desired policy intervention (for example, Mosse 2011; Lewis and Mosse 
2006; Levitt and Merry 2009). Bill Easterly (2014) terms this process, 
when performed by economists, ‘the tyranny of experts’. So, this prompts 
us to ask who are the rule of law practitioners in these new locations, how 
do they act as regulatory agents of a TLO and how are they themselves 
regulated?
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9. Agents of the rule of law
Development economics is replete with descriptions of the complexities 
of principal–agent relationships in the design and delivery of aid 
(for  example, Gibson et al. 2005). We lack a full benchmark study of 
how many organisations and individuals are involved in rule of law 
promotion work worldwide. Thus, it is risky to profile rule of law practice 
by sampling public documentation, as Desai (2014) does. What we know 
from pilot empirical studies is that, despite highly technocratic regimes 
of oversight and control, rule of law remains a highly relational field 
(Simion and Taylor 2015). 
Many of the rule of law market’s biggest actors—the EU, the UNDP and 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—
limit their recruitment to lawyers and members of other branches of the 
legal profession. Chiefs of parties recruiting for a rule of law mission, 
particularly in a high-risk location, will prefer colleagues who are known 
to them or who come with endorsements from trusted third parties. 
Established missions in places that lack glamour or prestige also relax 
their standards when it comes to recruitment. This  is  consistent with 
what Baylis (2009) describes as the ‘cycling’ effect of cohorts moving from 
one ‘hot’ development destination to the next, and with international 
policing studies that show a reluctance to be ‘the last man out’ (Durch 
2012). 
Professional networks 
Rule of law is intensely mobile work, so it is not surprising that digital 
communities of practice have emerged: key examples are the Rule 
of  Law Community of Practice Network in the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the International Network to 
Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL), sponsored by the US Institute for 
Peace (Simion and Taylor 2015: 66). More interactive discussion takes 
place using social media such as ‘LinkedIn’ and through groups such as 
the Justice Support Group and the Rule of Law Veterans group (Simion 
and Taylor 2015: 66). The growth of online forums can be seen as ‘wiki-
regulation’ (Grabosky 2012) and the creation of a self-regulatory ‘space’ 
for debating rule of law ideas, norms and practices, but these are not 
designed to have strong regulatory traction. 
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Ethics and accountability
A signature capacity of a profession is its ability to control its membership 
and to sanction members who violate its behavioural standards 
(for  example, American Bar Association 2015). Rule of law actors in 
transnational spaces may perceive themselves to be beyond the reach 
of regulation, either because they see themselves as the ‘source’ of legal 
norms or because they are physically removed from familiar professional 
environments. Where this occurs it may have legitimacy costs for the 
discursive or actual power of rule of law norms; people promoting rule of 
law should also be subject to the laws of the system they are supporting 
(Rausch 2006; Roesler 2010). The most egregious examples of violation 
have been by UN peacekeeping forces and private military contractors 
(for example, Simm 2013; Durch and Berkman 2006). But anecdotal 
evidence suggests that we should also examine legal and ethical awareness 
among practitioners of rule of law. 
Where more than one agency or state is involved in a rule of law 
promotion project, a threshold issue is whose rules apply? Secondees 
from government agencies are generally bound by domestic legislation 
and a  ‘sending’ organisation’s code of conduct and legal mandate 
(for  example, DFAT 2015b), as well as by those of their ‘receiving’ 
organisation and sometimes immunity provisions deriving from 
international conventions (for example, UN 1946) and restrictions 
stemming from insurance coverage. 
In this ‘choice of law’ contest, the first casualty is usually local law 
(for  example, Derks and Price 2010: vi). The paradigm example is 
consumption of recreational drugs or alcohol in places where this is 
illegal. This may be ignored or downplayed, in the tacit or overt belief 
that the local legal system is underdeveloped or unworthy of respect. 
Or  it may be excused on the basis that remote locations allow more 
latitude for behavioural lapses, and an expectation that monitoring by 
peers is looser where their professional relationships may be short-lived 
(Taylor 2009). 
Beyond strict legality, rule of law practice is replete with ethical 
dilemmas. Do you honour ‘local ownership’ and accommodate gender 
segregation or a degree of ethnic patronage in distributing opportunities, 
or do you insist that the ‘international’ norms must prevail (for example, 
Hansen and Wiharta 2007)? There is currently no mechanism in place 
for resolving those tensions beyond particular projects or for defining 
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quality standards for rule of law practice. So, regulatory contestation 
at the project level is normal, as local actors and international actors 
compete for control over the norms and direction of a rule of law 
intervention (Bosch 2016).
Rule of law practitioners move fluidly among networked organisations, 
taking with them their knowledge, contacts, professional practices and 
their sense of ‘how we do’ rule of law promotion (Alkon 2013; Bosch 
2016). This makes it difficult to sustain ‘feedback loops’ for the kind of 
learning that is necessary for effective interventions. This was termed 
a  ‘problem of knowledge’ (Carothers 2006) and was considered to be 
a lack of political and commercial incentives for rule of law actors to 
coordinate their efforts (Channell 2006; Taylor 2009). More accurately, 
it is a problem of how to effectively share, absorb, reflect on and 
institutionalise knowledge gained from practice across a multilevel, 
globally diffuse field. 
10. Conclusion
This chapter has argued that rule of law promotion is a transnational 
regulatory endeavour that can also be seen as an attempt to create a 
transnational legal order. Rule of law promotion operates discursively 
as a form of regulation by purporting to identify states that ‘lack’ rule 
of law. The malleability of the concept of rule of law allows a very wide 
range of norms to be produced and inscribed in global policy tools and 
technologies. By so doing, transnational actors are able to pursue a range 
of policy aims in relation to the target state. 
The production and distribution of rule of law are sustained in part 
through standardisation of norms—one example being rule of law 
indicators, which focus on formal, abstracted aspects of legal systems 
rather than the pluralist, context-specific details at the local level. 
Tools for monitoring and measuring compliance with these standards, 
then, in turn, become rule of law ‘products’ for the rule of law marketplace. 
The translation of rule of law norms from the transnational to the local 
level is the work of individual and organisational ‘brokers’ and ‘translators’ 
(Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2011). They shape regulatory outcomes 
locally by leveraging their technical knowledge, prestige and professional 
capital. That process, however, is complicated by the fact that rule of 
law practitioners and their employer organisations largely float beyond 
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national regulatory reach. Visible slippage between practitioners’ 
invocation of rule of law norms, and their failure to embody these in 
practice, is one of the ways in which rule of law’s claim to legitimacy 
may be diminished.
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Regulating sex in peace 
operations
Gabrielle Simm1
1. DynCorp in Bosnia
DynCorp is a large private military and security company that was 
contracted by the US Government to provide police trainers and 
advisers to the United Nations (UN) mission in Bosnia in the late 
1990s (Simm 2013). Despite the company’s role in policing and training 
police, some employees were implicated in trafficking women and girls 
to Bosnia from Russia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and other Eastern 
European countries. At the time it was estimated that international 
personnel accounted for 30–40 per cent of clientele and approximately 
70 per cent of the revenue from trafficking in Bosnia (Mendelson 2005). 
Media reports indicated that some DynCorp employees purchased 
trafficked women and children as well as benefiting from free sex in 
brothels. Evidence of the involvement of some DynCorp employees 
came from two whistleblowers, Kathryn Bolkovac and Ben Johnston. 
Kathryn Bolkovac was employed in April 1999 by DynCorp to work as 
a police monitor in Bosnia. An experienced police officer from Nebraska, 
USA, she had particular expertise in child abuse and sexual assault 
1  This chapter is based on Simm (2013).
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cases.2 Bolkovac became aware of widespread trafficking of women 
and girls into Bosnia by organised crime groups and that international 
personnel were involved. According to local police, trafficking had 
not existed prior to the arrival of international peacekeepers (Lloyd-
Roberts 2002). Bolkovac sent emails to around 50 recipients in the 
United Nations and DynCorp describing in graphic detail the abuses 
perpetrated against trafficked women and girls. She alleged that women 
and girls were smuggled into Bosnia ‘to work as dancers, waitresses, and 
prostitutes’, forced to perform sex acts on customers to pay debts and, if 
they refused, they were ‘locked in rooms without food for days, beaten 
and gang raped by the bar owners and their associates’ (Wilson 2002). 
She alleged that the clientele of these women included ‘“some” local 
people, SFOR [Stabilisation Force] and IPTF [International Police 
Task Force] personnel, local Police and international/humanitarian 
employees in Bosnia-Herzegovina’.3 Following the email, Bolkovac 
was redeployed to another area and, in April 2001, she was dismissed. 
Bolkovac won her unfair dismissal case against the company, with the 
UK Employment Tribunal holding that DynCorp’s explanation was 
‘completely unbelievable’ and that it had ‘no doubt whatever that the 
reason for her dismissal was that she made a protected disclosure’ under 
the UK legislation protecting whistleblowers.4 The tribunal awarded 
Bolkovac £110,000 (about AU$305,000 at the time) compensation for 
unfair dismissal. Bolkovac’s story has been made into a feature film titled 
The Whistleblower (Kondracki 2010), based on the book by Bolkovac 
(with Lynn 2011). 
Ben Johnston, a former US Army aircraft mechanic employed by 
DynCorp in Bosnia, made internal complaints about company 
employees who boasted about ‘buying and selling women for their 
own personal enjoyment’ and about the ‘various ages and talents of the 
individual slaves they had purchased’ (O’Meara 2002: 12). Johnston 
reported that at DynCorp ‘a lot of people said you can buy a woman and 
how good it is to have a sex slave at home’ (Human Rights Watch 2002: 
66). DynCorp’s site supervisor at the US military’s Comanche Base, 
Bosnia, John Hirtz, videotaped himself having sex with two women, one 
of whom was clearly saying ‘no’. Hirtz later admitted to having raped 
one of the women. Kevin Werner, another DynCorp employee, admitted 
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purchasing a weapon and a woman from a brothel owner and left Bosnia 
as a result of the weapons charge (US Inspector-General 2003). Another 
DynCorp employee, Richard Ward, told Johnston he could purchase 
a woman for him. 
He says he’ll get me one for you—you can have one for 100 marks a 
night or buy them for two or three thousand marks. They can be yours, 
and they can be your ‘hoes’. (Deposition of Benjamin Dean Johnston, 
Ben Johnston v DynCorp Inc., District Court, Tarrant County, Texas, 
20 March 2001, pp. 50–2, cited in Human Rights Watch 2002) 
When DynCorp took no action on his complaints, Johnston 
approached  the US Criminal Investigation Command, which 
substantiated some of his allegations (Capps 2002). Johnston also alleged 
that the company ‘turned a blind eye’ to the involvement of DynCorp 
personnel in purchasing women and that their involvement in trafficking 
continued despite the army investigation. In June 2000, DynCorp 
fired Johnston ‘for “misconduct, violation of standards and conditions 
of employment and employment agreement” by bringing “discredit to 
the Company and the U.S. Army while working in Tuzla, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”’ (Human Rights Watch 2002: 66). DynCorp was reluctant 
to fire the employees about whom Johnston had complained. The US 
State Department intervened to ensure that some employees were 
dismissed and repatriated (US Department of State 2002). In August 
2000, Johnston sued DynCorp in a federal district court in Texas. 
The case settled in August 2002, two days before it was due to go to 
trial and hours after Bolkovac won her case against the company in the 
United Kingdom.
Despite evidence from whistleblowers, corroborated by US Army 
investigations, no members of the international police taskforce were 
prosecuted for trafficking in Bosnia; they were instead repatriated 
(Evidence of Martina Vandenberg, in US Congress 2002; Andreas 
2009). US Army investigators found they did not have jurisdiction over 
civilian contractors so they referred the case to Bosnian police. Bosnian 
police were apparently unsure whether the contractors benefited from 
immunity under the Dayton Peace Accords so did not prosecute them. 
At least 13 DynCorp employees were repatriated from Bosnia, at 
least seven of whom were fired for ‘purchasing women, many of them 
underage, or participating in other sex trafficking activities’ (Feminist 
Majority Foundation 2002). DynCorp nevertheless kept its contract 
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with the US Government to provide police to Bosnia. An inquiry by 
a subcommittee of the US Congress heard evidence from David Lamb, 
a former UN human rights investigator in Bosnia:
an astonishing cover-up attempt … seemed to extend to the highest 
levels of the UN headquarters … The Department of State purposefully 
distances itself from US IPTF members by hiring DynCorp as the 
middle man and makes no attempt to know anything about the 
activities of its IPTF officers who are serving as representatives 
and Ambassadors of the United States. (Evidence of David Lamb, 
US Congress 2002: 35) 
The case of DynCorp illustrates the range of actors involved in peace 
operations. Individual personnel include private military contractors 
working as UN police, diplomats, international humanitarian workers and 
local police. Entities whose personnel were implicated were international 
organisations (such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)), private corporations (DynCorp and others), 
sending states (whose diplomats and military were representing their 
governments, and aid workers whom the government might not have 
known were there) and the host state (Bosnian police and government 
officials). While there are layers of law regulating some of these actors, 
such as military peacekeepers, who are bound by the laws of their sending 
state and military discipline, they benefit from immunity from the host 
state’s law for crimes they commit in that country. Other actors, such 
as foreign aid workers, are unlikely to benefit from any legal immunity 
but are rarely prosecuted for any crimes they commit, suggesting they 
benefit from impunity in practice. The variation in regulation of different 
categories of personnel, depending partly on which organisation employs 
them, raises questions about the regulation of sex in peace operations. 
2. Regulatory studies and sex in peace 
operations
How are regulatory studies relevant to situations such as the sex 
trafficking perpetrated by some DynCorp employees in Bosnia? Sexual 
crimes committed in peace operations might be seen as a human rights 
abuse, a problem of criminal impunity, an issue of violence against women 
or an example of sexual abuse of children. All of these could, and perhaps 
should, be dealt with by a combination of international and domestic 
human rights law and criminal law. Sex, not amounting to sexual 
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crimes, is already highly regulated, by social mores, religious doctrine, 
organisational codes of conduct and personal morality. Sex in peace 
operations is arguably subject to greater strictures, occurring as it does 
during conflict or in post-conflict societies and usually between people 
of different ages, cultures, religions and socioeconomic status. When sex 
occurs between people of the same gender, it is often subject to social 
stigma, taboos and, sometimes, criminal penalties. So why should sex in 
peace operations be further regulated? Why should the United Nations, 
a non-governmental organisation (NGO) or a private military security 
company, such as DynCorp, act as ‘the sex police’ ( Jennings 2008)?
Using a broad definition of regulation as ‘the intentional activity of 
attempting to control, order or influence the behaviour of others’ 
(Black  2002: 1), sex in peace operations is already highly regulated. 
Drawing on regulatory studies, which see law as a subset of the broader 
field of regulation, enables us to ‘decentre’ law and consider other 
regulatory options. Decentring law is both productive and unsettling for 
an international lawyer such as myself. Regulatory studies are particularly 
relevant when the attempts to regulate sex, particularly sexual crimes, 
in peace operations have primarily taken the form of ‘zero tolerance’ 
codes of conduct, which lack the force of law. A prime example in this 
context is the Secretary-General ’s bulletin on special measures for protection 
from sexual exploitation and abuse (UN Secretariat 2003). It might be 
expected that criminal law would be the most appropriate response to 
crimes. The problems with applying and enforcing criminal law in the 
internationalised space of peace operations are precisely what have led 
the United Nations, NGOs and private military security companies to 
resort to non-legal forms of regulation.
Building on the work of Charlesworth and Chinkin (2004), I have 
attempted to view international law through a regulatory lens. Lacking 
a central authority or sovereign and relying more on horizontal or peer 
enforcement than on vertical or hierarchical authority, international 
law is an ideal candidate for regulatory approaches. Surprisingly, there 
has been little engagement by international lawyers with the field of 
regulatory  studies. However, certain aspects of regulatory theory are 
helpful in conceptualising the problem of sex in peace operations. 
In my work, I draw on the foundational theory of responsive regulation 
put forward by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, particularly John 
Braithwaite’s  elaboration of networked regulation in developing 
economies. My work is further informed by the idea of smart regulation 
advocated by Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (see Gunningham 
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and Sinclair, Chapter 8, as well as Grabosky, Chapter 9, this volume). 
Their  willingness to consider non-state actors as potential regulators 
is useful in a context, such as peace operations, where a functioning 
host country legal system is often absent. Finally, I raise some feminist 
questions of regulatory studies—in particular, while regulation 
offers useful insights into problems, such  as sex in peace operations, 
regulatory  studies remain largely oblivious to questions of sex and 
gender. The issue of sex in peace operations highlights this weakness in 
regulatory theory to date.
3. Responsive regulation
Responsive regulation holds that regulation ‘be responsive both in 
what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response 
will be’ (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 4). In this model, regulation starts 
with non-legal mechanisms and reserves state-enforced criminal law 
for the most serious transgressions where other measures have failed. 
Responsive regulation draws the regulator’s attention to the particular 
actor and specific situation. So Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite envisage 
different regulatory responses according to the type of actor involved. 
Virtuous actors will elicit restorative justice responses; rational actors 
will respond to deterrence; and incompetent or irrational actors should 
be incapacitated by the regulator. Command and control or punitive 
legal responses will be reserved for incompetent or irrational actors. 
This model also works with a single actor across time, such that a regulator 
should begin on the assumption that the actor is virtuous, but, if this 
assumption is demonstrated to be false, based on repeated disregard for 
the rules, the regulator’s response will harden and escalate accordingly 
(Braithwaite 2005). Designed to be tested through empirical research, 
responsive regulation is a dynamic model and the type of matters to 
be dealt with through self-regulation or increasing degrees of punitive 
intervention need to be adjusted based on experience. As responsive 
regulation incorporates both punitive and persuasive models of regulation, 
it is able to invoke the more appropriate strategy based on the situation. 
Another benefit is that responsive regulation makes punishment cheap, 
relying as it does on self-regulation in the majority of cases and reserving 
punitive measures for serious cases, making it attractive to developing 
countries. Responsive regulation offers promise in dealing with sex in 
peace operations where state-based law is inadequate. 
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Regulatory studies have been developed in industrialised countries 
characterised by strong legal systems. In this sense, regulatory studies 
could be seen as a reaction against state-centred law. The international 
arena is usually seen as lacking a strong central power such as that 
represented by the state in industrialised economies. Even there, ‘few 
countries exhibit a sufficiently unified or strong state capacity for 
regulatory power to be capable of sustained manipulation to secure 
desired regulatory outcomes’ (Scott 2003: 158). Peace operations might 
be seen as an extreme example of the lack of central state power and 
hence ripe for the application of regulatory mechanisms. A potential 
critique of regulatory theory is that it assumes that the punitive power of 
law can be called on when necessary—an assumption less likely to apply 
in states hosting peace operations. Braithwaite responds to this critique 
by arguing that responsive regulation relies on a large degree of self-
regulation and invokes the punitive power of regulators progressively as 
the effectiveness of self-regulation diminishes. Nevertheless, responsive 
regulation appears less likely to work in weaker states, due to lower levels 
of capacity and the potential for regulatory officials to be corrupted due 
to poverty, the greater risk of capture and corruption of bureaucrats by 
business and NGOs’ comparative lack of resources (Braithwaite 2005).
Braithwaite’s solution to these potential problems with responsive 
regulation in developing states is ‘networking around capacity deficits’ 
(see also Braithwaite, Chapter 7, this volume). Unlike in industrialised 
countries, where there is reference to the regulatory or even post-
regulatory state, in developing countries ‘under the influence of 
international organisations, many states are looking to construct the 
institutions which will make state governance more effective, rather than 
to dismantle them’ (Scott 2003: 167). This is particularly the case in peace 
operations, where the United Nations usually has a specific mandate 
to develop institutions as part of a process of state-building. Another 
approach is for developing states to enrol non-state regulators to cover 
their weaknesses. These non-state regulators might be foreign states, 
domestic or international businesses or NGOs. Braithwaite adapts this 
model to the example of a domestic NGO regulating human rights abuse 
by either business or the state. The domestic NGO enrols or networks 
with a range of domestic and international actors, such as international 
NGOs, foreign embassies, media and the United Nations, when its 
initial naming and shaming of human rights abuses are not successful. 
Escalation of naming and shaming through a network of regulators is 
advocated ‘as a path around the developing economy’s capacity problem 
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for enforcing standards’ (Braithwaite 2005: 891). Networked regulation 
also avoids the problem of legal loopholes or the opportunities for abuse 
that I argue international law creates. 
However, there are two potential weaknesses in networked regulation. 
The first is the absence of the voices of victims to draw attention to 
abuses,  as empirical research has demonstrated that most victims are 
reluctant to report (Lattu 2008). This is not necessarily a problem 
if whistleblowers come forward to report where victims do not. 
For  example, the evidence of two whistleblowers was crucial to the 
revelation of DynCorp employees’ involvement in trafficking in Bosnia. 
While the whistleblowers were effective in exposing the problem of 
DynCorp employees’ involvement, the biggest sanction faced by those 
allegedly involved was dismissal—a fate shared by the whistleblowers 
themselves. The second potential weakness is the fact that, in many 
cases of sex in peace operations, it is not just one organisational actor, 
such as an NGO, that is involved, but others as well. This leads to the 
conclusion that it is insufficient to rely on a limited number of actors—
such as states, NGOs, private military and security companies or the 
United Nations—to regulate each other. Braithwaite anticipates this 
problem, giving the example of where only two actors are sufficiently 
networked to escalate regulation and there is a risk they will collude 
to protect their own interests, rather than contesting each other. Other 
actors, such as the media, NGO donors, UN member states (who fund 
peacekeeping operations), insurance companies, corporate clients and 
perhaps shareholders, are required as regulators.
4. Smart regulation
In Smart Regulation, Gunningham et al. (1998) undertake a 
comprehensive inquiry into the potential for regulatory instruments 
to support, neutralise or negate each other (see also Gunningham 
and Sinclair, Chapter 8, this volume). They call this ‘smart regulation’. 
The main contribution of smart regulation is a detailed consideration of 
the optimal combination of particular regulatory instruments to achieve 
desired policy goals:
In the majority of circumstances, the use of multiple rather than single 
policy instruments, and a broader range of regulatory actors, will produce 
better regulation. By implication, this means a far more imaginative, 
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flexible, and pluralistic approach to environmental regulation than 
has so far been adopted in most jurisdictions: the essence of ‘smart’ 
regulation. (Gunningham et al. 1998: 4) 
The proponents of smart regulation are not purist about their 
instruments,  declaring that ‘the goal is to accomplish substantive 
compliance with regulatory goals by any viable means using 
whatever regulatory or quasi-regulatory tools that might be available’ 
(Gunningham  et al. 1998: 14). They argue against ‘single instrument’ 
approaches as misguided and not flexible enough to address all problems 
in all contexts. Like the proponents of responsive regulation, on which 
smart regulation builds, they aim to ‘harness the strengths of individual 
mechanisms while compensating for their weaknesses by the use 
of additional and complementary instruments’ (Gunningham et al. 
1998: 15). 
Regulatory theory takes the role of non-state actors as regulators 
seriously  (see Grabosky, Chapter 9, this volume). The economic 
heritage  of regulatory studies is possibly responsible for this, because 
of the field of economics’ interest in markets and its suspicion of the 
role of the state. Some proponents of free-market ideology call for the 
‘invisible hand’ of the market to take care of business and regard state 
‘intervention’ as ineffective and inefficient. However, while they ascribe 
a larger and more significant role to non-state actors as regulators than 
as adherents of a state-based conception of law, most regulatory scholars 
continue to see a role for the state as ‘backstop’ or meta-regulator. 
Braithwaite and Ayres advocate the enrolment of non-state actors such 
as business and civil society where they are better placed for or more 
suited to the job of regulation. In environmental regulation, where 
Gunningham et al. (1998: 250) describe a shift to ‘new environmental 
governance’, commercial and non-commercial third parties scrutinise 
and pressure ‘regulatees’ (see also Holley, Chapter 42, this volume). 
Some businesses realised that the reputational benefits of going ‘beyond 
compliance’ recouped the initial costs. NGOs frustrated with the slow 
pace of government intervention believed that they could achieve 
more by direct negotiation with business. Hence, private, public and 
non-government stakeholders collaborate towards ‘commonly agreed 
(or  mutually negotiated) goals’ (Gunningham 2009: 203). Another 
model is that of enforced self-regulation, in which the state’s role should 
be to act where other regulators have tried but failed. Also referred to 
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as ‘regulating at a distance’, ‘light-handed regulation’ and ‘steering not 
rowing’, mechanisms such as self-regulation and enlisting surrogate 
regulators continue to depend on their enforcement by the state. 
However, there are a number of potential problems with enlisting non-
state actors as regulators. Gunningham identifies the risk of virtually 
delegating regulatory powers to private actors who may be coopted by the 
process. Further, there may be a disparity between the financial resources 
of the parties involved in regulating—for example, the state and private 
sector being much better funded than NGOs, leading to burnout of 
NGO volunteers and the inability to voice their concerns effectively due 
to the power differentials in the forum. Another possibility is that the 
state merely uses non-state actors as a ‘delivery vehicle’ for government 
initiatives, retaining political control but outsourcing responsibility for 
failures (Gunningham 2009). A further concern is the risk of vigilantism 
where non-state actors act as delegated or surrogate regulators. Another 
risk is collusion, where there are only a few actors powerful enough to act 
as regulators and they collude to protect their own interests.
5. Sexing regulation
Regulatory theories assist in understanding sex in peace operations. 
The scenarios in which sexual crimes are most likely to be committed 
are those where law is marginalised or its enforcement is dependent on 
a constellation of political factors. However, regulatory approaches also 
have limits and weaknesses when applied to sex in peace operations. 
Having originated in industrialised countries, regulatory studies to this 
point assume a functioning state and legal system, a rule of law and a 
basic level of order that may not be applicable to post-conflict societies. 
While regulatory scholars often argue that it is more efficient for the 
state to ‘steer’ rather than ‘row’, a question that remains unanswered is 
whether the enrolment of non-state actors as regulators would work if 
the state were not able to guarantee the non-state actors. Put another 
way, would ‘speaking softly’ be effective in the absence of the ‘big stick’ 
that the threat of law represents (Braithwaite 1997)? The enrolment of 
surrogate regulators is not necessarily effective where the reason non-
state actors are being called on to act as regulators is precisely the state’s 
inability to intervene effectively. States hosting UN peace operations are, 
by definition, unlikely to be effective regulators. Regulatory studies pay 
detailed attention to the available selection and mix of policy instruments 
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but less attention to what the policy aims of regulation should be. 
There is some discussion of whether policy instruments are pure and 
unadulterated, or whether their selection affects the design of policy 
(Black 2003). Clearly, policy aims will be very important, no less so in 
the case of sex in peace operations. Another striking feature of regulatory 
studies is the absence of attention to sex. There are a number of studies 
of regulation of areas that raise sex squarely—for example: sexuality, 
reproduction and sexual assault (Harding 2011; Sangster 2001; Jackson 
2001; Daly 2002). However, these studies might be better understood 
as feminist scholars engaging with regulation, rather than regulatory 
scholars engaging with sex (cf. Braithwaite 2006). The questions posed 
by Charlesworth and Chinkin (2004: 268) remain relevant: ‘Who are 
the regulators; who regulates the regulators? Does regulation affect 
women and men differently? What gendered patterns of life, work and 
politics does regulation support?’ They highlight the potential for further 
engagement between regulatory studies and studies of gender and sex.
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Holding individuals to account 
beyond the state? Rights, 
regulation and the resort to 
international criminal responsibility 
Michelle Burgis-Kasthala
1. Introduction: Understanding international 
criminal law as governance
International law as a discipline and practice comprises a number 
of  overlapping and sometimes conflicting regimes for the regulation 
of  relations between states as well as, increasingly, various relations 
within and across states (Koskenniemi 2007). This chapter considers 
the rise of international criminal law (ICL) as a particular technique 
of governance that both builds on other international legal regimes and 
marks a departure in its practices and effects. ICL is concerned with 
holding individuals criminally responsible for various crimes that have 
become internationalised including the well-known singular crimes 
of piracy, slavery, genocide and apartheid as well as a whole range of 
offences under the broad headings of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Procedurally, ICL offences can be heard in international, 
hybrid and domestic jurisdictions, but it is important to note that 
the reach of ICL  is imperfect and often relies on states to codify 
specific crimes. Many ICL offences grow out of public international 
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law concerns  over state responsibility regarding a state’s citizens, 
international human rights law (IHRL), as well as a state’s conduct of 
hostilities, international humanitarian law (IHL). Under these regimes, 
states may be held responsible for breaches of both customary and treaty 
norms. States will also often be required to criminalise and prosecute 
or extradite individuals suspected of breaching these various norms. 
Thus, ICL takes norms initially applicable to states and transforms them 
into individual criminal offences. The irony in this system—particularly 
for IHRL—is that, although it depicts the state as predatory and in need 
of restraint (Cogan 2011: 331–7, 342–3), its normative impetus is state 
action/consent, whether through treaty or customary law. Thus, rights 
and responsibilities as well as individual and state liabilities intersect at 
domestic, international, transnational and global levels in increasingly 
complex and sometimes antagonistic ways. 
The greater emphasis on individual rights within IHRL (see 
Charlesworth,  Chapter 21, this volume) is also now reflected in an 
increasing focus on individual responsibility for crimes committed 
during peace and particularly during conflict in international criminal 
law. We can therefore understand IHRL and ICL as opposing and 
complementary trends within the international legal field’s focus on the 
individual as situated within a global (rather than a national) community. 
[Yet the] paradox at the heart of this twin project (international 
criminal law and international human rights law) is that while its core 
animating idea is the abolition of all distinctions within humanity, some 
of its most energetic practices are dedicated to punishing ‘inhumane’ 
acts … and acting on behalf of humanity against those who are deemed 
to have stepped outside or defied humanity. (Simpson 2012: 115–16)
A shift towards individual criminal responsibility is a manifestation of 
neoliberal governance, which tends to obscure structural dimensions 
of conflict and only works towards ‘negative peace’ (or the absence 
of violence) (Nouwen 2012: 332). In addition, Kendall (2011: 587) 
identifies the ‘neo-liberal premise that justice can be subjected to market 
rationalities’, including the increasing prominence of private, donor-led 
initiatives. It is not surprising, then, that despite ICL’s post–World War I 
genesis, it has come to flourish in the post–Cold War international 
system. 
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Focusing on individual perpetrators simplifies the complexities of 
responsibility in modern life (Drumbl 2007: 35). Within the realms 
of an international criminal trial, highly complex conflicts can be ‘lifted 
outside of worldly politics and into a morally unambiguous realm 
of good and evil’ (Orford 2011: 186).  
[Focusing] on the idea of international criminal justice helps us to 
forget that an overwhelming majority of … crucial problems … are not 
adequately addressed by criminal law … The seemingly unambiguous 
notions of innocence and guilt create patterns of causality in the chaos 
of intertwined problems of social, political and economic deprivation 
surrounding the violence. (Tallgren 2002: 593–4) 
Critiques of ICL focus particularly on the way it obscures profoundly 
political situations through techniques of criminalisation, legalisation 
and juridification (Simpson 2008; S Dezalay 2012). A study of ICL 
as governance, then, must be attuned to the politics shaping and being 
produced within the matrix of a range of ICL practices. Although 
intimately reliant on states and societies for its impetus and normativity, 
ICL as a governance tool overexposes the role and responsibility of an 
alleged individual criminal for the most heinous and often the most 
systemic of acts, such as genocide, apartheid and crimes against humanity 
(Cryer 2005: 985). 
This chapter first examines the evolution of ICL as a field of practice 
and scholarship. It then considers the central actors and institutions 
within ICL before considering its normative substance and boundaries. 
The chapter ends by evaluating the contribution that ICL makes to the 
governance of intersecting domestic, international, transnational and 
global spaces. 
2. Mapping the rise of the ICL field and 
associated projects
The rise of ICL can be recounted in many ways, but, for the purposes of 
this chapter, it is important to understand how ICL emerged as a key 
component of managing conflict-torn and post-conflict societies across 
the developing world since the end of the Cold War. In this way, we 
can see ICL as an example of regulatory globalisation that has favoured 
the interests of the global North, such as in the case of global business 
regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). We must also appreciate the 
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ways in which ICL was built on, and has even colonised, other fields, 
particularly human rights and transitional justice. Finally, although it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, we need to be aware of how progressivist 
histories of ICL justify its place today as a key global governance tool. 
Compared with its domestic counterpart of criminal law, ICL springs 
from immature roots. It is for this reason that Dubber (2011: 930) 
describes ICL as ‘ahistorical’ and ‘a pioneer project to boldly go where 
no one has gone before’. When origins are needed, however, dominant 
historical accounts within ICL tend to overlook efforts during the 
interwar years and begin with the Nuremberg and Tokyo international 
military tribunals (IMTs) after World War II. The Cold War figures as a 
pause in a narrative of progress that then resumes with the ever-growing 
importance of ICL through the proliferation of international criminal 
tribunals (ICTs) from the 1990s onwards, which I consider in Section 3 
(Skouteris 2010: Chapter 4). 
Although the IMTs remain a watershed moment for ICL, what has 
been more significant is the rise of human rights as a discourse and 
set of mechanisms during democratic transitions from the 1970s 
onwards. Like ICL, the practical promise of IHRL remained largely 
unfulfilled for the first few decades after the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights of 1948 as Cold War politics shifted attention to other 
projects. According to Dezalay and Garth (2006: 239), Chile served as 
a laboratory for human rights, where activists learned to frame their 
claims less in domestic, constitutional law idioms, and more in universal, 
IHRL-centred language (see also Moyn 2010). Human rights framing 
and various transitional justice techniques became dominant tools for 
societies in transition throughout the 1970s and 1980s, especially in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe. Invoking international or universal 
norms became even more acceptable once the Cold War ended and the 
best way to do this was through recourse to human rights in increasingly 
technical and legal registers. Humanitarian actors discovered that 
professionalised legal discourse attracted donor funding and this, in turn, 
contributed to the juridification of public discourse (S Dezalay 2012: 
72–3) alongside massive institutional investments in international trials 
(Levi and Hagan 2012: 15).
Thus, the meteoric rise of the ICL industry (Tallgren 2015: 137) is very 
much a product of the post–Cold War world that allowed for greater 
multilateralism within the context of numerous ongoing and emergent 
civil conflicts and the triumph of neoliberalism. No longer paralysed by 
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superpower rivalry, the United Nations (UN), in particular, could devote 
greater attention and resources to peacekeeping operations. According 
to Orford: 
[the] expansive apparatus of techniques developed at the UN for 
conflict-prevention, peacekeeping and civil administration would no 
longer be limited to filling a political, economic, social or military 
vacuum. Instead, they would be used for detecting possible causes of 
conflict and acting early to prevent disputes arising. (Orford 2011: 91) 
The de jure obstacles of non-intervention and state sovereignty 
(as per Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) were eroded by an emphasis 
on de facto questions about state capacity and willingness to protect 
populations, particularly within the idiom of human rights (Mazower 
2012: 379–80, 388). Legal requirements of state consent or UN Security 
Council (UNSC) Chapter 7 authorisation became less important 
in the face of overwhelming humanitarian concerns that gave rise to 
the emergence of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine. This new 
humanitarianism (of militarised care) or ‘humanity law’ (Teitel 2011) 
was not simply a product of state-level multilateralism, however, as such 
activities were supported and extended by proliferating civil society 
actors, particularly within the interrelated aid, development and human 
rights sectors. Thus, in instances where certain states were deemed 
by the ‘international community’ to be incapable of protecting their 
populations, both public and private actors operating within this global 
arena were ready to intervene and directly assist such populations with 
far more than emergency relief. According to Sara Dezalay (2012), we 
can understand the post–Cold War era as producing a conflation of 
development and security that, in turn, has enabled the transformation 
of (underdeveloped) societies through various forms of intervention, 
whether military or legal.
It was within such a context of UN operations, human rights 
consciousness and debates about humanitarian intervention that ICL 
emerged as a central tool for shaping conflict-affected and post-conflict 
states (Mazower 2012: 396). Despite much of ICL’s institutional and 
normative architecture being the product of classic state-based-consent 
international law, it is also very much a product of UN design. This is 
illustrated by the UNSC’s responses to two of the most significant 
conflict-based humanitarian crises of the 1990s: the dissolution of the 
Yugoslav Republic and the Rwandan genocide. In both cases, the UNSC 
acted under Chapter VII to create ad hoc ICTs tasked with ‘prosecuting 
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persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law’ (UNSC Resolution 827 (1993)). This marked a radical departure 
vis-a-vis interpretations of the council’s powers to determine and act on 
threats to international peace and security (UN Charter, Article 39).1 
This concern with international criminal justice significantly expanded 
the remit of the UNSC beyond a model of simple conflict prevention 
and, occasionally, collective security. Such UNSC institution building 
precipitated the establishment of a number of other ICTs, including 
ICL’s permanent forum, the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
explored below. 
What is important to note here in our discussion about the expanding 
powers of the UNSC as refracted through ICL is the way in which 
a  series  of crises has led to the institutionalisation of international 
criminal  interventions backed by the police powers of the UNSC. 
Although the UN General Assembly had originally been the main UN 
body to support the ICC’s creation (Mazower 2012: 399), the UNSC’s 
key role in determining threats to the peace or acts of aggression under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well as its power under the Rome 
Statute to refer cases to the ICC have placed this highly political body 
at the centre of ICL practice. Through this interplay between law and 
politics, along with crisis and institutionalised norm, we see how the 
UNSC’s turn to ICL is emblematic of international law as a discipline 
of and a discipline in crisis (Charlesworth 2002). As a practice, ICL 
straddles crisis and norm through its focus on exceptional events 
that are then juridified and institutionalised most powerfully in ICT 
prosecutions. 
3. Delimiting the field: ICL actors, institutions 
and effects
Although ICL is increasingly seen as a default governance tool, we need 
to understand how the ‘apparent normative consensus’ on the increasing 
resort to ICL ‘comes to be presented as such’ (Levi and Hagan 2012: 14). 
This is particularly apparent during armed conflict where calls for ‘global 
justice’ are often linked with support for international criminal trials 
(Nouwen and Werner 2015: 163). In this section, I touch on how ICL 
1  See also Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic ( Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999).
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has become naturalised through the pioneering role of ‘lawyer-brokers’, 
how they operate within the transnational conflict or criminal justice 
field and how ICTs were established within this milieu. 
As a result of the processes outlined above in the post–Cold War 
world, including the juridification of public discourse, lawyers have 
become central figures in the interrelated fields of human rights and 
ICL. Within a climate of ‘humanitarianism’ and greater consciousness 
of others’ suffering, international lawyers felt the urge to ‘do something’ 
with the law (Orford 1998: 11). The elaboration of rights was not 
enough and, instead, it is ICL, with its enforcement ‘teeth’, that has 
allowed international lawyers to be part of a ‘global responsibility to 
protect’ (Nouwen 2012: 329). Critical international law scholarship on 
ICL has noted how international criminal lawyers operate through a 
deeply set (and, often, un–self-reflexive) faith in ICL’s promise of ending 
impunity (Koller 2008). This could be the product of who populates the 
ICL field as:
the boundaries between academia, advocacy, and practice are perhaps 
at their most narrow in the field; international criminal justice is 
symbolically and uncritically equated in mainstream academia with the 
triumph of the human rights movement. (Byrne 2013: 1000)
A number of socio-legal accounts have highlighted how legalisation 
of conflict has provided new opportunities for international lawyers. 
Where once lawyers tended to act in response to conflict, they began to 
act pre-emptively by defining ‘the scope of the problem itself ’ (Levi and 
Hagan 2012: 38). Lawyers now increasingly act as brokers who can 
frame a range of crises in highly expert idioms that then preclude the 
authority of other non-legal experts. Such reframing of problems also 
assures jobs and prestige as ‘[l]awyer-brokers play a key role in building 
and legitimating the market in their services and expertise’ (Dezalay and 
Garth 2012: 279). One of the best ways of consolidating authority is 
through institution building (Kauppi and Madsen 2014: 328), which 
is exemplified by the proliferation of the ICL field, which can boast an 
upward trajectory of ICTs, ICL journals and ICL university courses.
For Hagan and Levi, the end of the Cold War presented new opportunities 
for lawyers, particularly in North America, to internationalise the 
governance of war crimes. Thus, lawyers were seminal in the emergence 
of what Sara Dezalay calls the conflict field. Within the conflict or 
international criminal justice field, lawyers and legalisation were what 
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came to dominate governance practices. In particular, ‘justice’ came to be 
understood in increasingly narrow and legalistic ways. Thus, for Kamari 
Clarke (2009: 13), much of ICL’s success is a product of select actors and 
institutions being able to obscure and silence other justice narratives. 
If we understand ICL as an unmediated relationship between international 
law and the individual—whether as victim or accused—then, for Cogan, 
this is illustrative of the regulatory turn within international law more 
broadly, which straddles the contradictory traditions of human rights 
and law enforcement. This contest is epitomised by ICL itself:
With the reduction in the fear of governmental power, the limits on 
the ability to enforce human rights through state action dissipated 
significantly. The move to create international criminal tribunals 
(especially the International Criminal Court); the specification of 
international crimes (such as war crimes and crimes against humanity); 
the increasing demands of human rights treaty bodies for states to 
take positive action, including coercive action, to apply and enforce 
the law against individuals in their private capacity; the elaboration 
and criminalization of violations of human rights norms … and 
the attempted innovations in the concept of universal jurisdiction 
represent, to many, a natural extension of the human rights movement. 
(Cogan 2011: 359–60)
The crucial word in this quotation is ‘natural’, capturing how ICL has 
built on and, in many instances, colonised other transnational fields, 
including the human rights field. 
Perhaps the best way of understanding ICL’s reach is through an 
examination of ICTs and their disproportionate focus on the global 
South. The blueprints for all later ICTs were the two UNSC-created 
ad hoc tribunals mentioned above, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. Based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
their jurisdiction prevailed over all other domestic and international 
legal forums. Yet, unable to deal with the vast number of potential 
perpetrators, both tribunals required domestic counterparts to fill at 
least some of the gaps in their purview. These two examples were used 
as laboratories for the newly emerging ICL field and it was crucial that 
they served as exemplars of international standards. Such aspirations, as 
well as the nature of the hearings themselves, have produced incredibly 
lengthy and  costly trials whose outcomes could never be satisfying 
to everyone. 
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A range of civil society, state and IGO actors, building on the example of 
these two ICTs and the lessons learnt, was galvanised to work towards the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal, the ICC 
(Tallgren 1999: 359–60). The UN General Assembly requested the 
International Law Commission (ILC) to work on a draft statute for the 
court and, during the mid-1990s, a series of meetings was convened in 
New York that brought together state and civil society actors. This activity 
culminated in the Rome Conference of 1998, which was sealed with 
the signing of the ICC Statute, which came into force in 2002 with 60 
ratifications (there are now 122 parties). This statute and the court itself 
were and remain the highpoint of ICL governance, but it is important to 
note the ICC’s many limitations in the face of such hope and the nature 
of its work to date. In particular, the court is restricted in its capacity 
due to finite resources and an imperfect jurisdictional reach. The court’s 
jurisdiction is founded, first, via referral to the prosecutor by a state 
party (Article 14); second, through a referral by the UNSC (Article 13); 
and third, on the initiative of the prosecutor her/himself (Article 15). 
Although it may seem strange for states to initiate cases themselves—
especially over contentious civil conflicts, as in the examples of Mali, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and 
Uganda, so-called ‘self-referrals’ in fact indicate how the ICC tends to 
rely on state-centric accounts for some of its work (Nouwen 2012: 336; 
Robinson 2011). For example, Uganda’s self-referral in relation to the 
situation in the north of the country with the Lord’s Resistance Army 
was a way of legitimising its own narrative about the conflict (Nouwen 
and Werner 2010: 948). In contrast with Uganda, the conflict in Darfur 
came under the court’s remit through UNSC referral. Although Sudan’s 
president has been indicted, he remains able to travel widely across the 
African continent, indicating the deep distrust about at least part of the 
ICC’s current focus, where its docket is populated almost exclusively 
by African situations (the exception being Georgia, along with a 
number of non-African jurisdictions under preliminary examination). 
Clarke (2009: 46–9) goes as far as to describe the court’s work as the 
tribunalisation of African violence, amounting to a new scramble for 
Africa. These examples illustrate how ICL is increasingly being used as 
a way of framing conflict and the development of post-conflict societies 
across the global South. 
ICL’s reach is not based solely on ICTs, however, as it also extends 
directly  into the domestic realm in a number of ways, including 
through a range of more localised tribunals. Closely linked to the 
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institutional legacies of the ICT on Rwanda, the ICT on the former 
Yugoslavia and the ICC are mixed, hybrid or internationalised tribunals 
that tend to oversee transitions by bringing together domestic and 
international norms and practice within the affected state. Examples 
include Cambodia,  Timor-Leste, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. 
Where the ‘international community’ has deemed the domestic setting 
to be unaccommodating to a trial process, it is also possible to move 
domestic criminal proceedings outside the crime site, such as the ICT 
for the former Yugoslavia and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Burgis-
Kasthala 2013) in The Hague and the ICT for Rwanda in Arusha, 
Tanzania. 
4. ICL normativities: Protecting humanity 
through individual criminal responsibility 
within and beyond the state
This overview of international and mixed international criminal 
tribunals  above highlights how states, IGOs, NGOs as well as 
lawyer-brokers have all been crucial in contributing to ICL as an 
exemplar of the regulatory turn within international law more broadly. 
As  introduced above, Cogan’s (2011) notion of this regulatory turn is 
distinguished from a dominant Cold War approach of mediated law 
as between international governance and the individual to a growing 
post–Cold War emphasis on unmediated or direct regulation of the 
individual. ICL  came early to this trend through the 1948 Genocide 
Convention and the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. By the turn of the century, 
the regulatory turn in:
international law manifested itself in three ways: the establishment of 
direct international duties and their direct enforcement; the expansion 
of mediated law’s coverage and the increasing specificity in which 
that  law was outlined; and the extension and the particularising 
of facilitative law and processes. (Cogan 2011: 346)
Although it would appear that ICL is particularly reliant on the 
first element of direct international duties and their international 
enforcement  through the proliferation of ICTs, in fact, its greatest 
reach arises from both unmediated and mediated laws at the domestic 
level. For,  although ICTs are a crucial element of ICL’s development, 
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their limited capacities mean that domestic criminal prosecutions of 
international crimes are as or more important for consolidating the 
reach of ICL. States have enacted legislation as required by treaty, but 
some have also acted pre-emptively to preclude possible international 
adjudication. Most generally, states can invoke ICL norms through 
the resort to universal jurisdiction for a range of international crimes 
irrespective of their location, the perpetrator or the victim. A well-known 
example of this is the Pinochet case,2 which relied on a universalist 
interpretation of torture as crime. In 2000, the UK House of Lords 
determined that a former head of state was extraditable for alleged crimes 
of torture committed during his rule and, even though he never faced 
trial in Spain due to ill health, this did not detract from the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. Such recognition of ICL’s domestic dimension is 
also embodied in the notion of complementarity within the ICC, where 
domestic jurisdiction is the rebuttable presumption for alleged crimes 
(Articles 17–20). As ICL’s central concern is impunity, it is not significant 
whether a fair trial occurs domestically or internationally. Under the 
policy of ICC complementarity, states are required to demonstrate how 
their criminal justice systems are adequate in responding to allegations 
before the court, highlighting how ICL can have far-reaching effects on 
domestic jurisdictions. The ICC can underscore such practices through 
entering into partnership agreements with host states, such as in the 
case of Libya. Other states, IGOs and NGOs can also play a facilitative 
role in this policy of ‘positive complementarity’, whose ‘explicit aim is to 
catalyse developments at the domestic level’ either directly or indirectly 
(Nouwen 2013: 104). 
Whether an ICL trial occurs domestically, internationally or in some 
hybrid forum, the common result is the framing of individual criminal 
responsibility for acts that often straddle the fields of IHL, IHRL and 
ICL. Recalling the most elementary dimension of crime, we need to 
ask here what is the harm being regulated, who is deemed to be the 
perpetrator, who is the victim and which social world informs underlying 
narratives of harm and criminality? Although ICL often does play 
out domestically, it is crucial to recognise not simply its international 
dimension (as the product of crimes created by states), but also its global 
quality as a practice that constructs ‘humanity’ as its source, telos and 
site of regulation (Corrias and Gordon 2015). Regardless of whether 
humanity as a constituency or political community exists, the idea of 
2  R v Bow Street Magistrates Ex P Pinochet [2001] 1 A.C. 147. House of Lords.
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humanity serves as the central trope in the dominant ICL narrative of 
progress through law. In this narrative, states are the ones who facilitate 
ICL’s reach, but states are rarely the ones responsible for its breaches, 
particularly states from the global North. Recalcitrant states may be 
brought within the fold through capacity building and criminalisation, 
while, ultimately, individuals are the ones who are held out and 
sanctioned as enemies of humanity for the most serious of acts (Dubber 
2011: 932), including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
The  most ‘political’ of crimes—aggression—implicates the state more 
than any other crime and perhaps, then, it is why this offence has been 
so difficult to institutionalise within current ICL structures. Once the 
ICC potentially considers allegations of aggression after 2017, however, 
the difficulties of criminalising political projects will only highlight more 
starkly the particular biases inherent in a resort to individual criminal 
responsibility for (certain, probably non-Western-instigated) wars of 
aggression. 
5. Conclusion
International criminal law is an increasingly prominent example of the 
globalisation of regulation (see Drahos, Chapter 15, this volume) vis-a-
vis conflict-torn and post-conflict states, whose reach extends far beyond 
the prosecution of rogue individuals; its broader remit is to reconfigure 
‘incapable’ states and societies in the global South. This globalisation of 
criminal law can be contrasted with a globalisation that aimed at repairing 
relations through principles of restorative justice and responsiveness 
(see Braithwaite, Chapter 7, this volume). Despite its name: 
[the] project of international criminal law is global, rather than 
international, insofar as it concerns itself not with the interaction 
of nations or with nations taken individually, but with individuals’ 
relationship to humanity globally speaking; the offender of international 
criminal law offends humanity anywhere and everywhere, regardless of 
national affiliation. (Dubber 2011: 934, emphasis in original) 
The ICL project is also a political one that seeks to confine questions 
of social redress and repair within extremely limited registers. Where 
once justice could capture a variety of practices, when invoked through 
the international criminal justice field, it has become synonymous with 
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trials of individual criminal responsibility. ICL governance, then, relies 
on techniques of depoliticisation and juridification to advance liberal 
and neoliberal rationalities for often divided and peripheral societies. 
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Section 5: Crime 
and regulation
RegNet has been a meeting place for those interested in criminology 
and regulation. A praxis-style project in which crime stimulates creative 
regulatory theory that in turn underpins mechanisms and processes of 
regulatory response to crime was under way before RegNet’s formation. 
Braithwaite’s (1982) model of enforced self-regulation addresses 
the problem of corporate crime, as does his earlier and classic work, 
Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (1984). The chapters in 
this section show how RegNet researchers have continued this praxis-
style project. 
Russell Brewer’s opening chapter analyses how network and nodal 
theories, which are described in other chapters in this book, help us to 
understand the transformations taking place in the delivery of security 
in  the modern world. Susanne Karstedt, deriving from regulatory 
studies the principles of context independency, scale independency 
and sequencing, argues that they enable criminology to connect with 
and move between micro and macro-worlds of criminality, thereby 
potentially increasing the repertoire of solutions for both. Heather 
Strang’s chapter explains the influential experimental work started in the 
1990s by an ANU-based research group around reintegrative shaming—
work that was continued by RegNet’s Centre for Restorative Justice and 
that contributed hugely to theory and innovation in restorative justice. 
Julie Ayling uses the lens of meta-regulation, showing how one might 
develop preventive approaches to transnational environmental crime. 
Roderic Broadhurst and Mamoun Alazab discuss another transnational 
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problem, spam. They show how the networked delivery of spam requires 
an enforcement response based on a network of public and private 
actors. The network theme—this time on the need for states to govern 
the security of cyberspace through networks—emerges again in Lennon 
Chang and Peter Grabosky’s chapter.
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Scholars have, for some time now, chronicled a significant 
transformation in the way policing is organised, and have acknowledged 
the increasingly pluralistic and networked nature of crime control 
(see, among others, Bayley and Shearing 2001; Fleming and Wood 2006; 
Brodeur 2010). No longer is the state regarded as holding a monopoly 
over policing (Bayley and Shearing 2001). Instead, controlling crime has 
become shaped by networks that integrate the public police with a host 
of other actors involved in the authorisation and delivery of security, 
including various state, as well as non-state, actors. Much research has 
explored the confluence of these multiple actors in various crime control 
contexts and has served to establish key theoretical strands within this 
burgeoning scholarship that view security as being delivered through 
networks (Dupont 2004, 2006a; Fleming and Wood 2006; Wood and 
Dupont 2006). This body of work suggests that the relationships between 
actors vary, ranging from highly coordinated, coproductive alliances to 
differing forms of contestation (Shearing and Wood 2003; Crawford 
2006a). Several scholars have also sought to elucidate the nature of these 
connections and, in particular, the various ways in which information 
and resources actually flow across networks to deliver security 
(see Marks et al. 2011, 2013). One important thread emerging from this 
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scholarship recognises that assessing the nature of these flows involves 
the consideration of social structures—particularly through its macro-
structural properties (Dupont 2004, 2006c). These very dimensions have 
been subject to empirical examination in some recently published work 
by the author (Brewer 2014, 2015), offering fresh insights into how the 
distinct patterns of connections within security networks shape the ways 
in which criminogenic conditions are controlled and responded to. 
This chapter will probe key theoretical and empirical developments and 
account for how various state and non-state actors shape flows across 
networks. It begins by outlining a theoretical foundation for this work, 
detailing the evolution of crime control as it has unravelled in recent 
years, the pluralisation of policing arrangements and the emergence 
of networked approaches within the criminological literature. After 
establishing these important theoretical strands, this chapter then draws 
on findings from several recent empirical studies of security networks 
to explain and reconcile emergent structural forces that serve to shape 
network flows and influence security outcomes. It is argued here that a 
better understanding and appreciation of these forces, and the various 
contexts for which they operate, is necessary as policing networks 
continue to diversify. This chapter concludes by tying these findings in 
to broader debates occurring within criminology about the governance 
of security and the need to establish regulatory approaches to account 
for these developments.
2. Delivering security in the modern state
To fully comprehend the complex interweaving of state and non-
state actors involved in contemporary policing and its complex social 
undertones, it is first necessary to give conceptual consideration to 
precisely how the propagation of non-state orderings within the modern 
state has drastically altered the delivery of public security. The ascendency 
of neoliberalism as the prevailing economic and political paradigm has 
generally coincided with widespread privatisation, marketisation1 and 
the dispersal of systems of governance. The state’s longstanding primacy 
as the central ‘guarantor of security’ was not unaffected by the broader 
1  Marketisation refers to instances where public institutions operate in some ways as market-
oriented firms replete with market-oriented goals and objectives (that is, increased economic 
performance, competition) and market-type relationships (Salamon 1993). This process can occur, 
for example, through the reduction of subsidies and the deregulation of certain state-funded sectors.
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transformation occurring across the modern state, as it, too, was heavily 
altered by a ‘new public–private paradigm’ ( Johnston and Shearing 2003: 
32–5). Bayley and Shearing’s (1996: 586) much celebrated transformation 
thesis provides an account of these developments, proclaiming the ‘end of 
a monopoly’ in policing by public constabularies—ushering in a new line 
of scholarly inquiry seeking to account for the dispersal and restructuring 
of more traditional security roles within developed economies. In a later 
piece, Bayley and Shearing (2001: 1) argue that: 
Gradually, almost imperceptibly, policing has been ‘multilateralized’: 
a host of non-governmental groups have assumed responsibility for 
their own protection, and a host of non-governmental agencies have 
undertaken to provide security services. 
Systems of social control have, as a result, become fragmented—
being forced to restructure into an ‘array of interlaced networks and 
institutions that transcend the classical public/private divide’ and 
incorporate an increasingly diverse cast of state and non-state providers 
of security (De Maillard 2005: 326). The complexion of such networks 
is crowded and includes various government agencies and multinational 
corporations operating within the same sphere as small businesses, 
communities, associations and even individual actors (Castells 2000; 
Holley and Shearing, Chapter 10, this volume).
The literature is not in complete agreement as to the extent to which 
such fragmentation is a product of the transformation thesis, as Bayley 
and Shearing (1996, 2001) suggest. Instead, some scholars (for example, 
Jones and Newburn 1998, 2002; Newburn 2001; Hoogenboom 2010) 
argue that the nature of diversification witnessed is merely representative 
of a modern state (and its police) reinventing itself along contemporary 
hybrid structures that formally capture new (but often pre-existing) 
agents of social control, who have always coexisted with state policing 
agencies and continue to do so (such as tram conductors, bouncers, 
ushers, shopkeepers, and so on). What is consistent across this diverse 
discourse, however, is the widespread recognition of an expansion 
of policing networks within the modern state, accompanied by a 
pervasive shift in the governance of security emphasising these public/
private orderings. The  factors explaining the origins of such profound 
changes are numerous and interlaced—revising the roles of both 
public constabularies and other non-state auspices over an extended 
period. Some, like Bayley and Shearing (1996, 2001), contend that 
such emergent governance arrangements are reflective of parallel shifts 
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occurring within the modern state itself: fledgling economies throughout 
the 1970s, the rise of mass private property (see Shearing and Stenning 
1983; Kempa 2004) and the decline of the Keynesian welfare state being 
some of the most salient drivers (for further treatment of these concepts, 
see Newburn 2001; Dupont 2004; Reiner 2010). The parallel emergence 
of a ‘risk society’ has also been significant—featuring risk management as 
the key technology providing a ‘systematic way of dealing with hazards 
and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization’ (Beck 1992: 
21; see also Haines, Chapter 11, this volume). The application and 
institutionalisation of this ‘technology’ within the modernising state have 
had considerable implications for the way criminal justice institutions 
operate, and the way crime policy is conceived: shifting away from a 
more traditional and episodic ‘bandit-chasing’, deviant individual focus 
to one that resituates crime control as its primary focus (Buerger and 
Mazerolle 1998). Such developments have also been aided considerably 
by the proliferation of powerful information, communication and 
surveillance technologies throughout the 1990s, which have enabled 
previously bounded agencies, organisations and individuals to expand 
the limits of their roles and responsibilities (Dupont 2004).
With the exception of a number of countries where the state has 
aggressively retained its primacy, the resultant revisions to the 
complexion of policing represent far more than the simple devolution 
of the existing roles of state institutions into subordinate orderings, but 
instead represent a blurring of such responsibilities in a technologically 
facilitated risk-based exercise designed to control and respond to crime 
( Johnston 2000; Bayley and Shearing 2001; Waring and Weisburd 2002; 
Dupont 2004; Hoogenboom 2010). Determinism has not been a factor 
in limiting the types of private and public actors becoming involved (or 
the extent of their involvement) in this exercise, or the degree to which 
they cooperate with or compete against one another in pursuit of internal 
and external security objectives. Rather, the uncertainty associated with 
the fragmentation of responsibility over security has compelled actors 
to seek order by coordinating with others (but not necessarily with 
all others). This has prompted the establishment of new channels of 
communication, the forging of new social connections (or ties) among 
previously disparate actors (or nodes) and the formation of alliances to 
tackle crime problems (Dupont 2004). The shared models emerging 
throughout this process are expansive, yet multifaceted, interweaving 
state authorities and non-state actors into an ‘increasingly complex and 
differentiated patchwork of security provision’ (Newburn 2001: 830).
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3. Making sense of the melange
Taking stock of these developments, and making sense of the inherent 
complexities driving the provision of security in the twenty-first 
century, has proved a challenging, yet fertile, domain of scholarly 
inquiry. Within this burgeoning literature, the concept of ‘networks’ has 
provided a useful framework for portraying these complexities, and has 
attracted considerable attention from policing scholars involved in their 
study. The usage of this concept has, however, been driven largely by 
intuition about what a network is or how it should behave—drawing 
theoretical assumptions about neat, highly coordinated assemblages 
that presuppose activities of coproduction via horizontal partnerships 
(Brodeur and Dupont 2006; Dupont 2006a). This literature has 
interrogated the pervasiveness and utility of these assumptions largely 
using narrative or statistical data—concluding that policing relations 
are, in fact, characterised by a ‘complex mosaic’ of ‘more-or-less awkward 
relations’ that are ‘poorly organised and co-ordinated’, ‘suffer duplication’, 
‘are marked by competition and mistrust’ (Crawford 2006a: 466–7) and 
thus offer ‘little evidence of the development of a co-ordinated system 
of policing’ ( Jones and Newburn 1998: 197; see also Newburn 2001; 
Crawford et al. 2005). This work also sheds light on several important 
considerations surrounding the study of plural policing with which the 
application of network theories must grapple. For one, the provision 
of security within this increasingly pluralised ‘patchwork’ is incredibly 
difficult to trace, its boundaries porous and the true diversity of its 
memberships unclear. Nodes form networks across numerous plains 
of existence that overlap and intersect: they can be localised within 
communities, they can be inter-institutional, they can be transnational, 
they can also be entirely virtual and, importantly, they can change over 
time (Dupont 2004). Discrete networks can also be vastly different 
in terms of their scope and operating contexts, and ties can (and are) 
mobilised through a multifarious web of regulatory, contractual, 
voluntary and informal arrangements (Cherney et al. 2006; Dupont 
2006a). Nodes are not necessarily bound by shared values or overarching 
objectives either, and are instead more appropriately characterised as a 
medley of overlapping (but also potentially competing or conflicting) 
interests and interdependencies (for example, Castells 2000; Newburn 
2001; Crawford et al. 2005; Crawford 2006a; Brewer and Grabosky 
2014; Brewer 2015). As a consequence of all these characteristics, the 
formation of connections among nodes and development of distinct 
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patterns of relationships have seen pluralised policing networks unfold 
in unique and sometimes unexpected ways. These myriad developments 
have considerable consequences for the provision of security and warrant 
further empirical attention.
To date, very few studies of policing (and, indeed, across criminology 
more broadly) have scrutinised the structural features of such networks 
(Dupont 2006a) or, in particular, employed network science (based in 
graph theory and widely used across other disciplines) to capture and 
explain precisely how the myriad links and interdependencies formed 
among security actors (no matter how strong, fleeting or diverse) serve 
to shape outcomes (Papachristos 2011). Several scholars have called for 
a need to move away from untested theoretical assumptions and employ 
methodologies to verify the multiplex nature of policing (which may be 
captured through network approaches): the extent to which nodes form 
connections, share resources (or do not), develop trust (or do not) and 
align interests (or do not) ( Johnston and Shearing 2003; Fleming and 
Wood 2006; Johnston 2006). A substantial body of work emanating from 
within the discipline of sociology has long recognised the importance 
of accounting for a node’s positioning within a network, as well as the 
meanings behind regular patterns of relational ties that emerge within 
networks—in other words, its social structure (Marsden 1982; Wellman 
1988). However, only a handful of studies to date have adopted a network 
orientation in elucidating the complex social structure underpinning 
plural policing.2 Dupont’s (2004, 2006a, 2006b) pioneering research 
took important first steps in establishing concrete methodological and 
analytical parameters surrounding the study of security networks3 using 
relational data. Using social network analysis (SNA), this body of work 
undertook the onerous task of mapping the social structure (that is, the 
extent of connections and the placement of nodes) of localised security 
networks. Subsequent research by the author (Brewer 2014, 2015) has 
employed similar methods to build on these contributions and further 
develop understandings of how the diverse connections between nodes 
2  The dearth of research in this space is surprising, considering the number of studies that have 
adopted a network orientation to examine so-called ‘dark networks’ (Raab and Milwaard 2003). 
Several notable studies have, for example, applied social network analysis to various forms of criminal 
networks (for example, Bright and Hughes 2012; Morselli 2009; Bichler and Malm 2015).
3  Dupont (2006a: 168) posits that ‘security networks form around the authorisation and delivery 
of security, through a range of processes and services that extend from identification of needs and the 
resources available to respond to them, to the management of risks and the deployment of human 
technological assets’. Nodes can vary in specification; they may be ‘institutional, organisational, 
communal or individual agents’ that fall either directly or indirectly within this remit.
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and their emergent social structures influence security outcomes by 
shaping the flow of network assets (that is, information and resources). 
With respect to these findings, the following discussion will tease out one 
important narrative surrounding the unexpected priority of some nodes 
over others, and a resultant concentration of control within a network 
structure. This commentary will reiterate that security networks do not 
operate as egalitarian horizontal structures, and instead demonstrates 
that only a select few nodes within a given network are adequately 
positioned to ‘fully exploit the opportunities this form of governance 
yields’ (Dupont 2004: 78). 
4. Locating the positions of power and 
control over policing
The modelling undertaken of discrete security networks, first by Dupont 
(2006a, 2006b) and then by Brewer (2014, 2015), offers unique insight 
into how security is being delivered that has not previously been 
canvassed. Although these studies vary in terms of jurisdiction, size and 
scope, they both nonetheless feature consistent attributes pertaining 
to the interdependencies that exist between public and private nodes, 
the formation of distinct patterns of relational ties connecting nodes, 
and the emergence of complex structures that govern flows across 
security networks. 
First, this body of work clearly articulates the extent of the diversity 
of both public and private nodes involved in the provision of security, 
and that sufficiently dense networks can afford copious opportunities 
for exchange. This is not to suggest, however, that all actors (public and/
or private) operate on a level playing field, each having equal access to 
opportunities across the network. Rather, a node’s reach within a security 
network is affected by the extent to which its connections and activities 
are confined within distinct subgroups, or clusters. The abovementioned 
studies have shown the extent to which providers of security tend to 
concentrate activities among distinct subgroups, which, in many ways, 
serve to limit their capacities to connect to, and access resources across, 
the broader network. Brewer’s (2014) study of networked policing 
on the waterfronts of Melbourne, Los Angeles and Long Beach, for 
example, demonstrates that such patterns are reflective of tendencies 
among nodes to remain active within the confines of others who share 
similar values and interests, operating most effectively within parochial 
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silos and not concerning themselves with opportunities that may exist 
externally to that cluster. On Melbourne’s waterfront, for example, nodes 
had a tendency to restrain their activities within a single cluster, where 
their duties, skills and functions remain non-overlapping and narrowly 
constrained to the point of specialisation. Public constabularies were 
shown to concentrate their connections among other institutional nodes 
involved in sharing intelligence and undertaking joint operations, and 
were regarded by nodes contained within other clusters as largely ‘being 
left to their own devices’, as ‘only being interested in the glamour crimes’ 
and as being ‘way too far removed from industry and from the front 
line’ (Brewer 2014: 138).4 Private stakeholders, on the other hand, were 
also very much aligned with, and connected to, other organisations 
sharing similar commercial interests. Owners of infrastructure were 
chiefly concerned with ensuring business continuity (and interacted 
with other related actors on that basis), while those involved in moving/
clearing cargo also served their own internal interests. Such activities 
served to further distance (and, in some cases, alienate) these nodes in 
the eyes of external parties, promulgating the perception of ‘closed shop’ 
environments where crime problems were being addressed discretely 
(if at all) via ‘in-house solutions’ (contrary to legislative requirements 
that involve notifying public agencies contained within other clusters) 
(Brewer 2014: 138).5 These findings are significant in that they clearly 
illustrate a division of responsibility over network assets (information 
and resources), which in turn impacts on precisely where (and with 
whom) power resides within security networks. As such, opportunities 
for engagement and the flows of network resources are concentrated 
within, and are at risk of being fragmented across, distinct pockets of 
network activity.
This is not to suggest that crosscutting networking opportunities are 
futile within security networks. To the contrary, the research suggests that 
certain actors are sufficiently well connected within security networks 
to create opportunities for linkages, and effectively control the flow of 
network assets among less-connected actors. Studies of security networks 
to date have modelled control of such flows through a determination of 
which nodes actively occupy the most central (and, hence, most powerful) 
positions within a given network’s structure. Measures of centrality have 
4  Observations made by a maritime union representative and reiterated by other industry 
stakeholders interviewed for Brewer’s (2014, 2015) research.
5  Views expressed by numerous state and federal officials (law enforcement and regulators) 
interviewed for Brewer’s (2014, 2015) research.
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frequently been used by researchers of security networks (for example, 
Dupont 2006a, 2006c; Brewer 2014) and elsewhere (for example, studies 
of criminal networks; see Note 2) to identify those nodes that hold the 
most connections and, thus, the greatest opportunities to connect with, 
influence and direct flows towards others. Relatedly, Brewer’s (2015) 
study also emphasised the significance of brokerage roles undertaken 
by certain nodes within security networks, who are strategically placed 
to bridge ‘structural holes’ (Granovetter 1973) and connect otherwise 
isolated nodes. This research showed that public actors—and public 
constabularies, in particular—are both centrally and strategically situated 
network players. Such findings are perhaps unsurprising given the 
exclusive control governments have over essential security assets, which 
include specialised ‘security equipment’, the ‘legitimate use of force’ and 
access to ‘restricted crime-related information’ (Dupont 2006a: 175). 
What is striking about the social structures detailed by Brewer’s (2015) 
study of Melbourne’s waterfront, however, is that the network core is 
not exclusively the domain of the police; rather, entrepreneurial private 
nodes—in this case, the Port Corporation and terminal operators—also 
assume privileged positions to become the most strategically placed nodes 
within the entire network. In this respect, security networks have pluralised 
to such an extent that private nodes are increasingly becoming central 
players in the provision of security, and take a leading role in creating 
network paths, bridging structural holes and controlling flows across 
the entirety of the networks—thus targeting and creating opportunities 
for connection, especially among those disadvantaged and constrained 
by their structural positions within clusters.
5. Security networks and the governance 
of security
The structural elevation of private actors in crime control contexts is 
not an entirely unexpected phenomenon. Several years ago, Crawford 
(2006a:  466) noted that ‘developments in the security market’, 
including  those undertaken by private actors, represent yet another 
thread that needs to be recognised of plural policing activities 
that coexist  and intertwine. Indeed, over the past several decades, 
criminological scholarship has sought to clarify the extent of these 
developments—through empirical approaches that may serve to 
ground understandings of the conceptual placement of state and non-
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
456
state actors in an increasingly pluralised environment and to enhance 
prevailing debates surrounding the governance of security. The notion 
of ‘anchored pluralism’  (Loader and Walker 2006) represents one 
established perspective that has received considerable attention within 
the criminological literature, arguing that public constabularies exhibit 
distinct attributes that reinforce (anchor) their central position in the 
collective provision of security (for example, perceptions of legitimacy, 
symbolic power and cultural authority, access to resources and its position 
of being a backup of last resort). The empirical findings considered above 
support this perspective to a limited extent, showing that while public 
police serve as ‘anchors’ in some respects (they do maintain control over 
some network flows, as well as a symbolic position of authority), the 
network ‘does not depend on [the police] to mediate its exchanges on a 
routine basis’ (Dupont 2006a: 177).
In light of this, a nodal perspective (see further, Holley and Shearing, 
Chapter 10, this volume) better captures and explains the patterns of 
relations and coordination of security networks than does a purely state-
centric view. The ascendency of private nodes to prominent network 
positions provides clear evidence of a shift towards ‘corporate-anchored 
pluralism’, with private actors becoming a primary site of governance 
existing outside the state (see Johnston et al. 2008). The impact of 
increasingly dominant privately centred structures underpinned by 
competitive logics (that is, loss prevention) has been foreshadowed in 
the theoretical literature exploring ‘private governments’, highlighting, 
in particular, the capacity of private nodes to actively steer ‘the flow 
of events to promote security’ (Shearing 2006: 11; see also Macaulay 
1986). We have learned from the research canvassed in this review that 
private actors have considerable influence over controlling flows within 
security networks—particularly in terms of ‘build[ing] bridges between 
disconnected parts of the market and organisations where it is valuable to 
do so’ (Burt 1992: 18). Brewer’s (2015) study of Melbourne’s waterfront 
shows that private actors can (and do) broker network flows along 
such lines and, to the extent possible, exercise control over segments 
of a security network in support of ‘club goods’ (Crawford 2006b) that 
benefit the maritime industry over broader ‘public goods’ concerning 
crime reduction. By way of example, this has led to network flows that 
often preference the expedited movement of cargo, ships and trucks 
(guarding against disruptions) over the provision of thorough and time-
consuming screenings, investigations and reporting. Moreover, specific 
security undertakings often tend to be orientated towards addressing 
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vulnerabilities most pertinent to commercial interests (that is, mitigating 
internal risks), emphasising ‘volume criminality’ such as vandalism, 
trespassing and container thefts over international ‘glamour crimes’ 
such as terrorism and drug trafficking, which present more far-reaching 
consequences.6 Such capabilities introduce a conundrum where private 
actors can, through their control over certain network assets, effectively 
usurp government and the public interest and potentially seize control 
of the authorisation and delivery of security within a range of settings.
The consequences of such developments are significant. Their 
implications have been forecast in the scholarly literature with some 
trepidation. Loader (2000: 329), for example, posits the downside risks 
associated with a policing paradigm characterised by diminishing state 
involvement and control, suggesting:
[the] rapid expansion of commercial provision and competitive 
logics not only threaten to see the private sector replace the state as 
suppliers (or ‘rowers’) of policing across a range of settings; it also, more 
significantly, creates a situation in which government finds it ever more 
difficult to exercise its ‘steering’ functions, whether in terms of effecting 
some control over the distribution of policing goods, or of bringing 
service providers to democratic account.
Relatedly, Crawford et al. (2005: ix) advocate an ‘urgent need to … 
secure suitably robust forms of governance and regulation to ensure 
policing is delivered in accordance with democratic values of justice, 
equity, accountability and effectiveness’. To this end, Loader (2000: 333) 
further suggests a need to ‘begin to formulate conceptions of democratic 
regulation appropriate to the diverse instances of policing as governance 
that are currently unfolding beyond the state’ and, quoting Valverde et 
al. (1999: 31), proposes a need to develop and put in place ‘mechanisms 
… to ensure at least some measure of democratic accountability within 
bodies that might be formally “private” but which are performing more 
and more governmental actions’.
An important thread present within this scholarship suggests that, 
if left unchecked, the propagation of such social structures may ultimately 
produce serious dilemmas for governance, specifically resulting from 
the potential for abuse of corporate power by privileged private nodes. 
While it certainly is important to identify and mitigate against such 
6 Views expressed by numerous state and federal officials (law enforcement and regulators) 
interviewed for Brewer’s (2014, 2015) research.
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downside risks, it must be acknowledged that these developments also 
have a bright side—particularly in terms of enhancing crime-control 
network functionality and producing efficiency gains via an emergent 
capability to ‘bridge [social] structures and allow the unfettered access to 
information and resources, build trust, and link otherwise disconnected 
nodes’ (Brewer 2014: 178). These private actors effectively serve as 
‘conduits of exchange’, and thus have potential to create resiliency within 
otherwise fragmented security networks—enabling structural deficits to 
be overcome and thus providing access to resources across the network.
While monitoring the influence of private actors via appropriate 
regulatory measures is pertinent given the aforementioned risks, 
their implementation requires careful planning. Given the attendant 
successes (enhanced network activities, distribution of resources, and so 
on) observed by the author in his previous studies, a strong case can 
be made that such patterns should, in the right contexts, be not only 
recognised, but also encouraged. For example, Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992: 19) argue that true innovation can be an important by-product of 
‘empowering’ private actors, by ‘pushing control out of the bureaucracy’. 
Accordingly, restraints on private providers aiming to ‘guarantee universal 
compliance to democratic principles’ should take care to celebrate the 
diversity in the authorisation and delivery of security, preserve the drive 
of private actors to create certainty and order, and reap the crime control 
benefits associated with such activities (Dupont 2006c: 105). Any such 
undertaking should adopt a meta-regulatory framework (Parker and 
Braithwaite 2003; Cherney et al. 2006) that makes possible the careful 
‘regulation of regulation’ (for a depiction of how such a framework might 
be conceived, see Dupont 2006c: 104–10).
6. Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of the key theoretical and empirical 
developments around security networks. Through its review of the 
limited research available using social network methodologies, 
it  demonstrates that the structural composition of such networks is 
crucial to garnering a nuanced appreciation of the pluralisation of 
policing and the security networks that have evolved, and continue to 
evolve, as a result of that process. The studies canvassed in this chapter 
clearly illustrate that security networks are invariably messy. They vary 
immensely across time and space, they can be extraordinarily diverse in 
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terms of size, scope and membership, and the unique patterns that form 
through the multiplicity of connections between nodes can have broader 
implications for the governance of security. More research is required to 
understand these attributes and, in particular, their applicability in other 
networked policing contexts. Such work would, again, benefit from the 
application of SNA methodologies as a means to unpack these complex 
nodal patterns.
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Scaling criminology: From street 
violence to atrocity crimes
Susanne Karstedt1
1. Criminology and regulation: 
Adopting principles 
In 2000, John Braithwaite argued for the ‘transformation of 
criminology’  and even for its abandonment as a discipline in favour 
of all-encompassing ‘studies of regulation’ (2000: 223). As he noted 
then, this was not to happen in the near future, and, indeed, it did not 
happen. What happened, and what he had started a decade earlier, was 
an invasion of regulation theory, concepts and ideas into criminology, 
which, in many and prolific ways, changed how criminologists think. 
Most influential among these were the principles and practices of 
restorative justice, which became the most successful criminal justice 
innovation worldwide since the adoption of the panopticon prison in 
the nineteenth century (Parmentier et al. 2011). 
1  I owe immense gratitude to the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) as an institution, 
and to all those who made it one of the most wonderful intellectual networks and inspiring 
environments I have ever known. In particular, I wish to thank John and Valerie Braithwaite, Hilary 
Charlesworth, Peter Drahos and Peter Grabosky for support, guidance and inspiration. I would also 
like to thank the wonderful research students whom I taught in 2013 and 2014.
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However, there are more lessons to be learned for criminology and more 
conceptual tools to be imported from the regulatory framework. These 
are foundational principles rather than developed practices. This chapter 
will explore the potential of the basic principles of regulation theory and 
concepts for criminology, and will use the exemplary case of extreme 
and high-level violence. It will focus on three principles that I identify 
as most important in this area: context independency, scale independency 
and sequencing. 
These three principles are representative of the definition of (responsive) 
regulation as ‘a general theory of how to steer the flow of events’ 
(Braithwaite 2014: 432; Parker and Braithwaite 2003). This certainly 
is in stark contrast with traditional and, in particular, aetiological, 
criminology with its focus on the offender and controlling them. It has, 
however, much in common with more recent theoretical and conceptual 
developments in criminology such as routine activity theory and 
situational and environmental crime prevention; these are frameworks 
that focus on the crime incident rather than on the individuals involved. 
In this way, criminology and regulatory concepts share a common 
perspective on the dynamics of events, the role of actors within these 
and their decision-making processes (for example, Leclerc and Wortley 
2014). The common perspective includes the principles of intervening 
in the flows of events. Consequently, both criminological and regulatory 
perspectives address proximate factors rather than distal or root causes, 
and promote interventions that are based on the former rather than 
on the latter. 
Context and scale independency imply that we can move: between 
different types of the same event, for example, violence in pub brawls 
and violence between ethnic groups; between different types of events, 
for example, tax evasion and violence; between the local and the global 
and between micro and macro-contexts; or between different types of 
actors such as corporations and militias. Sequencing is a principle that 
originates from the focus on the ‘flows of events’ and implies a move 
along with the flow, following its original dynamics and changing its 
trajectory at different stages in different ways. 
The overall aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how these principles 
can inform the use of criminological knowledge and research for the 
prevention of incidents of mass violence and atrocity crimes, as well 
as for interventions when they evolve. The plan of the chapter is, first, 
to define the set of circumstances in which contemporary mass violence 
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takes place. The next sections will then explore the ways in which 
criminological knowledge and research evidence can be gauged for 
violence prevention and intervention in such contexts. I move on to ways 
of using knowledge and evidence from such large-scale violence to the 
smaller scales of street crime and gang networks. This is a process of both 
scaling up and scaling down, of moving from micro to macro-contexts 
and vice versa. 
2. Contemporary landscapes of mass 
violence and atrocity crimes 
The term ‘atrocity crime’ as used here is now widely adopted for massive 
violence committed by state and non-state actors. It includes the 
international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
such as torture or forced disappearance, as well as ethnic cleansing 
(Scheffer 2006; Karstedt 2013a; UN 2014). Contemporary contexts 
of mass violence evolve in a landscape of long-term and multifaceted 
conflicts, extreme violence and state fragility (for an overview, see 
Karstedt 2013a). The majority of mass killings since World War II have 
been part of civil wars and ethnic conflicts (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). 
These conflicts typically occur below the level of the nation-state and 
independent of its boundaries. 
These are conditions and environments that Christian Gerlach (2010) 
describes as ‘extremely violent societies’. This defines a (temporary) 
condition of society where violence has become endemic and 
encompassing. First, violence becomes ‘multipolar’: different groups 
become victims of massive attacks of physical violence, including 
mass killings, systematic sexual violence and enforced displacement, 
and mass violence oscillates between these different forms of violence. 
Next,  participation in these events spreads across the boundaries of 
different groups and, consequently, the lines between different types 
of involvement and non-involvement become blurred, as does the 
distinction between victim and perpetrator groups. Further, diverse 
groups of perpetrators participate for multiple and often changing reasons, 
ranging from domination or ethnic hatred to access to resources and 
criminal exploitation of the population through extortion and taxation. 
Groups include state government forces, paramilitary forces and militias, 
rebel forces and warlord groups—all of whom engage in complex and 
shifting alliances with each other or government forces. The  conflict 
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in the Great Lakes Region of Africa involving Rwanda, Burundi and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is an exemplary case. 
Between the 1950s and the 1990s, Hutus and Tutsis changed place as 
victims and perpetrators more than once (Prunier 2009). The final crisis 
and mass atrocities in Darfur, Sudan, were the last in a series of conflicts 
that reached back across half a century and targeted different groups; 
they all included atrocities on a massive scale (Flint and de Waal 2008). 
Atrocity crimes are increasingly committed by non-state organised actors 
such as paramilitary groups, who often are encouraged, empowered and 
guided by state actors such as the police or military or other powerful 
actors such as opposition leaders. These developments were first visible 
in Central and Latin America from the 1980s onwards (Guatemala, 
Colombia) (Rothenberg 2012), and then in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
Darfur (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009), DRC (Autesserre 2010) 
and the Central African Republic. The engagement of state forces such 
as the military and the police in paramilitary action creates a situation 
where laws and restraint are easily and deliberately ignored; this is fertile 
ground for forced displacement, torture and widespread sexual violence, 
as, for example, in Guatemala (Rothenberg 2012). Such atrocities are 
often linked to other criminal activity, including weapon and drug 
trafficking or illegal natural resources exploitation. 
We can track these developments in the declining incidents of mass 
atrocities and their death toll, as shown in Figure 27.1. There is a rapid 
decline after 1990 in the number of incidents, which mostly—with 
the exception of the Rwandan genocide—coincides with a substantive 
decrease of victims. With a considerable lag, campaigns of one-sided 
violence by state actors (police, military and paramilitary units organised 
by the state) against civilians—that is, noncombatants—as well as the 
number of victims started to decline in the second half of the 1990s; 
this mainly concerns atrocity crimes on a smaller scale (Human 
Security Report Project 2011; Sikkink 2011). However—and in line 
with the contextual patterns of extreme violence as described above—
the involvement of non-state actors such as militias, paramilitary 
defence groups, rebel groups and warlord armies has risen from a low 
30 per cent in 1997 to more than 80 per cent of all conflicts globally 
in 2007 (Human Security Report Project 2011, 2013). Hence, they 
are increasingly responsible for the massive violence, atrocities and 
dispossession committed against populations, and for the ‘horizontal 
violence’, in contrast to state-led ‘vertical’ violence.
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Figure 27.1 The global dynamics of violence, 1955–2002: Mass atrocities 
and deaths
Source: Author’s work, adapted from Harff (2003).
These contextual patterns have been measured with a Violent Societies 
Index (VSI), which addresses the typical combination of different types 
of violence. It includes battle deaths, (repressive) state violence, terrorist 
attacks and interpersonal violence (homicide).2 Table 27.1 shows the 
top-20 ‘violent societies’ across the 2000s, and demonstrates a number 
of distinctive features. First, most of these societies experienced mass 
atrocity events, either between 2000 and 2012 or previously. Second, 
those societies that had been among the most violent societies in the first 
half of the decade remained in this group in the second half until 2012. 
Extreme violence is entrenched and path-dependent; this applies equally 
when the most violent countries are tracked over a much longer period, 
from 1980 to 2009 (Karstedt 2012). State violence is most consistently 
correlated with all other types of violence, and it is a strong predictor 
for levels of other types of violence across both five-year and 10-year 
periods. In particular, where state violence had been high, homicide 
2  For each of the types of violence, a scale from one to 10 was constructed from available data 
sources. The VSI covers the period since 1976; as homicide rates were not available for the whole 
period and for many of the countries, one version of the VSI (VSI30) includes only battle deaths, 
state violence and terrorist attacks. A second version, VSI40, includes homicides and covers the 
period since 1995. The VSI40 is used here. For details, see Karstedt (2012).
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levels tended to be high in the following years (Karstedt 2013b, 2014).3 
State-led violence consistently seems to be most detrimental for the 
social and institutional fabric of societies, and its impact on societies is 
the most long-lasting.4
Table 27.1 Violent Societies Index: Top 20 countries, 2000–2012
2000–06 2007–12
Rank Country VSI Country VSI
1 Colombia 23 .3 Pakistan* 16.1
2 Russia* 15 .1 Colombia 14.8
3 India* 13 .6 Honduras 13.3
4 Israel* 13 .0 Jamaica 12.6
5 Nepal* 12 .8 India* 12.3
6 Algeria* 12 .8 El Salvador* 11.4
7 El Salvador* 11 .7 Russia* 11.1
8 Jamaica 11 .3 Philippines* 10.3
9 South Africa* 11 .2 Venezuela 10.3
10 Philippines* 11 .1 Israel* 10.2
11 Uganda* 11 .0 Syria* 9 .6
12 Brazil 10 .7 Brazil 9.6
13 Honduras 10 .5 South Africa* 9.5
14 Indonesia* 9 .6 Thailand 9.5
15 Pakistan* 9 .3 Guatemala* 9.1
16 Venezuela 9 .0 Yemen* 9 .1
17 Guatemala* 8 .8 Mexico 8 .7
18 Haiti 8 .3 Dominican Republic 8 .6
19 China* 7 .9 Uganda* 8.1
20 Thailand 7 .8 China* 7.6
* Previous mass atrocity
Note: Countries in bold were included in the top-20 countries, 2000–06.
Sources: Author’s work based on Violent Societies Index, VSI40, including homicide rates; 
see Karstedt (2012: notes 4, 5).
3  The correlations across countries were calculated for selected years in each decade (Karstedt 
2012).
4  See Karstedt (2015) for the impact of state violence on trust in police and justice in transitional 
and post-conflict societies.
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At the micro-level of local communities and individual involvement, 
clearcut divisions into perpetrators, bystanders, collaborators and 
victims  are increasingly blurred. Here, local dynamics and family 
and friendship bonds play a role, as Fujii (2009) has shown for the 
recruitment  process into violent groups and participation in violence. 
Looting, arson and damage to property, as well as assaults on the 
population and sexual assaults can be immediate precursors of massive 
violence, but often are not taken further than this. These types of violent 
action are used to threaten and intimidate the population and enforce 
displacement where resources are exploited. These are conditions 
where organised criminal groups become involved. Exemplary for 
these changes were two militia leaders who operated in the north of 
the DRC, Mai Mai Checka and Bosco Ntaganda. Both led militias 
and rebel groups who were involved in illegal resource exploitation and 
forms of organised crime, and committed atrocity crimes including 
sexual violence and slavery. Their forces and groups committed mass 
atrocities serious enough for the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
to issue arrest warrants and for the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) to send an intervention force with an explicit mandate to use 
force (Braithwaite 2013; UN News Centre 2013). 
These types of violence and the actors involved have much more in 
common with violence in the streets of Baltimore and Rio de Janeiro, 
and with gang violence, than the model of state-led and hate-induced 
atrocity crime would suggest (Alvarez 1999). Pre-existing factors such 
as ethnic tensions and hatred, or discrimination per se, are not sufficient 
for mass atrocities to happen, nor are these root causes easily addressed. 
Such types of violence and their context lend themselves to policing 
and justice strategies rather than military interventions (Hills 2015: 1). 
It is from this vantage point that criminological knowledge and research 
evidence can contribute to prevention and intervention. 
3. Scaling up: From street crime to 
atrocity crimes
Regulation theory includes deterrence as a regulatory strategy; however, 
deterrence is used in a sequenced and ‘dynamic’ approach and as a 
‘tough deterrent peak’ that ‘drives action down to the dialogic base of 
the pyramid’ (Braithwaite 2014: 433). Equally, action can be driven up 
to the top of the sanction pyramid, if dialogue fails at its broad base. 
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Where domestic and international communities intervene in contexts 
of extreme violence, the threat and the use of force against (potential) 
perpetrators as well as the threat of legal prosecution and sanctions 
combine at the top of the sanction pyramid. The former is a matter of 
control and the use of technology and manpower; the latter resides in 
the credibility of international and domestic criminal justice to bring 
perpetrators to justice. This implies both a dynamic and a sequenced 
use of deterrence rather than static and ‘passive deterrence’ (Braithwaite 
2014: 433). 
There is presently little evidence that international prosecution and 
sentencing can act as such a deterrent at the peak of the regulatory 
pyramid and bolster dialogue at its base. Akhavan (2009) provides 
anecdotal evidence from Uganda and Sudan that leaders of militias 
and armed groups feared defection as a consequence of arrest warrants 
issued by the ICC. Sikkink (2011) and Olsen et al. (2010) conclude from 
systematic research that criminal justice prosecution works as a deterrent 
only in combination with other truth and reconciliation measures, which, 
however, are located more at the dialogic base of the sanction pyramid 
than at its top. 
Criminological research provides systematic evidence that deterrent 
effects seemingly reside in policing, police presence and certainty of being 
arrested and prosecuted rather than in the threat of long prison sentences 
(Durlauf and Nagin 2011). Recently, a set of newly implemented and 
evaluated policing practices termed ‘lever-pulling policing’ has shown 
promising results in terms of reducing violence, mainly related to drug 
markets, gun use and gang activity (Braga and Weisburd 2012; Corsaro 
et al. 2012). These practices are based on the principles of ‘dynamic 
concentration of deterrence’ (Kleiman 2009; Kennedy 2008), which 
move deterrence from a static and passive principle to a sequenced and 
dialogical one. They are based on the characteristics that most violent 
settings share. Both street crime and situations of extreme violence are 
highly concentrated in ‘hotspots’ (Raleigh and Hegre 2009). Raleigh et 
al. (2010) found that entrenched and repetitive violence was, on average, 
concentrated in 15 per cent of a country’s territory. Spatial analyses of 
extreme violence and mass atrocities thus confirm that they are as highly 
concentrated in hotspots as violence and crime generally, and that a 
comparably small number of communities suffer extreme victimisation 
while many others are spared (Hagan et al. 2005; Rothenberg 2012; 
Braithwaite 2012). However, concentrated violence on the street level 
and in violent conflicts is simultaneously contagious, and spreads to 
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proximate areas if conducive conditions prevail there (for US street 
crime, see Mears and Bahti 2006; for conflicts and violence, see Buhaug 
and Gleditsch 2008). With these common characteristics, violence is an 
exemplary case for exploring scale and context independency. 
The strategies of lever-pulling policing and ‘dynamic deterrence’ are based 
on four principles: selective focusing; communication and dialogue; 
future orientation; and a broad range and escalation of intervening 
actions (Kennedy 2008; Kleiman 2009). First, the police focus resources 
on selected and known offenders, which often are leaders of networks 
and gangs (Bichler and Malm 2015). Second, police engage in directed 
and targeted communication with this group. This involves identifying 
networks, leaders and followers, and communicating the deterrent threat 
and its potential escalation to this group. Third, and importantly, the 
threat does not address past crimes but is directed at future criminal 
activity of this group and its leaders. Finally, the group will be informed 
as part of the communication strategy that the police will use all 
resources and mechanisms available in case of noncompliance (‘pulling 
all levers’). ‘Dynamic concentration of deterrence’ refers to the practice 
of successive targeting of perpetrator groups: if the deterrent threat fails 
with the selected leadership group of perpetrators, the resources are 
deployed towards the next level, and the larger group. Thus, ordinary 
members are becoming involved in putting pressure on their leaders to 
comply (Kleiman 2009). 
In a number of programs, the deterrent threat has been part of a broader 
offer for routes out of violent action. In such programs, the deterrent 
threat was communicated in meetings, which included community 
members, as well as social and welfare services; it was thus complemented 
by offers of support and positive incentives for compliance. When 
applied to spatial clusters of criminal activity (hotspots), the principle 
of concentration of deterrence has been successful: focused, intermittent 
and non-permanent deployment of police to the small number of 
hotspots significantly reduced crime and violence there, and often in 
adjacent areas, resulting in a substantive reduction of the overall rate of 
crime and violence (Weisburd et al. 2011). 
In which ways can these principles be scaled up from street crime to 
high-risk conflict zones? Violence in these contexts is mostly violence 
against all members of a group and, as such, is indiscriminately deployed. 
Can such indiscriminate violence be met by programs of selective 
deterrence? Krain (2005) shows that interventions in such contexts 
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that directly challenge perpetrators and restrain and disarm them are 
effective in slowing and stopping mass violence. The concentration of 
resources and targets makes these practices particularly adaptive to an 
environment where control is contested, where the capacity of protective 
forces is low and where criminal justice agencies are institutionally weak. 
Public commitment to targeted and intensive enforcement for future 
crimes and not crimes in the past thus can support the monitoring of 
specific types of violence (for example, sexual violence) or of a group 
of known and identified perpetrators. Concentration, selectivity and 
direct communication may address the major problem of credibility in 
creating security and deterring violent action. These strategies might also 
generate safe zones, as targeted groups take refuge in communities with 
known clusters of (law) enforcement and deterrent action (Czaika and 
Kis-Katos 2009). 
Strategies of concentrated dynamic deterrence address networks of 
perpetrators. Atrocity crimes are collective action and violence, most 
often committed by groups who are organised, trained and part of a 
command chain; most of the violence, therefore, is structured in terms 
of timing, location and use of weapons (Verwimp 2006). The ‘webs 
of violence’ through which perpetrators transmit threats and fear, and 
social networks and neighbourhood ties that facilitate recruitment and 
involvement (Fujii 2009), provide channels for targeted messages of 
deterrent threats. Local and regional leaders at the lower levels might 
be more susceptible to both threats of deterrence and positive incentives 
for compliance than the highest level of leadership (Braithwaite 2013). 
As successful gun-control programs in violence and gang-ridden cities in 
the United States demonstrate, concentrated deterrence supplemented 
by incentives for handing in guns can significantly reduce violence 
(Kleiman 2009; Kennedy 2008). Peacebuilding programs that included 
arms control, or flanked concentrated deterrence with offers of welfare 
and support, have been successfully implemented in conflict zones 
(Braithwaite et al. 2011). 
The practices of dynamic deterrence are genuinely embedded in local 
contexts. Consequently, those who use them need to have at least 
sufficient knowledge of local actors, conflicts and potential allies and 
opponents; otherwise, these strategies fire back and fuel conflict and 
violence (Autesserre 2012). They can be used by a broad range of actors 
regardless of whether their task is protection of victims or prosecution of 
perpetrators: local authorities who try to build up resistance and defence 
against atrocity crimes, national law enforcement and enforcement of 
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international criminal law. Concentrated deterrence practices can be 
used in establishing safe zones for victims, preventing recruitment into 
violent groups and activities, restraining leaders of collective violence or 
encouraging defection of subordinates. They meet their greatest challenge 
when confronting extremely ruthless opponents, the governments and 
their military and security forces—all strictly organised and hierarchical 
forces. Here, the limits of regulatory theory and of the role it assigns to 
dynamic deterrence become obvious (Braithwaite 2014). 
4. Scaling down: Peacebuilding in states 
and gang-ridden communities 
Scaling down implies that strategies for the ‘regulation of states’ can 
be applied to the ‘regulation by states’ (Braithwaite 2014: 452), and to 
their domestic crime and justice problems. At the level of states and 
the international system, the dynamic escalation of deterrent and 
forceful action is common. It is based on prioritising dialogue and 
communication before escalating. Most recently, it has been flanked 
by internationally led peacebuilding programs in conflict-ridden states 
and regions that encompass both peace settlements and transitional 
justice. Increasingly, peace and justice are seen not as antagonistic, but 
as parts of a framework of sequencing ‘truth, reconciliation and justice’ 
(Braithwaite and Nickson 2012). Can we scale down from evidence on 
peace negotiations, peacebuilding and settlement to violence reduction 
and prevention in urban neighbourhoods? 
The answer is: yes, we can. The exponentially growing number of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions since the end of the Cold 
War provides a solid database for case and quantitative studies (Human 
Security Report Project 2011: Overview). Most important for scaling 
down are three results of this research. First, mediation—whether 
resulting in ceasefires or full or partial settlements—is successful in more 
than half of the cases, and only 4 per cent fail completely (Regan et 
al. 2009). This is confirmed for regional conflicts in South-East Asia 
and Oceania, with a strong positive relationship between mediation and 
reduction of violence (Möller et al. 2011). Second, interventions, peace 
operations and the presence of a peacekeeping mission significantly 
reduce the risk of recurrence of violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; 
Fortna 2008). Such forces are particularly important to provide security 
for groups in disarmament and demobilisation programs (Human 
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Security Report Project 2011: 72–3). Third, peace agreements are 
successful in terminating violence in two-thirds of the cases, while 
violence recurs and is resumed within a five-year period in a minority 
of 32 per cent of the cases (Human Security Report Project 2013: 175). 
However, if violence is resumed, it is at a reduced level of overall violence 
(Human Security Report Project 2013: 176). 
For securing and policing gang-ridden neighbourhoods, two 
conclusions can be drawn. Mediation is nearly always the better option 
to end violence, which should not only involve police forces but also 
follow models from peacekeeping by engaging ‘groups of friends’ from 
local neighbourhoods, or even other cities. Further, where violence is 
entrenched and at high levels, efforts at communication, dialogue and 
mediation need to be repeated as often as a deterrent approach. A single-
shot intervention does not seem sufficient and, in a substantive number 
of cases, violence will be resumed; however, returning to previous levels 
will be a rather rare outcome. Successful mediation is mostly based on 
numerous failed attempts.5
Scaling down does not necessarily imply the transfer of these models 
to more stable environments, better functioning contexts or established 
and democratic criminal justice systems. Gang-ridden neighbourhoods 
in Central American cities neither have the local capacity for nor can 
they rely on a functioning system of criminal justice or on noncorrupt 
police forces. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) caution that the mechanisms 
of peacebuilding probably will not be successful where local institutional 
and economic capacity are at a low level or non-existent. It is therefore 
important in scaling down to know the local context and to engage local 
actors in building capacity. Violent actors often include members of 
the police forces and they are part of the violence problem rather than 
contributing to its solution. 
5. Towards a criminology of multiple scales 
Moving the scale of criminology from small worlds to larger ones and 
back again has proven to be a productive strategy. It owes much to the 
links that have been established between criminology and regulatory 
studies, and, in particular, to three regulatory principles: context 
5  Personal communication from John Braithwaite, based on data from the Peacekeeping 
Compared Project, June 2015. 
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independency, scale independency and sequencing. All three principles 
encourage a focus on ‘flows’ and dynamics, and moving between scales. 
When moving up in scale, much can be learned from micro-contexts 
of networks, families and neighbourhoods for larger collectivities and 
extreme violence. When moving down in scale, much is to be gleaned 
from conflict and extremely violent societies for addressing the problems 
of gang and violence-ridden neighbourhoods. Scaling down from the 
international and state levels to the neighbourhood level and up again 
has the potential to provide fresh insights for both levels. Should we 
think of crime-ridden neighbourhoods as failing states? Failing states are 
like bad neighbours and peers: they export violence and are contagious 
(Karstedt 2013b). 
I would therefore like to encourage a criminology of multiple scales. 
This will be a criminology that moves easily between the different scales, 
between the local neighbourhood and the global sphere, between gang 
networks in a local neighbourhood and the organised crime actor into 
which some states degenerate, or between local and global hotspots of 
violence (Braithwaite 2012; Karstedt 2013b). Moving our theories up 
and down the scale will provide fresh insights, and help to reshape and 
refine them (Braithwaite 2014). Moving evidence-led practices from the 
large to the small scale and vice versa will greatly enhance our repertoire 
of crime prevention. Thus, criminologists could profit from research on 
peacekeeping that finds that mediation seems to be the best option to 
end violence (Human Security Report Project 2013: 175). In return, 
criminologists could offer principles of hotspot policing to conflict and 
violence-ridden countries. In this endeavour, criminology will greatly 
profit from regulatory studies and theory. 
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Experiments in restorative justice
Heather Strang
1. Introduction
Restorative justice famously is a story both ancient and modern. 
It describes both the oldest means of nonviolent conflict resolution and 
the most recent framework for remedying long-recognised deficits in 
our criminal justice system. Its ancient form refers to traditional justice 
responses that entailed offenders making amends to their victims mainly 
through restitution, to restore order and peace after a conflict and to 
avoid the consequences of feud and vengeance (Weitekamp 1999). 
It  remains pervasive in many different renderings throughout the 
world (Braithwaite 2002), but its lineage through the Pacific region has 
been especially important in the development of recent formulations 
of restorative justice. This history has been particularly significant in 
New  Zealand and Australia, which, in large measure, have been the 
locations for many of the intellectual and practical developments in 
restorative justice (RJ) over the past 25 years.
In this chapter, I will discuss the recent history of RJ, especially in 
Australasia. I will describe the circumstances that led to both the 
establishment of a fledgling RJ program in Australia in the early 1990s 
and the events that saw that program become the subject of the largest 
piece of criminological research ever conducted in Australia. This 
research project, known as the Reintegrative Shaming Experiments 
(RISE), was  based at The Australian National University (ANU) in 
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the precursor to the Centre for Restorative Justice in the Regulatory 
Institutions Network (RegNet), and ran from 1995 until 2010 in its data 
collection phase, while data analysis continues to this day. I will discuss 
the setting up and running of this study, especially the collaborative 
arrangements for its conduct worked out between Canberra police 
officers and academics. Finally, I will assess the value of the RISE project 
today in the context of the growth of restorative practices worldwide.
2. Definition and origins 
Today, the term ‘restorative justice’ covers a multitude of justice 
innovations that have taken place across the Western world over the 
past several decades. With roots in so many indigenous and preindustrial 
traditions of conflict resolution, new programs based on principles of 
reparation and reconciliation sprang into existence from the mid-1970s 
in North America in reaction to a widespread sense of dissatisfaction 
with the formal justice system, especially from the perspective of crime 
victims (van Ness 1986; Zehr 1990; Wright 1991). Victim–offender 
mediation (VOM) and victim–offender reconciliation programs have 
been used in limited areas of the United States since that time (Umbreit 
et al. 1994, 2000; Nugent et al. 2003), though without making serious 
inroads into mainstream criminal justice. 
At the same time, European traditions of mediation in criminal matters 
going back many decades continued to flourish. This usually took the 
form of an out-of-court agreement between a victim and offender, 
sometimes but not always managed face-to-face and without other 
participants; in the case of ‘shuttle mediation’, a negotiator speaks with 
each party separately and attempts to reach a settlement that pleases 
all parties with no meeting at all. Meanwhile, by the late 1980s at the 
other end of the world, New Zealand was contemplating revolutionary 
changes to its justice system based on traditional Māori and Pacific 
Island conflict-resolution practices in which entire communities came 
together following disputes in which a member of one group had harmed 
a member of the other. 
These disparate origins have led to a flowering of imaginative alternatives 
and additions to formal justice procedures and, at the same time, 
considerable confusion and disagreement about what constitutes the 
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sine qua non of restorative justice. This confusion has led to the term 
encompassing a continuum from the crudest form of punitive payback 
through to the softest kind of resolution of trivial juvenile offending.
One way of addressing the definition problem in RJ is to describe it in 
terms of the way it works. The United Nations definition (UN 2002), 
for example, defines an RJ program as one that uses restorative processes 
and seeks to achieve restorative outcomes. Furthermore, a restorative 
process means:
any process in which the victim and the offender, and, where 
appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by 
a crime, participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising 
from the crime, generally with the help of a facilitator. (UN 2002: 3) 
More useful, perhaps, than this process orientation is Braithwaite’s 
(2002: 14) proposal to focus on the content of RJ values. He suggests 
these should include respect for human rights specified in international 
human rights agreements, and notes that the principles found there 
include both emotional and material restoration after the harm caused by 
the crime. This broad view has the advantage of excluding categorically 
many programs that presently clutter the scene internationally—
those that bear the ‘RJ’ label but which do not subscribe to these values.
Beyond these considerations, however, are some important aspects of the 
process itself without which the RJ label is, at the least, inappropriate. 
Indeed, it might be argued that process can sometimes trump values in 
deciding what is important in RJ (see Braithwaite and Strang 2001). 
Braithwaite’s (2002) description of an RJ conference—the model that 
became the subject of the RISE program—usefully operationalises the 
values and the process: 
Once wrongdoing is admitted … the conference is a meeting of … two 
communities of care. First there is a discussion of what was done and 
what the consequences have been for everyone in the room (the victim’s 
suffering, the stress experienced by the offender’s family). Then there is 
a discussion of what needs to be done to repair those different kinds 
of harm. A plan of action is agreed upon and signed by the offender 
and usually by the victim and the police officer responsible for the case. 
(Braithwaite 2002: 26)
These definitional difficulties in RJ have more than semantic importance. 
The looseness around what kind of justice intervention has the ‘right’ 
to be called RJ has led to problems with the interpretation of the 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
486
body of  research now available on the effectiveness of RJ as either a 
diversion from conventional justice or an addition to conventional 
justice (Strang  and Sherman 2015). There have been many studies 
conducted on the effectiveness of some of these versions, but none that 
approaches the rigour of the RISE program, which was squarely focused 
on RJ conferencing as the model to be tested.
The Canberra RISE program has had enormous impact on RJ 
internationally as well as in Australia. The development of RISE and 
the significance of its findings for RJ worldwide are the themes of the 
remainder of this chapter.
3. Restorative justice in Australasia
The year 1989 was a critical one for RJ, though at the time few people 
could recognise it. It saw the introduction in New Zealand of the Children, 
Young Persons and their Families Act1—a landmark piece of legislation that 
completely altered the principles and procedures for dealing with juvenile 
offending. It also saw the publication of Braithwaite’s Crime, Shame and 
Reintegration. Neither of these mentioned the term ‘restorative justice’ 
and it is hard now to appreciate that the term was virtually unknown 
at the time. As Braithwaite (2002: 26) observed, at this time: 
[F]or all of us, practice was ahead of theory, and it was well into the 
1990s before the North American label ‘restorative justice’ subsumed 
what had been developing elsewhere for a long time. 
But both these developments were fundamental to the establishment 
of  restorative justice practices in the mainstream justice systems 
of Australia and New Zealand and, later, internationally.
Prior to the introduction of this new legislation, New Zealand had 
been struggling with a growing juvenile justice problem, especially in 
its indigenous communities (Maxwell and Morris 1993). Māori people 
especially were distressed about the increasing rate at which their 
young people were being arrested, charged and prosecuted through the 
courts and receiving custodial sentences in juvenile detention centres. 
They  agitated for greater involvement of families in the resolution of 
offending behaviour, along traditional lines of resolving such matters 
1  Available at: legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1989/0024/latest/DLM147088.html.
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(Power 2000). This legislation was a direct response to these concerns 
and  led to the establishment of the New Zealand Family Group 
Conference (FGC) program.
FGCs were very much the model for a program set up in Wagga Wagga, 
New South Wales, in 1991 by NSW police officer Sergeant Terry 
O’Connell, following a visit he made to New Zealand. A colleague of 
his, John McDonald, an advisor on juvenile crime to the then NSW 
Police Commissioner, also visited New Zealand to observe FGCs. 
It was McDonald who read Braithwaite’s Crime, Shame and Reintegration 
and recognised that this theory fitted both what he had observed in 
New  Zealand and what was then being operationalised in Wagga 
Wagga. After many conversations and observations of O’Connell’s 
RJ  conferences, Braithwaite was convinced the program was robust 
enough both in its theoretical underpinning and in its execution to 
warrant the most rigorous evaluation of its effects.
By 1993, Braithwaite had embarked on an arduous journey both to 
gain the necessary permissions to expand the ‘Wagga program’ under 
the auspices of the NSW Police, whose officers would facilitate the 
conferences, and to raise funds for a rigorous evaluation of the program. 
As it turned out, getting the finance—difficult though it was to put 
together given the scale of the planned evaluation and the multiple 
funding sources—was a simpler affair to manage than the politics of 
policing at that time. After almost a year of negotiations, the NSW Police 
Commissioner, beset with difficulties of his own, declined to expand the 
program or to support the evaluation. Within a few days of this decision, 
however, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Chief Police Officer 
agreed to host a Canberra RJ conferencing program facilitated by ACT 
police officers, which would be the subject of the four RISE randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs).
4. Setting up the RISE program
Over six months in the first half of 1995, an RJ program, based on 
O’Connell’s ‘Wagga model’, was set up in Canberra in collaboration 
with the Australian Federal Police and located inside the ACT Police. 
The fledging RISE research team taking shape in The Australian 
National University’s Research School of Social Sciences Law Program 
at that time worked closely on the training of the police officers who 
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would actually facilitate the RJ conferences that would be the subject of 
the RISE evaluation (see Strang 2012). We also planned and delivered 
information days to more than 600 operational officers across four 
major policing districts, both to familiarise them with RJ principles and 
practice and to explain the process by which they would be asked to refer 
eligible cases into RISE. 
It was essential for every officer to understand the principles of 
randomisation and why treatment integrity was essential to the reliability 
and validity of the findings. It was only by engaging the cooperation of 
all these officers—if not always their enthusiasm—that cases could flow 
into RISE, because we depended entirely on them for referral into the 
study. As might have been anticipated, not all officers were interested 
in either the program or the evaluation, but the fact of such widespread 
exposure to RJ meant that, at the least, the term was familiar across the 
ACT Police Service and there was a high level of awareness of the kind 
of cases needed for referral into RISE. 
The setting up and running of RISE involved establishing unusually 
close relationships between Canberra police and Canberra academics, 
which turned out to be a learning experience on both sides. As I have 
written elsewhere (Strang 2012: 214), successful research partnerships 
on the scale of the RISE program mean the cultivation of ‘a set of human 
relationships and social networks between the research team and the 
leadership of the agency and the operational staff involved in program 
delivery’. This inevitably entailed multilayered understandings of the 
task in working towards a common purpose, often between individuals 
with little shared experience in their professional lives, yet all of whom 
could find satisfaction in what they accomplished jointly.
It was not only with the police that good relations were needed. 
In  the  months before the start of random assignment in July 1995, 
while a great deal of activity was under way with police training and 
while the finer details of the management of RISE were still be worked 
through, John Braithwaite and I embarked on a charm campaign 
across the ACT criminal justice system. No stone was left unturned 
in the magistrates’ courts, across government departments and among 
both Crown prosecution and defence lawyers, especially those who 
worked in the Children’s Court. We were not always warmly received. 
Canberra’s defence lawyers, in general, were particularly defensive. They 
were concerned about the ethics of random assignment, they told us, 
and were especially concerned that juveniles would not have the benefit 
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of their advocacy if they were diverted from court to RJ conferencing. 
They remained unconvinced of the wisdom both of the program itself 
and of testing RJ, throughout RISE.
Canberra’s media proved another headache as we attempted to make 
both the RJ program and RISE itself better known to the Canberra 
community. They tended towards the view that RJ was another too-soft 
approach in dealing with juvenile crime, and wrote about it mostly in 
those terms. The Canberra Times was often at odds with us, with both 
its then crime reporter and its then editor taking a firm stand against 
our work, each for their own reasons. As for the public at large, RJ was 
largely unknown and they were generally indifferent to it.
5. RISE research design and case referral
From the outset, the objective of the RISE research team was to test 
the effectiveness of the RJ program in the most rigorous way possible, 
and with a variety of offenders and offences. RISE would therefore 
employ a randomised research design—the ‘gold standard’ for evaluation 
on the model of clinical testing of drugs and surgical procedures in 
medicine. The cases to be referred to the research team by the police 
were  to be fed into a random assignment process that would decide 
whether eligible cases in the four offence categories would be dealt 
with in court (as they would normally be treated) or instead diverted to 
RJ conferences. It was agreed that these categories would be: juvenile 
offenders admitting property offences against a personal victim; juvenile 
offenders admitting shoplifting from large stores (no personal victims); 
offenders up to the age of 29 years admitting violent offences; and 
adults admitting drink-driving offences following a random breath test 
(see Strang 2002: Chapter 4 passim). 
The inclusion in RISE of a large drink-driving experiment (900 cases) 
proved to be a useful way of communicating with the Canberra public 
at large about RISE. By their nature, random breath tests (RBTs) are 
indeed random and scoop up a random sample of Canberrans, or at least 
of Canberra drivers, and ACT police officers were conducting more than 
100,000 RBTs each year. Every offender was required to bring supporters 
to the conference—in the case of drink driving, five supporters were 
expected—and it was estimated that more than 3,000 people had direct 
experience of RJ this way. 
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The drink-driving experiment gave the research team a steady stream 
of cases and we were able to complete data collection for this offence 
within two years. By contrast, it took five long years to obtain enough 
cases in the other three experiments, with far more modest numbers 
sought. In that period, police officers referred 173 juvenile property cases, 
113 juvenile shoplifting cases and 100 youth violence cases. This was not 
a huge haul, and many cases that would have been eligible for RISE were 
never referred for reasons briefly discussed below. Nevertheless, it was a 
large enough number of cases to reach robust and valid conclusions on 
the major outcome measures we specified.
The process of case referral from apprehending police officers to the 
research team now seems crude, but, at the time, it was cutting edge. 
It entailed providing every police officer with the RISE ‘hotline’ number 
to a mobile phone (radically new technology for the time) in the custody 
of a member of our core research staff on a rostered basis 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week, for the five-year life of the experiment. Officers 
had been trained about the type of cases we wanted in RISE; they also 
knew that they were by no means compelled to give us all such cases—
only those they were comfortable about processing either by court 
or by conference. 
The concept of random assignment is by no means an intuitive concept 
and proved a particularly tricky one with officers for whom certainty 
about the way to proceed in any given case was essential in many ways to 
their identity as police. But this research design was fundamental to the 
evaluation: none of us in the RISE team was interested in undertaking 
anything less rigorous and the advantages of an RCT were self-evident 
to us for establishing whether a causal relationship existed between the 
treatment and the outcomes. But the question of the ethics of random 
assignment often proves problematic in the operational environment 
(Strang 2012). For the research staff, it was easy to divide the ostensibly 
eligible cases into those that must go to court and those for which court 
or diversion to RJ were equally appropriate, given that we were in a 
condition of equipoise about the relative effectiveness of each in reducing 
reoffending: we simply could not tell which was better. For police officers 
whose culture and training were all about certainty, the number of cases 
were relatively few for whom they were willing to suspend that certainty 
and leave it to the sealed envelope held by the research team to decide 
which way they would be treated.
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The slow trickle of cases referred by the police caused the research team 
to come close to despair on occasion, as we struggled with the perennial 
problem when conducting experiments: case flow, case flow, case flow. 
Although much has been written about this issue (see, for example, 
Boruch 1997; Strang 2012), nothing prepared the RISE research team 
for such a lengthy and drawn-out data collection period—not to mention 
the additional funding needed to keep RISE going.
Throughout these five years, the research team kept up relentless contact 
both with senior police officers and with junior officers throughout 
the ACT. While any kind of tangible encouragement—even cakes 
and biscuits—was frowned on by senior police management, we put 
great effort into maintaining good personal relations with all officers. 
This proved to be the most reliable way of getting case referrals, although, 
inevitably, most of them ultimately came to us from a small number 
of committed officers. 
At the planning stage, outcome measures were very much focused on 
offenders and especially the potential of RJ to reduce offending, given the 
preoccupation of government and the public with this goal of criminal 
justice policy. Nevertheless, it was agreed that, as well as the question 
of reoffending, there should be two other major outcome measures in 
comparing RJ and court treatment. The impact of RJ on participating 
victims was a focus of interest to the research team from the outset, even 
if at this early point victims’ views were additional rather than a priority 
(but see Strang 2002). As well, we recognised that RISE presented an 
ideal opportunity to add to a growing theoretical and empirical evidence 
base on perceptions of both victims and offenders about procedural 
justice and police legitimacy as vital aspects of effective criminal justice 
(see, for example, Tyler 1990; Tyler et al. 1997; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). 
The views of both victims and offenders in the RJ conferences and 
in court were sought via face-to-face interviews. This was a major 
logistical exercise, with over 60 interviewers involved in the first wave of 
interviewing alone, conducted within six to eight weeks of the finalisation 
of the case. Ultimately, two more waves of interviewing took place, two 
years and then 10 years after random assignment, each bringing its own 
set of problems in tracking down participants in the experiment and 
persuading them to be interviewed. 
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In addition to the program of interviewing, the RISE team aimed to 
observe every court case and every RJ conference for the offenders in 
the experiment. This also required numerous staff members, not only to 
make and record the observations, but also to keep track of the numerous 
court appearances and the often complicated processes for setting up the 
conferences. In addition, we attempted to interview every offender and 
every victim and many of the supporters of both in every case. RISE must 
sometimes have seemed to its ANU colleagues like an enormous cuckoo 
in the nest, employing not only a core research team but also trailing a 
small army of ancillary observation and interview staff. At its peak, RISE 
consisted of around 10 observers and 20 interviewers working with the 
core team of five, who managed both ongoing collaboration with the 
police and courts and the enormous amount of data being generated. 
Even as data collection continued with the addition of new cases into 
the experiment, from 1997 onwards, a parallel program of data collection 
began that entailed the re-interviewing of RISE offenders and victims 
two years after their initial random assignment. The purpose of these 
interviews was to assess the longer-term consequences of case disposal 
by court and by RJ conferencing.
Finally, a follow-up of both victims and offenders began in 2005 on 
the tenth anniversary of the first cases coming into RISE. This wave of 
interviewing tracked the intake of cases over the period 1995 to 2000, 
and the last of this third wave was completed in 2010. 
6. Impact of RISE in Australia and 
internationally
Over the past 20 years, the RISE research team has published extensively 
on the findings of the experiments. The mass of data relating to findings 
gathered by observation of RISE cases disposed of both by court and 
by RJ conferencing, and by the interviewing of participants in those 
cases, is summarised in a major report published on the website of the 
Australian Institute of Criminology (Strang et al. 2011). 
Results concerning reoffending patterns among offenders in the four 
RISE experiments, in all their complexity, have been reported elsewhere 
(see Sherman et al. 2000; Sherman and Strang 2007, 2012; Strang et 
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al. 2013), but, in brief, the following claims can be made without 
equivocation about the effects of RJ compared with court over the two 
years following disposition:
• The juvenile/youth violence experiment showed that RJ reduced 
reoffending significantly more successfully than did court.
• The juvenile property experiment showed that, across all offenders, 
court reduced reoffending significantly more successfully than did RJ. 
This was due to the dramatic backfiring effect of RJ with Aboriginal 
property offenders; for white offenders, there was no significant 
difference between court and RJ.
• The drink-driving experiment showed that court reduced reoffending 
better than RJ.
• Across all experiments there were significantly higher perceptions 
of procedural fairness among both victims and offenders whose cases 
were dealt with by RJ than by court.
• In both the property and the violence experiments, victims 
expressed much higher levels of satisfaction with RJ than with court 
(see Strang 2002).
These results were received both nationally and internationally with 
huge interest, providing at last, as they did, a rigorous assessment of the 
effects and effectiveness of RJ compared with the processing of these 
kinds of cases through the court in the usual way. RJ is now widely 
used throughout Australia, though predominantly for juvenile offenders 
admitting to minor crime; Larsen’s (2014) report describes in detail the 
current situation in each state and territory.
Nowhere were these results more eagerly received, however, than in the 
UK Home Office, which was extremely interested in the potential in 
England and Wales of an initiative with a strong evidence base that 
successfully reduced violent offending. The new Blair Government, 
elected in 1997 with a promise to be ‘tough on crime, tough on the 
causes of crime’, was putting substantial resources into crime research, 
with special attention given to RJ. Funding was made available for a 
series of follow-up experiments in the United Kingdom with a focus 
on the effects of RJ on violent crime. But, this time, eligible offenders 
were to be mostly adults, and RJ was not to be tested as a diversion from 
normal justice through the courts but, instead, as an addition to it.
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In 2001, members of the RISE research team were successful in 
winning the Home Office funding to undertake this research. The reach 
was much greater, however, encompassing eight experiments in 
different locations, with different kinds of offences and offenders with 
different levels of seriousness. This time the team concentrated on the 
development and management of the experiments, rather than purely 
on program evaluation, which was to be carried out independently by 
the University of Sheffield. Our operational partners were the London 
Metropolitan Police for the robbery and burglary experiments, the 
Northumbria Police for the property and violence experiments and 
prisons and probation authorities in the Thames Valley area of southern 
England for the experiments on the most serious violence cases.
These experiments took place between 2001 and 2004 and have been 
extensively reported on by the Sheffield University team (Shapland et al. 
2006, 2007, 2008). They revealed, across all the experiments combined, 
a 27 per cent reduction in reoffending for offenders who experienced RJ 
in addition to normal justice processing, compared with those offenders 
randomly assigned not to receive RJ. It indicated as well that it was most 
effective for serious crime and appeared more effective for adults than 
for juveniles. In addition, there were exceptional levels of satisfaction 
among participating victims, with the additional benefit of significant 
reductions in post-traumatic stress symptoms among victims who had 
met their offenders in an RJ conference compared with those who had 
not had this experience (Angel et al. 2014).
Restorative justice conferencing now has the benefit of more numerous 
and more rigorous evaluations than perhaps any other criminal justice 
program. Some might say the world of RJ practice has been little 
influenced by this long program of research, bedevilled as it is by the 
cautiousness of policymakers around the Western world about applying 
it to those very cases for which research shows it to be most effective. 
Thus, RJ is still rarely used for serious and violent crime (but see, for 
example, Strang 2014) and instead is usually implemented precisely for 
those cases where evidence shows it to be least effective and sometimes 
even counterproductive: trivial offending by juveniles. Governments 
these days are unwilling to pay for additional services of the kind that 
RJ repays so well and instead tend to focus on using RJ practices as an 
alternative to more expensive criminal justice procedures. At the same 
time, a not infrequent consequence of these policies is net widening, 
with many additional lawbreakers, especially juveniles, being brought 
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into the justice system in cases that would not have been proceeded with 
when so-called ‘restorative practices’ were not available (see Strang and 
Sherman 2015).
Nonetheless, the RISE team that gathered at ANU in 1995, and 
continued their work in RegNet’s Centre for Restorative Justice, has 
much to be proud of. Nelson Mandela, on the occasion of his receiving 
an honorary Doctor of Laws at ANU in September 2000, inscribed his 
name on the sign for the centre—an inspiring moment for the team and 
a wonderful endorsement of our work. The quality and integrity of this 
long program of research are exceptional and the findings far-reaching. 
RISE, as well as the high-calibre research in the United Kingdom 
that built on it, is available for the world to see whenever scholars and 
practitioners need rigorous evidence about what RJ conferencing really 
can do.
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Prevention of transnational 




Transnational environmental crime includes offences such as the illegal 
taking and trafficking of wildlife and timber, the international dumping 
of toxic waste and the trade in illicit ozone-depleting substances. 
Several  features distinguish the current regulation of transnational 
environmental crime (TEC) from the regulation of environmental 
behaviour at the domestic level. 
Domestically, there is increasing use of the concepts of responsive 
regulation and smart regulation, involving regulatory pyramids, 
combinations of policy instruments and a broad range of regulatory 
actors (see John Braithwaite, Chapter 7; and Gunningham and Sinclair, 
Chapter 8, this volume; Gunningham 2009; Pink 2013). However, 
states have, when dealing with TEC, almost exclusively focused on law 
enforcement, at the peak of the regulatory pyramid. The exploration of 
other possible responses to TEC—at the lower levels of the regulatory 
pyramid and harnessing actors other than the state—is still in its infancy. 
This is largely because recognition of the enormous environmental, 
social and economic consequences of TEC, both for individual countries 
and at a global scale, is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
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Second, responding to TEC is often more complex than responding to 
domestic environmental harms. TEC crosses borders, so, if it is to be dealt 
with comprehensively, cooperation between jurisdictions is necessary. 
The transnational nature of the crimes also means they require varying 
degrees of organisation, ranging from simple small-group transactions 
to complex networked business models. Increasingly, we are seeing the 
involvement of organised criminal groups in many TECs, including 
groups known for other transnational crimes such as drug trafficking 
and terrorism. This trend raises concerns for states about national and 
international security. 
Third, prevention rather than just control is crucial in dealing with TEC. 
Transnational environmental crime can result in the complete demise of 
an environmental resource (for example, the extinction of a species) or 
in irreversible damage to the environment that has global implications. 
Prevention requires a whole-of-society approach; however, preventive 
approaches are still fairly rare even at the domestic level of environmental 
regulation, and certainly in the field of organised crime.
This chapter demonstrates how a combination of regulatory and 
criminological theories suggests some additional ways of approaching 
the prevention of TEC.
2. Current responses to transnational 
environmental crime
Together with legal economic activities (mining, logging and urban 
expansion) and climate change, TECs pose serious threats to biodiversity, 
human wellbeing and the preservation of healthy ecosystems. 
The monetary value of all organised transnational environmental crime 
has been estimated at between US$70 billion and US$213 billion 
(AU$92–280 billion) annually (Nellemann et al. 2014). There has been 
a rapid escalation in the volume of some forms of TEC in the past few 
years, such as the illicit trade in ‘luxury’ goods like ivory and rosewood, 
related mostly to an upswing in demand from the growing middle classes 
of developing countries.
An understanding of the nature of TECs and how to respond to them 
has been slow in coming and is still patchy. In many jurisdictions, laws 
to deal with these crimes are inadequate, penalties are low, enforcement 
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of such laws as exist is lax and these crimes are viewed as victimless 
and therefore of low priority. However, calls for action to combat 
TECs have increased over the past couple of years. These calls have 
come from both states and international organisations such as the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the European Parliament, 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, the G8 and 
the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). This is 
due largely to a new recognition of the broader social, economic and 
political implications of TEC. A recent report by the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and INTERPOL (Nellemann et al. 2014), dealing 
with the illicit trade in wildlife and forest resources, points out that this 
trade not only damages environmental sustainability, it also obstructs 
sustainable economic development, reduces domestic revenues, interferes 
with livelihoods and undermines good governance and the rule of law, 
particularly in still-developing nations. The prospect of the extinction 
of certain iconic species such as rhinos, tigers and elephants if illegal 
poaching is left unchecked has also helped motivate states to think more 
deeply about how to respond to these threats. So, too, has evidence of a 
growing involvement on the part of both organised crime and ‘terrorist’ 
groups (militias, insurgent groups) in perpetrating many of these crimes. 
However, responding to TEC is a tough challenge. Many TECs are 
complex in nature, involving diverse offenders, victims, motivations, 
modi operandi and outcomes.1 In addition, these crimes cross borders, 
complicating the task of responding to them. There is, therefore, no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ solution. Policing strategies, penalties and other responses 
need to be tailored to the particular crime and its specific context. 
Until now the chief response of states and international organisations 
has been to strengthen law enforcement. Transnational environmental 
crimes do not lack legal frameworks, with an abundance of applicable 
1  Consider, for example, the variety of crimes that can be categorised as ‘wildlife crime’ 
(Wyatt 2013): crimes involving the taking and trading of a variety of nonhuman animals and plants, 
serving different markets such as those for collectors’ items or traditional medicines, perpetrated by 
differently motivated offenders ranging from opportunistic individuals to highly organised crime 
groups, and resulting in different victims at varying distances from the actual act, including the 
species, humans (both individuals and societies), states and the environment itself.
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treaties2 and many interested international, regional and domestic 
institutions.3 Funding and support for law enforcement operations 
and new technologies for detection and investigation, as well as better 
resourcing and training of frontline enforcement agencies of various 
types (police, rangers, customs agencies, port and airport officials, and so 
on), have increased in recent years. But law enforcement is an expensive 
business and the financial outlay by states has not kept up with the need. 
Moreover, so far, these investments have had a limited impact on TEC, 
particularly in terms of its prevention. This is well illustrated by data on 
poaching and trafficking of rhinoceros horn—a product highly valued in 
many Asian countries for its supposed medicinal benefits as well as for 
the status its possession brings (Milliken and Shaw 2012; Ayling 2013b). 
As Figure 29.1 illustrates, poaching of rhinos in South Africa increased 
by more than 9,200 per cent between 2007 and 2014. Figures issued 
by the South African Department of Environmental Affairs indicate 
that, while arrests for poaching increased from 2010 (when figures first 
became available) to 2014 and there was a small drop in 2015, poaching 
has shown little sign of diminishing. 
2  For example, 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES); 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals (CMS or Bonn Convention); 1987 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer (Vienna Convention) and Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(Montreal Protocol); 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention); 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD). It should be noted that these treaties predominantly regulate trade rather than criminalise it.
3  For example, at the international level, there are intergovernmental organisations such as the 
CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and organisations involving partnerships between states and civil 
society such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), TRAFFIC and 
the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE); at the 
regional level are bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Wildlife Enforcement 
Network (ASEAN-WEN), the Asian Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network 
Initiative (AECEN) and the Australasian Environmental Law Enforcement & Regulators network 
(AELERT); and, at the domestic level, there are governmental environmental ministries and 
subnational networks.
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Figure 29.1 Rhinoceros poaching statistics, South Africa 
Source: Author’s research; data drawn from South African Department  
of Environmental Affairs.
It is not surprising that traditional law enforcement techniques only 
go so far towards preventing transnational environmental crimes. 
Deterrence theory tells us that the efficacy of deterrence is dependent 
on offenders’ perceptions of the likelihood of punishment (Beccaria 
1995; Erickson et al. 1977; Williams and Hawkins 1986; Nagin 1998). 
However, punishment is anything but likely for most perpetrators of 
TEC. As well as weak penalties and problems with investigation and 
enforcement, there are often impediments to law enforcement efficacy 
relating to intra and interstate agency capacity and coordination and 
public corruption.
So, the issue is: if the capacity of law enforcement to prevent TEC 
is imperfect, what else can be done? By using both regulatory and 
criminological theories, we can go some way towards answering 
that question.
3. Beyond law enforcement 
Third parties—non-state, non-offending actors—have the potential 
to be active participants in crafting and implementing strategies 
to prevent TEC; that is, to be involved in its ‘policing’. Policing as a 
concept encompasses crime prevention and law enforcement activities 
by many more actors than simply traditional law enforcement agencies. 
Over  recent decades, policing has become multilateralised or pluralised 
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(Bayley and Shearing 2001; Brewer, Chapter 26, this volume). Pluralised 
policing is largely a product of the turn to neoliberalism in the late 
twentieth century that ‘hollowed out’ the state (Rhodes 1994) as greater 
efficiency in public administration was sought and more emphasis was 
placed on markets to solve problems, including environmental ones 
(Gunningham 2009). This new hybrid governance of policing (Grabosky 
1995b)—involving not only state institutions but also business, 
community groups and individual citizens—reflects wider societal 
shifts from state-centric ‘government’ to ‘decentred, at-a-distance forms 
of state regulation’ (Braithwaite 2000: 222) and towards governance 
performed by many actors (Rhodes 1997).
4. Identifying third parties
The third parties that have the most potential to be effective providers 
of TEC policing are those that are positioned at what Bullock et al. 
(2010: 2) call ‘pinch-points for intervention’—that is, at places along the 
crime script4 where opportunities occur to disrupt or derail the crime. 
This is known in criminology as a situational crime prevention (SCP) 
approach because it focuses not on the offender but on manipulating 
the crime’s social and physical settings to prevent the crime. SCP seeks 
to reduce opportunities for crime by increasing the efforts and risks and 
diminishing the rewards associated with the crime. 
Generally, SCP has emphasised potential interventions by traditional 
law enforcement agencies in the crime script. However, often third 
parties, not police or other law enforcement agencies, are the ones who 
will be on hand at pinch-points to influence the course of the crime.
What kinds of roles can and do such third parties play in relation to TEC? 
Routine activities theory (RAT) suggests one answer. RAT underpins 
the situational crime prevention approach and has been summed up by 
Eck (2003: 88) as follows:
[A] crime is highly likely when an offender and a target come together 
at the same place, at the same time, and there is no one nearby to control 
the offender, protect the target, or regulate conduct at that place.
4  The crime script consists of the different steps that make up the particular crime. Crime scripts 
vary from crime to crime and commodity to commodity (see Cornish 1994).
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Controlling offenders (handlers), protecting victims (guardianship) and 
regulating conduct in places where crime takes place (place management) 
are all roles that various third parties positioned along the crime script 
may be able to perform to help prevent TEC. Thinking again about 
rhinoceros poaching, we might, for example, imagine a situation in which 
a community group involved in a conservancy,5 or a company engaged in 
an industry such as forestry or mining, employs at a decent wage those 
who might otherwise poach rhinos (thus, handling potential offenders), 
guards the rhinos on their patch and manages the potential crime site 
by preventing poachers’ access to the area with fencing and secure gates. 
Mapping the third parties who could possibly play the roles of handlers, 
guardians and place managers in different TEC scenarios would be 
a first significant step towards a better understanding of how various 
transnational environmental crimes might be prevented. Of course, there 
will be many third parties who are able to play only one or two of these 
roles, not all three. Banks and other financial parties, for example, are in a 
position as potential handlers to be vigilant about to whom they lend and 
in checking suspicious transactions, especially when those transactions 
form patterns over time. Indeed, lists of third parties who may play an 
intervention role to prevent TEC will often include financial parties and 
transport and warehousing firms. Other possible roles for third parties 
include demand reduction (through, for example, consumer education) 
and anticorruption activities (detection, prevention).
5. Coordinating prevention: The role 
of the state
It is one thing to identify the many non-state, non-offending parties 
who can play a part in preventing TEC. It is quite another to assume 
that all those parties will be ready, willing and able to undertake that 
task. Crime prevention can be an onerous and unwelcome job. And, 
where third parties do have the capacity and willingness to act, as is the 
case with many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) dedicated to 
protecting wildlife and forests, not all of them may be in agreement over 
strategies. Diverse ideologies can lead to clashing agendas and different 
ideas about appropriate responses to environmental harms, including 
5  A conservancy is a grassroots organisation dedicated to protecting and preserving the 
environment of a designated area. Many hundreds of conservancies exist across Africa.
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how important it is to stay within the limits of the law (White 2012). 
In short, third parties face a range of transaction and negotiation costs 
that complicates their ability to effectively act and collaborate on crime 
prevention.
So, it is important, then, to think about how the capacities of third parties 
to prevent TEC can be harnessed. The aims of ensuring that those who 
can contribute to prevention do, and that any contributions are actively 
constructive, will be best served if there is some coordination of activities 
to that end. 
Who is in the best position to do this job of coordination? States are 
really the only ones that have a full array of mechanisms (see below) 
available to catalyse preventive action by a wide range of actors, including 
the ability to coerce intransigent third parties. Of course, states may not 
always be capable of coordinating crime prevention activities. Weak states 
sometimes lack capacity to tackle crime problems at all, and civil society 
and private transnational institutions may then step in to compensate 
for this inadequacy in innovative ways. However, to coordinate a whole-
of-society response to prevent a cornucopia of crime problems that are 
transnational in nature is something that requires a greater reach than 
is typically within the power of a single private party. Strong states can 
support weak ones in this endeavour, as they already do in relation to 
state-led actions to control TEC.
Although some of the academic literature relating to TEC has dealt 
with SCP and the role of non-state actors (see, for example, Graycar and 
Felson 2010; Wellsmith 2010; Schneider 2012; Lemieux 2014), the ways 
in which governments could systematically catalyse the broad potential 
of those third parties to contribute their own capacities in the pursuit of 
preventive outcomes have not been a focus. 
6. Catalysing third parties: Mechanisms
The coordinating role the state can play in relation to third parties is 
not limited to regulation as traditionally understood, but extends beyond 
rulemaking to purposefully influencing the flow of events in any of a 
number of ways (Parker and Braithwaite 2003). The theory of responsive 
regulation indicates that the manner in which states approach the 
task of regulation needs to be context sensitive—that is, alive to the 
(non)compliance stance of the potential regulatee and able to adapt 
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to any changes in that stance (see John Braithwaite, Chapter  7, this 
volume). This suggests that states should consider adopting a repertoire 
of regulatory strategies for TEC prevention and choose between 
them according to the intended regulatee. In this way, the state can 
‘responsibilise’ third parties and encourage or command them to use 
their capacities to prevent TEC.
The strategies the state can use to harness the capacities of third parties 
to enhance security generally have been examined by Grabosky and his 
colleagues (Grabosky 1995b; Cherney et al. 2006). These range along 
a continuum of mechanisms, from coercive to non-coercive, allowing 
the state to choose a strategy that takes into account the seriousness 
of the situation it faces and how willing a particular third party is to 
contribute their capacities. Brewer (2014) has represented these strategies 
diagrammatically (Table 29.1). 
Table 29.1 Mechanisms used to facilitate community coproduction
Mechanism Description
Conscription Mandating/commanding external institutions 
through such mechanisms as legislation to carry out 







Requiring that targets of regulation interface with 
another private actor who is well placed to detect, 





Requiring the keeping and disclosure of records to 
prescribed authorities, with the aim being to enhance 




Actively seeking the cooperation of external 
institutions in furtherance of crime control. The 
formality of these arrangements can vary, from 
detailed contractual specification to informal requests 




Using new or pre-existing entitlements to persuade 
third parties to take crime control actions
Incentives offering incentives as a means of inducing institutions 
or individuals to comply with policies/processes/




Providing training and educational programs to raise 
awareness among external parties regarding agency 
responsibility and the capacity to prevent criminal 
activity
Source: Adapted from Brewer (2014: 52).
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While there is not the space in this chapter to examine these strategies in 
any detail,6 they are briefly summarised below, together with one or two 
examples of how relevant third parties have been or might be catalysed 
to play a role in preventing TEC. 
Conscription
The state could legislatively impose mandatory obligations on third 
parties to carry out certain actions or to report certain information, with 
penalties for noncompliance.
Example: The state could require privately held stockpiles of ivory and 
rhino horn to be registered on a secure government-operated register 
or actually surrendered to government for safekeeping or disposal, with 
the dual aims of reducing the amount of stock potentially available for 
trading on the black market and deterring market speculation, which 
provides an incentive for poaching (Mason et al. 2012). 
Required private interface
By requiring potential offenders to ‘use the machinery of private 
institutions’, the state can harness the capacity of third parties (the private 
institutions) as ‘gatekeepers’ at the legal–illegal interface.
Example: Governments could require private businesses involved in the 
logging of timber concessions to have their records audited by formally 
accredited professional institutions to ensure that harvest, export and 
financial records match up and comply with legal allowances.
Required record-keeping and disclosure
The state often requires record-keeping to ensure that it has access to 
information, but record-keeping requirements also open the possibility 
that the record-keeper (third party) will spot anomalies that indicate 
that a crime may be or is being committed and either report this to the 
authorities or personally intervene to close a criminal opportunity.
6  For a more detailed description and further examples, see Ayling (2013a).
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Example: Online auction houses such as eBay could be required to keep 
records of all attempts to trade endangered species products through 
their sites, thus requiring these third parties to undertake a surveillance 
role that could assist in closing down a trafficking opportunity.
Cooptation of external interests
Formal and informal partnerships between states and non-state actors 
(third parties) are common in the environmental area at a domestic level, 
and are becoming increasingly common with respect to TEC.
Examples: In many African countries, state-registered conservancies 
are  charged with protecting and conserving the environment of a 
designated area, often with state funding and sometimes funded by 
their own activities (for example, tourism). Such public recognition 
of the important role of local residents in environmental protection 
can significantly increase the value a community ascribes to its area’s 
biodiversity and its willingness to take TEC prevention measures. 
The  existence of motivated conservancies may itself have a chilling 
influence on criminal activity.
NGOs often work in partnership with international organisations 
to respond to TEC. For instance, the International Fund for Animal 
Welfare (IFAW) has long collaborated with INTERPOL on anti–
ivory trafficking projects and currently helps to train law enforcement 
and customs officers at major East African airports in investigative 
techniques for wildlife crime (INTERPOL 2013).
Conferring entitlements
The state could create rights for third parties and the ability to enforce 
them in ways that will assist in TEC prevention.
Example: Private enforcement provisions already exist under domestic 
environmental statutes in some jurisdictions such as the United States 
and Australia.7 A further broadening of legislative standing requirements 
or the creation of additional rights could encourage third parties to 
take preventive action, say, with respect to other third parties with 
guardianship or place management responsibilities.
7  US: Endangered Species Act 16 USC §1531 et seq., 1973; Australia: Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s. 475. 
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Incentives
Using incentives can be more powerful than other more coercive 
strategies because they are often perceived as more legitimate (Grabosky 
1995a). Direct incentives include the use of rewards for providing 
information to authorities or for capturing crime perpetrators; indirect 
incentives include tax deductions, administrative privileges and prizes.
Example: The US Lacey Act criminalises trafficking in the United States 
of wildlife taken in contravention of any foreign law. Under the Act, 
a reward account has been set up into which some of the fines levied 
under the Act are deposited and used to provide financial incentives for 
information leading to the arrest and conviction of violators.8
Education and capacity-building/facilitation
Education, capacity-building and other facilitative measures can enable 
third parties to better make use of their capacities to further the aim 
of crime prevention. 
Examples: Training could be given in environmental law, investigatory 
skills, criminal justice processes and rules of evidence to NGOs and 
community groups that wish to assist with law enforcement activities. 
States could also assist these groups financially as they engage in 
consumer  education programs and the development of certification 
schemes. For example, significant funding was provided by Austria 
towards the establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council 
(Bartley 2007).
7. Regulatory risks
Less intrusive regulation can be extremely powerful but regulating at a 
distance is not without risks and difficulties. The transnational nature 
of environmental crimes such as wildlife and timber trafficking makes 
coordinating crime prevention efforts complex. Organised criminal 
groups are adept at taking advantage of differences in regulation between 
8  See 16 USC § 3375(d).
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states, so, although it is hard, making efforts to coordinate efforts across 
jurisdictions not only in relation to law enforcement but also on third-
party regulatory measures is worthwhile. 
Potential third-party mobilisations also need to be thoroughly assessed 
for their likelihood of furthering the aim of preventing the targeted 
TEC and for possible unintended and undesirable consequences. 
This may require third parties to be verified as worthy of the state’s 
trust, especially when being funded for crime prevention activities. 
Accountability mechanisms for third-party actions also need to be 
put in place. These mechanisms may need to be situated outside state 
jurisdictions to ensure a corruption-free process—perhaps in existing or 
bespoke intergovernmental or international bodies. Evaluation of TEC 
prevention measures is also desirable to ensure that states can learn what 
works in this area and not engage in constantly reinventing the wheel.
8. Conclusion
Reducing the impact of TEC needs a whole-of-society approach 
and calls on the state to take on, as it has in other areas of regulation, 
a much greater steering role. A more systematic approach to harnessing 
the many capacities of third parties for policing TEC, involving 
coordination by national governments alone or in combination, 
could be guided by work already done in relation to strategies for the 
coproduction of security generally. Although there are challenges to 
achieving this kind of coordination, it is clear that there is a need to 
go beyond law enforcement to counter criminal networks perpetrating 
TEC with a networked response that draws together the good work 
in the field already being done by third parties, albeit in an ad hoc way, 
both as individual initiatives and in partnership with or at the behest 
of governments.
As outlined here, coproductive regulatory strategies are readily applicable 
in the area of TEC prevention. This chapter has suggested that what 
is needed is the mapping of relevant third parties for particular types 
of TEC and the planning of appropriate responsive strategies that 
make use of their varied regulatory capabilities, including as guardians 
of TEC  victims, handlers of TEC offenders and place managers 
of TEC sites. 
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Roderic Broadhurst and Mamoun Alazab1
1. Introduction
Unsolicited bulk, mass emails, or ‘spam’, pose a global challenge because 
they form a major vector for the dissemination of malware. Spam takes 
many forms and has many varieties. Spam can merely carry annoying 
but benign advertising; however, it can also be the initial contact for 
cybercriminals, such as the operators of a fraudulent scheme who use 
emails to solicit prospective victims for money or to commit identity 
theft by deceiving recipients into sharing personal and financial account 
information.
Legislation criminalising or limiting spam has been introduced in more 
than 30 countries (OECD 2004) but there is no mutual agreement on 
its definition. Spam is difficult to define precisely, but broadly includes 
any unsolicited electronic message, usually sent as a bulk transmission. 
Definitions vary depending on whether the emphasis is on lack of 
consent (unsolicited) or the content of the email. The Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA 2004, 2014) defined 
1  We acknowledge the assistance of the Criminology Research Council (Grant CRG 13/12-13) 
and the Australian Research Council. We also thank the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (ACMA) and the Computer Emergency Response Team Australia for their assistance 
in the provision of data and support. We thank our colleagues Peter Grabosky, Khoi-Nguyen Tran, 
Ki-hong ‘Steve’ Chon and Brigitte Bouhours for their contributions to the data collection and 
analysis.
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
518
spam as ‘unsolicited commercial electronic messages’, which may not 
capture the versatility of spam. Under this definition, a single electronic 
message can be considered spam if it is unsolicited. On the other hand, 
Spamhaus (2014) considers an email is spam if it is both unsolicited 
and sent in bulk. 
Despite international efforts initiated under the 2004 London 
Action Plan On International Spam Enforcement Cooperation2 to 
further global  cooperation and public–private partnerships to address 
spam-related problems, spam remains a significant cost and risk 
(UNODC 2013). The action plan brings together 27 states and agencies 
(Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, South 
Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States), non-governmental agencies (for example, Spamhaus 
Project, M3AAWG), telecom and information security companies 
(for example, Verizon, McAfee) and corporate and consumer groups to 
implement anti-spam activities. The London Action Plan invites and 
encourages informal cooperation among states. It acts as a clearing house, 
establishes for each participant a designated contact point for spam-
related problems and engages the private sector in anti-spam activities. 
The plan encourages crime prevention as well as improvements in the 
investigation of spam-related crimes such as online fraud, phishing and 
virus dissemination. 
Thus, the plan is an example of how informal and pluralistic attempts 
at  regulation of a costly and harmful global activity arise when 
much of  the behaviour occurs beyond domestic borders—outside 
the sovereignty of the state. When states alone lack the capability to 
suppress spam, they must rely on mutual interest among states and a 
host of non-state actors to perform tasks that are usually the province 
of law enforcement agencies. So, via partnerships, states seek to steer 
private actors and multinational corporations (especially in information 
technology and related domains) that often have the means to monitor 
and interdict to play a regulatory role (see Grabosky, Chapter 9; and 
Tusikov, Chapter 20, this volume).
2  See: londonactionplan.org/.
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Although levels of malicious spam may seem insignificant at the individual 
level, it is estimated that in 2013, approximately 183 billion emails were 
sent and received every day, so the number of malicious communications 
can be substantial. Symantec (2013) estimated that about 30 million spam 
emails are sent each day, and, as we show, significant proportions include 
malware. It is not surprising that a huge amount of spam emails are 
necessary because it has been estimated that, for a spam advertisement to 
be profitable, one in 25,000 recipients need to open the email and make 
a purchase in an underground market (Symantec 2008). Spam sent in 
2010 earned its operators US$2.7  million (AU$3.5  million) in profit 
from fake sales in pharmaceuticals alone (Krebs 2012), while the cost of 
spam to internet services providers (ISPs) and users worldwide reaches 
into the billions of dollars (Anderson et al. 2013). A recent study on the 
economics of spam (Rao and Reiley 2012) calculated that spammers may 
collect gross global revenues of the order of US$200 million (AU$262 
million) per year, while some US$20 billion (AU$26 billion) is spent 
fending off unwanted emails. 
Spamhaus, a non-profit spam monitor operating since 1998, maintains 
the Register of Known Spam Operations (ROKSO) and estimates 
that about 100 spam operations or spam ‘gangs’ are active and may be 
responsible for as much as 80 per cent of the spam present in cyberspace 
at any one time. These simple and often virtual crime operations may 
comprise small groups of up to five people who first 
acquire a list of victim email addresses from a specialised harvester, rent 
a botnet3 … join a spam affiliate programme and include a link to an 
illegal market site on his spam emails. (Stringhini 2015: 36) 
Once this process is in place, the spammer receives a cut of the affiliate 
market earnings generated by his/her victims.
Spamhaus can make traces via aliases, addresses, redirections, locations 
of servers, domains and Domain Name System (DNS) setups to a 
relatively small hardcore group, who: 
3  A botnet is a group of computers that have been infected by some form of malware. They 
respond to instructions from a remote computer through command-and-control servers, to send 
bulk spam, make denial of service attacks, install other malicious code (such as fake antivirus 
software) and steal sensitive information, such as harvested passwords and credit card and bank 
account numbers, to be used or sold.
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pretend to operate ‘offshore’ and hide behind anonymity. Some pretend 
to be small ‘ISPs’ themselves, claiming to their providers that the spam 
is being sent not by them but by non-existent ‘customers’. When caught, 
almost all use the age old tactic of lying to each ISP long enough to buy 
a few days or weeks more of spamming and when terminated simply 
move on to the next ISP already set up and waiting. (Spamhaus 2015)
Spam emails with hidden malware or uniform resource locators (URLs) 
that direct users to malware are common methods used by cybercriminals 
to find new victims. For example, spammers may want to expand their 
botnets or cybercriminals may use them to propagate their computer 
intrusion software (that is, software developed as ‘crimeware’) to harvest 
passwords, credit card accounts, bank accounts and other sensitive 
personal information. The need to develop preventive methods to help 
reduce the propagation of malware via the frequently used medium of 
spam emails is the focus here. Before presenting our results, we briefly 
describe our data and how criminals disseminate spam emails.
Unlike ‘low volume–high value’ cybercrime that targets financial services 
and requires advanced hacking capability, spam enables malware to 
reach ‘high volume–low value’ targets that are less likely to have effective 
antivirus measures in place. Such malware is distributed through two 
types of spam: those with an attachment that contains a virus or trojan 
horse that installs itself in the victim’s computer when opened; and those 
with a hyperlink to a web page where the malware is downloaded on to 
the compromised computer.
Spam thrives on the acquisition of active email addresses and these 
addresses are harvested in three different ways: first, by searching for 
email addresses listed on websites and message boards; second, by 
performing a ‘dictionary attack’, which is a combination of randomly 
generated usernames with known domain names to guess correct 
addresses; and finally, by purchasing address lists from other individuals 
or organisations such as in underground markets (Takahashi et al. 2010). 
Once email addresses are harvested, spammers distribute spam by using 
botnets, and this technique is used by large spam botnets such as Storm 
Worm, Grum and Bobax (Stringhini et al. 2012). Spam often contains 
a malicious attachment or a link to legitimate websites that have been 
compromised by a web attack toolkit (for example, Blackhole).
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Botnet-based spam emerged around 2004 as a novel distribution network 
and is responsible for almost all large-scale spam campaigns. Beside its 
potential for crime, spam is problematic because of its sheer volume, 
which impedes the flow of legitimate internet traffic. Spam volumes are 
estimated to be about 30 million spam emails each day (Symantec 2013). 
A recent innovation involves attacking computers indirectly by 
concealing intrusions in an intermediary website or ‘waterhole’—that 
is, sites the target is likely to visit and which also host malicious code 
on the landing page (see Figure 30.1). Cybercriminals also create links 
in spam messages that point to exploit portals hosting malware—an 
alternative approach that avoids the need to hack legitimate websites 
before planting malicious code. 
Figure 30.1 Example of a redirection link ‘waterhole’ attack
Source: Authors’ work.
Our analysis shows that 40 per cent of our dataset consists of emails that 
have been distributed more than 50 times and sometimes more than 
1,000 times, suggesting that these spam emails have been sent by different 
groups, using botnets to distribute them (Alazab and Broadhurst 2016). 
2. Dataset and results
We use three real-world datasets (DS) of spam emails collected in 
2012. Emails are identified as spam in two ways: first, an email user 
may determine that an email is spam; second, emails may be collected 
and  identified as originating from known spamming networks. 
Both scenarios are captured in our real-world DS. For each email, we 
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extracted attachments and URLs, uploaded them to VirusTotal and 
scanned for viruses and suspicious content. We considered an attachment 
or URL to be malicious if at least one scanner showed a positive result. 
The first dataset, the HABUL DS from the HABUL Plugin for 
‘Thunderbird’, uses an adaptive filter to learn (machine learn variants 
of spam text) from a user’s labelling of emails as spam or normal email. 
The second dataset is an automated collection from a global system 
of honeypots and spam-traps designed to monitor information about 
spam and other malicious activities, which we labelled the ‘Botnet DS’. 
The third dataset is formed from spam emails reported by Australians 
and sourced from the spam intelligence DS (provided by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority), which we labelled the ‘OzSpam 
DS’. While the spam in the HABUL DS has been viewed by a potential 
victim, the Botnet DS and OzSpam DS contain spam that circulated all 
over the world, but without the certainty that the emails have reached 
their intended targets. 
Altogether, about 13.5 million spam emails were collected, which 
included nearly half a million attachments and over six million URLs. 
The proportion of spam that carried malicious code in attachments 
or through hyperlinks in the body text of the email varied across the 
different sources. For example, 1.38 per cent of HABUL attachments 
and 13 per cent of HABUL hyperlinks were identified as malware and 
this was similar to the OzSpam DS, which identified 10.5 per cent of 
hyperlinks and 0.77 per cent of attachments as malware. The Botnet 
DS, however, had fewer suspect hyperlinks (0.52 per cent), which 
was as expected given the method applied, but approximately similar 
proportions of malware in the attachments (0.95 per cent) forwarded 
with the spam mail. 
For each dataset, there were peak periods of spam that contained 
malicious content or did not contain it, and which suggested different 
types of spam (mass propagation) campaigns. These campaigns usually 
shared similarities in the content of their emails, and this alone may 
indicate the risk of malicious content. 
Four main methods of attack were noted: social engineering and spear 
phishing, compressed files, right-to-left override email attacks and 
URL shortening. These are discussed in further detail below.
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Social engineering and spear phishing
Cybercriminals favour social engineering tactics to persuade their 
victims to click on a malicious URL or download malware because it is 
easier than trying to insert malware remotely (such as via trojan horses) 
so that key-loggers can obtain banking passwords or other sensitive 
information. In examining the malicious attachment file names in 
our data, we found a trend towards referencing trusted business labels 
(for  example, labels or brands related to shipping) rather than other 
labels or general names. 
Spear phishing is a spamming method that targets selected users or 
groups via a compromised computer that can then be used as a ‘zombie’ 
computer capable of importing malware (key-loggers, crypters, and 
so on) to steal banking passwords and other confidential data. Spear 
phishing emails are personalised, and often try to impersonate a trusted 
source to avoid anti-spam detection at the system level. The most 
commonly found shared file types using purloined brands had the file 
extension ‘.zip’, and were responsible for 76 per cent of the total number 
of spear phishing email attachments during our monitoring period. 
File extensions bearing other common formats—such as ‘.pdf ’, ‘.xls’, 
‘.doc’, ‘.jpg’, ‘.txt’ and ‘.gif ’—accounted for the remaining 24 per cent 
of malware, and, of these, .jpg and .txt extensions accounted for most. 
Spammers have also learnt to focus only on sending a single malicious 
attachment and to craft the payload necessary to get that attachment to 
the end user. 
Compressed files
Spam emails can carry different types of files as attachments; however, 
it  appears that files disguised under the extension .zip are the most 
common malware file type. The majority of spam filters block email 
attachments with the ‘.exe’ file extension, but do not reliably scan 
archived and zipped documents, therefore encouraging spammers 
to compress executable files (.exe) into an archived form such as .zip. 
Our analysis showed that .zip files represent the majority (90 per cent) 
of malicious files. 
There are malware formats that also try to get a recipient to download 
them using the double extensions method (for example, as ‘per.doc.exe’). 
Other detection avoidance measures use double extensions (‘.jpg.exe’) to 
try to trick users or filters. Recipients will see .jpg or .pdf and may feel 
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comfortable to open up what seems to be an image or a standard pdf 
file. Our analysis of the three DS confirms that these simple avoidance 
methods are still commonplace. 
Right-to-left override email attacks
Usually when executable files are decompressed their appearance 
provokes suspicion. So spammers conceal executable files with fake icons 
to make them appear as harmless file extensions, such as .pdf, .doc, .xls or 
.jpg, and employ the Unicode’s right-to-left override (RLO) technique, 
which reverses the character ordering from right to left and so changes 
the order of characters. 
Spammers thus use the RLO technique to deceive users into downloading 
and executing the malicious file hidden in an attachment under the cover 
of a fake file name extension, and the technique is often combined with 
very long file names that disguise the .exe file name extension. To make 
the process even harder, the malicious file names manipulated in this 
method are also delivered within .zip files or archives. 
URL shortening
A service called ‘URL shortening’ has become popular and also enables 
methods to disguise or obfuscate spam/malware. This service allows long 
URLs to be transformed into much shorter URLs and thus enhances 
the likely use of the link. Spammers use URL-shortening services, 
even establishing their own.
Spammers redirect a link through many different shortened links: rather 
than leading straight to the spammer’s final destination website, the 
links point to a shortened URL on the spammer’s fake URL-shortening 
website, before redirecting to the spammer’s final website and its hidden 
malicious content. This service has become more common because of 
its simplicity, automated capability and anonymity. Popular URL-
shortener websites such as Google URL Shortener and Bit.ly provide 
an easy interface that allows users to convert long URLs into short ones. 
Information security companies have warned that attacks using URL-
shortening services are on the rise, and our data showed that URLs 
shortened via Twitter accounted for 56 per cent of these events. 
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3. Responses: Joint investigations and 
legal interventions
Technological or legal responses alone are not as effective as those that 
combine technical methods with sound law enforcement practices and 
process. Coordinated operations were needed to take down several 
complex botnets (for example, McColo, GameOver ZeuS, Grum, 
Coreflood, Rustock). The advantage of using legal processes is that it 
mandates the removal of all the top-level domain names associated with 
spam. The examples noted also showed the benefits of international 
police cooperation, even though the investigations were unable to disarm 
the techniques used or arrest the offenders involved. 
In June 2014, the US Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) announced a national and international effort to 
disrupt the GameOver ZeuS botnet (US Justice Department 2014). 
It was a joint effort by investigators at the FBI, Europol and the United 
Kingdom’s National Crime Agency as well as security firms CrowdStrike, 
Dell SecureWorks, Symantec, Trend Micro and McAfee and academic 
researchers at Vrije University in Amsterdam and Saarland University 
in Germany. The GameOver ZeuS botnet spread mainly through spam 
email and was thought to be involved in the theft of banking and 
other credentials from individuals and businesses all around the world. 
These combined technical and law enforcement responses to complex 
cybercrime activities also depend on the role of private information 
security businesses to achieve the most effective solution (OECD 2006; 
Krebs 2014). 
A recent study of spam and phishing identified the location of high-
risk ISPs that acted as ‘internet bad neighbours’, and found that 
spam originates from a small number of ISPs. The majority of ‘bad’ 
ISPs were concentrated in India, Brazil, West Africa and Vietnam. 
Typically, cybercrime is executed in a jurisdiction that is not party to 
multilateral enforcement agreements such as the Council of Europe’s 
Cybercrime Convention, which enables mutual legal assistance 
across borders to facilitate the investigation of a cybercrime event, 
while the victim is located  in another jurisdiction (Broadhurst 2006). 
For  example,  62  per  cent of all the addresses serviced by Spectranet, 
an ISP in Nigeria, were sending out spam (Moura 2013). In 2009, 
the US Federal Trade Commission, for example, closed the ISP 3FN 
service, as it was found to be hosting spam-spewing botnets, phishing 
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websites, child pornography and malicious web content (Federal Trade 
Commission 2009). However, Trend Micro (2010) reported that the 
service was back in business a few days later—reinvented and established 
outside US jurisdiction. 
Laws, regulations and policies can, however, sometimes hinder the 
effectiveness of public or private actions. Policies such as ‘network (net) 
neutrality’ or common carrier policies (EC 2009) can hinder ISPs and 
other network providers from acting to eliminate criminal traffic from 
their networks because of the risk of breaching network neutrality 
regimes. Even in states where laws do not specifically preclude action, the 
conventional approach is to minimise possible interventions by ISPs and 
other actors that could counter or eliminate undesirable behaviour (such 
as hate mail, spamming). A potential policy change would be to reframe 
network neutrality laws or practices to allow for the alteration of internet 
traffic flows that indicate a high risk of being malicious. Under some 
interpretations of privacy laws, such as the US Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA), companies that detect illegal activity on their 
networks are unable to voluntarily share information with other parties 
(for example, other ISPs or information security firms) about such 
activities to prevent further illegal activity. For instance, corporations are 
concerned about sharing non-redacted spam and phishing mail feeds, 
for fear of unintentionally violating their customers’ privacy rights under 
the ECPA (Barrett et al. 2011). Similar concerns prevail in Australia and 
have the effect of fragmenting collective countermeasures and creating 
barriers to applied research on such problems.
4. Discussion 
Spam as a prime means for social engineering continues to be a popular 
way to spread and inject malware on digital devices. Household users and 
small enterprises are most vulnerable to cyberattack due to factors such 
as the cost of maintaining up-to-date security. Thus, the oft-repeated 
cliché that our security is only as good as our weakest link applies. 
Existing detection and defence mechanisms to deal with email spam 
containing malicious code are mostly reactive and ineffective against 
constantly evolving spam email formats that hide ever improving 
malware payloads and capabilities. There is an urgent need to identify 
new malware-embedded spam attacks (especially in the increasingly 
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common URL approach) without the need to wait for updates from 
spam scanners or blacklists (Tran et al. 2013). Machine-learning 
methods of identifying spam and other spam-filtering methods aim to 
be highly responsive to changes in spamming techniques, but have not 
been sufficiently flexible to handle variations in the content or delivery 
methods found in spam emails (Blanzieri and Bryl 2008; Alazab 2015). 
The widespread use of botnets shows how spammers manipulate the 
networks of infected computers and servers around the world to ensure 
high volumes of spam are delivered. The increased role for networked 
crime groups has also impacted on the scale and sophistication of 
cybercrime. The emergence of bespoke email content tailored to entice a 
specific victim or victim type via spear phishing also poses dangers that 
require equally targeted education and crime prevention efforts. The use 
of spam emails remains an important and underestimated vector for the 
propagation of malware. 
In short, fighting spam requires a combination of technology and relevant, 
up-to-date laws and policies as well as the constant reformulation of 
crime prevention practices to keep abreast of the evolution of spam–
malware techniques. This, as we noted in the introduction, requires 
effective partnerships between the state, private actors and multilateral 
groupings of states, corporations and consumer groups that can tackle 
the cross-jurisdictional nature of spam and malware propagation. Shifts 
in malware attacks to new vectors using spam-like methods often based 
on astute and tailored social engineering also need constant attention. 
A good example is the shift to Twitter and other new media, where, 
for example, URL-shortening methods may prosper. While effective 
civil measures (including anti-address-harvesting laws) are in place 
to mitigate commercial misuse of spam in Australian cyberspace, the 
challenge lies in the integration of countermeasures that can further 
suppress the spam–malware vector. In addition, maintaining the high-
level industry–government–law enforcement agency coordination 
required for successful disruption of malware-driven spam campaigns and 
other cybercrime must be at the forefront of government-led initiatives. 
To  maximise such cooperation, a reassessment of the co-regulatory 
burdens on industry may be required and proposals to deregulate the 
current e-marketing and spam industry codes of practice, for example, 
may be welcome if they encourage more self-help and help secure 
continued partnership with government in the fight against cybercrime.
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In spam emails, ‘crimeware as a service’ is more evident than ever and 
it involves selling exploits and tools for computer trespass. Once attack 
tools are in place, buyers can rent them to deliver attacks. Individuals 
and businesses need to increase their awareness of the dangers of 
spam emails, especially targeted attacks (for example, spear phishing) 
and create effective policies and practices to prevent their distribution. 
Botnets generally account for the global dissemination of spam. 
The widespread uses of botnets show how spammers manipulate the 
networks of infected computers and servers around the world to ensure 
high volumes of spam are delivered. The increased role of networked 
crime groups has also impacted on the scale and sophistication of 
cybercrime (Broadhurst et al. 2014). Trends in spam designed to create 
botnets also show increasing malware complexity that exploits new 
opportunities arising from automated financial activities (for example, 
GameOver ZeuS and CryptoLocker). The internet has also become the 
preferred platform on which to deploy spam attacks to intentionally 
disrupt or subvert these automated services and also to launch denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks (for profit or ideological motives). These tools 
have far-reaching implications for the evolution of cybercrime, which 
need to be explored and investigated. Spear phishing is a good example 
of offender innovation. By using personal information already gathered 
through deception or by inserting a remote access tool via an email 
with apparently relevant content from a trusted sender, this method can 
circumvent countermeasures. 
The forms of social engineering used in spam emails have also become 
more sophisticated, personalised and compelling, thus improving their 
ability to deceive many users into malware self-infection. Given the 
limitations in what may be learned by technical investigations to identify 
new attacks and trends, turning to what victims experience and what we 
can learn from them will be increasingly important. Victim studies will 
be most useful if experimental and observational studies that compensate 
for the absence of technical knowledge about the modus operandi of the 
cyberattack can be employed. Constant education and the development 
of crime prevention practices that focus on methods of deception are 
crucial and need to be as current as the novel and advanced forms of 
malware that present on the internet.4 Informal regulatory practices 
such as those sponsored by global efforts like the London Action Plan 
4  For example, SCAMwatch (scamwatch.gov.au/); and ACMA’s Cybersmart (cybersmart.gov.
au/).
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serve as examples of how groups of actors (‘coalitions of the willing’) can 
influence the behaviour of cybercriminals (who continue to enjoy the 
safe havens provided by rogue states and bulletproof ISPs), despite the 
limits of sovereignty and the failure to create an international regulatory 
regime to combat cybercrime. 
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The governance of cyberspace
Lennon YC Chang and Peter Grabosky
1. Introduction 
The challenge of discouraging undesirable conduct in cyberspace is, 
in  many respects, similar to the management of misconduct ‘on the 
ground’. In terrestrial space, most social control is informal. Cultures—
whether they are cultures of indigenous peoples or of the modern 
university—have their social norms, to which most of their members 
adhere. Minor transgressions tend to elicit expressions of disapproval, 
while more serious misconduct may be met with ridicule, ostracism, 
some form of ‘payback’ or expulsion from the group or organisation. 
With the rise of the modern state, formal institutions of social control 
have evolved to provide rules of behaviour, forums for the resolution 
of disputes between citizens and institutions for policing, prosecution, 
adjudication and punishment of the most serious transgressions. 
However,  it is now generally accepted that governmental agencies of 
social control are neither omnipresent nor omnipotent, thus creating a 
demand for supplementary policing and security services. These state 
institutions are accompanied by a variety of non-state bodies that 
‘coproduce’ security. Such entities vary widely in size and role, from 
large private security agencies and the manufacturers and distributors 
of technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), to the good 
friend who keeps an eye on her neighbour’s house at vacation time. 
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This wider notion of policing terrestrial space has been nicely articulated 
by scholars such as Bayley and Shearing (1996) and Dupont (2006) 
(see also Brewer, Chapter 26, this volume).
Cyberspace differs only slightly from terrestrial space in its response 
to antisocial behaviour. Most of us who use digital technology do the 
right thing not because we fear the long arm of the law in response 
to misconduct, but, rather, because we have internalised the norms that 
prevail in our culture (on compliance generally, see Parker and Nielsen, 
Chapter 13, this volume). Most of us take reasonable precautions to 
safeguard things of value that might exist in digital form. Nevertheless, 
because there are deviant subcultures whose members do not comply 
with wider social norms, and nonchalant citizens who are careless with 
their digital possessions, there is a need for formal institutions of social 
control in cyberspace. So, too, is there a need for the coproduction 
of cybersecurity.
One characteristic of cyber-deviance that differs significantly from 
terrestrial misconduct is that cross-national activity is much more 
common. Very early on in the digital age it was said that ‘cyberspace 
knows no borders’. The nature of digital technology is such that one may 
target a device or system physically located on the other side of the world 
just as easily as one in one’s own hometown. A successful response to 
transnational cybercrime thus requires a degree of cooperation between 
states—cooperation that may not be automatically forthcoming.
The governance of cyberspace is no less a pluralistic endeavour than 
is the governance of physical territory. This chapter will provide an 
overview of regulatory and quasi-regulatory institutions that currently 
exist to help secure cyberspace. In addition to state agencies, we will 
discuss a constellation of other actors and institutions, some of which 
cooperate closely with state authorities and others that function quite 
independently. These range from large commercial multinationals such 
as Microsoft, Google and Symantec; other non-governmental entities 
such as computer emergency response teams (CERTs); groups like 
Spamhaus and the Anti-Phishing Working Group; and hybrid entities 
such as the Virtual Global Task Force and End Child Prostitution, 
Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes 
(ECPAT), both of which target online child sexual abuse. In addition, 
there are independent, ‘freelance’ groups such as Cyber Angels, which 
exist to promote cybersafety, and ad hoc, transitory collectives that 
engage in independent patrolling and investigation of cyberspace. 
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Other groups, such as Anonymous, and whistleblowers such as Edward 
Snowden, challenge apparent cyberspace illegality with sometimes 
questionable methods of their own. Anonymous attacked sites related to 
child pornography in 2011 (Operation Darknet) and Edward Snowden’s 
disclosures revealed questionable practices by the US National Security 
Agency.
The next section of this chapter will briefly review some of the 
more important published works on the social regulation of digital 
technology. We will then discuss, in order, state, private and hybrid 
regulatory orderings. The chapter will conclude with some observations 
on regulatory orderings in cyberspace, through the lens of regulatory 
pluralism.
2. Literature on the regulation of cyberspace
Current literature on the regulation of cyberspace is no longer focused 
on whether cyberspace can be regulated. Instead, discussion focuses on 
how cyberspace is regulated and who are the regulators. It is generally 
conceded that the state cannot adequately control cyberspace via laws 
and regulations. Even when laws and regulations are kept up to date 
with  developments in technology, the functions and effectiveness 
of laws and regulations will be limited; the transnational dimensions of 
much cyber illegality and the architectures of digital technology all but 
guarantee this (Grabosky et al. 2001; Katyal 2003). Other regulatory 
methods such as code and system design, self-regulation by the private 
sector and co-regulation via public and private cooperation have been 
proposed as alternatives with which to govern cyberspace. 
Code and architecture
As pointed out by Professor Lawrence Lessig (1999), the internet was 
built for research and not commerce. Its founding protocols are inherently 
unsecure and are designed for the sharing, rather than the concealment, 
of data. The subsequent devolution of access to the computer network 
from government and research bodies to individual private users has 
provided a gateway for cybercriminals and cyber-deviant entrepreneurs. 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
536
Lessig (2006) argued that cyberspace is substantially regulated by code—
computer programming and system architecture. In this book, Code: 
Version 2.0, he notes that the internet is built on simple protocols based 
on the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/
IP) suite. Cyberspace is simply a product of architecture, not of ‘God’s 
will’. Lessig argued that the internet is the most regulable space that 
we know, since, through its architecture, it can reveal who someone is, 
where they are and what they are doing. When the machine is connected 
to the internet, all interactions can be monitored and identified. 
Thus, anonymous speech is extremely difficult to achieve. 
Lessig (2006) described the code embedded in the software or 
hardware as ‘West Coast Code’, as it is usually ‘enacted’ by code writers 
on the West Coast of the United States such as in Silicon Valley and 
Redmond, Washington, the headquarters of Microsoft. It is different 
from the ‘East Coast Code’—the laws enacted by the US Congress in 
Washington, DC, complemented by state legislation. Although each 
code can work well alone, Lessig pointed out that the power of East 
Coast Code over West Coast Code has increased, especially when the 
West Coast Code becomes commercial. A classic example was seen in 
1994 when the US Government enacted the Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). Under this Act, telephone companies 
are required to create a network architecture that serves well the interests 
of government, making wire-tapping and data retrieval easier. 
Similarly, Katyal (2003) speaks of digital architecture and its relationship 
to cybercrime. He suggests that the architectural methods employed to 
solve crime problems offline could provide a template to help control 
cybercrime. This will become even more obvious as digital technology 
pervades modern society, and as the divide between the real-space 
and cyberspace diminishes. Katyal proposes four principles of real-
space crime prevention through architecture: 1) creating opportunities 
for natural surveillance; 2) instilling a sense of territory; 3) building 
communities; and 4) protecting targets of crime (2003: 2262).1 
To elaborate, Katyal maintains that current proliferating claims in cyber 
law are too grand and should not be seen in a binary formula, such as 
‘open sources are more/less secure’ and ‘digital anonymity should be 
encouraged/discouraged’ (2003: 2261–2). Based on the architecture 
1  As the building of communities and protecting targets of crime focus on collaboration with 
other institutions, these will be introduced in a later section.
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of  ‘natural surveillance’, he argues that open source platforms such as 
Linux might not necessarily be more secure than closed source software 
such as Microsoft Windows. Although the open source platform might 
attract more people to view the code to improve security for reward or 
to enhance their reputation, only those with a technological background 
can achieve these objectives. The number of such people is much 
smaller than the pool of people available for natural surveillance offline. 
Therefore, Katyal (2003) suggests that a closed platform can be a better 
security model than an open source platform when natural surveillance 
is low. 
Katyal (2003) also emphasises the importance of territoriality. 
Territoriality can be easy to define in the real world, however, it is usually 
hampered by the anonymity of users in cyberspace. He suggests that 
a ‘verified pseudonymity’ using Internet Protocol logging (IP logging) 
would be helpful for law enforcement agencies to identify criminals. 
IP  logging attaches a designated address number to each computer 
connected to the internet. It can facilitate crime investigation or even 
deter crime from happening. As some skilled criminals might ‘mask’ 
their IP logging, Katyal (2003) suggests that a verified digital identity 
involving biometric information such as a fingerprint scan might 
eliminate this concern. He called this ‘pseudonymity’ as it will not 
disclose the user’s identity online. However, when it comes to crime 
investigation or prosecution, the government would be able to link the IP 
logging to a person by matching the biometric information. One notes 
that this capacity may be directed against human rights activists as well 
as cybercriminals.
Although both Lessig and Katyal focus on the architecture of code, 
they have different opinions on the involvement of state power. Katyal 
(2003) disagrees with Lessig’s (1999) fear that if code is to be regulated 
by government, it will lose its transparency and become an architecture 
of control. Katyal (2003) argues that freedom of information laws might 
play an important role in maintaining the transparency of regulation 
(at least in those jurisdictions where such laws exist). Direct government 
regulation will also generate effective architecture that provides security 
and builds both trust and commitment.
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Self-regulation/private regulation
Apart from code and architecture, markets themselves can serve as 
regulatory institutions. Compared with laws enacted by government, 
‘self-regulation offers greater speed, flexibility, sensitivity to 
market circumstances, efficiency, and less government intervention’ 
(Gunningham et al. 1998: 52). It has also been regarded as a form 
of responsive regulation—regulation that responds to the particular 
circumstances of the industry in question. Commercial activities within 
the private sector, and the influence they exert on and through markets, 
are having a significant effect on regulation (Grabosky 2013). 
Feick and Werle (2010) observe that voluntary, private self-regulation 
coordinated the early architecture of the internet. Debate relating to 
the regulatory arrangement of the internet is divided into two main 
camps. On one side, some argue there is too much regulation of the 
internet. They believe that network neutrality rules are unnecessary and 
dispensable. Others, however, argue for more regulation, particularly of 
technical infrastructure. Some scholars have even regarded responsible 
self-regulation as the only legitimate form with which to govern 
cyberspace ( Johnson and Post 1996; Murray 2012). 
Three forms of self-regulation are commonly identified (Gunningham 
et al. 1998: 51): voluntary or total self-regulation (without government 
involvement), mandated self-regulation (involving direct government 
involvement) and mandated partial self-regulation (partial government 
involvement) (Braithwaite 1982). It is quite rare to see pure self-
regulation. Most self-regulation has some government involvement 
in directing, shaping or endorsing the regulation (Tusikov 2016). 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
is an example of self-regulation with government involvement. 
ICANN is a non-profit organisation that operates the internet’s Domain 
Name System (DNS). However, it is contracted by the US Department 
of Commerce and overseen by the US Government (Murray 2012). 
Similar situations can also exist at the nation-state level, especially in 
critical infrastructure industries such as banks, telecommunications 
and electricity. For example, in 2006, the Internet Society of China, 
a Chinese Government–endorsed industry association, announced the 
‘Self-Regulation against Malicious Software’ to regulate abuse from 
malicious software and prevent its spread. Members who signed the self-
regulation protocol are required to protect the cyberspace environment 
and do their best to control malicious software. They also have a duty 
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to report any malicious software found and to share that information 
with other companies. Most of the large telecommunication companies 
and internet service providers (ISPs), such as China Telecom, CNNIC, 
Yahoo!, Baidu and Sina, signed up to this self-regulation agreement 
(Chang 2012). 
Nonetheless, one can still find examples of regulation of online behaviour 
without intervention from the state. To tackle online infringement of 
copyright, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), 
an  association formed by music companies in the United States, 
conducts  its own investigations to locate the IP addresses of those 
who are illegally sharing music. It then contacts the ISPs to identify 
the perpetrators and may sue them directly and/or enlist the support of 
ISPs in controlling offending behaviour (Tusikov 2016). Nonetheless, 
the  RIAA’s might is always successful in identifying the user, even 
though  they have no coercive power to force the ISPs to give the 
information to them (Shiffman and Gupta 2013). This also illustrates 
the weakness of private regulation. 
Distributed security/Wikified crime prevention
For offline crime, police play an important role in investigation and 
prevention. However, a higher level of cooperation with states, the 
private sector and even individual users is required to tackle online 
crime. Governing risk through a national approach is no longer sufficient 
(Ericson 2007). New approaches need to be taken to secure cyberspace. 
Brenner (2005) proposed a ‘distributed security’ scheme to emphasise 
that government, users (individual and organisational) and computer 
architects should all share responsibility for cybersecurity. Similarly, 
Chang (2012) proposes the idea of ‘wiki cybercrime prevention’ to 
address the necessity of mass collaboration between the government 
and the private sector when sharing information on security incidents 
and establishing early warning schemes.
Brenner (2005) argues that, unlike crime in the real world, cybercrime 
is not typical one-to-one victimisation. Because of the automation of 
such crime, cybercriminals can commit a huge amount of crime with 
very little effort. Due to limited resources and a reactive strategy, law 
enforcement agencies may not be able to deal with this problem. Brenner 
proposes four measures to improve law enforcement’s reactive strategy: 
1) the Convention on Cybercrime; 2) law enforcement strikeback 
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techniques; 3) civilian strikeback techniques; and 4) more officers. 
However, she argues that these are not only insufficient to deal with 
cybercrime, they might also add to the problem, as strikeback techniques 
might produce collateral damage to legitimate systems in a hospital or a 
telecommunications company. 
Supporting the idea that ‘the monopolization of policing by government 
is an aberration’ (Bayley and Shearing 2001: 1), Brenner (2005) 
contends that it is essential to involve the private sector in responding 
to cybercrime and in cybercrime prevention. She proposes a new 
concept—a ‘distributed policing strategy’—that relies mainly on active 
citizens rather than active police. The distributed policing strategy is 
different from the idea of community policing, as it shifts the focus 
of law enforcement from reaction and punishment to deterrence and 
prevention. Normally, community policing focuses on cooperation 
between police and the public to create a secure place where crime is 
not tolerated. It is established on the basis that participants want to live 
in a secure neighbourhood. However, as Brenner argues, this strategy 
cannot easily be applied to cybercrime prevention, as cybercrime is a 
distributed crime that has no central and binding focus such as a physical 
neighbourhood. 
Brenner (2005) suggests that, to let civilians be active and responsible 
for the prevention of cybercrime, obligatory conduct might be more 
effective than voluntary conduct. An individual user or organisation 
might be required by law to install security software or to report illegal 
activity. The alternative is a lengthy hiatus, as it takes a long time to 
form and internalise a norm that it is everyone’s responsibility to prevent 
cybercrime. Brenner considers that ‘do not’ laws might be better than ‘do’ 
laws, which impose an obligation to take certain preventive measures. 
‘Do laws’ will ‘not only impose an unprecedented obligation to prevent 
cybercrime; they produce criminal activities even though no crime was 
committed ’ (Brenner 2005: 15, emphasis in original).2 She also stresses 
that, as software plays an important role in cyberspace, it should be seen 
as national infrastructure, rather than as a ‘civil product’.
2  For example, internet users are required to set up a password to secure a wireless connection. 
They will be fined if they fail to do so and unauthorised people take advantage of this open connection 
to conduct criminal behaviour such as illegally downloading data (see also Grieshaber 2010).
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Malicious computer activities are the ‘infectious diseases’ of the virtual 
world. They are pandemics and can be hard to control. Therefore, for 
cybercrime prevention, risk management measures become particularly 
important in the prevention of malicious activities from spreading and in 
reducing harm to society. Chang (2012) also emphasises the importance 
of civilian participation in cybercrime prevention. Learning from 
infectious disease prevention models, he advocates ‘wiki cybercrime 
prevention’. Chang (2012) argues that cybercrime can easily become a 
‘chain reaction’, as most public and private sectors are sharing the same 
closed-code software. Therefore, it is important to discover the breach or 
vulnerability used for the attack and to share this information with other 
users immediately to reduce damage to society. That is, it is important to 
develop ‘early warning’ and ‘information sharing’ systems.
This is not a completely new idea as there have been attempts to 
establish  models of ‘wikified’ cybercrime prevention. For example, in 
2002,  the US Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)3 
established a reporting system to protect both national security and 
non–national security related computer systems in government agencies 
(including government agency contractors). In most countries, there are 
CERTs to deal with reporting and information sharing. However, as the 
recent experiences of Sony Pictures, Target and Home Depot suggest, 
when institutions such as banks, large retailers and telecommunications 
companies share their adverse experiences, they risk reputational 
damage, administrative punishment, law suits, audits, public shaming 
and further onerous reporting requirements. These risks might inhibit 
the willingness to report (Chang 2012). For example, banks might suffer 
from unexpected audits and be penalised for administrative system or 
prudential failure, even if the reporting was voluntary. Moreover, existing 
hydra-headed reporting systems might also discourage reporting. 
According to Chang (2012), some industries are required to report 
computer incidents to as many as five competent authorities within a 
defined time. They would prefer not to disclose the incident to avoid 
additional work at the very time they are busy fixing the problem.4 
To minimise those concerns, Chang (2012) suggests the reporting 
should be voluntary, confidential and non-punitive, as is the practice 
in the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS 2008). If a company’s 
voluntary reporting has successfully prevented malicious cyber activities 
3  Federal Information Security Management Act, 44 USC § 3541, et seq.
4  For an overview of data breach notification laws in the United States, see NCSL (2015).
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from spreading and causing more serious damage, the government 
should even consider praising or rewarding the reporting company or 
agency to acknowledge its contribution. Information security companies 
could be used for intermediation or as a gateway in the reporting system. 
By reporting through an information security company, victims can have 
their identity well protected. Furthermore, an incident might be caused 
by human error or a conflict between software and hardware within the 
organisation; these can all be resolved before disclosure to avoid alarmist 
public reaction.
3. Regulatory institutions in cyberspace
The previous section introduced different regulatory methods involving 
different agents, including state regulatory institutions, private sector 
bodies and even individuals. This section introduces some important 
regulatory institutions in cyberspace.
State regulatory institutions
Among regulatory institutions, the most significant are state agencies. 
No matter which regulatory method is used, there is intervention or 
involvement from state regulatory institutions. Despite the revolutionary 
idea that ‘code is law’, Lessig (2006) demonstrated the importance of law 
made by state regulatory institutions. Even with self-regulation, one can 
see the influence of government in the form of constructing, shaping, 
promoting and/or facilitating self-regulation (Tusikov 2016). 
Legislation still plays an important role in combating cybercrime 
despite some libertarians strongly opposing government use of law and 
regulation to intervene in the development of cyberspace (Barlow 1996; 
Goldsmith and Wu 2006; Grabosky et al. 2001; Katyal 2003). However, 
as mentioned earlier, state regulatory institutions have limitations 
when it comes to regulating cyberspace due to the decentralisation 
and de-territorial character of cyberspace. The cross-border character 
of cybercrime restricts the effectiveness of laws and regulations. 
Issues  such  as legal consistency among states and collaboration in 
investigating cybercrime have been raised (Chang 2012).
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International agreements and conventions encourage harmonisation 
of cyber laws and regulations, and seek to build cooperation among 
nations in responding to cybercrime. For example, three decades ago, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) published Computer-related Crime: Analysis of Legal Policy, 
which emphasised the importance of establishing common criminal 
law and criminal procedural law to protect international data networks 
(OECD 1986). From 2001 onwards, the United Nations (UN) has 
adopted resolutions encouraging its member states to take proper actions 
against cybercrime. It called on its members to note the Convention on 
Cybercrime (Budapest Convention) drafted by the Council of Europe. 
The Budapest Convention is the first and only international convention 
to encourage harmonisation of cyber laws and regulations, and to build 
cooperation among nations in controlling cybercrime. It is open to 
Council of Europe member states and non-member states. It is currently 
the most accepted convention on cybercrime, with 51 states ratified/
acceded as of December 2016 (Council of Europe 2001). Key members 
include European nations and the United States.
Nevertheless, most countries in Latin America, the Middle East 
and Asia-Pacific, including Brazil, Russia, China and India, are not 
signatories to the Budapest Convention because they were not involved 
in the drafting or, as is the case with less-affluent countries, they lag 
behind in developing domestic cybercrime laws to the requisite standards 
(Broadhurst and Chang 2013). This reduces the effectiveness of the 
convention as it applies to less than half of the world’s internet users 
and, as Archick (2006) argued, most of the ‘problem countries’ are not 
actively involved in the convention. In 2012, a new global cybercrime 
treaty was proposed by China, India, South Korea and a number of other 
regional countries at the twelfth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice in Salvador, Brazil. Although the proposal did not gain 
much support from Western countries, it might provide a good basis for 
a new, more inclusive convention.
Bilateral and multilateral state–state cooperation
To control cross-border cybercrime, states need to sign agreements 
with other states covering areas such as substantive criminal law, as well 
as procedural laws covering such matters as arrest, search and seizure, 
evidence collection and extradition. These can be bilateral agreements 
negotiated directly by the respective authorities in two countries or 
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multilateral agreements or treaties negotiated through international or 
regional organisations (on the difficulties of multilateral negotiation, 
see Downie, Chapter 19, this volume). The Budapest Convention 
was envisaged as being the multilateral agreement against cybercrime; 
however,  due to its limited membership, it cannot be regarded as a 
truly global platform for mutual assistance on cybercrime investigation. 
Therefore, most states still need to enter into mutual assistance 
agreements either bilaterally or multilaterally.
Normally, bilateral mutual assistance agreements provide more efficient 
and reliable bases for cooperation in crime matters than multilateral 
agreements, as they are negotiated by the two parties based on their 
mutual trust and confidence in successful pre-existing relationships 
(Chang 2013). The disadvantage of bilateral agreements is that it can be 
rather time-consuming to reach agreement with many partner countries. 
Also, due to political concerns, it may be difficult for jurisdictions such as 
Taiwan and China or South Korea and North Korea to reach agreement. 
That said, some collaboration can be seen between Taiwan and China 
against telecommunications crimes. For example, in an action called 
‘Operation 0310’, 692 suspects were arrested in a joint investigation 
against telecommunications fraud syndicates in June 2011 (Mainland 
Affairs Council 2012).
4. Non-state actors
Non-state actors also play important roles in the governance of cyberspace. 
As in the discussion of code and architecture, self-regulation and wikified 
cybercrime prevention, here, we can see evidence of non-state actors (see 
Tusikov, Chapter 20, this volume). Here, we will discuss three crucial non-
state actors as regulatory institutions in cyberspace: commercial companies, 
non-profit organisations and grassroots bodies or individuals.
a) Commercial organisations
Commercial companies, especially information technology companies, 
are playing critical roles in the governance of cyberspace. Some of them 
take up the role voluntarily while others are forced to participate under 
government laws and regulations. As mentioned earlier, Lessig (2006) 
argued that government can control cyberspace by regulating the code. 
Similarly, Goldsmith and Wu (2006: 68) remind us not to ‘overlook how 
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often governments control behaviour not individually, but collectively, 
through intermediaries’. In the real world, doctors and pharmacists are used 
as gatekeepers to prevent drug abuse and bartenders are given responsibility 
to prevent their alcohol-affected customers from driving. Internet content 
providers are asked to take down copyright-infringed music and films, 
as well as indecent content that may come to their attention. Quite 
independently of government, the multibillion-dollar information security 
industry exists to protect the digital assets of its customers.
b) Non-profit organisations
There are also many non-profit organisations that act as regulatory 
institutions in the cyber world. ICANN, mentioned earlier, is a non-
profit organisation that regulates the distribution of domain names. 
The  World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is a non-commercial 
collective of volunteer organisations. The work of the W3C has political 
and regulatory consequences since internet standards are not purely 
technical, having underlying commercial interests, political preferences 
and moral evaluations (Feick and Werle 2010).
In the domain of third-party cooperation against cybercrime, CERTs 
are prominent non-governmental organisations that share information 
on malicious cyber activities. CERTs are organisations that provide 
incident response to victims. It not only helps to safeguard information 
security within one country, but also collaborates with other CERTs 
at international and regional levels.
There are also other non-profit organisations that deal with different 
types of issues in cyberspace—for example, Spamhaus, the Anti-
Phishing Working Group and ECPAT. In addition, independent groups 
such as Cyber Angels promote cyber safety and engage in independent 
investigation of cyberspace. 
c) Grassroots bodies
Other groups, such as Anonymous, and individuals such as Edward 
Snowden, challenge cyberspace illegality with questionable methods of 
their own. Cyber crowdsourcing—the power of netizens conducting crime 
investigation by using social networking tools—has been shown to be a 
formidable form of private regulation. This is especially the case in Asia 
(Chang and Poon 2016; Grabosky 2013). Cyber crowdsourcing has been 
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successfully used to identify viruses and malware. The US Government 
has also been harnessing the power of cyber crowdsourcing to combat 
cybercrime. It has recently established the ‘Neighborhood Network Watch’ 
program, which educates internet users on cybersecurity and encourages 
them to report suspicious behaviour related to terrorism (Shiffman and 
Gupta 2013). This can also be seen as ‘wiki cybercrime prevention’.
Hybrid regulatory orderings
There are three basic ways by which commercial companies collaborate 
formally with government as regulators of cyberspace: such cooperation 
can be commanded by law, it may flow from commercial public–private 
partnerships or it can be entered into on a pro bono basis by the commercial 
actor (Ayling et al. 2009). An example of coercive collaboration is the 
requirement that telecommunications carriers design systems in such 
a way as to facilitate surveillance by state law enforcement agencies. 
The CALEA legislation noted above is but one example. 
Commercial joint ventures have been established between law 
enforcement agencies and private commercial entities. The New York 
Police Department (NYPD) and Microsoft jointly developed the 
‘Domain Awareness System’ to track surveillance targets using databases 
and surveillance cameras around New York City. The system is designed 
to be licensed for use by other law enforcement agencies, with profits to 
be shared by the NYPD and Microsoft (City of New York 2012). 
The private sector may also provide goods and services to law enforcement 
agencies free of charge. In 2014, a memorandum of understanding was 
signed between Microsoft and the Jakarta Police Department to educate 
the public on the danger of using pirated software. Through the training, 
they wished to increase awareness and cybersecurity protection for 
customers and businesses (Cosseboom 2014). Similarly, Intel’s McAfee 
security branch has signed an agreement with European law enforcement 
to establish joint operations to control cybercrime (Kirk  2014). Such 
acts of corporate largesse are obviously in the donors’ interests. Whether 
they are entirely consistent with the policy priorities of the recipient is 
another matter (see Tusikov, Chapter 20, this volume).
Big companies are not the only ones to play a role in governing cyberspace; 
small and medium-sized companies also contribute via information 
sharing. InfraGard, an information sharing and analysis effort established 
by the US Government with business, academic institutions, state and 
local law enforcement agencies and other participants, is a good example 
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of how commercial companies can contribute as regulatory institutions 
to  protect cybersecurity. Another example is the Virtual Global Task 
Force, which provides information, training and investigation in 
furtherance of child protection. Commercial partners include Blackberry, 
PayPal and Microsoft.
5. Conclusion
There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescription for securing cyberspace. 
Governments differ in their willingness and capacity to contribute to 
the solution. In situations where states, alone or in concert, are not in a 
position to ensure cybersecurity, a variety of private and hybrid actors 
may be able to assist. We refer to these, because of their influence, 
as quasi-regulatory institutions. We have noted how the information 
security, telecommunications, software and entertainment industries each 
contribute their own solutions for cybersecurity. Ideally, these will serve the 
public’s interest as well as that of the institution. Individual users also bear 
some responsibility for managing their own resources and information. 
Ad hoc collectives also provide quasi-regulatory services at the grassroots.
To the extent that these various regulatory and quasi-regulatory 
institutions function in an efficient and effective manner, so much 
the better. Those who continue to look to the state for leadership in 
cybersecurity are likely to favour a degree of coordination under state 
auspices. One should, however, be cautious about expecting the state to 
deliver beyond its capacity. In all but the most draconian jurisdictions, 
a degree of spontaneity on the part of non-state actors is both inevitable 
and desirable. This spontaneity may be beneficial when it results in 
constructive, creative outcomes. But such success is by no means 
guaranteed. Regulatory space is contested, and resulting relational 
interactions between institutions are often complex. One must be 
alert for initiatives that are part of the problem, rather than part of the 
solution. Institutions and initiatives should be accountable, whether they 
exist under commercial or private auspices.
The appropriate institutional configuration for cybersecurity will vary 
over time and place, depending on the security setting in question and 
the prevailing capacities of individual participants. Efforts by the private 
sector may in some situations compensate for shortcomings on the part 
of government. Some states may be in a position to raise the security 
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consciousness of their citizens, while others are not. But there is little 
doubt that cooperation across sectors is the general direction in which 
we should be heading.
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Section 6: Regulating 
for health
Judith Healy was an early leader at RegNet on health regulation, 
examining the ways in which responsive regulation might be used to 
improve the performance of the healthcare sector. Scott Burris’s visits 
to RegNet were crucial to the work on nodal governance, as well as 
its application to health policy and regulation (see his ‘Governance, 
microgovernance and health’ in Temple Law Review). RegNet doctoral 
students such as Buddhi Lokuge and Warwick Neville  undertook 
hugely important work, the former on managing the risks of pandemics 
and the latter on one of Australia’s most important health initiatives, 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. Buddhi Lokuge has gone on to 
pioneer initiatives in the complex field of Indigenous health (see Lokuge 
and Burke 2014). The governance of health, as the chapters in this section 
demonstrate, has grown into an area of major work for RegNet.
The extraordinary and almost daily advances in medical technology 
seemingly open the door to a possible world in which it is the best of 
times for the health of citizens everywhere. But, as Sharon Friel makes 
clear in her chapter, many regulatory institutions impact on the health 
of citizens, distributing risks in very unequal ways. Inequality stalks 
capitalism and probably nowhere is this more evident than in the case 
of health outcomes. For example, patent cartels and patent globalisation 
mean that access to medicines is massively unequal both within and 
across countries. Scott Burris introduces the reader to the methods being 
used to probe the causal fields that surround health outcomes. Judith 
Healy, using the assumptions of meta-regulation, argues that approaches 
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derived from responsive regulation and nodal governance can be used 
by patients to turn themselves into active regulators in their own cause 
rather than remaining passive regulatees shuffling through a world of 
medical command. The National Research Centre for OHS Regulation 
has been one of RegNet’s longest running centres, with funding from 
the Australian Research Council and Safe Work Australia. Harmful 
work environments kill about two million workers globally each year. 
Elizabeth Bluff, one of the directors of the centre, opens her chapter 
with this startling estimate and analyses how good uses of the broader 
version of regulation described in Chapter 1 of this volume can save lives.
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Scientific evaluation of law’s 
effects on public health
Scott Burris
1. Introduction 
Law has played an indispensable role in improving public health over the 
past 100 years. Laws and legal practices also have significant unintended 
effects on health. Just as in other realms of regulation, however, it is 
not enough to assert the important roles of law in public health. 
If law matters to public health, we have to be able to show how, under 
what circumstances and to what degree. We have to produce evidence. 
Public health law research (PHLR) is the field devoted to creating and 
disseminating that evidence.
This chapter describes scientific theory and methods for investigating 
the development, implementation and effects of public health laws, 
enforcement strategies and other basic forms of regulation. Part one is 
an introduction to the basic concepts of PHLR. Part two is devoted to 
special questions of measurement that arise when law is the independent 
variable, and describes new tools for measuring law. Part three describes 
theories that researchers from diverse disciplines can use to study how 
law influences behaviour—the mechanisms or processes through which 
a rule manages to have measurable effects on health. Finally, part four 
considers the various study designs for PHLR. 
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2. Law, health and science
Public health law research (also referred to as ‘legal epidemiology’) is 
the scientific study of the relation of law and legal practices to population 
health (Burris et al. 2010, 2016). This includes both direct relationships 
between law and health and relationships mediated through the impacts 
of law on health behaviours and other processes and structures that 
affect population health. Both ‘law’ and ‘health’ are broadly conceived 
in PHLR. 
Consistent with the general approach in studies of regulation and 
governance (Braithwaite et al. 2007), PHLR’s conception of ‘law’ is not 
confined to ‘law on the books’—constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, 
and so on. PHLR is necessarily concerned with the psychosocial 
mechanisms through which compliance is achieved, the range of 
state and non-state regulatory techniques that may be deployed and 
how law operates as a social practice embedded in institutions and 
implemented by agents (Stryker 2013). It is part of, not distinct from, 
the social environment whose influence on health is the focus of social 
epidemiology.
In the tradition of social epidemiology, health is understood as a product 
of the interaction of genes, people and places, and not simply, or even 
primarily, a consequence of consuming healthcare services (Berkman and 
Kawachi 2000). Most things human beings do, and most characteristics 
of our environments, have some impact on the level and distribution of 
health in a population (CSDH 2008). 
This view of law and epidemiology suggests two broad roles for law 
in the production of health. First, law helps build and maintain the 
social, economic and physical worlds in which we live, learn, work and 
play. It  authorises, structures and protects institutions and statuses, 
validating and protecting current distributions of power and resources 
and prescribing methods for change. Second, law acts as a mechanism 
through which social structures are transformed into a level and 
distribution of health in a population. The life course of a person with 
the status ‘poor’, for example, will often be shaped by experiences 
with  legal  rules, institutions and agents that are quite different from 
those of better-off people (Sarat 1990). 
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Figure 32.1 Logic model of public health law research
Source: Author’s work.
The spectrum of PHLR studies is depicted in Figure 32.1. Moving from 
left to right, we begin with studies of the lawmaking process, observing 
and analysing the factors that influence which laws are enacted and 
that shape the specific characteristics of the statutes and regulations 
adopted. In these studies, public health laws themselves are the outcome 
of interest and political and other factors are the explanatory variables. 
Next, studies of legal practices focus on the implementation of the law 
on the books, including how the law affects the structure or operation 
of regulatory systems. The completeness of implementation and the 
effectiveness of mechanisms for ensuring compliance with the law are 
critical elements influencing the law’s effect on health outcomes. Legal 
practice studies explore these influences as mediators of the statute’s or 
regulation’s impact on health.
The core of PHLR involves study of the effects of the law on environments 
and health behaviours. Laws and their implementation affect social 
institutions and environments by creating or reducing opportunities, 
increasing or decreasing available resources, expanding or reducing rights 
and obligations and creating incentives and penalties. Research in this 
area examines processes and how they shape the conditions for people 
to be healthy. Law may affect health behaviours both directly and by 
shifting the environmental conditions that make particular behavioural 
choices more or less attractive. For example, drink-driving laws may 
directly influence driver behaviour through fear of punishment, but also 
indirectly through the social environment by changing attitudes towards 
the behaviour. Ultimately, changes in environments and behaviours lead 
to changes in population-level injury and death. 
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3. Measuring and monitoring law
When law is being evaluated in quantitative research, the very first 
methods question is how to capture the attributes of law in a way that 
will be accepted as reliable by the scientific community. In any study 
involving laws in multiple jurisdictions that vary across time (for example, 
studies of state/provincial laws or cross-national studies), accurate 
measurement of law allows the research to fully exploit the natural 
experiment that such variation creates. For decades, a small cadre of 
scientists, including lawyers, has been creating scientifically reliable legal 
datasets, but there was until recently little in the literature in the way of 
articulated, shared standards cutting across topical silos. In the past few 
years, however, both new methods papers (Anderson et al. 2013) and 
new tools (Public Health Law Research Program 2015) have emerged 
in PHLR to define standards and support more efficient and accurate 
measurement of the attributes of statutes and regulations.
Measuring law for scientific purposes is quite different from the way 
lawyers measure law in traditional legal research. Legal research is 
typically focused on assessing how a rule may be applied to a particular 
situation, and is typically focused on current law. In contrast, scientific 
research is focused on measuring underlying dimensions of law whose 
importance is derived from theory, and relating those dimensions 
to other phenomena. To meet scientific standards, a dataset must be 
created through transparent and reproducible methods, which requires 
an explicit protocol and variables that are sufficiently objective to be 
consistently measurable by different researchers. Achieving sufficient 
reliability requires strict quality-control procedures and, typically, 
redundant research processes using multiple independent coders. 
A dataset of US state laws addressing the use of mobile phones by drivers 
provides an illustration (Ibrahim et al. 2011). The research encompassed 
all laws directly addressing the use of mobile communications devices 
by drivers enacted by US states between 1992 and 2010. Given that 
39 states had passed more than 300 iterations of these, which were being 
coded for 20 variables, the project was not small, either in the collection 
of the law or in its coding. 
Both the regulatory strategy and its targets had evolved over the years, 
which points to the need for both formative research and a recursive 
approach to coding. Earlier statutes referred to ‘cellular telephones’ or 
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‘mobile telephones’. As technology developed, producing more devices 
capable of being used by a driver to communicate, drafters used broader 
terms, such as ‘mobile communications device’, and began to address 
behaviours such as text messaging. Whether the term ‘cell phone’ in 
a traffic law would cover a wi-fi-enabled iPad being used for a Skype 
call could be quite important for a lawyer applying that law to a 
particular case,  but, for creating legal data, it sufficed to observe that 
the term ‘cell phone’ is used to specify the device whose use the law 
regulates. In addition to the prohibited behaviours, the dataset captured 
the extensive variation in which categories of drivers were covered, 
the penalties and the enforcement mechanisms.
Along with a lack of explicit methods guidance, this sort of legal 
measurement has also been hampered by a lack of tools. Collecting 
and coding laws on paper are tedious, and require a second data-entry 
step that costs time and introduces a risk of clerical error. Spreadsheet 
software is also prone to entry error in datasets with many columns 
and rows; more importantly, it requires manual merging to collect and 
compare the work of multiple coders. Commercial database software 
supports forms that reduce clerical error, but generally does not allow 
multiple coders to work in the same file. Software for free-coding text is 
sometimes used, and has the advantage of storing and allowing the coder 
to see the text on the coding form, but is not optimised for quantitative 
coding with a predetermined coding scheme. In recent years, at least two 
web-based solutions have emerged that significantly improve matters. 
Google Forms allows users to build a coding form that feeds data to 
a spreadsheet and supports simultaneous and redundant coding work. 
LawAtlas, developed by the Public Health Law Research Program, was 
designed for coding and publishing legal data. It allows the creation of 
custom coding forms, stores the legal texts, allows the coder to code and 
view the text on the same window and supports simultaneous redundant 
coding. Data can be downloaded into a spreadsheet. 
Scientific research methods and software that supports efficient coding 
and publication have made possible the ongoing collection, analysis, 
interpretation and dissemination of information about important 
public health laws. This practice, which is emerging under the label 
‘policy surveillance’ (Chriqui et al. 2011), efficiently satisfies two basic 
conditions for the effective use of law and law reform to improve 
health: the creation of data for evaluation and the rapid dissemination of 
health policy activities to speed up the diffusion of innovation. 
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4. Interdisciplinary approach to the 
mechanisms of legal effect
A scientific approach to understanding how law influences health is 
crucial to assessing whether it does so. Theoretically grounded research 
illuminating mechanisms of legal effect is important in several ways for 
public health law research and practice. Theories of how law influences 
structures, behaviours and environments are used to define the phenomena 
to be observed. This enables researchers to properly identify effects to 
measure: tell us where to look, at what point in time we might expect 
to  see effects, how effects might evolve over time and what sort of 
intended and unintended effects to look for. Because much PHLR is 
necessarily observational, data on how law works support causal inference 
by providing evidence of plausible mechanisms to explain an observed 
association. Theory also helps unpack a law into regulatory components 
that may make varying contributions to the overall effect, and helps 
identify dose–response relationships between specific legal components 
or dimensions and health-related outcomes. In a similar fashion, this 
kind of evidence can guide reform and implementation. Assuming 
confidence that law is causing an effect, research on how it does so 
provides important guidance on ways to influence the magnitude of 
the effect, reduce unintended consequences or produce the effect more 
efficiently. Understanding how law works can also guide legislators and 
regulators to craft innovative interventions aimed at newly recognised 
problems (Anderson and Burris 2014).
a) Defining the phenomena to be observed
Law is just one of many factors in a web of causation that shapes 
health outcomes. A theory of how law will influence the outcome can 
be used to generate a causal diagram that depicts the process, and the 
relation of law to other potential causes (Swanson and Ibrahim 2013). 
Consider a law aimed at the emerging problem of concussion in youth 
sports. Between 2009 and 2012, nearly all US states passed similar 
laws aimed at ensuring that athletes suffering a possible concussion in 
school sports activities were identified and removed from play pending 
medical clearance (Harvey 2013). The underlying theory of the ‘problem’ 
was that kids were not being identified because athletes, coaches and 
parents were not able to diagnose possible concussion, were unaware 
of the serious risks or were unwilling to report because of social norms of 
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‘playing tough’ or enduring injury for the sake of the team. The regulatory 
intervention based on this analysis was to require education for athletes, 
coaches and parents, removal from play for possibly concussed athletes 
for a set period and medical clearance before resuming participation. 
Generally, these laws did not include regulatory oversight or penalties.
Both socio-legal and behavioural theories can illuminate plausible 
mechanisms through which the law’s approach might work, and guide 
evaluation of whether it actually does. As is often the case in PHLR, 
consistent data on the incidence of concussion in the target population 
are not available, so, in the short and medium terms, other measures of 
legal impact will be needed—and that is where theory is so valuable.
It is clear that information is the primary mechanism through which 
this law is intended to change behaviour. The legislation itself sends 
information about the seriousness of the issue. Its primary requirement 
is that information be provided to coaches, parents and players. 
One  straightforward thing to measure in evaluating the law is the 
extent to which substantive knowledge of the risk and the symptoms of 
concussion grows among the targets. But mere knowledge is not enough 
to assure that behaviour will change. The law will be optimally effective 
only if beliefs about the danger, and the norms of sporting behaviour, 
begin to change. Coaches, parents and teachers must all start to see 
concussion as a bigger problem, and social norms must emerge that make 
it unacceptable to ignore possible injuries or to fail to seek immediate 
medical attention. We can draw on many different kinds of theories to 


















Figure 32.2 Law in the theory of planned behaviour
Source: Author’s work.
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The theory of planned behaviour is a widely used tool in social 
psychology (Ajzen 1991). It explains behaviour in terms of the factors 
that lead an individual to form an intention to perform the behaviour. 
A simplified version is applied to the law in Figure 32.2. Behaviour is 
theorised to be a product of constructs that drive behavioural intent, 
including attitudes towards the behaviour and its consequences; 
perceptions of the normative value of performing the behaviour, 
including  perception of how others will view it; and beliefs about 
the difficulty of performing the behaviour given external or internal 
constraints. These well-defined constructs can be measured using 
validated instruments, and can readily be applied to investigate whether 
a concussion law might be influencing behaviour. Student athletes, for 
example, could be surveyed over time to determine whether attitudes 
about concealing a concussion were becoming more negative, whether 
perceptions about the ‘heroism’ of such behaviour were changing and 
whether the law or changing norms were giving them a greater sense of 
self-efficacy to request medical attention (Register-Mihalik et al. 2013; 
for further discussion of this kind of theory in PHLR, see Flay and 
Schure 2013).
Another way to think about measuring the emerging impact of the 
law is to draw on a theory more familiar to regulatory scholars. Tyler’s 
procedural justice model posits that people are more likely to comply 
with laws they regard as legitimate and that they have experienced as 
fairly enforced (see also Murphy, Chapter 3, this volume). Figure 32.3 
depicts Tyler’s model as it applies to the concussion law, which suggests 
that compliance with the law can be understood as depending on two 
related sets of beliefs about the legitimacy of the concussion law and 
the fairness of its application. We can measure how parents, coaches or 
students feel about the legitimacy of the legislature issuing mandates 
about sports; the greater is the legitimacy accorded to the legislature’s 
action, the more likely it is people will feel an obligation to comply as 
citizens. Likewise, perceptions of procedural fairness in the application 
of these rules will increase their legitimacy and independently promote 
compliance. 
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Are the rules fair? Being applied
fairly across players and teams?
Do stakeholders regard the legislature 
as legitimate arbiter of sport?
Figure 32.3 Procedural justice and compliance
Source: Author’s work.
These theories identify phenomena that can be readily measured to 
assess whether the law is having any impact, and whether that impact is 
in the desired direction. They will not tell us whether the law is reducing 
concussions, but they are relevant to causal inference, as we discuss next.
b) Supporting causal inference
Like most research on how law influences health, evaluations of the 
implementation of concussion laws will be observational. They may 
demonstrate a correlation between the law and a reduction in injury, but 
have less capacity to support an inference that law caused the outcome. 
The rate of concussion is caused by many factors, only some of which 
have been or can be observed. In any sort of study of causation in a 
complex system, even experimental evidence of causation is bolstered 
by research that reveals more of the system’s elements. Defining the 
mechanism of effect—an observable, plausible chain of events between 
the law and the outcome—can help us decide whether an inference of 
causation is warranted and how confident we should be. 
There are many possible explanations for a correlation between a 
reduction in youth concussions and a law requiring removal from play. 
The most obvious is that the same community concern about concussion 
that produced the law has also produced greater awareness of the dangers 
of traumatic brain injury. Several kinds of research findings could bolster 
the inference that the law has contributed to the reduction in harm:
• Knowledge of the law influences self-reported compliance or an 
intention to comply.
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• Knowledge of the law is associated with the belief that playing after 
a concussion is unwise, that one’s peers disapprove of playing after a 
concussion and that refusing to play (or allow an injured athlete to 
play) is a feasible behaviour.
• People who know about the law and report compliance or an intention 
to comply regard the law as legitimate and fairly applied. 
If the observed behaviour and attitude in the regulated population are 
consistent with these hypotheses, and the enactment and implementation 
of the law are correlated in time with a reduction in harm, we can proceed 
with more confidence that the law is helping the situation.
c) Guiding reform and implementation
Having provisional confidence that a law is having an effect on health 
outcomes is not the end of the inquiry. Logically, we should desire that 
law has the largest positive effect it can have, with the fewest negative 
effects. Research that documents the mechanisms of legal effect can make 
a valuable contribution to making law work better. Documentation of 
implementation can identify practices that enhance or reduce the law’s 
impact. Negative side effects may be largely the result of how the law is 
enforced or implemented, rather than an inevitable consequence of the 
law’s terms or design. 
In the youth concussion example, early research found that student 
attitudes towards concussion reporting had the greatest impact on 
their intention to report (Register-Mihalik et al. 2013). In Washington 
state, which passed the first of these laws, both athletes and parents are 
required to review and sign a concussion information form as a condition 
of participation, but implementation research three years into the regime 
showed that only 39 per cent of athletes and 58 per cent of parents had 
completed the form (Chrisman et al. 2014). Other findings indicated 
that many students were getting limited education from their coaches, 
but also that how much a coach knew about concussion was not linked 
with their willingness or ability to identify athletes in their charge who 
were playing on after suffering one (Rivara et al. 2014). These findings 
would suggest that greater emphasis on compliance is needed and that, if 
there are any substantial declines in repeat concussion, it will be difficult 
to attribute them to the law. Advocates and policymakers can use this 
information to allocate resources and attention to compliance.
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5. Study designs
The objective of PHLR is to improve knowledge of whether a law 
causes a change in population health. The level of confidence in a causal 
interpretation of an observed relationship between law and health 
hinges on the quality of the research design. PHLR is not fundamentally 
different to other realms of evaluation, but there are some special 
difficulties and opportunities to address.
The randomised controlled trial (RCT) is routinely referred to as the 
‘gold standard’ for determining whether an intervention caused an effect. 
Its strength lies in comparing two populations that are identical except 
for exposure to the intervention. Truly random assignment to treatment 
and control groups is the essence of the experimental design. Researchers 
rarely have the opportunity to randomly assign people to be exposed to a 
law, but some version of that is occasionally possible. The key is usually to 
cooperate with officials who are keen to learn whether their intervention 
works. For example, researchers at Temple University cooperated with 
the Philadelphia Police Department to test the effect of increased foot 
patrols on violence. The study randomly assigned patrol areas to the 
treatment (increased foot presence) and control conditions (Ratcliffe et 
al. 2011). Because opportunities for RCTs arise so rarely, it is worthwhile 
to extract as much value as possible for as long as possible. Between 1994 
and 1998, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
randomly assigned clients to two different treatments and a control 
group to test the impact on poor people of policies that helped them 
move from high to low-poverty neighbourhoods. Many researchers used 
the data to test the health and social effects of differing housing support 
policies over an extended period. For example, a 2011 study reported on 
health outcomes more than 10 years out (Ludwig et al. 2011).
Another approach is to isolate one element of a policy, or the 
mechanism  of legal effect, for experimental testing. The Behavioural 
Insights Team of the UK Cabinet Office worked with the Courts Service 
to test approaches for increasing compliance with fine payment orders. 
The default treatment was a (costly) bailiff ’s visit. The experiment tested 
five different mechanisms of enforcement. One test was a message of 
some kind versus no message, but the study also used behavioural theory 
to construct hypotheses about personalised versus non-personalised 
messages and various forms of personalisation. Two inexpensive trials 
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produced the finding that a properly personalised text message could 
increase payments by £3 million (AU$5 million) and avoid 150,000 
bailiff visits annually (Haynes et al. 2012).
While randomised studies could and should be used more in regulatory 
evaluation, there is a distinguished line of studies in PHLR that takes 
advantage of the natural experiments that arise when law changes 
over time or varies across jurisdictions. Indeed, ‘effectively combining 
many design elements into a single study can produce real-world legal 
evaluations with higher overall levels of validity and strength of causal 
inference than randomized trials’ (Wagenaar and Komro 2013: 309). 
These elements include many repeated measures; multiple comparison 
jurisdictions, groups and outcomes; and multilevel structures. Careful 
attention to theory can also help by identifying the proper time resolution 
for measuring effects and hypothesising their form. For example, is a new 
law likely to have an immediate effect at the time its passage is publicised 
or only after enforcement? Do we expect a drop-off in compliance over 
time and, if so, how steep? 
A classic example of a study taking effective advantage of a natural 
experiment was conducted by Alexander Wagenaar in the late 1970s 
(Wagenaar 1981). The US states of Maine and Michigan, which changed 
the legal age for possession and consumption of alcoholic beverages, were 
compared with New York state, where the legal age had been 18 for half a 
century, and Pennsylvania, which had a consistent legal age of twenty-one. 
This was the first level of comparison. Second, nested within each state, 
the focal age group affected by the change in law (18–20-year-olds) was 
compared with younger and older age groups. Third, nested within each 
age group, alcohol-related car crashes were compared with non-alcohol-
related crashes. Fourth, to address the possibility that changes in the law 
might be changing the reporting of alcohol involvement, two measures 
of alcohol-related crashes were observed: normal crash reports by police 
officers regarding drivers’ drinking, and single-vehicle night-time crashes, 
which were known to have a high probability of involving a drinking 
driver and which, as a measure, did not rely on officer reports of drinking. 
For each cell in this hierarchical design, outcomes were measured 
monthly for many years before and after the legal changes. There were 
reductions in crashes beginning in the first month after the new law, 
but only in the ‘experimental’ states that raised their legal drinking age 
(and not in the comparison states), only among teenagers (not among 
drivers 21 and over, who were not affected by the change in legal age 
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from 18 to 21) and only among alcohol-related crashes (and not among 
non-alcohol-related crashes, measured with two measures of alcohol-
related crashes). These findings supported a highly confident inference 
that this particular law caused a change in car crashes. Replications in 
other states that raised the legal age confirmed this pattern of effects. 
Public health officials and policymakers considering alternative laws 
and regulations want to know not only how many disease or injury 
cases are averted, but also whether it is worth it in terms of the costs 
involved. Methods for cost-effectiveness and cost–benefit analyses are 
well described, and there are numerous resources available to assist in 
building studies (see, generally, Miller and Hendrie 2013). There are, 
however, some special considerations that arise in designing economic 
studies of regulatory interventions.
Laws are typically meant to influence behavioural choices. They will 
require individuals to stop doing things that they enjoy doing, or profit 
from, on the grounds that these behaviours are deleterious to the common 
good or, paternalistically, are actually less beneficial than the actor believes. 
A law requiring motorcyclists to wear a helmet does not just raise the 
cost of the activity by the price of the helmet; it also deprives the rider of 
the pleasure of wind blowing through her hair, and reduces her freedom 
of choice. Costs like these count as social costs. Deciding how to value 
them can be difficult. It is not just a question of setting an initial price. 
We know from many instances that regulatory commands initially seen 
as impositions—such as required safety belt use in vehicles—can become 
normal behaviours preferred by those who initially resisted them. 
Laws are not free to pass, implement or enforce. For example, in 1985, 
Miller and colleagues estimated the costs of mandating the installation 
of high-mounted brake lights on cars to reduce rear-end crashes. They 
specified 15 distinct work tasks, as well as the costs of the administrative 
notice and comment procedure, and estimated that implementation and 
administration constituted about 4 per cent of the regulation’s total costs 
(Miller and Hendrie 2013). Health laws may have spillover effects, both 
positive and negative. Bicycle helmet laws have been found, at least in 
Australia, to reduce bike use. Motorcycle helmet laws have been observed 
to reduce motorcycle thefts—presumably, because thieves who happen to 
be without helmets are deterred from riding without them (Miller and 
Hendrie 2013). Finally, laws not explicitly aimed at health can nonetheless 
have important health effects. Income support laws, for example, may have 
significant effects on the health of children (Komro et al. 2014).
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Finally, qualitative research is a mainstay of regulatory research 
(see Henne, Chapter 6, this volume). Qualitative research complements 
quantitative approaches by providing more in-depth or nuanced 
information on how laws are designed or implemented, and how 
available health outcome measures might not fully encompass all 
legal effects. Results from such qualitative studies then feed back into 
improved measurement and design of quantitative studies. Qualitative 
research can be used to explore the mechanisms of legal effect suggested 
by theory, but can also deploy ‘grounded theory’ methods to inductively 
develop a theory of legal effect through the research process. 
A study by Biradavolu and colleagues (2009) illustrates how standard 
qualitative research techniques can be used for regulatory research. 
The research reported was part of an ethnographic study of a sex-worker 
collective established in a small Indian city to support sex-workers’ 
own efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS. The way police treated sex-workers 
was an important influence both on their overall quality of life and on 
their risk for HIV infection. The researchers were interested in whether 
collectivisation influenced sex-workers’ interaction with police. Over 
time, as part of their overall project, the team learned about interactions 
with police through interviews with sex-workers, their intimate partners, 
police, madams, lawyers and clients as well as observation of the 
collective’s activities. 
The theme of regulation was an obvious way to think about the function of 
the police in relation to the sex-workers, and traditional socio-legal theory 
provided a solid context for understanding the gaps between Indian law 
on the books and the actual ‘law on the street’ imposed by police officers. 
Sex work itself is not illegal in India, and sex-workers have civil rights, 
but, in practice, police extorted bribes, delivered beatings and arrested sex-
workers on other charges. The primary object of this study, however, was to 
learn more about sex-worker agency. The study explored how sex-workers 
regulate police, framing their analysis within a definition of regulation as any 
process or set of processes by which norms are established, the behavior of 
those subject to the norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for 
which there are mechanisms for holding the behavior of regulated actors 
within the acceptable limits of the regime (whether by enforcement action 
or by some other mechanism). (Scott 2001: 283) 
The study revealed that the sex-workers, through their collective, were 
able to build an effective regulatory pyramid. The collective educated 
the police and the public about their rights and the role of sex-workers 
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in preventing HIV. Along with information, they deployed deterrence: 
sex-workers began to assert their rights vocally when threatened with 
unjustified arrest. If that failed, sanctions escalated and networked sex-
workers quickly reported arrests to the collective, which responded 
by sending representatives to the police station to intervene:
For especially egregious abuses, such as physical assault … written 
complaints were filed with superior officers and more nodes of the 
network, such as the media or political groups, were tapped into to put 
pressure on the police. At the peak of the pyramid was … challenging 
police abuse in the courts. (Biradavolu et al. 2009: 6) 
6. Conclusion
It is universally accepted that a drug should not be used on patients 
until it has been tested and found to be both safe and effective. Laws, 
by contrast, are commonly applied in large doses to millions of citizens 
without any testing whatsoever. This has something to do with the 
difference between pharmaceuticals and regulations, but a point remains: 
public health laws are treatments and it is important to know whether 
they work, and with what side effects. Public health law research is the 
field devoted to this inquiry, drawing on a wide range of behavioural 
theories and research methods.
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Whatever your beliefs about society, your political views, your outlook 
on life or your material circumstances, the enjoyment of adequate 
health is vital to the pursuit of whatever life you have reason to value. 
Health  is  intrinsic to living—no matter what one’s walk of life. But 
health  is not simply an instrument for the purposes of other social 
functions; it is an end in itself. Health is the product and reflection 
of society’s attention to an adequate standard, available to all, in the 
conditions in which its population lives. 
In spite of impressive initiatives by institutions worldwide, health issues 
are constantly in the news: famines, wars, early death and escalating 
healthcare costs from obesity, diabetes, cancers and mental illness, deaths 
and injuries from traffic accidents and extreme weather events, and the 
prevailing communicable disease killers such as malaria, tuberculosis 
and now Ebola keep the world busy (AP-HealthGAEN 2011; Frieden 
et al. 2014; Murray et al. 2012). 
No country is immune from these concerns but such life and death 
experiences are not distributed evenly between or within nations. It seems 
remarkable that, today, a man living in the east end of Glasgow, where 
this author is from, is at risk of dying 15 years earlier than a man living 
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in the west end of Glasgow (GCPH 2014). Within a prosperous country 
such as Australia, is it fair that the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
can still expect to die younger (six years, on average) than the richest 
20 per cent of the population (Leigh 2013), and that those who are more 
socially disadvantaged (by income, employment status, education) and 
Indigenous Australians also have a higher risk of depression, diabetes, 
heart disease and cancers (AIHW 2015)? People born in Papua New 
Guinea die, on average, 21 years earlier than people born in Australia 
(WHO 2014a).
It does not have to be like this. The causes of health inequities are 
complex, arising from the interaction of a variety of political, economic 
and social factors (CSDH 2008); health inequities are human-made. 
To some extent, there is eagerness, globally, among many politicians, 
different levels of policymakers, researchers and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to address these inequities. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) Commission on Social Determinants of Health 
(CSDH) assessed the global evidence and made recommendations on 
what could be done to rectify the economic and social policies that have 
contributed to global and national-level health inequities (CSDH 2008). 
The political declaration of the United Nations (UN) high-level meeting 
on non-communicable diseases in September 2011 positioned these 
diseases as matters of concern for the highest level of global governance 
(UN General Assembly 2011). As the Millennium Development Goals 
approach the end of their current form, countries and institutions reflect 
on the successes, failures and opportunities to improve the lot of the 
world’s poor (UN General Assembly 2000). 
This chapter will assert, however, that, in spite of major advances 
in understanding the causes of health inequities, persistent poor 
governance at national and global levels, indifferent policy choices and 
suboptimal regulation underpin and perpetuate twenty-first-century 
health inequities. The specific aims of the chapter are twofold. The first 
is to define health equity such that the reader locates health and 
disease in the wider societal context and not simply as medical issues. 
Second, the chapter aims to draw attention to the political, economic 
and social drivers of health inequities and, in so doing, demonstrate 
what governance  and regulation for health equity could look like. 
The  argument will be that the use of multiple intersectoral policy 
instruments, involving a broad range of actors, is necessary to address 
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the ‘causes of the causes’—the fundamental structures of social hierarchy 
and the socially determined conditions these create in which people 
grow, live, work and age, and which ultimately affect health equity. 
2. A theory of health equity
Universal as it is in principle, health manifests in practice very differently 
for different people around the world. There are many explanations for 
this, ranging from the personal to the political. 
Poor people behaving badly
For many years, peoples’ behaviours received a lot of attention as a 
potential explanation for health differences. Various psychological 
theories dominated the health behaviour literature through the later 
part of the twentieth century. The focus was on personal beliefs, attitudes 
and expectations, thereby drawing attention to the idea of individual 
control and self-regulation (Becker 1974; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; 
Leventhal et al. 1998; Bandura 2005). 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the underlying theory 
driving the behavioural explanation of social inequalities in health had 
shifted. Building on Weber’s work of rationality and lifestyles, Abel 
and Cockerham suggested that people’s health-related behaviours are 
based on choices from options available to them according to their 
life chances, and this varies depending on people’s social position 
(Abel 1991; Cockerham et al. 1993). This concurs with the empirical 
evidence worldwide that more of those with poor health also have poor 
lifestyle behaviours such as smoking and unhealthy diets, and are from 
lower socioeconomic groups (Wilkinson and Marmot 2003). 
Beyond the proximate to society 
While health inequality can be defined as the difference in health 
between different social groups and nations, health inequity is that 
part of the difference that could be avoided or remedied. If there is no 
necessary biological reason for the often staggering differences then they 
are not inevitable. And, if such differences in health are not inevitable, 
the failure to avoid or remedy them is to be found in political and social 
arrangements, and constitutes a failure of social justice. 
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But there are different ways of interpreting health (in)equity. On one 
hand, it can be seen as equality of people’s opportunities to seek health; 
on the other, health equity can be seen as the societal obligation to work 
towards a reasonable equality among people in health outcomes. Two 
leading intellectuals, Rawls and Sen, invoke issues of regulation and 
governance through their theorising of the ways in which both structure 
and agency are fundamental to the pursuit of social justice, and embrace 
issues of opportunity and outcome. 
The social production of health
Rawls’s theory of justice operates on a contract basis, where people are 
asked, hypothetically, to choose the structure of society they want from 
behind a veil of ignorance, thereby ensuring impartiality and pursuit 
of arrangements that are fair for all:
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, 
nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities … This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged 
in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the 
contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and 
no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, 
the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. 
(Rawls 1971: 11)
Operationalising this contract, Rawls’s theory focuses heavily on 
the structures that provide opportunity and is organised around the 
importance of ‘just institutions’, including governments, markets 
and systems of property. Rawls also describes primary goods such as 
income, education and power as intrinsic to the pursuit of social justice 
(Rawls 1971). In essence, he is referring to the structures in society and 
the functioning of them in a fair and just way—many of the things 
described in the social production of disease/political economy of health 
argument, which is organised around notions of power, politics and 
economics (Navarro 2000). 
Located within the political economy of health model is dependency 
or world systems theory, which is often used to understand differences 
between nations (Wallerstein 1974). Dependency theory suggests that 
the differences in health, and the differences in the conditions needed 
for health, between rich and poor countries reflect historical and current 
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international capitalist arrangements, often unequal, and the enormous 
differentials of national wealth and poverty that these generate 
(Stiglitz 2013). 
Within countries, the health experienced by different groups 
corresponds very closely with their place in the social hierarchy or with 
their different living and working conditions. Empirical studies from 
around the world provide compelling evidence of a persistently graded 
relationship between social position and health. Generally, the further 
down the social ladder, the greater is the risk of poor health and premature 
death (Di Cesare et al. 2013; Marmot et al. 1991; Labonté et al. 2005). 
At the core of a political economic explanation of health inequalities 
within countries is the Marxist belief that material disadvantage directly 
affects the variation in mortality and health outcomes, and that class 
relations underwrite the associations between social position and health 
outcomes (Scambler 2007). It is believed that material circumstance is 
structurally determined, evolving from political, economic and social 
contexts, and that individuals across the range of social positions are 
exposed to significantly differing daily environments as a result. In all 
societies, rich and poor, the materialist hypothesis suggests that social 
infrastructure—in the form of legislation and regulatory protections and 
controls, social protection systems and services such as education, health 
services, transportation and housing—is vital for health.
Freedoms and control 
While opportunities for health are vital, they alone are not enough. 
The function of a just society is to do more than simply open the way for 
individuals to make use of their opportunities; it is to organise in such a 
way that, where people are deprived of opportunity to lead meaningful 
lives, such effects can be detected and changed. Sen (1999; 2009) does 
this by extending Rawls’s argument through the introduction of people’s 
capabilities or substantial freedoms: real opportunities based on natural 
and developed potentialities, as well as the presence of governmentally 
supported institutions, to engage in political deliberation and planning 
over one’s life—that is, having the freedom to lead a healthy and 
flourishing life.
Freedom relates to agency and empowerment, which operate along three 
interconnected dimensions: material, psychosocial and political. As discussed 
earlier, people need the basic material requisites for a decent life, but they 
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also need to have control over their lives. Theorists such as Bourdieu and 
Weber argue that peoples’ choices and their health are affected not only 
by the socioeconomic resources that they have available to them, but also 
by the very existence of a social structure and an individual’s perception of 
where they lie within that and their experience of that grouping (Bourdieu 
1989; Cockerham et al. 1993). This has been demonstrated empirically 
worldwide but the landmark study was that of UK civil servants, where 
Marmot and colleagues identified a strong social gradient in health 
outcomes across economically secure occupational positions. Based on these 
findings, it was postulated that the relationship observed between social 
position and noncommunicable diseases and mental health is mediated 
through psychosocial factors such as stress and social relations (Marmot 
2004). Similarly, Wilkinson’s work has demonstrated that, in developed 
countries, it is the relative distribution and not the absolute level of income 
that is related to life expectancy, and the social consequence of this relative 
income is a causal factor in health inequities (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). 
Governance and power 
There is continuity between the previous two dimensions of 
empowerment  through a third, which is to do with power and 
participation and the form of governance they combine to create: the 
degree to which individuals and communities are empowered to influence 
their nations’ processes of governance and to influence the decisions that 
affect the conditions in which people live (Popay et al. 2008). 
Farmer (1999), Navarro and various other political scientists argue that 
health inequities flow from the systematically unequal distribution of 
power and prestige among different social groups. Global, national and 
local politics and modes of governance, economic, physical and social 
policies and infrastructure and cultural norms generate and distribute 
power, income, goods and services. These are distributed unequally across 
the social hierarchy (Navarro 2000). 
This manifests in inequities in both material and psychosocial conditions 
through the inequities in the daily conditions in which people are born, 
grow, live, work and age, meaning that who you are and where you live will 
affect access to quality and affordable education and health care, sufficient 
nutritious food, conditions of work and leisure, quality of housing and 
built environment and your social relations. Together, these factors affect 
health and health inequities (Marmot et al. 2008; Friel 2013). 
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Addressing the distribution of power involves fostering a process of 
‘political empowerment’—broadly defined as the process whereby 
people, or groups, gain control over the decisions that affect them and 
increase and release their ‘capacity to act’ (agency) to effect change in 
the areas they define as important. Political empowerment, therefore, 
is a fundamental medium of social interaction, constituted both at the 
level of individuals (how much people can exercise control and decision-
making over the course and content of their own lives) and at the level 
of communities (how people can effectively apply their collective values 
and interests to the way societal resources are distributed). Health equity 
depends on the political empowerment of individuals and groups to 
represent their needs and interests strongly and effectively and, in so 
doing, to challenge and change the unfair distribution of material and 
psychosocial resources to which all men and women, as citizens, have 
equal claims and rights (UN ECOSOC 2000).
3. The determinants of health equity 
in practice
So, what does all this mean for regulation and governance? 
The  conventional biomedical model of health often directs health 
regulation towards medicines, health services or personal behaviours 
(Bandura 2005; Ratanawijitrasin and Wondemagegnehu 2002). These 
are important and are discussed by Healy (Chapter 34) in this volume. 
But the exposé made in this chapter of the wideranging determinants 
of health inequity highlights that a conventional approach is insufficient 
to improve health equity globally and locally. Policy and regulation for 
health equity are complex, needing to address issues of, for example, trade, 
tax systems, food systems, the behaviour of multinational organisations 
or urban planning. The intersectoral nature of the determinants of health 
inequities demands a holistic response (see Burris, Chapter 32, this 
volume). It is no use, for example, getting the physical built environment 
right if the underlying social inequities prevail. 
There also is an increasing array of actors, institutions and interests at 
stake (Kickbusch 2012). Returning for a moment to Rawls’s veil of 
ignorance, clearly, from a health perspective, the present arrangements 
are far from what we might choose under conditions of impartiality—
suggesting deliberately unfair arrangements. But, as Sen reminds us, 
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creating ‘just institutions and structures’ is necessary but insufficient. 
Supporting people’s freedoms and opportunities and enabling people to 
realise their potential are essential. One might argue that responsive and 
smart regulation is in order (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Gunningham 
et al. 1998).
Regulatory approaches and health equity
Let me use the example of inequities in obesity to illustrate a range of 
possible equity-oriented regulatory mechanisms. Obesity is the result 
of an imbalance in energy consumed (via diet) and energy expended. In 
high- and middle-income countries, obesity is more common among 
socially disadvantaged groups (McLaren 2007; Ezzati et al. 2005). 
Three major social changes over the past 50-plus years—globalisation, 
marketisation and the increasing power and impact of the business 
sector (Nye and Kamarck 2002)—are highly related to obesity and, 
in particular, diet. 
One of the instruments of these social changes, trade liberalisation, sits 
often uncomfortably with health and diet-related inequities. Without 
doubt, trade agreements influence the distribution of power, money and 
resources between and within countries, which, in turn, affects people’s 
daily living conditions and the local availability, quality, affordability 
and desirability of products including food (Friel et al. 2015).
Health concerns relating to trade agreements have tended to focus on 
two areas: the protection of multinational intellectual property rights and 
the implications for access to essential medicines; and the privatisation 
of health care and health-related services (Labonté 2014; Blouin et 
al. 2009). However, as the scope and depth of trade agreements have 
expanded over recent decades, two further areas have been receiving 
greater attention: the reach of trade agreements into ‘behind-the-
border’ issues affecting domestic policy and regulatory regimes (Labonté 
2014; Thow et al. 2015); and trade and investment in health-damaging 
commodities (particularly tobacco, alcohol and highly processed foods) 
and the associated global diffusion of unhealthy lifestyles, which is 
particularly relevant for obesity (Hawkes et al. 2009, Stuckler et al. 2012). 
Administrative regulatory capacity is essential to deal with these trade–
diet risks. At the national level, countries must understand that free-
trade agreements carry health and social risks and costs (Walls et al. 
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2015). Internationally, agencies such as WHO can play an important 
role to support countries to implement trade agreements, as well as 
provide technical guidance and support with respect to ensuring health 
concerns are represented at the international level. 
Equitable food marketing requires binding international codes of 
practice related to healthful food marketing, supported at the national 
level by policy and regulation (Cairns et al. 2013). Restricting exposure 
to advertising of foods high in fat, salt and sugar is widely considered to 
be one of the most cost-effective child obesity prevention approaches 
available and may contribute to reducing dietary inequities due to the 
higher exposure and vulnerability of low-income children to marketing 
(Magnus et al. 2009; Loring and Robertson 2014). Reliance on 
voluntary guidelines may result in differential uptake either by better-off 
individuals or by institutions and provides little opportunity for private-
sector accountability (Galbraith-Emami and Lobstein 2013). 
Economic instruments can help regulate dietary intake, and involve 
domestic healthy food production subsidies and food taxes. According 
to modelling literature, regulatory approaches that combine taxes on 
unhealthy foods with subsidies on healthy foods such as fruits and 
vegetables are likely to have the greatest positive influence on inequities 
in healthy eating (Thow et al. 2010; Ni Mhurchu et al. 2013; Nicholls 
et al. 2011). 
Urban planning levers hold promise in providing solutions to the 
problems of land use mix and equitable access to healthy food. The city 
of Sam Chuk in Thailand restored its major food and small goods 
market with the assistance of local intersectoral action inclusive of 
architects. In general, urban design and planning would be greatly aided 
by routine health-equity impact assessment of food retail placement, 
neighbourhood walkability, transport networks and street safety. 
Without material and psychosocial resources, however, having nutritious 
food available and physically accessible means little. Prudent social policy 
initiatives such as social protection schemes and national wage agreements 
can provide material security if based on healthy standards of living, and if 
they reflect the real cost of healthy eating (Friel et al. 2006). 
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Unfortunately, the dominant focus is not on the above but on individual-
level action to make people eat more healthily. The regulatory and 
governance arrangements are missing the heart of the problem (Friel et 
al. 2007).
Smart governance for health equity
Given the view that health is universal among basic human needs, 
maintenance of a population’s health is a fundamental task of social 
organisation, and one in which the stewardship role of the state is central. 
Government action can, broadly, take three forms: 1) provider or 
guarantor of human rights and essential services; 2) facilitator of policy 
and regulatory frameworks that provide the basis for equitable health 
improvement; and 3) gatherer and monitor of data about populations 
that generate information about health equity (Blas et al. 2008). 
However, the context for governing health has changed, with much more 
interdependence between countries and problems. Globally, increasing 
acknowledgement of the need for collective action among states for 
shared benefits—including environmental protection and human 
security, among others—offers real opportunities to advance global 
health equity and also the arguments in favour of fair representation and 
equitable inclusion in existing and new global institutions. 
Traditionally, society has looked to the health sector to deal with 
concerns about health and disease. However, action to address health 
equity necessarily moves outside the health system and cuts across many 
government departments, NGOs and service providers, business, a 
plethora of advocacy groups and international institutions. Policies and 
regulation must encompass key sectors of society, not just the health 
sector. That said, the health sector is critical to global change. It can 
champion action at the highest level of society, demonstrate effectiveness 
through good practice and support other ministries in creating policies 
that promote health equity. 
Given the complex context in which health inequities arise today, there 
are obviously many other actors and institutions who must also play a 
role in the coproduction of health equity (WHO 2014b). With this come 
different power constellations, processes, interests and ideological positions 
nested within different political systems and cultures at different levels of 
governance (Kickbusch 2005). We must remember that good governance 
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involves many faces; as Rawls noted, we need fair and just institutions, but, 
returning to the notion of empowerment, we also have other mechanisms 
through which to enable actors and their agency. 
Formal civil society organisations have enabled improvements to 
social determinants of health at all levels of society, through advocacy, 
monitoring, mobilisation of communities, provision of technical support 
and training and by giving a voice to the most disadvantaged sections of 
society. New social movements such as informal workers’ alliances in low 
and middle-income countries, including fair-trade basic food producers 
and anti–child labour campaigns, are now also developing and affecting 
employment conditions in ways that are good for health.
Some argue, however, that the current global arrangements of norms and 
regulations render some actors structurally weak (Ottersen et al. 2014). 
To what extent can agency change the effects of structure? In part, the 
answer lies in agent-constructed webs of influence (see Drahos, Chapter 
15, this volume) and exploiting networks of nodal governance to change 
flows of power and influence (see Holley and Shearing, Chapter 10, 
this volume). There are lessons from history on how to pursue health 
and health equity using soft forms of power and networked governance 
(see Box 33.1). 
Box 33.1 Lessons from Doha
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was 
signed in 1994. It mandated 20-year patent terms for signatory countries. However, 
at the insistence of many low- and middle-income countries, the TRIPS agreement 
incorporated a number of flexibilities (health safeguards) for countries to bypass 
patents to protect public health (for example, in circumstances of emergency). The 
rights to use these safeguards were reaffirmed in the 2001 Doha Declaration on 
Public Health and the TRIPS agreement. How did this happen? Analysis by Drahos 
(2003) points to four elements of good governance: 1) good technical analysis of legal 
and economic issues; 2) clever framing of issues by advocacy groups; 3) circles of 
consensus, building unity among developing countries; and 4) networked governance, 
with a broad-based coalition of states integrated with NGo networks.
4. Conclusion
Health inequities are emergent structural properties of complex 
systems—changing only when systems change. If one were to take a 
Marxist approach then change would mean a replacement of the capitalist 
neoliberal order. However, as others in this book highlight, capitalism 
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has proven to be highly adaptive (see Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, this 
volume). A regulatory capitalism that embraces values of responsiveness 
and smartness may help to bring capitalism’s basic arrangements for 
health equity closer to what citizens might choose for themselves under 
conditions of Rawlsian impartiality. The example of Doha and TRIPS 
demonstrates that it can be done; networked governance opens up 
capitalism to these kinds of possibilities.
Further reading
Meier, BM and Onzivu, W 2014. ‘The evolution of human rights in 
World Health Organization policy and the future of human rights 
through global health governance’, Public Health 128(2): 179–87. doi.
org/10.1016/j.puhe.2013.08.012.
Swinburn, B, Kraak, V, Rutter, H, Vandevijvere, S, Lobstein, T, Sacks, 
G, Gomes, F, Marsh, T and Magnusson, R 2015. ‘Strengthening 
of accountability systems to create healthy food environments 
and reduce global obesity’, The Lancet 385(9986): 2534–45. doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)61747-5.
References
Abel, T 1991. ‘Measuring health lifestyles in a comparative analysis: 
Theoretical issues and empirical findings’, Social Science & Medicine 
32(8): 899–908. doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(91)90245-8.
Asia-Pacific Global Action for Health Equity Network (AP-
HealthGAEN) 2011. An Asia Pacific Spotlight on Health Inequity: 
Taking Action to Address the Social and Environmental Determinants 
of Health Inequity in Asia Pacific, 2011. Canberra: Global Action for 
Health Equity Network. Available at: www.wpro.who.int/topics/
social_determinants_health/ehgAPHealthgaenreport.pdf.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) 2015. Life 
Expectancy of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People. Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. Available at: aihw.gov.au/
deaths/life-expectancy/#indigenous. 
585
33 . GoVERNANCE, REGULATIoN AND HEALTH EqUITY
Ayres, I and Braithwaite, J 1992. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bandura, A 2005. ‘The primacy of self-regulation in health promotion’, 
Applied Psychology 54(2): 245–54. doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-
0597.2005.00208.x.
Becker, MH 1974. The Health Belief Model and Personal Health Behavior. 
Thorofare, NJ: Charles B Slack.
Blas, E, Gilson, L, Kelly, MP, Labonté, R, Lapitan, J, Muntaner, C, 
Östlin, P, Popay, J, Sadana, R and Sen, G 2008. ‘Addressing social 
determinants of health inequities: What can the state and civil 
society do?’, The Lancet 372(9650): 1684–9. doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(08)61693-1.
Blouin, C, Chopra, M and van der Hoeven, R 2009. ‘Trade and 
social determinants of health’, The Lancet 373(9662): 502–7. doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(08)61777-8.
Bourdieu, P 1989. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement 
of Taste. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Cairns, G, Angus, K, Hastings, G and Caraher, M 2013. ‘Systematic 
reviews of the evidence on the nature, extent and effects of 
food marketing to children: A retrospective summary’, Appetite 62: 
209–15. doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2012.04.017.
Cockerham, WC, Abel, T and Lüschen, G 1993. ‘Max Weber, formal 
rationality, and health lifestyles’, The Sociological Quarterly 34: 413–
28. doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1993.tb00119.x.
Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) 2008. 
Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action 
on the Social Determinants of Health—Final Report of the 
Commission on Social  Determinants of Health. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.  Available at: who.int/social_determinants/
thecommission/finalreport/en/.
Di Cesare, M, Khang, YH, Asaria, P, Blakely, T, Cowan, MJ, Farzadfar, 
F, Guerrero, R, Ikeda, N, Kyobutungi, C, Msyamboza, KP, Oum, 
S, Lynch, JW, Marmot, MG and Ezzati, M 2013. ‘Inequalities in 
non-communicable diseases and effective responses’, The Lancet 
381(9866): 585–97. doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61851-0.
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
586
Drahos, P 2003. ‘When the weak bargain with the strong: Negotiations 
in the WTO’, International Negotiation 8(1): 79–109. doi.
org/10.1163/138234003769590677.
Ezzati, M, Vander Hoorn, S, Lawes, CMM, Leach, R, James, WPT, 
Lopez, AD, Rodgers, A and Murray, CJL 2005. ‘Rethinking the 
“diseases of affluence” paradigm: Global patterns of nutritional risks 
in relation to economic development’, PLoS Medicine 2(5): e133. doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020133.
Farmer, P 1999. ‘Pathologies of power: Rethinking health and human 
rights’, American Journal of Public Health 89(10): 1486–96. doi.
org/10.2105/AJPH.89.10.1486.
Fishbein, M and Ajzen, I 1975. Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: 
An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley.
Frieden, TR, Damon, I, Bell, BP, Kenyon, T and Nichol, S 2014. ‘Ebola 
2014: New challenges, new global response and responsibility’, 
New England Journal of Medicine 371: 1177–80. doi.org/10.1056/
NEJMp1409903.
Friel, S 2013. ‘Improving equity’, in C Guest, I Kawachi, I Lang and 
W  Ricciardi (eds), Oxford Handbook of Public Health Practice. 3rd 
edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 406–17. doi.org/10.1093/
med/9780199586301.003.0041.
Friel, S, Chopra, M and Satcher, D 2007. ‘Unequal weight: Equity oriented 
policy responses to the global obesity epidemic’, British Medical 
Journal 335(7632): 1241–3. doi.org/10.1136/bmj.39377.622882.47.
Friel, S, Hattersley, L and Townsend, R 2015. ‘Trade policy and public 
health’, Annual Review of Public Health 36: 325–44. doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-publhealth-031914-122739.
Friel, S, Walsh, O and McCarthy, D 2006. ‘The irony of a rich country: 
Issues of access and availability of healthy food in the Republic of 
Ireland’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 60(12): 
1013–19. doi.org/10.1136/jech.2005.041335.
Galbraith-Emami, S and Lobstein, T 2013. ‘The impact of initiatives 
to limit the advertising of food and beverage products to children: 
A  systematic review’, Obesity Reviews 14(12): 960–74. doi.
org/10.1111/obr.12060.
587
33 . GoVERNANCE, REGULATIoN AND HEALTH EqUITY
Glasgow Centre for Population Health (GCPH) 2014. Ten Years of the 
Glasgow Centre for Population Health: The Evidence and Implications. 
Glasgow: Glasgow Centre for Population Health. Available at: 
gcph.co.uk/assets/0000/4853/GCPH_Evidence_Narrative_Web_
Version.pdf.
Gunningham, N, Grabosky, P and Sinclair, D 1998. Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hawkes, C, Chopra, M and Friel, S 2009. ‘Globalization, trade and 
the nutrition transition’, in R Labonté, T Schrecker, C Packer and 
V Runnels (eds), Globalization and Health: Pathways, Evidence and 
Policy. New York: Routledge, pp. 235–62.
Kickbusch, I 2005. ‘Tackling the political determinants of global 
health’, British Medical Journal 331(7511): 246–7. doi.org/10.1136/
bmj.331.7511.246.
Kickbusch, I 2012. ‘Addressing the interface of the political and 
commercial determinants of health’, Health Promotion International 
27: 427–8. doi.org/10.1093/heapro/das057.
Labonté, R 2014. ‘The global health agenda and shrinking policy spaces 
in the post-crisis landscape’, in D Drache and L Jacobs (eds), Linking 
Global Trade and Human Rights: New Policy Space in Hard Economic 
Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 216–35. doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9781107238985.015.
Labonté, R, Schrecker, T and Gupta, A 2005. Health for Some: Death, 
Disease and Disparity in a Globalising Era. Toronto: Centre for Social 
Justice.
Leigh, A 2013. Battlers and Billionaires: The Story of Inequality in Australia. 
Melbourne: Black Inc.
Leventhal, H, Leventhal, EA and Contrada, RJ 1998. ‘Self-regulation, 
health, and behavior: A perceptual-cognitive approach’, Psychology 
& Health 13(4): 717–33. doi.org/10.1080/08870449808407425.
Loring, B and Robertson, A 2014. Obesity and Inequitites: Guidance 
for Addressing Inequities in Overweight and Obesity. Copenhagen: 
The Regional Office for Europe of the World Health Organization.
McLaren, L 2007. ‘Socioeconomic status and obesity’, Epidemiologic 
Reviews 29(1): 29–48. doi.org/10.1093/epirev/mxm001.
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
588
Magnus, A, Haby, MM, Carter, R and Swinburn, B 2009. ‘The cost-
effectiveness of removing television advertising of high-fat and/or 
high-sugar food and beverages to Australian children’, International 
Journal of Obesity 33(10): 1094–102. doi.org/10.1038/ijo.2009.156.
Marmot, M 2004. Status syndrome. London: Bloomsbury. 
Marmot, M, Friel, S, Bell, R, Houweling, TAJ and Taylor, S 2008. 
‘Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on 
the social determinants of health’, The Lancet 372(9650): 1661–9. doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(08)61690-6.
Marmot, MG, Smith, GD, Stansfeld, S, Patel, C, North, F, Head, J, 
White, I, Brunner, E and Feeney, A 1991. ‘Health inequalities among 
British civil servants: The Whitehall II study’, Lancet 337(8754): 
1387–93. doi.org/10.1016/0140-6736(91)93068-K.
Murray, CJL, Vos, T, Lozano, R, Naghavi, M, Flaxman, AD, Michaud, C 
and 357 others 2012. ‘Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for 291 
diseases and injuries in 21 regions, 1990–2010: A systematic analysis 
for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010’, The Lancet 380(9859): 
2197–223. doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61689-4.
Navarro, V 2000. The Political Economy of Social Inequalities: Consequences 
for Health and Quality of Life. Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing 
Company.
Nicholls, S, Gwozdz, W, Reisch, L and Voight, K 2011. ‘Fiscal food 
policy: Equity and practice’, Perspectives in Public Health 131(4): 
157–8. doi.org/10.1177/1757913911412479.
Ni Mhurchu, C, Eyles, H, Schilling, C, Yang, Q, Kaye-Blake, W, 
Genc, M and Blakely, T 2013. ‘Food prices and consumer demand: 
Differences across income levels and ethnic groups’, PLoS ONE 
8(10): e75934. doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0075934.
Nye, J and Kamarck, E 2002. Governance.com: Democracy in the 
Information Age. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Ottersen, OP, Dasgupta, J, Blouin, C, Buss, P, Chongsuvivatwong, V, 
Frenk, J, Ni Mhurchu, C, Eyles, H, Schilling, C, Yang, Q, Kaye-Blake, 
W, Genc, M and Blakely, T 2014. ‘The political origins of health 
inequity: Prospects for change’, The Lancet 383(9917): 630–67. doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)62407-1.
589
33 . GoVERNANCE, REGULATIoN AND HEALTH EqUITY
Popay, J, Escorel, S, Hernández, M, Johnston, H, Mathieson, J and Rispel, 
L 2008. Understanding and Tackling Social Exclusion: Final Report to 
the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health from the Social 
Exclusion Knowledge Network. Geneva: WHO Social Exclusion 
Knowledge Network.
Ratanawijitrasin, S and Wondemagegnehu, E 2002. Effective 
Drug Regulation: A Multicountry Study. Geneva: World Health 
Organization. Available at: apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s2300e/
s2300e.pdf. 
Rawls, J 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press.
Scambler, G 2007. ‘Social structure and the production, reproduction 
and durability of health inequalities’, Social Theory Health 5(4): 297–
315. doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.sth.8700101.
Sen, A 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred A Knopf.
Sen, A 2009. The Idea of Justice. London: Penguin Books.
Stiglitz, J 2013. The Price of Inequality. London: Penguin Books.
Stuckler, D, McKee, M, Ebrahim, S and Basu, S 2012. ‘Manufacturing 
epidemics: The role of global producers in increased consumption 
of unhealthy commodities including processed foods, alcohol, and 
tobacco’, PLoS Medicine 9(6): e1001235. doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pmed.1001235.
Thow, AM, Jan, S, Leeder, S and Swinburn, B 2010. ‘The effect of 
fiscal policy on diet, obesity and chronic disease: A systematic 
review’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 88(8): 609–14. doi.
org/10.2471/BLT.09.070987.
Thow, AM, Snowdon, W, Labonté, R, Gleeson, D, Stuckler, D, Hattersley, 
L, Schram, A, Kay, A and Friel, S 2015. ‘Will the next generation of 
preferential trade and investment agreements undermine prevention 
of noncommunicable diseases? A prospective policy analysis of the 
Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement’, Health Policy 119(1): 88–96. 
doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2014.08.002.
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
590
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC) 2000. 
General Comment 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, 11 August, UN Doc E/C. 12/2000/4, UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Geneva. 
United Nations General Assembly 2000. United Nations millennium 
declaration (‘millennium development goals’), 18 September, UN Doc 
A/RES/55/2, UN General Assembly, New York. Available at: un.org/
millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf.
United Nations General Assembly 2011. Political declaration of the high-
level meeting of the General Assembly on the prevention and control of 
non-communicable diseases, 16 September, UN Doc A/66/L.1, UN 
General Assembly, New York. Available at: www.who.int/nmh/
events/un_ncd_summit2011/political_declaration_en.pdf. 
Wallerstein, I 1974. ‘The rise and future demise of the world 
capitalist system: Concepts for comparative analysis’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 16(4): 387–415. doi.org/10.1017/
S0010417500007520.
Walls, HL, Smith, RD and Drahos, P 2015. ‘Improving regulatory capacity 
to manage risks associated with trade agreements’, Globalization and 
Health 11: 14. doi.org/10.1186/s12992-015-0099-7.
Wilkinson, R and Marmot, M 2003. Social Determinants of Health: 
The  Solid Facts. 2nd edn. Copenhagen: The Regional Office for 
Europe of the World Health Organization.
Wilkinson, R and Pickett, K 2010. The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better 
for Everyone. London: Penguin Books.
World Health Organization (WHO) 2014a. Life Expectancy at Birth, 
2012. [Online]. Geneva: World Health Organization. Available at: 
gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/mbd/life_expectancy/
atlas.html.
World Health Organization (WHO) 2014b. Smart Governance for 
Health and Wellbeing: The Evidence. Copenhagen: The Regional Office 





Patients as regulatory actors 
in their own health care
Judith Healy
1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the ways in which an individual patient can be 
a regulatory actor in ensuring that the treatment he/she receives is 
safe and of good quality. While health policies now promote patients 
as regulatory actors, this is not an easy role for patients to undertake. 
This  is  so for several reasons, including the weight of knowledge and 
power inherent in health professionals (particularly doctors) compared 
with patients. Building on my earlier work (Healy 2011a; Healy 2011b: 
Chapter 9; Healy and Dugdale 2009), this chapter addresses the 
following regulatory concepts, dilemmas and questions:
• Why regulate: What is the rationale for patients to act as regulators?
• Information asymmetry: Do patients have sufficient information 
to regulate?
• Power asymmetry: What powers can patients exert through pyramids 
of supports and sanctions?
• Networked regulation: Who can patients enlist to strengthen their 
influence?
• Transparency: Are patients told when things go wrong? 
• Trust: Does information erode therapeutic confidence in one’s doctor?
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To begin with the first question, why should policymakers enlist patients 
as regulators and what is the justification for stronger regulation in 
health care? Virtually everyone during their lifetime consults health 
professionals, takes medication and undergoes procedures. The main 
reason for engaging people in regulating their own health care, therefore, 
is the pragmatic one that we are the ones who suffer most keenly the 
consequences of unsafe or poor-quality health care. From a patient’s 
point of view (and we are all patients), we should have a say; we are too 
trusting in leaving it all to the doctors.
The complacent assumption about the safety and quality of modern 
health care has been shaken over the past decade. Health care can be 
a risky business. Studies from several high-income countries, including 
Australia (Runciman et al. 2000), report that between 4 and 12 per cent 
of patients experience an adverse event in hospital—in other words, you, 
as a patient, have about a one in 10 chance of something going wrong. 
Even in the best of hospitals, therefore, some form of unintended error 
can occur in a person’s care. Further, substandard health services are not 
uncommon. For example, a population-level survey of adult patients in 
the United States found that only about half had received the treatment 
recommended in clinical protocols (McGlynn et al. 2003). 
The concept of a patient as a regulatory actor invokes the principle 
of personal responsibility. But is it fair to ask people to take more 
responsibility for the quality and safety of their own health care? 
Patients are only one type of regulatory actor in a complex healthcare 
system, and health authorities are in the process of strengthening 
governance by a range of actors. Clearly, there are limitations to expecting 
sick people to engage as regulatory actors given lessened capacity during 
illness. There are also other barriers to participation including a class 
barrier of fewer resources, both educational and financial, a cultural 
barrier of different expectations and language, a knowledge barrier given 
the esoteric nature of medical expertise and a power barrier given the 
unequal relationship between doctors and patients. Nevertheless, some 
of these barriers can be surmounted, and this chapter goes on to discuss 
such strategies.
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2. Concepts of patients
The term ‘patient’ is used in this chapter mainly because it is difficult to 
find another appropriate word. While ‘patient’ implies passivity (contrary 
to the argument here), alternative words also carry dubious connotations, 
such as ‘consumer’ and ‘customer’. The last two terms imply that health 
care is entirely a commodity rather than a public good—a value position 
that is not endorsed in this chapter. 
The metaphors of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ suggest how individuals can 
influence  service providers (Hirschman 1970). ‘Voice’ is a political 
concept that fits a citizen participation paradigm, referring to the 
ability of a person to influence a service provider while continuing to 
use the service. This  assumes an active not a passive person who can 
ask for information,  negotiate options, fill out surveys, use complaint 
procedures and join an interest group. ‘Exit’ is an economic concept 
that fits a market model paradigm and refers to a person’s ability to 
leave a service and go elsewhere, which assumes that a person has the 
capacity to leave a service, that other options are available and that the 
person is able to obtain or pay for another service and can make an 
informed choice—all of which are somewhat problematic assumptions 
in health care. 
This chapter draws on the model of responsive regulation developed 
by John Braithwaite and colleagues, and the regulatory pyramid in 
particular, since this offers a framework for considering actors and 
strategies (see John Braithwaite, Chapter 7, this volume). The users of 
health services can be conceptualised as regulatory actors in terms of 
six roles (and accompanying strategies): informed patients, selective 
consumers, vocal complainants, entitled citizens, active partners and 
aggrieved litigants. The ways in which a patient can exert influence 
draw on mechanisms that range upwards in a regulatory pyramid, from 
voluntary strategies at the base (asking for information, giving consent), 
to market strategies (responding to a survey, making a complaint), to 
enforcement strategies (asserting one’s rights, suing for malpractice). 
These concepts are depicted in Figure 34.1, with informed patients at 
the wide base of the pyramid (since this strategy is most commonly 
used) rising to active partners and aggrieved litigants towards the apex.
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This pyramid is a hybrid form of two pyramids: a sanctions-based and 
a strengths-based pyramid (Braithwaite et al. 2007: 319; Braithwaite 
2009: 28). ‘Informed patients’ and ‘active partners’, for example, draw on 
the strengths of patients themselves in supporting a good standard of 
health care by being better informed and by participating in decisions. 
‘Vocal complainants’ and ‘aggrieved litigants’, in contrast, are examples 
of patients who invoke sanctions against poor services and professional 
malpractice. Regulators could devise two pyramids—supports and 
sanctions—and offer a range of mechanisms that patients might use 
from base to apex. Further, the pyramid can be embellished with the 
addition of network partners at different levels (Braithwaite 2009: 30), 









Figure 34.1 Patients as actors on a responsive regulation pyramid
Source: Adapted from Healy (2011b: 285).
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3. Informed patients
The doctor–patient relationship is changing from the centuries-old 
medical tradition of ‘trust me, I’m a doctor’. The doctor in this paternalistic 
model decided the treatment and told the patient little other than to 
secure compliance with the regime: ‘take the antibiotics with each meal’. 
Patients were not asked for their views and were expected to follow 
instructions:
Little more than a decade ago, doctors made the decisions; patients did 
what they were told. Doctors did not consult patients about their desires 
and priorities, and routinely withheld information—sometimes crucial 
information, such as what drugs they were on, what treatments they 
were being given, and what their diagnosis was. (Gawande 2002: 2010) 
Health authorities now commonly use an information strategy to 
empower or, at least, educate patients. This is a big task since the health 
services field is an example of what economists refer to as a market 
characterised by information asymmetry. Redressing this imbalance calls 
for improving the supply and accessibility of information as well as its 
take-up by the public. In other words, healthcare providers need to be 
better communicators, while patients need to be more health literate. 
Health literacy is a crucial attribute if people are to make informed 
decisions (Nutbeam 2008). Defined as the capacity to acquire, understand 
and use information for health, health literacy is a risk factor in poor 
health outcomes: such patients have higher risks of hospitalisation, 
have longer hospital stays, are sicker when they seek medical help, are 
less likely to comply with treatment and are more likely to make errors 
with their medication (Institute of Medicine 2004). In other words, 
poorly informed patients experience lower-quality and less safe health 
care. Recommendations on reforms to the Australian healthcare system 
consequently include calls for action to improve health literacy. 
An information strategy aims to enable patients to make informed 
decisions. Good professional practice calls for a doctor to explain and 
obtain consent before a procedure. Moreover, ‘informed consent’ is 
a legal requirement in many countries, including in Australia under 
common law, whereby all competent adults have the right to consent to 
and refuse medical treatment. If consent is not established, there may 
be legal consequences for health professionals. This requirement also 
establishes another layer of protection against adverse events, according 
to a systematic review of consent procedures (Shojania et al. 2001). 
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Exactly  what constitutes ‘informed’ consent to tests and treatment 
remains, however, a matter for conjecture, while offering a readily 
understood medical explanation is a challenge when people lack health 
literacy. 
Most people can relate to the experience of coming away from a 
consultation with a doctor and being unclear what was said, not necessarily 
because the doctor did not explain, but because anxiety got in the way of 
asking, listening, understanding and remembering. A manual produced 
for health professionals by the National Health and Medical Research 
Council (NHMRC 2006) suggests practical strategies to engage in 
better two-way communication with patients. Health authorities now 
put out material on many health topics. Since people can be confused 
by myriad internet websites that offer information (and misinformation) 
on health conditions and treatments, and doctors complain about their 
patients asking for the latest quack remedy, health authorities have set 
up credible websites. For example, the Australian Department of Health 
(in  partnership with state health departments) runs HealthDirect 
Australia, an internet gateway that offers information on health and 
wellbeing and provides links to other specialist websites. 
4. Selective consumers
Policymakers promoted consumer choice in the neoliberal reforms 
that swept across health sectors from the 1980s onwards. Consumer 
exit, more than citizen voice, was the preferred demand-side regulatory 
mechanism. The citizen rights rationale is that people are entitled to 
information that can directly affect them; the informed consumer 
rationale is that people need reliable information on success rates and 
risks to choose between providers and procedures; the market rationale 
is that informed consumers will choose high performers and so motivate 
others to improve. The concept of a selective consumer involves three 
elements. First, people must be able to articulate what they want from 
health professionals and health services. Second, they must have access 
to information for making informed choices. Third, they must be able to 
leave a service and go elsewhere. While consumer choice is an important 
principle, there are limitations to the concept of a selective healthcare 
consumer. As noted earlier, relying on patients to regulate their own 
health care may not be feasible or reliable in some cases:
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Hospital director: We are a major trauma hospital and patients aren’t 
competent in much of our emergency work. In some we don’t even 
get consent because they are straight to theatre. Also, most of our 
patients are really sick. Second, if a patient has something that is not 
pretty simple, it’s difficult to get them to tell you that back reliably. 
Also, I don’t think many patients are confident enough to challenge 
professionals. Unless you are part of the health culture, it’s difficult to 
question professional advice; people just tend not to do it. (Healy 2008)
Choice is a key consumer principle that is expected to push health 
services to improve. Patient choice of doctor is a strongly held principle 
in some countries, including Australia, whereas in some others people are 
expected to enroll with a particular general practitioner (GP) practice. 
The extent of patient choice in relation to specialists and hospitals also 
varies. In some countries, including Australia, patients must have a 
referral from a GP to qualify for reimbursement for specialist care, while, 
in other countries, patients can bypass a GP gatekeeper and go directly 
to specialists.
Some governments use patient choice as a demand-side regulatory 
mechanism, since the economic rationalist assumption is that patients 
will choose high performers and so put pressure to improve on poor 
performers. The consumer choice principle assumes, however, that 
patients can make an informed choice. But it is not easy for a person 
to access information on which to make a choice. One method is 
access by the public to a medical register, which is the norm in many 
countries. For example, the Federation of State Medical Boards in the 
United States posts information on a doctor’s full disciplinary history. 
The public has access to much less information on medical practitioners 
in the Australian states (Healy et al. 2008). This has been improved under 
the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (Cth), whereby a 
national register for each of the 14 health professions has been set up 
that offers the public access to information on practitioners including 
their qualifications and any restrictions or conditions placed on practice 
by a board or tribunal. 
Public reporting is being widely adopted as a promising regulatory 
strategy. For example, government agencies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom post information on hospital scores, surgery success 
rates and adverse events, as do private sector agencies, such as the US 
Leapfrog Group and the UK ‘Dr Foster’ website. In Australia, state 
health departments have been slow to publish performance indicators 
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for their public hospitals. The Australian Government in 2010 set up the 
MyHospitals website, with performance measures now being developed 
further by the National Health Performance Authority. While there is 
a strong public interest case, public reporting so far appears to have had 
a limited impact on people choosing better-performing health services. 
Public reporting does have an impact, however, as systematic reviews 
have found that reputational pressure exerts a significant impact on 
provider behaviour, since hospitals and surgeons care greatly about their 
reputations (Marshall et al. 2004). 
What might be the reasons for the lack of impact on patient choice? 
First, it is early days for public reporting and the public is not yet familiar 
with this approach. Second, the information presented is usually too 
complex and geared more to professionals than to the public. Third, 
people may opt for convenience and familiarity in going to the nearest or 
known provider. Fourth, people are suffering from information overload 
since so many providers do so much public reporting—mostly glossy, 
confusing and self-serving—such as banks, electricity companies and 
schools. Finally, the public trusts hospitals and doctors, or else trusts the 
health authorities to regulate where necessary. Public reporting is likely 
to have more impact in future as the concept of performance indicators 
becomes better understood, and as people become more discerning users 
of health care given greater public knowledge about the variability of 
quality and safety. 
5. Vocal complainants
Patient ‘voice’—that is, the expressed views of patients—can exert 
pressure to improve the safety and quality of health care, with two main 
avenues being consumer surveys and formal complaints procedures. 
Patient opinion now is regarded as a legitimate indicator, among 
other measures, of healthcare quality. Patient satisfaction is a measure 
of quality from the patient’s perspective and so offers a different view 
to collections of data from health service managers and practitioners. 
Patient satisfaction surveys have become the norm in many health 
services—although people are wearying of being asked by all manner 
of companies to rate an encounter. Australian state health departments 
now publish the results of patient surveys across different hospitals, 
although consumer surveys must be interpreted with caution since an 
overall satisfaction question generally obtains a satisfaction rating of 
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more than 80 per cent. While consumer surveys arguably are a relatively 
reliable way of gauging patient views, anecdotal accounts can be telling. 
While many are testimonials by grateful patients, others tell tales of poor 
treatment. The personal stories of patients who experienced a medical 
error can be a powerful way of influencing policymakers.
All public hospitals in Australia have internal complaints procedures, 
as required for over a decade by intergovernmental hospital funding 
agreements, although hospital brochures prefer to avoid the word 
‘complaint’ and instead ask ‘what would you like to tell us?’. People 
can complain to a designated staff member or can take their complaint 
outside to an independent agency: each state and territory has 
a  healthcare complaints commissioner or similar title (Walton et al. 
2012). For example, in 2013–14, the NSW Health Care Complaints 
Commissioner received 4,767 written complaints, investigated 226, took 
14 to a professional standards committee and prosecuted 67 matters. 
6. Entitled citizens
The fundamental right of citizens to good health care is set out in 
some countries in a constitution, bill of rights, legislation or codes of 
practice. Such formal entitlements offer leverage in demanding quality 
health care. The idea of patient rights flows from the United Nations 
(UN) 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights in that a person 
has a fundamental right to good health and to good health care. Views 
on patients’ rights differ across countries depending on social and 
political norms, and there are still some echoes of attitudes depicted in 
Solzhenitsyn’s novel Cancer Ward, in which patients had to battle with 
the doctors for information about their treatment:
[Doctor] It’s strictly against the rules for patients to read medical 
books … 
[Patient] What is the diagnosis? 
[Doctor] Generally speaking, we don’t have to tell our patients what’s 
wrong with them … (Solzhenitsyn 2003: 41)
Since at least the 1980s in Australia, the state has been expected to 
consult with its citizens on matters that affect them. Patient participation 
has been adopted in the health sector and health managers are expected 
to be adept in managing consultation with patients and many other 
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vested interests, including patient advocacy groups (Dugdale 2008: 194). 
Major  changes in health policy are generally not undertaken without 
a round of consultations.
What sort of standards can patients reasonably expect from their 
health services? Both patients and providers need some guidance. 
‘Patient charters’ are produced that encapsulate such standards rather 
than legally enforceable ‘rights’. The Australian Charter of Healthcare 
Rights, endorsed by the country’s health ministers in 2008, required 
the states to ensure that their public hospitals post a patient charter. 
A charter must inform patients they are entitled to free access to public 
hospital treatment, to be treated as a public or a private patient within 
a public hospital, set out the process by which patients can complain 
about hospital services and explain how complaints can be made to an 
independent complaints body. 
Nordic countries led the way in passing patients’ rights legislation—
for  example, Norway passed the Act on Patients’ Rights 1999, which 
included the right to choose a hospital, to have access to a specialist 
evaluation within 30 days of referral, to a second opinion, to be fully 
informed, to give informed consent and to have access to complaints 
procedures. New Zealand also stresses a rights approach in its Code 
of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights. Australia does 
not have a ‘bill of rights’ (except in the Australian Capital Territory) in 
relation to citizen rights in general or to patients’ rights in particular, 
and no legislation at national or state level sets out a comprehensive 
statement of patient rights. The law in Australia has concerned itself 
with specific aspects, such as ensuring that a person gives consent to 
health care, breach of contract between a doctor and a patient involving 
medical negligence and a person’s right to access their own medical 
information (McIlwraith and Madden 2006). 
Although many countries have informed consent legislation, patients 
are not necessarily legally entitled to know when an error occurs in their 
medical treatment. Many studies have found that most patients are not 
told about a medical error and that most believe they should be told 
(Studdert 2009). The Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care advocates that health professionals tell their patients when 
something goes wrong and has produced guidance on ‘open disclosure’.
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7. Active partners 
Citizen participation strategies are pursued in the health sector with 
the intention of redressing the unequal power relationship between 
professionals and patients. The citizen participation concept suggests a 
democratic paradigm where a person is an active partner in decision-
making. This approach aligns with community development principles 
that broadly are about removing conditions of domination (for example, 
by health professionals) and increasing the self-determination of 
individuals by lifting restrictions (for example, by providing accessible 
and good health care) and by increasing capacity (for example, through 
information and empowerment). In transactions between people and 
health services, the therapeutic argument is that involving patients as 
partners in the process results in satisfied patients and in better health 
outcomes. The quality argument is that patients understand their own 
needs best and can help ensure the safety and quality of their own care. 
The governance argument is that consumers can regulate their own 
health care: in market terms, they are coproducers of their own health 
care and, in citizenship terms, they are active participants. 
Most health sector boards and advisory councils now include consumer 
representatives, but the issue of who best represents healthcare users 
remains problematic. Boards are more likely to seek members from 
consumer organisations (substantive representation) than to aim for 
a  microcosm of the consumer population (descriptive representation) 
or to seek members through a democratic voting procedure 
(formal representation). 
The claim is that research shows that patients who are more involved 
with their care tend to get better results (Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality 2008). The evidence for this claim is strong, particularly in 
the area of chronic care management, where people have a long-term 
commitment to understanding and being involved in the management of 
their own health care. The World Health Organization (WHO) World 
Alliance for Patient Safety has set up an international network of patient 
organisations to enlist consumers in helping to drive the patient safety 
movement. Health services now enlist patients as partners in a range 
of activities that involve them in contributing to treatment decisions, 
checking the accuracy of records and processes, monitoring their own 
treatment and being involved in self-management (Coulter and Ellins 
2007). For example, people now have the right to read their own medical 
record, which previously was regarded as the property of the healthcare 
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provider; and asking patients to verify information is an effective safety 
check given the many errors that can creep into medical records. Patients 
increasingly are involved in monitoring and managing their own health, 
particularly those with chronic conditions such as asthma and diabetes.
While people, in theory, can be active partners, in practice, many, 
or perhaps most, need to be reassured that it is okay to question, let 
alone challenge, doctors and nurses. This reticence by patients is deeply 
embedded in the healthcare culture. Patients are reluctant, for example, 
to remind doctors and nurses that they should wash their hands before 
physically examining them. For example, a survey of patients in English 
public hospitals found that although 71 per cent said that patients 
should be involved in improving hand hygiene, only 26 per cent said 
they were willing to remind staff to clean their hands (Davis et al. 
2008). Some countries produce brochures to encourage people to speak 
up. For  example, a US brochure, ‘Ask Me 3’, urges patients to ask at 
least three questions during a visit to the doctor: ‘What is my main 
problem? What do I need to do? Why is it important for me to do this?’ 
The Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care puts 
out ‘Ten Tips for Safer Health Care’, which exhorts people to ‘speak up 
if you have any questions or concerns’. 
Stephen Schneider, who was diagnosed with a rare type of lymphoma, 
is an example of a patient who was an active partner in discussing and 
deciding his treatment decisions with top US clinicians (Schneider 
2005). The title of his book says it all: The Patient from Hell: How I Worked 
with My Doctors to Get the Best of Modern Medicine and How You Can 
Too. He acknowledged, however, that he was better qualified than the 
average patient to research the condition and treatment options, and 
that many patients may need a knowledgeable advocate to help them on 
their patient journey. 
There are limits to the regulatory power of an individual, of course, so the 
concept of networked regulation suggests ways that one person can enlist 
other people and groups in a regulatory enterprise (Braithwaite 2009). 
One of the reasons that people entrust others—whether governments 
or health insurance funds—to purchase health services on their behalf 
is that it is difficult for a lay person to make an informed decision on a 
procedure, doctor or hospital, because this often requires considerable 
medical and technical knowledge, so it is easier to trust one’s doctor to 
make the decision (Dugdale 2008: 132). The role of health broker in 
negotiating decisions is undertaken by a person’s general physician in 
many health systems, and by a health maintenance organisation in the 
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case of the US private health insurance model. The increasing complexity 
of health care has prompted the role of a trusted intermediary (broker, 
case manager, advocate) who can manage interactions with health 
services and insurance funds on behalf of a patient. 
The strategy of enlisting others with greater powers also aligns with the 
idea of nodal governance, whereby a regulator seeks to exert influence 
through a concentration of regulators at a particular location in a 
regulatory field (Burris et al. 2005; Holley and Shearing, Chapter 10, 
this volume). For example, the Australian Commission on Safety and 
Quality in Health Care gathers together experts and policymakers 
as leaders on strategies to improve health care. A patient can recruit 
more powerful actors who have the capacity to connect together and 
pull the various strands of power. An individual patient may therefore 
exert influence through a better informed family member or friend, 
a health ombudsman or lawyer, or through groups that range from 
self-help groups based on mutual assistance between peers to formal 
organisations run by a board and employing professional staff. Large 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) advocate on behalf of their 
clients or on behalf of a defined population group and might also engage 
in research, prevention and treatment. 
8. Aggrieved litigants
Some observers propose ‘regulation by litigation’ as an effective strategy 
for regulating health care. Compensation for medical injuries in common 
law countries, including Australia, is a fault system based mainly on 
the tort of negligence—torts being civil wrongs where compensation 
is sought. Several categories of charges by patients against health 
professionals can arise, including negligence and criminal charges, such 
as assault (McIlwraith and Madden 2006). The main arguments for 
patients being able to sue healthcare providers are that it is a necessary 
avenue of last resort for aggrieved patients and, second, that it has a 
salutary impact in ensuring better and safer health care (Hirsch 2009). 
The counter view, however, is that fear of being sued makes health 
professionals more likely to cover up rather than learn from their 
mistakes, and that the experience of litigation is traumatic and costly 
for all concerned. Further,  since many cases are settled out of court, 
the opportunity for wider learning is limited, since medical indemnity 
insurance funds are not keen to publicise and so promote more litigation 
by patients.
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Figure 34.2 The salutary threat of litigation
Source: CartoonStock.
9. Concepts and conclusions
The responsive regulation model works well as a predictor and working 
model when applied to the distinctive and complex context, culture and 
behaviour of health professionals. While much of the regulation literature 
focuses on regulatory authorities, the responsive regulation model 
developed by John Braithwaite and colleagues broadens this perspective 
to encompass a variety of actors (state and non-state) and a variety of 
mechanisms (from persuasion to enforcement). Regulation  from this 
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perspective is defined broadly as steering the flow of events (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992). The pyramidal framework promotes the view that 
it is better to begin with respectful and cheaper strategies at the base. 
This allows virtuous actors to voluntarily comply with reminders about 
standards, while rational actors calculate that it is in their interests to 
comply. This makes sense in relation to the health sector since the great 
majority of health professionals seek to do good, not harm. The main 
point here, however, in relation to patients as regulators is that patients 
must be able to escalate from softer to stronger actions (both supports 
and sanctions) if required. 
The two pyramids—supports-based and sanctions-based—offer a more 
nuanced framework for how patients can support better health care and 
how they can invoke sanctions to insist on compliance with standards 
and to punish malpractice. The concepts of networked and nodal 
governance are important in that they offer empowerment strategies 
whereby individual patients recruit others to strengthen their influence 
over the health system.
The behaviour of patients as regulators can also be depicted in terms 
of a ladder of actions. A classic paper by Arnstein (1969) applied 
a power analysis to citizen participation in depicting a ladder with eight 
rungs, beginning with the bottom rung of manipulation and ascending 
upwards through therapy, information provision, consultation, placation, 
partnership and delegated power to the top rung of citizen control. 
While most people are willing to step on to the bottom rung to answer 
a consumer survey, very few want to climb to the top rungs or become 
a board member. This changes the idea of a ladder to something more 
resembling a pyramidal shape.
There has been a dramatic change in the nature of the encounter between 
health professionals and patients; the days are gone when patients hardly 
dared question their doctor. Admittedly, we have to be quick with our 
questions given the usual 10-minute GP consultation. The policy thrust, 
at least in well-developed healthcare systems, is to promote the ways 
patients/the public can have more say and to require health services to 
be more transparent in reporting on their performance. While patients 
are wise to be more cautious, the counter argument is that patients must 
be able to trust their doctors in a crisis, and, further, trust in one’s doctor 
is said to have a therapeutic effect (Mechanic and Meyer 2000). 
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What is the evidence that patients can be effective regulators? Research 
on patients as regulatory actors remains sketchy, with few rigorous 
systematic reviews so far undertaken. While there is considerable 
research on methods to impart information and to improve patient 
health literacy, a structured review concluded that the role of patients as 
regulatory actors was still in its early stages and that safety outcomes were 
difficult to measure (Coulter and Ellins 2007). The available evidence for 
the different strategies can be summarised as follows:
• Informed patients (that is, people who are health literate) have better 
health outcomes.
• Selective consumers have had little impact but this may strengthen 
with better public reporting on health services’ performance. 
• Vocal complainants can secure individual redress but it is unclear to 
what extent systemic improvements follow.
• Entitled citizens are well accepted in democratic societies and 
legislation and codes of patient rights are arguably influential in 
improving service delivery.
• Active partners who are involved in decisions on their own health 
care have better outcomes, as shown in studies of chronic disease 
management.
• Aggrieved litigants can secure compensation but some argue that 
defensive medicine is a barrier to quality medicine.
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This chapter is about regulating the harmful effects of work, which 
globally results in around two million deaths each year (ILO 2003). 
A further 270 million people suffer traumatic injuries and 160 million 
are affected by diseases arising from their work. Clearly, for many 
people, work falls short of sustaining their physical, mental and social 
wellbeing, as envisaged by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
in its Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the 
Working Environment (ILO 1981).
As in other fields, in work health and safety (WHS), the concept of 
regulation ranges from state regulation in the form of legal obligations 
and public agencies that promote, monitor and enforce compliance to 
the wider non-state mechanisms in local, national and transnational 
domains that influence enterprise conduct (Black 2001). This chapter 
applies this broader, ‘decentred’ conception of regulation, together with 
Parker and Nielsen’s (see their Chapter 13, this volume) holistic and 
plural model of business compliance, in examining the regulation of 
WHS through a series of interrelated conceptual themes, as follows 
(Parker and Nielsen 2011). 
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Taking enterprise behaviour as the starting point, nine practices are 
outlined, which, if rigorously implemented, sustain better protection for 
health and safety at work. Enterprise behaviour is, however, motivated 
by  business goals and priorities, and influenced by organisational 
capacities and characteristics. In turn, non-state institutions and actors in 
enterprises’ social and economic environments shape their motivations 
and capacities, with positive or adverse consequences for WHS. After 
examining these issues, the chapter turns to state regulation, including 
WHS laws and the role of state regulators, which seek to influence 
motivations and capacities and, through these, actions and outcomes 
for WHS. While  the empirical research and theory canvassed in this 
chapter are applicable in different countries, the challenge of regulating 
transnationally in the context of global supply chains warrants specific 
attention, and this is the focus of the final section.
2. Enterprise behaviour: Preventive practices
Empirical research suggests nine practices for effectively managing 
WHS to prevent work-related injuries, disease and deaths, as outlined 
by Johnstone et al. (2012). First, risk management is the central focus 
of WHS management as, to ensure health, safety and wellbeing, the 
enterprise must rigorously and comprehensively identify potential 
sources of harm, implement and maintain measures to eliminate or 
minimise risks and give preference to measures that design out or control 
risks at the source (see also ‘Laws for WHS’ below). Second, initiatives 
to manage WHS are led by senior managers and are planned, resourced, 
implemented and reviewed to ensure their effectiveness. Third, attention 
to WHS is integral to other organisational decision-making and 
functions, and forms part of the responsibilities of managers, supervisors 
and workers, commensurate with their roles. Fourth, WHS knowledge 
and skills are developed across the enterprise and are not confined to 
particular individuals, even if the enterprise employs or engages WHS 
professionals or practitioners to facilitate WHS management (see also 
‘Organisational capacities’ below).
A fifth practice is open and constructive communication about WHS 
matters among managers, supervisors and workers, and active worker 
participation through operational meetings (staff or toolbox) or health 
and safety representatives and committees. Priorities for participative 
problem solving are risk analysis for tasks and work roles, inspections 
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of the work environment and response to incidents and hazardous 
exposures. Sixth, monitoring and investigation of these events, and the 
underlying reasons for them, are crucial to minimising their impact, 
as are prompt first aid, access to medical treatment and emergency 
response. Seventh, enterprises have arrangements in place to consult, 
cooperate and coordinate on WHS matters with their wider workforce 
of contractors, subcontractors, agency and other precarious workers, 
as well as their suppliers, customers and end-users of their products and 
services (see also ‘Laws for WHS’ below).
The eighth practice for effective WHS management is succinct 
documentation, which assists the enterprise to communicate WHS 
arrangements internally and to demonstrate compliance with 
WHS  legal obligations to regulators and external stakeholders. Last, 
independent audits enable the enterprise to evaluate the capacity of its 
arrangements to prevent work-related injury, disease and death, and to 
draw information from a cross-section of managers, supervisors and 
workers, documentation of arrangements and observation of work and 
work environments.
Practices such as these can sustain the commitment to, capacity and 
arrangements for an enterprise to self-regulate and comply with its 
legal obligations for WHS. On face value, they seem straightforward, 
but, in reality, many different factors and processes affect the willingness 
and capacity of enterprises and their workers to address WHS matters 
effectively. First among these are motivational factors.
3. Goals and priorities that motivate 
enterprise behaviour
As the factors that drive or energise action and behaviour, motivations 
play a significant role in shaping the conduct of enterprises. Socio-legal 
scholars have characterised enterprise motivations as legal, economic, 
social and normative, or a subset or amalgam of these (Kagan et al. 
2011; May 2004). Legal motivations derive from the perceived authority 
of the law and the threat of penalties if noncompliance is detected, 
while economic motivations relate to regulatees’ commercial goals to 
maximise profit. Social motivations stem from regulatees’ desire to earn 
the approval and respect of significant people with whom they interact 
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(to be seen to do the right thing) and normative motivations arise from 
regulatees’ desire to conform to internalised norms or beliefs about right 
and wrong.
For WHS, empirical studies have established the contextualised and 
plural  nature of enterprises’ motivations, which may provide positive 
rationales for taking preventive action or negative justifications for not 
doing so. For example, a study of UK enterprises concluded they were 
motivated to address WHS if poor safety standards had the potential 
to threaten business survival, if there were serious and well-recognised 
health  risks for their operations and/or if they were large and highly 
visible to the inspectorate or local community (Genn 1993). When none 
of  these conditions was met, firms subordinated safety to profitability 
goals. Profitability was also the driving force behind Australian 
construction firms’ responses to work-related fatalities and, while 
influential and large firms were able to accommodate safety, smaller 
firms and those prone to competitive pressures chose between profit and 
safety (Haines 1997).
In contrast, for Australian enterprises from a cross-section of 
industries, motivations included a normative sense of moral and 
ethical duty to provide a safe workplace, economic concerns relating 
to insurance, reputational concerns and the threat of prosecution and 
penalties ( Jamieson et al. 2010). For enterprises such as machinery 
manufacturers, motivations derived from a mix of legal and technical 
standards1 and/or the economic goal of ensuring the marketability of 
machinery and firm profitability, and these tended to outweigh a sense 
of moral duty to protect human safety (Bluff 2015a). 
Recognising the contextualised and plural nature of motivations goes 
some way towards explaining workplace actions and outcomes for 
WHS. It does not, however, completely account for enterprise behaviour, 
which is also shaped by organisational capacities and characteristics. 
These, like motivational factors, are highly contextualised.
1  See, for example, international (International Organization for Standardization: ISO), 
European (European Committee for Standardization: CEN), US (American National Standards 
Institute: ANSI) and Australian (Standards Australia: AS) standards.
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4. Organisational capacities and 
characteristics that shape decision-making 
and action
Safety and socio-legal scholarship have recognised the central role of 
capacity, including knowledge and skills, in enterprise self-regulation 
and action on WHS (Hale and Hovden 1998; Nytrö et al. 1998; Parker 
and Nielsen 2011). Furthermore, work itself is a significant source of 
WHS knowledge and skills as learning takes place through participation 
in work activities and interactions (Billett 2001; Brown and Duguid 
1991), including through observation of others’ behaviour, conversations 
and storytelling and questioning and problem solving (Bluff 2015b; 
Gherardi and Nicolini 2002; Sanne 2008). In these respects, knowledge 
comprises individuals’ personal stocks of information, skills, experiences, 
beliefs and memories (Alexander 1991).
One implication of this is that opportunities to participate in sound 
WHS practice and problem solving, and to observe and interact with 
competent practitioners, foster better learning about WHS. Yet a 
lot of WHS information and training are not grounded in authentic 
work experiences, and instead attempt to ‘transfer knowledge’ through 
information materials or training (face-to-face or online). A further 
implication is that, as learning about WHS is situated in work 
activities and interactions, there are multiple bases for constructing 
WHS knowledge and skills, and these go beyond authoritative sources 
such as legal and technical standards or advice and information from 
WHS regulators. To the extent that enterprises do engage with WHS 
regulatory and professional communities of practice, this is facilitated by 
WHS professionals and practitioners who help to source information, 
promote workplace dialogue around WHS, support risk management 
and highlight the costs and legal consequences of not taking preventive 
action (Broberg and Hermund 2007; Hale et al. 2010; Jamieson et 
al. 2010).
Moving beyond issues of capacity, certain enterprise characteristics pose 
significant challenges for WHS. For example, enterprise restructuring, 
outsourcing, engaging workers as (sub)contractors or hired labour, 
conducting business in supply chains and franchising arrangements 
have reduced enterprises’ control over work, weakened chains of 
responsibility, contributed to the fracturing and complexity of work 
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processes and increased the proportion of workers in flexible, less secure, 
temporary, part-time or casual employment or working as self-employed 
contractors ( Johnstone et al. 2012; Quinlan et al. 2010). In supply 
chains and franchising arrangements, there is a stark contrast between 
the commercially powerful enterprises at the apex of these arrangements 
and the often small enterprises or self-employed individuals (including 
outworkers) who produce and supply the goods or services under poor 
conditions for WHS, remuneration, hours of work, job security and 
access to workers’ compensation and rehabilitation (Frazer et al. 2008; 
James et al. 2007; see also ‘Laws for WHS’ and ‘WHS in global supply 
chains’ below).
Enterprise size is a key characteristic influencing willingness and 
capacity  to  address WHS matters. The difficulties that smaller 
enterprises,  and their workforces, experience in dealing with WHS 
matters are multifaceted, ranging from limited resources and management 
expertise to competitive pressures, lower positions in contracting 
(or  franchising) hierarchies, shorter life cycles and inadequate worker 
representation (Lamm and Walters 2004; MacEachern et al. 2010). 
Moreover, effective strategies for building WHS capacity in small 
enterprises are resource-intensive as they require face-to-face discussions 
and practical problem solving for real risks facilitated by WHS advisers, 
as regulators or consultants ( James et al. 2004; Stave et al. 2008).
These are just some of the ways that organisational capacities and 
characteristics may impact on WHS. Diversity in these aspects 
contributes to differences in how, and how well, enterprises address 
WHS matters.
5. Non-state institutions and actors 
in enterprises’ social and economic 
environments
From the preceding discussion of organisational arrangements and 
relationships it is clear that multiple external actors may influence the 
operations of an enterprise and, in turn, that enterprise may influence 
others. Also, an enterprise’s interactions with external actors and the 
distribution of responsibilities, resources and power between them, can 
critically affect the enterprise’s willingness and capacity to address WHS 
matters and comply with its legal obligations.
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In regulatory theory, the role of regulatory actors beyond the state 
agencies  that set, monitor and enforce legal obligations is recognised 
in  the concepts of regulatory space and decentred regulation 
(Black  2001;  Hancher and Moran 1989). As well as enterprises’ 
customers  or clients, and parties in supply chains and franchising 
arrangements, other influential non-state actors for WHS include 
industry and professional associations, unions, insurance companies, 
providers of education and training, WHS consultants and technical 
standards bodies. In principle, these non-state actors may foster 
awareness of WHS and regulatory systems and positively influence 
WHS outcomes, but, in practice, the information they provide may be 
less than robust and their influence may run counter to regulatory goals 
or, in business relationships, they may limit a (small) enterprise’s room 
to move on WHS (Bluff 2015a; Hutter and Jones 2007; Lamm and 
Walters 2004).
All of this signals the need for regulators to pay attention to the influence 
of non-state actors. As Haines (1997) proposes, it may be necessary to 
map the dynamics within, outside and between enterprises that influence 
their decisions and actions, as a starting point for regulation.
6. State regulation of WHS
Laws for WHS
Governments in developed and some developing countries have 
established laws aimed at protecting health and safety at work. 
The  focus  here is on these preventive WHS laws, noting, however, 
that  levies, financial incentives and penalties, performance standards 
and audits under workers’ compensation and rehabilitation schemes are 
among the wider regulatory mechanisms with government authority, 
which may require or encourage enterprises to improve their management 
of WHS ( Johnstone et al. 2012; Verbeek 2010).
In framing WHS legal obligations, policymakers employ different types 
of standards, as described by Johnstone et al. (2012; see also Bluff and 
Gunningham 2004). General duties (or principles) define the obligation in 
terms of broad goals, while performance outcomes and performance targets, 
respectively, specify a required outcome or standard of exposure, as for a 
chemical or noise. The flexibility of these performance-based standards 
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contrasts with prescriptive standards, which specify the required action 
and may achieve this by calling up or giving evidentiary status to detailed 
technical standards issued by (non-state) national and international 
standards bodies.
Other options are process-based standards, which, as the name suggests, 
set out ways to address WHS matters—for example, processes for 
managing WHS risks and consulting workers. In some countries, 
processes are combined in a systematic strategy to manage WHS, as 
with the European Framework Directive on measures to encourage 
improvements in safety and health (EC 1989). This strategy is developed 
more fully in requirements for ‘internal control’, which mandate a 
preventive system to plan, organise, implement and review compliance 
with WHS legal requirements (Saksvik et al. 2003; Walters et al. 2011; 
see also ‘Enterprise behaviour’ above). Such requirements dovetail with 
global developments in WHS management systems, although the latter 
are typically promulgated by non-state sources, ranging from large 
corporations to national and international standards bodies (ILO 2001; 
Walters et al. 2011). Complementing process and systems standards are 
documentation standards, which require the regulatee to record the action 
they take to comply—for example, documenting risk assessments, safe 
work methods and plans for managing WHS.
A key development in WHS policy and standard-setting is the emphasis 
on controlling risks at the source. One aspect of this is a focus on safe 
design, based on the premise that a highly effective way to protect people 
from harm is to eliminate or control risks at the design stage (Safe Work 
Australia 2012; Schulte et al. 2008). To this end, legal obligations 
may extend to entities that design, develop, construct or manufacture 
systems of work, workplaces, machinery and equipment, substances and 
materials. A second aspect is regulatory innovation targeting enterprises 
with real control and influence over WHS in supply chains for goods 
and services. A recent example is Australian WHS laws requiring a 
person conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU) to ensure, as far 
as reasonably practicable, the health and safety of all persons who carry 
out work for them, as contractors, subcontractors, hired (agency) labour, 
outworkers or otherwise. And, from the top to the bottom of a supply 
chain, each PCBU must discharge their obligations to the extent that 
they have the capacity to influence and control particular WHS matters 
( Johnstone et al. 2012: 306–10, 470–1). There are also separate chain of 
responsibility laws aimed at ensuring minimum industrial and WHS 
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standards for workers in textile, clothing and footwear, long-haul truck 
transportation and cash-in-transit supply chains ( Johnstone et al. 2012: 
471–7; Rawling and Howe 2013).
As well as requiring enterprises to establish, implement and monitor 
arrangements to address WHS matters, laws for WHS constitute 
arrangements for their administration and enforcement. That is, they 
couple self-regulation with inspection and enforcement by the state in 
a form of enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992).
The role of state WHS regulators
The preventive WHS laws provide for external support, inspection and 
enforcement by state regulators, who may utilise a variety of different 
approaches and mechanisms to foster willingness and capacity to 
comply with WHS laws (Bluff 2011: 32–54; Johnstone et al. 2012: 
101–6). They may raise awareness and provide information through 
their websites, advisory services, workshops and forums, as well as the 
general and social media. In their direct interactions with regulatees, 
they may adopt a cooperative approach (also called an accommodative, 
facilitative or compliance approach) in which they preference advice and 
persuasion as means to elicit compliance. They may be more insistent 
by setting out clear expectations and signalling the need for a prompt 
response—for example, by issuing a notice requiring action to remove 
or control hazards. Or, they may apply a coercive approach (also called 
a sanctioning or deterrence approach), which involves some form of 
sanction, such as issuing an infringement notice or on-the-spot fine, or 
pursuing prosecution and court-imposed sanctions. As provided for in 
the relevant WHS laws, the types of sanctions imposed by courts may 
include fines, jail sentences, injunctions, undertakings or different types 
of orders, which can impact on economic motivations and reputational 
concerns, as well as requiring enterprises to address weaknesses in their 
capacity and arrangements to comply with the law (Gunningham and 
Johnstone 1999: 256–8).
The strongest evidence that inspection improves WHS performance 
comes from the United States, where a series of studies conducted 
over several decades demonstrates that inspected firms have improved 
performance for risk control or reduced work-related injuries, illnesses 
or workers’ compensation claims, as measured for the particular study 
(see for example, Baggs et al. 2003; Gray and Scholz 1993; Mendeloff 
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and  Gray 2005; Weil 2001). There is also evidence of prosecuted 
enterprises implementing additional actions to manage risks (specific 
deterrence), but less evidence that prosecution of others prompts non-
prosecuted enterprises to take appropriate preventive action (general 
deterrence), as communication of information about cases may be 
unreliable or differences in business operations may make comparisons 
difficult ( Jamieson et al. 2010; Schofield et al. 2009; Bluff 2015a; 
Thornton et al. 2005).
While there is some evidence that different types of enforcement 
can encourage improvements in WHS performance, there are many 
unanswered questions about how WHS regulators can most effectively 
employ the array of mechanisms and approaches available to them. 
For example, should WHS regulators apply risk-based regulation, 
deploying their regulatory resources and determining how to respond 
to noncompliance based on assessments of risk (Black 2010)? Should 
they  implement some of the types of regulatory responsiveness that 
fall under the approach of responsive regulation (see John Braithwaite, 
Chapter 7, this volume), using a judicious mix of cooperative mechanisms 
to build capacity to comply, but, when necessary, applying more insistent 
and deterrent mechanisms to address persistent noncompliance 
(Braithwaite 2011)? If they employ responsive regulation, what should 
trigger an escalation in their response? Is it a regulatee’s uncooperative 
attitude and behaviour, the gravity, frequency or seriousness of 
noncompliance or something else (Nielsen 2006)? And, if regulators 
encounter resistance from regulatees, should they move to sanctions or, 
as motivational posturing theory suggests (see Braithwaite, Chapter 2, this 
volume), should they put more effort into building trust, respect and 
shared understandings with these regulatees (Braithwaite 2009)? 
A further issue is what constitutes ‘compliance’. Is it self-regulation in 
the sense of willingness, capacity and arrangements to sustain ongoing 
preventive action and/or is it substantive compliance with regulatory 
goals such as eliminating or effectively minimising risks (Walters et al. 
2011: 8–9, 152–5, 194–5; Parker 2002: ix–x, 27, 43–61)? And, whether 
the focus is self-regulation or substantive compliance, is it helpful to 
conceive WHS regulation as an interaction between the regulator and a 
single enterprise or are their benefits in networked interventions whereby 
regulators engage with a cross-section of enterprises operating within 
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the same markets, supply chains or industry sectors2 and the industry, 
union, professional, insurance, training and other bodies with whom 
they, and their workers, interact (Bluff et al. 2012; Gunningham et al. 
1998; see Gunningham and Sinclair, Chapter 8, this volume)?
These are all live debates in WHS regulation. While regulatory theory 
and empirical research in other fields of regulation suggest promising 
directions, the diversity of enterprises, the risks arising from their 
operations and the persuasive influence of non-state institutions and 
actors demand careful consideration of ‘what works’ for WHS regulation, 
how, why and in what contexts. We also need to better understand how 
enterprise characteristics and capacities, motivations and operating 
contexts influence their actions and behaviour for WHS, and how 
regulators can take these variables into consideration in designing and 
implementing their interventions. We need to better define the types of 
knowledge and skills that inspectors require to elicit improvements in 
WHS performance, which is likely to be a mix of WHS knowhow and 
communication and relational skills, to build rapport and cooperation 
with regulatees and their stakeholders.
7. WHS regulation in global supply chains
A very great challenge for WHS is regulation in the context of global 
supply chains, where corporations conduct production, extraction, 
transportation or other operations in developing countries. State 
regulation in these countries is often absent or too weak to provide 
meaningful protection for WHS, and work conducted there is beyond 
the reach of developed countries’ laws, such as Australian chain of 
responsibility obligations (see ‘Laws for WHS’).
There are, however, a number of international institutions and actors 
in the transnational regulatory space for WHS. Key among these is the 
ILO, which promulgates conventions and supports the development 
of WHS programs at regional, national and local levels (Rosenstock 
et al. 2006). Others are global industry associations and corporations, 
international standards bodies, insurance companies, global unions, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social movements. 
2  For example, those that design/develop, construct/manufacture, import/supply/deliver and 
purchase particular types of products and services within the same markets.
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For example, corporations may develop codes of conduct, the success of 
which depends on them having the self-interest to ensure compliance 
by their suppliers (Kolk  and van Tulder 2005). For their part, global 
unions have negotiated international framework agreements with more 
than 100 corporations, which apply to their operations throughout 
the world (Global Unions n.d.). Trade development NGOs such as 
Fairtrade International have set standards (drawing on ILO conventions 
and national legislation) and support their implementation in around 
70  producer countries, with inspection and certification (by FLO-
CERT) of supply chain participants from point of production to point 
of sale (Dragusanu et al. 2014). FairWear campaigns have similarly 
sought to improve working conditions, but through ethical networks of 
union and social movement participants (Burchielli et al. 2004).
The above examples highlight the different participants in emerging, 
hybrid forms of global labour governance, which bring together state and 
non-state bodies to secure action on WHS and other labour standards 
issues (Marginson and Meardi 2014). A significant example is the legally 
binding Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, negotiated 
in response to the collapse of the Rana complex, in which more than 
1,100 people died and 2,500 were injured. Participants in this networked 
governance are the 190 apparel corporations from 20 countries that have 
signed up to the accord, two global unions and numerous Bangladeshi 
ones, four campaign and advocacy organisations and the ILO as the 
independent chair for the accord. Among other matters, the accord 
requires thorough and credible safety inspections by skilled personnel 
and commitments by customer companies to ensure their supplier 
factories implement required corrective actions.
The indications are that, globally, as within nations, no single source 
of state or non-state regulation is adequate to ensure continuing 
and effective action on WHS. Rather, successful strategies harness a 
combination of participants and regulatory mechanisms, including 
empowering non-state actors as surrogate regulators (see Gunningham 
and Sinclair, Chapter 8, this volume).
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8. Conclusion
This chapter began with some grim statistics about the prevalence 
of work-related deaths, injuries and diseases. While WHS laws and 
regulators are central players in efforts to reduce this toll, much more 
is at stake in determining whether enterprises are willing and able to 
effectively protect their workforces. Understanding the contextualised 
and plural nature of regulatees’ motivations, the situated nature of 
learning about WHS and the influence of non-state institutions and 
actors is essential to explaining enterprise actions and outcomes for WHS. 
Also influential are organisational characteristics and relationships that 
lessen the potential for sound learning about WHS and compound non-
state regulation of work.
A necessary starting point for improving WHS performance is to 
understand how these ‘variables’ play out in particular industry, sector and 
enterprise domains, whether these are national, regional or transnational 
in scope. The optimal mix of regulatory mechanisms and approaches for 
improving WHS will be the one that reinforces the positive influences 
and tackles the negative impacts in particular circumstances and 
contexts. And all of this requires careful planning and strategic choices, 
grounded in comprehensive information and analysis, in designing and 
implementing regulatory interventions.
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This section provides examples of the substantive regulation of 
commerce  that have been important to RegNet scholars as sources 
of insight into theory development, as well as for the application of 
regulatory theory. John Wood synthesises a complex history to reveal 
the long-run success of consumer regulation—a success to which he was 
a major contributor (see the Preface). Imelda Maher, the first director 
of RegNet’s Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy, illustrates 
how regulation is more constitutive than contradictory of competition 
and how the enforcement of competition law in transnational contexts 
is increasingly based on an architecture of networked governance. 
The  institution of tax was the object of a multidisciplinary research 
effort carried out by the Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI), the 
largest of many centres that have been housed within RegNet. Among 
other things, its work on compliance and responsive regulation had a 
practical and successful influence on the way in which the Australian 
Tax Office engaged with those with tax obligations—for example, in the 
‘cash economy’ and by corporations in the context of transfer pricing. 
Greg Rawlings, a former member of the CTSI, discusses the successes 
and failure of states and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in dealing with tax havens and profit 
shifting by multinationals. Kyla Tienhaara’s chapter outlines how the 
investor state dispute-settlement mechanism, now to be found in many 
hundreds of trade and investment agreements, allows for the private 
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regulation of public regulatory sovereignty. Neil Gunningham and 
Darren Sinclair, drawing on their work in mining regulation, show that 
solutions inspired by meta-regulation may founder when they run into 
resilient informal systems with deep roots. Here, the insights of legal 
pluralism are needed (see Forsyth, Chapter 14, this volume). Jeroen van 
der Heijden also explores the limits of creative governance solutions, this 
time in the context of urban sustainability and resilience. Collaborative 
governance and voluntary programs within cities are producing 
instances of success when it comes to energy efficient, low-carbon 
buildings, but these instances are yet to reach the scale and increase in 
growth required if cities are to reach a new sustainable equilibrium with 
their surrounding ecosystems. States remain central nodes in webs of 
regulation when it comes to scaling up regulatory solutions. The limits 
of new regulatory approaches in the context of the paradigm of new 
environmental governance and approaches such as experimentalism, 
adaptive governance and collaborative governance form the topic 
of Cameron Holley’s chapter. 
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Consumer protection: A case 
of successful regulation 
John TD Wood
1. Introduction
In The Wealth of Nations, the philosopher and economist Adam Smith 
expounded his view that:
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the 
interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be 
necessary for promoting that of the consumer. (Smith 1776: Book IV, 
Chapter VIII, vol. ii, para. 49)
He was making an important contribution to how we should view 
the market when we consider key aspects of consumer protection, and 
added to a long history of practical protection.
2. Background
From the time of the earliest recorded codification of laws, those 
of  King Hammurabi of Babylon (1795–50 BC), we find examples of 
consideration of consumer protection measures: matters dealing with 
fairness in the marketplace and ensuring that measurements are correct 
and goods safe. Thus, the Code of Hammurabi contained the following 
examples:
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104. If a merchant give an agent corn, wool, oil, or any other goods to 
transport, the agent shall give a receipt for the amount, and compensate 
the merchant therefor. Then he shall obtain a receipt from the merchant 
for the money that he gives the merchant. 
108. If a tavern-keeper (feminine) does not accept corn according to 
gross weight in payment of drink, but takes money, and the price of the 
drink is less than that of the corn, she shall be convicted and thrown 
into the water.
229. If a builder build a house for some one, and does not construct it 
properly, and the house which he built fall in and kill its owner, then 
that builder shall be put to death. 
233. If a builder build a house for some one, even though he has not yet 
completed it; if then the walls seem toppling, the builder must make 
the walls solid from his own means.1
Needless to say, consumer protection can, and has, appeared in many 
guises and has taken many different forms over the centuries and 
decades. Governments, alerted to practices considered injurious to the 
health, safety or economic welfare of the community, have, from time to 
time, been sufficiently roused to bring in legislative measures to cure the 
ill. Sometimes they have even been moved to prevent the ailment arising.
There are, then, consumer protection measures in statutes that deal with 
explosives and other hazardous substances, in the controls for therapeutic 
goods, in building codes, in the regulation of supply and use of chemicals, 
in the supply of energy, in requirements for the incorporation of entities, 
in road traffic rules, in vehicle design rules, and so on. 
Throughout the world, various of these have, from time to time, been 
the principal focus for consumer concern. In developing economies, 
consumer attention is frequently given simply to the basics of living: 
adequate and clean drinking water, weatherproof (and often disaster-
proof ) and safe shelter and adequate and uncontaminated food. 
In the contemporary world, discussion of government involvement in 
consumer affairs tends to relate to:
1  As set out in the Code of Hammurabi (available at: commonlaw.com/home/legal-history-and-
philosophy/code-of-hammurabi; Johns 1987).
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• the mandating of fair-trading practices in the marketplace and 
prohibition of anticompetitive conduct
• regulation of the supply and use of hazardous goods and services
• establishment of minimum or mandatory standards for goods and 
services
• fiduciary oversight and regulation of the practices of suppliers 
of economic and financial services
• the regulation of telecommunication and energy services
• maintenance of a system of weights and measures
• requirements for transparency and for information disclosure in 
consumer transactions
• the control of fit and proper persons to carry out commercial activities
• harmonisation of international standards and practices.
Illustrative of developments in consumer protection over the years 
in Australia and elsewhere are the following sectors.
3. Weights and measures
This has been one of the oldest areas of market control. The checking 
of  weighing devices—or implements and vessels for measuring 
volumes  of  oil, wine and grain—goes back a very long time. Beer 
measures became especially important, which is why standard-sized 
drinking vessels came into use—for example, English ‘pewters’ and 
German ‘steins’. The United Kingdom gained a Weight and Measures 
Act in 1795, which was duplicated in New South Wales in 1832. 
This legislation, in a more contemporary form, first came into force at 
the time of World War I—for example, the Weights and Measures Act 
1915 (Qld). 
To recognise the national importance given to weights and measurement, 
the Weights and Measures (National Standards) Act 1948 was enacted 
by the Federal Parliament and the National Standards Commission 
established.
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In more recent times, the needs of a national marketplace have been 
recognised, so that matters dealing with everything from units of 
measurement through to packaging and labelling are dealt with through 
uniform trade measurement legislation (for example, see the Trade 
Measurement Act 1993 (SA)).
4. Public health and food
Control of medicines became essential following the growth of patent 
medicine sellers—the ‘snake oil merchants’—at the turn of the century, 
and as more scientific knowledge became available about the effects of 
some of the cures that had been merrily dispensed by Victorian medicos, 
such as laudanum and arsenic.
Similarly, the growth of food processing plants and food preparation 
places, with the inevitable increase in food poisoning, led to food 
hygiene rules and inspectors. The Public Health Act 1902 (NSW) covered 
the sale  of unadulterated food, food standards, pollution, fraudulent 
ingredient labelling and injurious food. Subsequently, the companion 
Pure Food Act 1908 established rules and inspection regimes.
In both cases, it was concern with contamination and adulteration and, 
in the case of drugs, deceptive sales practices, which led to the legislative 
action. These statutes came into being as much to protect reputable 
businesses from disreputable competitors as to look after the interests 
of consumers.
The Australian legislative models, again, drew on overseas precedent, 
in this case the UK Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 and the US Food 
and Drugs Act 1906. Interestingly, given the then preoccupation of many 
of the male citizens of the country, one of the first pieces of legislation 
protecting the ‘purity’ of products was the Liquor Adulteration Act 
1855 (Qld).
5. Dangerous people!
The first statutory schemes to protect consumers were designed to 
prevent  undesirable people from carrying out various occupations. 
Hence,  the Hawkers and Pedlars Act 1849 (Qld); the Pawnbrokers 
Act 1857  (Tas.); the Landlords and Tenants Act 1899 (NSW); 
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the  Book  Purchasers Protection Act 1899 (NSW) (an early example of 
regulation of door-to-door sales); the Second-hand Dealers and Collectors 
Act 1906 (ACT); the Money-lenders Act 1912 (WA); and the Auctioneers 
and Agents Act 1941 (NSW). Because of profiteering due to shortages 
in some areas following World War II, and as a means of controlling 
inflation, price control legislation was also introduced (for example, the 
Prices Act 1948 (SA)). This form of regulation was extended to some 
individual products at different times—for example, beer and petrol 
prices in 1981 (Fuel Prices Regulation Act 1981 (Vic.)) and, most recently, 
by Part VB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), to protect consumers 
against exploitation following the introduction of a new tax system.
Another form of regulation also entered the statute books with the 
stated intention of protecting the consumers of professional services, 
although it was really more about safeguarding the interests of those 
already accredited, from competition. Thus, legal practitioners (Legal 
Practitioners Act 1881 (Qld)), veterinary surgeons (Veterinary Act 1918 
(Tas.)), architects (Architects Act 1921 (NSW)), medical practitioners 
(Medical Act 1894 (WA)), dentists (Dentists Act 1919 (Tas.)) and 
accountants (Public Accountants Registration Act 1945 (NSW)) received 
their own protection.
In recent times, this form of licensing was more broadly used to require 
certain minimum qualifications for entry into other occupations where 
it was considered that either disreputable practices had occurred or 
the consumer was potentially at risk if professional standards were not 
maintained or proof of good behaviour not required. Thus, in various 
jurisdictions, we saw regulation of activities ranging from those of 
psychologists to those of travel agents and those of financial advisers 
and planners.
6. Building
Local government controlled house building, and the development of 
regulation in the form of ordinances developed rapidly in Australia 
because of the very high levels of building.
After World War II, these controls became as concerned with matters 
affecting the health of occupants—such as ventilation, light penetration, 
plumbing, sewerage and drainage—as with the strength of the building’s 
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structure. More recently, standards relating to energy efficiency and 
conservation have been developed to ensure the sustainability of building 
projects (see van der Heijden, Chapter 41, this volume).
7. Post-sale consumer protection
Concern about the inequality of bargaining power of parties in the 
marketplace gave rise to the first specific consumer protection laws, the 
sale of goods legislation of the late nineteenth century (for example, the 
UK Sale of Goods Act 1893), which spread through the British Empire 
into the early days of the twentieth century and was the origin of all sale 
of goods legislation in the Australian states and territories, and a key 
component of the consumer protection provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth).
8. Defective products
The liability of manufacturers for their defective products was first 
recognised by the courts in the United States in 1916 when, in relation 
to the rapidly booming automobile industry, strict liability for mistakes 
in the manufacturing process was imposed on the makers of Buick cars. 
In the English law, it was the famous case of the mouse in the ginger 
beer bottle (Donoghue v Stevenson) in 1932 that established the liability 
of manufacturers, and which was followed in this country until the 1977 
amendments to the Trade Practices Act 1974. These were subsequently 
enhanced by the product liability provisions enacted as Part VA of 
the Act.
9. The new affluence and debt
As the gigantic manufacturing apparatus that had been brought into 
being to supply goods for the war effort during World War II was turned 
back to civil production, the affluent West saw a boom in the production 
of consumer goods. Coupled with the technological revolution that 
the war had also inspired, a new range and variety of products rapidly 
emerged into the consumer marketplace. Many of these were far more 
complex in engineering and design than their precursors, and, because 
of mass production techniques, far more accessible to a broad spectrum 
of the community.
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The rapid expansion of commercial radio, with its enticing advertisements, 
and the advent of television provided further impetus to consumerism’s 
rapid advance.
To complement this new and burgeoning consumer market came 
new methods of financing purchases. Following the Depression, the 
domestic market had boomed and, with banks retaining conservative 
lending practices and generally inaccessible to the man (and certainly 
the woman) in the street, consumers got caught up in schemes offering 
payment by instalment programs, called hire purchase. In some cases, 
the interest rates and practices of the companies offering this ‘service’ 
were unconscionable, with harsh contracts, extortion and inequality 
between the parties. As a result, a form of regulation was introduced by 
the various hire purchase laws of the late 1930s and early 1940s. See, for 
example, the Hire Purchase Agreements Act 1941 (NSW). The Credit Sales 
Agreements Act 1957 (NSW), covering the purchase of goods on credit 
from retail stores, and the Hire Purchase Act 1960 (NSW), dealing with 
finance obtained from credit providers for goods that were not owned 
until the entire sum was paid off, followed.
As access to a range of financial services widened, with finance companies 
(often owned by the major banks) being established and new products 
developed, the first attempts at achieving nationally uniform credit 
legislation began in 1972—not finally succeeding until 22 years later. 
Finally, recognition was given to the importance of national regulation 
with the introduction of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 (Cth).
10. Kennedy, Moloney, Hutchison and Nader 
and the era of the consumer activists
US President John F Kennedy announced on 15 March 1962, in a 
directive to the Consumer Advisory Council, that consumers had some 
basic rights—namely:
• the right to safety 
• the right to be informed
• the right to choose
• the right to be heard.
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He also forecast the establishment for the first time of an Office of 
Consumer Affairs. It was President Johnson who ultimately carried this 
out, and who also established the position of Presidential Adviser on 
Consumer Affairs, the first occupant of which was the labour activist 
Esther Petersen.
Later in that same year, an extremely influential report (Final Report 
of the Committee on Consumer Protection) was published in the United 
Kingdom. Known as the Molony Report after the chair of the 
committee that produced it, the report contained some 2,000 proposals 
and recommendations following its examination of significant areas of 
consumer need and of existing legislation, as well as of the need for 
further protection of the consuming public.
The major recommendations were:
• the establishment of a Consumer Council to ‘ascertain and review 
the problems experienced by the consumer and to devise and advance 
the means of resolving them’ (Moloney 1962)
• the revision of hire purchase legislation
• the consolidation and revision of the merchandise marks legislation
• the amendment of the Sale of Goods Act 1933
• the registration of Seals of Approval, and the amendment, 
in a number  of minor respects, of the Trade Marks Act 1938 
(Moloney 1962).
Meanwhile, in Australia, the first female member of the West Australian 
Legislative Council, Ruby Hutchison, initiated the Australian 
Consumers’ Association at a meeting in Sydney Town Hall in 1959. 
Established as a non-profit independent organisation undertaking 
product testing, it saw itself as a response to the ever-growing consumer 
complaints about poor-quality goods and services.
In 1965, Ralph Nader published his definitive book on a corporation’s 
(General Motors) lack of concern for its consumers (and its critics), 
Unsafe at Any Speed. His work in establishing specific-purpose consumer 
groups (popularly known as ‘Nader’s Raiders’) in the United States was 
paralleled in Australia with a plethora of groups at the state and territory 
level over the next 20 years that covered fields from health care to credit 
counselling, and from product safety to food and nutrition.
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11. The consumer protection acts
All governments in Australia had their attention drawn to the safety 
of a wide range of consumer products following Nader’s campaigns, 
the establishment by the US Federal Government of the Product 
Safety Commission and the results from a growing number of 
product tests carried out by the Australian Consumers’ Association. 
The first government response was in Victoria, where the Consumer 
Protection Council, to advise the government on consumer protection 
issues, was established in 1965. It was, however, the NSW Consumer 
Protection Act 1969 that became the general model for the rest of the 
nation and established both the Consumer Affairs Council and the 
Consumer Affairs Bureau under the Commissioner for Consumer 
Affairs. The bureau’s primary responsibility was to advise consumers and 
handle their complaints—the first time a government had provided such 
a service.
When considering why it was this particular era (1965–75) that finally 
saw the advent of government consumer affairs agencies and wide-
reaching consumer protection legislation, a NSW Department of 
Consumer Affairs’ publication in 1987 suggested the following factors:
• The rapidly increasing VARIETY of goods and services which 
modern technology made available and which became increasingly 
difficult for the consumer to evaluate;
• The growing size and complexity of the production and distribution 
system which placed the buyer at an increasing distance, both 
physically and psychologically, from the seller;
• The high level of SOPHISTICATION IN MARKETING 
AND SELLING PRACTICES in advertising and other forms of 
promotion;
• The REMOVAL OF THE PERSONAL ELEMENT from the 
buyer/seller relationship as a result of large shopping centres and 
supermarkets, mass-marketing methods and the consumer’s greatly 
increased mobility;
• The PRE-PACKAGING OF GOODS which again made it 
difficult for consumers to assess what they were getting in terms of 
value for money and operational ability;
• The increasingly COMPLEX TERMS AND CONDITIONS on 
which goods and services were sold;
• The many and varied forms of CONSUMER CREDIT and their 
widespread availability;
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• The CONFLICT OF INTERESTS between standard business 
practices and consumers’ needs;
• The increasing availability of RENTAL SCHEMES, as against 
direct purchase, for a wide range of goods;
• The growth of LARGE CORPORATIONS, MULTI-
NATIONAL COMPANIES AND MONOPOLIES which 
often placed the consumer at a disadvantage in the marketplace in 
terms of bargaining power;
• POOR ACCESS TO LITIGATION AND REDRESS—the 
court system being too costly for the average consumer to gain 
redress for problems with everyday goods and services. This added 
yet another layer to the general sense of powerlessness. (NSW 
Department of Consumer Affairs 1987).
12. The national perspective
With the advent of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1972, consumer 
affairs, for the first time, was given national attention. The outstanding 
product of this was the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). Considered 
by many internationally as the best model of consumer legislation, its 
architect, then Attorney-General, Lionel Murphy, drew, as was his wont, 
on the best of US and English law and his creative ideas and those of his 
advisers. The Act amalgamated a strict regime for dealing with restrictive 
trade practices (vastly improving provisions contained in an earlier Act)2 
with groundbreaking consumer protection provisions. He described the 
legislation’s purpose thus:
In consumer transactions, unfair practices are widespread. The existing 
law is still founded on the principle known as caveat emptor—meaning 
‘let the buyer beware’. That principle may have been appropriate for 
transactions conducted in village markets. It has ceased to be appropriate 
as a general rule. Now the marketing of goods and services is conducted 
on an organized basis and by trained business executives. The untrained 
consumer is no match for the businessman who attempts to persuade 
the consumer to buy goods or services on terms and conditions suitable 
to the vendor. The consumer needs protection by the law and this Bill 
will provide such protection.3 
2  Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1965 (Cth).
3  Senator the Hon. LK Murphy QC (1973), CPD Senate, vol. 57: 1013–14.
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A consumer affairs division was also established to provide policy advice 
to the first Federal Minister for Consumer Affairs.4 With the Act 
coming into force and with the Trade Practices Commission engaging 
in active enforcement, the consumer protection landscape in Australia 
was changed forever. 
This was nowhere better demonstrated than in the landmark prosecution 
of the Sharp Corporation of Australia by the Trade Practices Commission 
for false and misleading advertising.5 The Federal Court fined Sharp 
$10,000 for each of 10 counts—a total of $100,000, which was a huge 
sum for the time and one that sent a very strong message through 
corporate Australia, the advertising industry and the media.
13. What the statutes protect
The consumer protection laws adopted over time by the federal, state 
and territory governments deal with the following matters:6 
• prohibition or regulation of undesirable or unfair practices
• prescription of terms to be implied into contracts made with 
consumers
• prescription of standards of goods and services to be provided to 
consumers
• regulation of dangerous goods and services
• protection of public health and safety
• establishment of bodies to receive complaints from consumers, 
to investigate those complaints and to take action (including, 
if necessary, action in the courts) to rectify any justified complaints
• establishment of machinery to promote the education of consumers
• licensing and ongoing regulation of the types of people or 
organisations who may be permitted to supply certain types of goods 
and services to consumers.
4  The first Federal Minister for Consumer Affairs was the Hon. Bill Morrison MP, who was 
Minister for Science and Consumer Affairs. He was succeeded by the Hon. Clyde Cameron MP.
5  Hartnell v Sharp Corporation of Aust. Ltd (1975) 5 ALR 493.
6  The list builds on an original one in Goldring and Maher (1976). 
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14. International action
In 1960, the International Organisation of Consumers Unions (IOCU) 
was formed by the consumer organisations of Australia, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands that believed 
they could increase their strength by building networks across national 
borders.
The IOCU grew rapidly over the next few decades and, in 1995, it was 
renamed Consumers International (CI). Currently, it has more than 240 
member bodies from 120 countries. It also has regional offices in Africa, 
Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean; subregional 
offices for West and Central Africa and for Central America; and 
a Programme for Developed Economies and Economies in Transition; 
as well as its head office in London. 
The IOCU took the four consumer rights enunciated by President 
Kennedy in 1962—the rights to safety, to be informed, to choose and to 
be heard—and added four of its own:
• the right to redress
• the right to consumer education
• the right to a healthy environment
• the right to the satisfaction of basic needs.
The IOCU then set about trying to get some form of international 
recognition of these rights, to stimulate much wider adoption by national 
governments of effective consumer protection laws. The late 1970s 
and early 1980s gave evidence of the growing power of multinational 
corporations and the limitations on national governments in trying to 
gain redress for consumers if such corporations offended.
Consequently, the IOCU also worked very hard to obtain United 
Nations (UN) acceptance of a draft code of conduct for transnational 
corporations. While this campaign ultimately failed, much of its work 
ended up in codes adopted by some international business groups and in 
the rules of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
However, its lobbying efforts, particularly those of Anwar Fazal, then 
director of the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific and a former 
IOCU president, and Esther Petersen, the IOCU’s Special Representative 
to the United Nations, inspired some progressive administrators within 
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national governments to support another initiative. Eventually, despite 
some vigorous opposition from the United States, the UN Guidelines 
for Consumer Protection (UNGCP) were adopted by the General 
Assembly on 9 April 1985 (UN 1985).
Australia readily accepted its international responsibilities in relation to 
the guidelines and, in February 1990, sponsored a workshop for countries 
from the South Pacific, which recommended the establishment of a 
South Pacific Consumer Protection Programme (SPCPP). At a UN 
regional seminar on consumer protection for Asia and the Pacific in 
June 1990, jointly sponsored by Australia, the Australian Government 
announced its funding of the SPCPP through the IOCU’s Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific, then in Penang, Malaysia.
Consumers International in recent times has been lobbying for the 
extension of consumer rights in the revision to the UNGCP that was 
adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly on 22 December 
2015 (UN 2015). CI worked towards a range of new recommendations 
in the guidelines to adapt them to the globally networked age, 
including recommendations on digital issues, financial services, privacy, 
irresponsible marketing and access to knowledge.
15. Global regulation or laissez faire?
In many respects, the consumer movement was in the vanguard of 
those who recognised the importance of cooperation between nations 
to ensure that consumer protection was placed on the agenda of those 
bodies that emerged from the umbrella of the United Nations to set 
the global agenda for the way in which regulation and harmonisation 
of  approaches to food, health, standards and trade, among others, 
would develop. 
It is fair to say that, from time to time, Australia has played a major 
role in some of these intergovernmental forums. Unfortunately, there 
has only been one international intergovernmental forum, outside the 
European Community, dealing with consumer policy: the Consumer 
Policy Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. However, while it has been quite influential in shaping 
policy debates on such matters as financial services, distance selling and 
e-commerce, as a forum, it does not include the majority of nation-states.
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16. Deregulation, privatisation and 
fair trading
The late 1980s witnessed a significant realignment of government priorities 
away from regulatory activity to a focus on economic enterprise, as the 
philosophy of economic ‘rationalists’ gained the ascendancy. Regulatory 
impact statements, requiring a thorough assessment of the effects of a 
proposal on those to be regulated, became universal requirements. Adam 
Smith’s dictums on the subject of consumer sovereignty were erased from 
the memory banks and government ‘Consumer Affairs’ agencies became 
known as ‘Fair Trading Departments’. Where, in the past, they had been 
either standalone bodies or part of the ‘neutral’ legal portfolio, most 
were gradually absorbed into business or industry portfolios where the 
consumer affairs function was very much the junior interest. Following 
the 1998 Australian federal election, for the first time in 25 years, there 
was no minister with ‘Consumer Affairs’ in their title, and the consumer 
affairs policy division was absorbed into the Treasury.
As is so often the case, however, the end of the century saw a turn of the 
wheel. Public reaction to the poor consumer behaviour of many privatised 
utilities throughout the world has had the effect of governments 
considering, or actually, stepping up regulation again. 
17. National uniformity
The lack of uniformity between the laws of the states and territories has 
been one of the longest running ‘comic’ serials in Australia. In the food 
sector, for example, the first mention of the need for uniformity occurs as 
early as 1852 in comments attributed to Sir Henry Parkes.
As the realisation that Australia was increasingly competing in an 
international marketplace gradually dawned on policymakers, efforts to 
achieve uniformity in the field of consumer protection were stepped up.
From 1984 onwards, but especially up to 1993, there was a rapid 
acceleration in efforts made by the federal, state and territory 
consumer affairs ministers through their regular meetings7 to achieve 
7  Initially called SCOCAM (Standing Committee of Consumer Affairs Ministers) and later 
renamed MCCA (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs).
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uniformity across the raft of consumer legislation. Much of the effort 
concentrated on replicating the provisions of the TPA in state and 
territory legislation. Starting with the provisions in Division 1 of Part V 
of the TPA, dealing with unfair practices, it moved through provisions 
dealing with post-sale consumer protection; Division 1A dealing with 
product safety and recalls; and then on to uniform consumer credit 
legislation; compensation for the failure of travel companies; and trade 
measurement. In the early 1990s, the charge to deregulation saw a 
further round of reform through agreement between governments on 
the need for mutual recognition of each other’s schemes for regulation of 
goods and services generally. In effect, with a few exceptions, this meant 
states and territories had to recognise schemes for occupational licensing 
and standards for various products and services, even if these had lower 
standards than their own.8
Similarly, following the achievement of closer economic relations with 
New Zealand, the two countries agreed on a similar scheme of mutual 
recognition that was entrenched in nationally uniform legislation.9
Finally, on 1 January 2011, the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) 
commenced.
The ACL includes:
• a national unfair contract terms law covering standard form consumer 
contracts
• a national law guaranteeing consumer rights when buying goods and 
services 
• a national product safety law and enforcement system
• a national law for unsolicited consumer agreements covering door-
to-door sales and telephone sales 
• simple national rules for lay-by agreements 
• new penalties, enforcement powers and consumer redress options. 
8  See, for example, Mutual Recognition Act 1992 (Cth) and Mutual Recognition (Australian Capital 
Territory) Act 1992.
9  See, for example, Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997 (Cth) and Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition (South Australia) Act 1999.
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The ACL applies nationally and in all states and territories, and to 
all Australian businesses. For transactions that occurred prior to 
1 January 2011, the previous national, state and territory consumer laws 
continue to apply.
The full details of the ACL are contained in the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), replacing the Trade Practices Act. 
18. The advent of the industry ombudsmen
With the obvious failure of sole self-regulatory schemes, new 
co-regulatory mechanisms started appearing. The emergence of 
industry-based dispute-resolution schemes took place in the late 1980s 
(with the United Kingdom at the fore, initiating both the insurance and 
the banking ombudsman schemes). These were a reflection of consumer, 
government and (some) industry concern that there was a considerable 
imbalance in the relative bargaining position of the parties when it came 
to resolving complaints. Previously, affected consumers had to either 
take a dispute to court or rely on a consumer protection or fair trading 
agency to take up the matter as a breach of relevant laws. The court 
option was prohibitively expensive and consumer protection bodies 
simply did not have the resources to pursue other than a fraction of 
complaints. Besides, many of the complaints related to service quality 
and information that were not covered by any statute. The emphasis, 
when action was taken, was, thus, on prosecution rather than consumer 
redress and compensation.
Consumer activism and media interest exposed large numbers of 
unsatisfactory and unacceptable practices in various industries. These 
ranged from incomprehensible contract terms through to failure to 
respond to complaints and repair mistakes or, indeed, to provide any 
relevant information to bewildered consumers. 
Initially, the focus was on the financial services sector, but utilities rapidly 
came in for the same sort of scrutiny. This was accelerated in various 
countries with the privatisation of previously state-owned monopolies. 
Other sectors that attracted attention and various external dispute-
resolution (EDR) systems included real estate agents, funeral directors, 
legal services, public and private health services, and so on.
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Until recently, with the exception of Scandinavia, where there is 
a range of consumer complaints boards with a general remit and 
consumer ombudsmen for particular sectors, the development of these 
forms of EDR schemes has been concentrated in English-speaking 
Commonwealth countries.
In Australia, there has been an evolution of the various schemes with, 
for example, a number of financial services schemes joining together to 
form the Financial Ombudsman Service, and with the rationalisation 
of governance in some schemes.
19. External dispute-resolution principles
The first external schemes began with the Australian Banking 
Industry Ombudsman in 1990; the Claims Review Panel (general 
insurance) and the Life Insurance Complaints Service in 1991; and 
the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman in 1993. All schemes, 
however, still left much to be desired. 
Thus it was that work first commenced on the development of principles 
that should be the basis against which industry dispute-resolution 
schemes should be measured. They emerged in 1997 as the ‘Benchmarks 
for Industry-based Customer Dispute Resolution Schemes’, and set 
out a series of recommended principles, purposes and key practices. 
The principles were:
1. Accessibility: The scheme makes itself readily available to customers 
by promoting knowledge of its existence, being easy to use and 
having no cost barriers.
2. Independence: The decision-making process and administration of 
the scheme are independent from scheme members.
3. Fairness: The scheme produces decisions that are fair and seen to 
be fair by observing the principles of procedural fairness, by making 
decisions on the information before it and by having specific criteria 
on which its decisions are based.
4. Accountability: The scheme publicly accounts for its operations by 
publishing its determinations and information about complaints and 
highlights any systemic industry problems.
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5. Efficiency: The scheme operates efficiently by keeping track of 
complaints, ensuring complaints are dealt with by the appropriate 
process or forum and regularly reviewing its performance.
6. Effectiveness: The scheme is effective by having appropriate and 
comprehensive terms of reference and periodic independent reviews 
of its performance.
These benchmarks are now in wide use in both Australia and New 
Zealand and have played a key role in the examination and review 
of EDR schemes. In addition, they are prescribed by the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), in Regulatory Guide 
139, as criteria that must be met by any EDR scheme seeking approval 
in the financial services sector.
20. Conclusion
Consumer protection has advanced as the middle class has prospered 
around the world. With increased disposable income has come 
increased market and political power. The product of networked 
activism, together with effective compliance and enforcement by 
strong institutions such as the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC)—based on well-designed statute law—has been 
a well-regulated and efficient market (see also, Maher, Chapter 39, this 
volume). But principles-based regulation has also played a major role, 
as evidenced in the outcomes achieved by, for example, industry-based 
dispute-resolution schemes such as the Telecommunications Industry 
Ombudsman or the Financial Ombudsman Service. In the end, one of 
the principal reasons consumer protection regulation has predominantly 
been a success is that, when such regulation is effectively articulated and 
enforced, everyone wins: consumers, because of the protection of quality 
and safety of products and services, and business, because of increased 
consumer trust.
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Shifting profits and hidden 
accounts: Regulating tax havens 
Gregory Rawlings 
1. Introduction
In 1998, a UK Home Office investigation into financial services 
regulation in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man found that there 
were  some 15,000 nominee company directors on Sark, the world’s 
smallest  semi-sovereign self-governing jurisdiction. These directors, 
also  known as ‘signers’, sat on the boards of companies incorporated 
in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Panama and the Isle of Man, but 
seemed to have very little idea of what ‘their’ companies actually did. 
One islander alone was the director of 3,000 such companies. Yet while 
Sark had 15,000  company directors, the island’s population stood at 
just 575 (Edwards 1998: 88). Following a 1999 UK court decision that 
condemned  sham nominee directorships and subsequent regulatory 
reforms in the financial services sector in the Channel Islands, the 
‘Sark  Lark’, as it was known, appeared to come to an end. However, 
while  the island lost some of its appeal as a centre for nominee 
directorships, its directors were keen to continue their careers as 
professional signers elsewhere. 
More than 14 years later, the UK newspaper The Guardian revealed that 
a group of 28 nominee directors had been able to continue offering 
services to tens of thousands of secret offshore companies by relocating 
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themselves across the world. These offshore corporate directors, whose 
services were for hire to companies incorporated in major markets and 
specialist finance centres, were discovered in Cyprus, Dubai, Mauritius, 
St Kitts and Nevis (particularly Nevis) and Vanuatu. As The Guardian 
reported, ‘many still keep in touch on Facebook’ (Leigh et al. 2012). 
Collectively, they sat on the boards of 21,554 companies incorporated 
in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
New Zealand. One woman, with 12 addresses listed with the British 
Companies Register, ‘controlled’ 1,200 companies from the Caribbean 
island of Nevis. She continued to list a cottage on Sark, which 
provided a physical location for these companies’ numerous addresses. 
The  corporations ‘controlled’ from Nevis were involved in Russian 
property development, pornography and online gambling (Ball 2012a). 
Despite UK officials declaring that they would not tolerate the abuse 
of company directorships from Sark as far back as 1999, the island 
continues to provide a favourable location for ‘signers’ to provide their 
services. In 2012, two island residents on Sark sat on the boards of 8,239 
companies (Ball 2012b). 
The ability of company directors to bypass national regulations 
governing transparency, disclosure and due diligence, not to mention the 
sheer number of corporations involved, is emblematic of the continuing 
importance of tax havens, or offshore finance centres (OFCs) or 
international finance centres (IFCs), in contemporary global economic 
processes. These nominee company directors provide services for the 
ultimate owners of corporations whose identities remain obscured 
by layers of confidentiality, anonymity and privacy that are shielded by 
special purpose entities (SPEs), trusts and foundations incorporated 
in multiple jurisdictions with diverse approaches to fiscal norms and 
commercial regulations. 
Despite decades attempting to regulate tax havens and, in some cases, 
close them down, countries continue to prosper by offering regulatory 
flexibility in tax, finance and corporate management. Just when one area 
of offshore financial activity (such as banking) appears to be making 
major advances in regulatory reform, another new area of previously 
unforeseen commercial value suddenly finds tax haven markets to be 
particularly useful. Improvements in sharing information, transparency 
and data matching between tax havens and major economies have 
been offset by developments in e-commerce, whereby apps, software 
and search engines can register their intellectual property (IP) in one 
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jurisdiction, gain advertising revenues in another and pay taxes in a third 
country (invariably, a tax haven) and, if not strictly meeting its definitions, 
reaching an agreement with competing governments to make it as such. 
Tax havens continue to offer products and services for trusts, banking, 
private charities and foundations, transfer pricing, mutual funds, 
SPEs, international business companies/corporations (IBCs), payrolls, 
superannuation (pension) funds, shipping registration, offshore equity 
income and asset stripping. Moreover, archetypical tax havens (tropical 
islands, crown dependencies and alpine principalities) have increasingly 
been joined by countries that were never designed for this purpose. These 
include major members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) that continue to compete among each other 
for highly mobile capital by offering tax concessions, regulatory reforms 
and attractive IP protections. Just as tax havens provide multiple spaces 
for financial and fiscal ‘freedom’ and ‘innovation’, ways of managing them 
have been characterised by networks of competing regulatory projects, 
from setting international standards of best practice through to bilateral 
agreements designed to share information. Yet the release of information 
has not stopped regulatory arbitrage for taxable profits. If anything, it 
has just made it more transparent. The regulation of tax havens and 
aggressive tax planning remains a deep problem because globally 
networked markets have become more and more dynamically efficient 
in providing these services, or, as John Braithwaite (2005) puts it, they 
have become efficient ‘markets in vice’. The importance to democracy 
of maintaining the integrity of the tax institution was a major theme of 
the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) Centre for Tax System 
Integrity, with research on tax havens being a major strand of its work.
This chapter examines tax havens, offshore finance centres and the 
challenges of multiple, competing and contradictory regulatory 
initiatives. It provides an overview of the rise, consolidation, resilience 
and adaptation of tax havens and offshore finance centres. This is 
followed by an exploration of the transactions OFCs facilitate and 
resulting regulatory risks and responses, both in the havens themselves 
and in taxing states. Many of the latter have become, paradoxically, tax 
havens themselves and this transformation, or dualistic character of low 
tax costs and financial liberalisation, is one of the major challenges that 
regulators face today. 
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2. Tax havens: Rise, resilience 
and consolidation 
A tax haven, or OFC/IFC, is a jurisdiction (country, self-governing 
territory and/or a federal state or province with fiscal autonomy) with 
low or no direct taxation, strong confidentiality, anonymity and privacy 
provisions governing transactions, costs and capitalisation and a suite of 
wideranging, but flexible and permissive company incorporation laws 
and policies characterised by comprehensive regulation in some areas (for 
example, criminal penalties against unauthorised disclosure), and relaxed 
regulation in others (for example, laws governing directorships may be 
minimal or non-existent). There are also a number of states that ‘ring 
fence’ domestic taxable economic activity covering residential income, 
profits and losses from international non-resident investment, which 
is either exempt from taxation or is liable at low or concessional rates. 
This includes jurisdictions with active ‘onshore offshores’ such as the 
Netherlands, Singapore, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom and the American states of Delaware, Wyoming, Montana 
and Nevada. The ability of these ‘non-tax havens’ to operate akin to 
‘tax havens’ in specific circumstances presents one of the most serious 
regulatory challenges for orthodox taxing states in the contemporary 
fiscal world. 
Tax havens are particularly attractive to the wealthy, or high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs), also known as high wealth individuals (HWIs). 
There is evidence that the wealthy have sought safe and secure refuges 
for their assets for centuries. Chinese merchants found safe havens 
from imperial taxes and tributes outside the empire some 3,000 years 
ago (Seagrave 1995). In the late eighteenth century, French aristocrats 
fleeing the revolution started depositing money in Switzerland, with 
secret numbered accounts available by the end of the nineteenth century 
(Palan 2003: 103). In the decades leading up to World War II, wealthy 
individuals, families and some companies started to secretly move 
funds to low-tax regimes abroad, including Nova Scotia, the Bahamas 
and Jersey, while glamorous destinations such as Monaco and Tangier 
combined private banking, luxurious homes abroad and gambling in 
high-end casinos for mobile millionaires. 
Tax havens started to proliferate exponentially after World War II 
(see Table 37.1 for a listing). The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement 
carefully regulated domestic and international financial markets 
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through government control over foreign exchange rates and cross-
border capital flows. While most major economies signed the Bretton 
Woods agreement, there were still lacunae within the post–World 
War  II international financial architecture that allowed money to be 
moved offshore. Due to Cold War rivalry, interest rate differentials and 
regulatory arbitrage between major markets, companies, governments, 
banks and individuals started to open US dollar accounts outside 
America in the 1950s (Hampton 1996; Palan 1999; Picciotto 1999; 
Schenk 1998). This protected US dollar holdings from confiscation in 
the event of hostilities between rival powers and also allowed account 
holders to earn higher interest rates abroad. These US dollar accounts kept 
internationally were referred to as eurocurrencies or eurodollars, which 
were defined as any currency banked or traded outside of its country of 
origin. This coincided with technological advances enabling money to 
be booked by telegraph from one jurisdiction to another; it did not have 
to physically move but could be transferred by debiting and crediting 
cross-border ledger entities. This provided new opportunities for smaller 
countries and territories, which enjoyed fiscal autonomy and were not 
bound by the regulatory order of the Bretton Woods system. Eurodollar 
funds started to flow into fiscally autonomous European territories such 
as British-governed Hong Kong, Bermuda and the Bahamas, together 
with the crown dependencies of Jersey, the Isle of Man and Guernsey. 
Independent states that historically had reputations for bank secrecy 
(or quickly introduced it), such as Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland, continued to develop, expand and promote their financial 
centres as safe havens where money could be securely deposited, 
managed and anonymously reinvested into the world’s major onshore 
money markets (Hampton 1996; Palan 1999; Picciotto 1999). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, tax havens and OFCs expanded both in number 
and by value of deposit. Enjoying English common law, other UK overseas 
territories that had never historically had income tax were able to introduce 
offshore legislation by statute allowing for OFCs (Picciotto 1999). In these 
ways, territories such as Cayman Islands and the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) 
became OFCs. Tax haven deposits increased rapidly. In 1968, the total funds 
kept offshore were valued at US$10.6 billion (AU$13.9 billion) (Picciotto 
1999: 58). By 1978 this had increased to close to US$500 billion (AU$657 
billion). This continued to grow through the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Between 1985 and 1995, the volume of funds remitted from G7 countries 
into the Caribbean and Pacific increased to US$200 billion (AU$263 
billion) per annum, which was far in excess of foreign direct investment 
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(FDI) in these areas (OECD 1998: 17). This coincided with a rise in the 
number of jurisdictions offering offshore financial services. Countries that 
chose to remain British territories augmented their offshore legislation, 
such as the BVI, which in 1984 pioneered the IBC (Maurer 1995), while 
others that became independent kept their centres and introduced new 
products and services. By the mid-1990s, almost every independent 
and self-governing territory (with the exception of the French overseas 
departments) in the Eastern Caribbean’s Lesser Antilles had become a tax 
haven. Moreover, rapidly growing economies such as Singapore, Dubai 
and Hong Kong were actively competing with established market leaders 
such as Switzerland as centres for wealth management. Offshore assets 
continued to grow. In 1994, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
calculated that US$2.1 trillion (AU$2.8 trillion) was kept offshore, or 20 
per cent of total private worldwide stocks of wealth (IMF, cited in Palan 
1999: 23). In 1998 the UK Home Office estimated that this had increased 
to more than US$6 trillion (AU$7.9 trillion) (Edwards 1998). The OECD 
suggested it had reached between US$5 and US$6 trillion (AU$6.6–7.9 
trillion) in 2007 (Owens 2007: 17). In 2012, the UK-based think tank 
the Tax Justice Network (TJN) commissioned research by the economist 
James Henry, which found that between US$21 and US$32  trillion 
(AU$27.6–42 trillion) was kept offshore (TJN 2012). 
Thus, between the 1970s and the turn of the twenty-first century, the 
amount of money kept offshore has increased massively. The number of 
jurisdictions offering offshore financial services has similarly expanded 
considerably and now includes countries that were not historically 
considered tax havens (such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands 
and individual US states). The market has become segmented into areas 
of offshore specialisation with jurisdictions focusing on particular niches. 
The BVI provides IBCs, the Cayman Islands hosts major American 
mutual funds, Bermuda offers captive insurance facilities, Switzerland, 
Singapore and Dubai have emerged as major centres of wealth 
management, while Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands provide 
convenient locations for profit shifting, corporate domicile and bespoke 
tax deals between multinational corporations and accommodating 
governments. Major financial centres such as London and New York 
continue to process, manage and reinvest funds that flow in and out of 
tax havens by way of stocks, shares and pension funds. The entire global 
financial system has become interlinked with the onshore/offshore 
marketplace, in ways that mutually entangle and enmesh tax havens with 
their taxing state counterparts. 
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3. Risks, markets and practices: Tax havens 
and regulatory challenges
Low or no-tax jurisdictions combined with a lack of transparency and 
access to information about beneficial account holders present specific 
fiscal risks to OECD members and emerging markets alike. Significant 
revenues are forgone because of the use of OFCs. In  2008, the US 
Senate found that up to US$100 billion (AU$132 billion) a year was 
being lost in tax revenues as a result of offshore activities (Gravelle 
2013: 1). In 2013, the UK-based overseas development charity Oxfam 
estimated that US$156 billion (AU$205 billion) per annum in tax 
revenue disappeared as  a result of OFC use—enough to end global 
poverty (Oxfam  International 2013a). Oxfam also concluded that 
US$38.4  billion (AU$50.5 billion) in tax revenues was being moved 
out of Africa each year as a result of trade mispricing—a form of profit 
shifting, whereby companies undervalue prices of exports that can then 
be sold at market rates abroad with the difference recouped offshore 
(Oxfam International 2013b). 
Offshore finance centres are involved in a far wider range of activities 
than just accepting deposits in their banks. Money is actively managed, 
lent, reinvested, borrowed, used as collateral, pooled in collective 
investment vehicles and channelled through secondary markets back 
into onshore stock exchanges, property developments and industrial 
enterprises. All of these pose specific tax risks. Tax havens are host to 
a range of financial activities facilitating the active investment of funds. 
Even where money is deposited in an offshore bank, clients will expect a 
reasonable rate of return and, in an era of historically low interest rates, 
this will mean that it is reinvested and traded in shares, bonds, property, 
hedge funds, foreign exchange markets and venture capital enterprises. 
Corporations will use OFCs to finance joint ventures, mergers and 
acquisitions and attract new sources of capital. 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































37 . SHIFTING PRoFITS AND HIDDEN ACCoUNTS
Transfer pricing or profit shifting makes extensive use of tax havens 
and OFCs. Corporations establish subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions 
and then sell goods and services to them at low prices, reducing overall 
income for headquarters but realising it offshore. In this way, profits can 
be shifted to low or no-tax jurisdictions. While rules, policies and laws 
have been introduced to prevent the abuse of transfer pricing, it has 
become a particular regulatory challenge with IP licensing and online 
e-commerce developments. As Drahos (2013: 91) observes: ‘The sale 
or licensing of intellectual property rights is used to shift income from 
high tax jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions.’ As a result, a number of 
e-commerce companies such as Google, Apple, Amazon and Facebook 
have been able to use offshore centres to reduce tax liabilities in their 
US domicile and the countries where they operate. In Australia in 
2013, Google paid virtually no tax. The company claimed it had paid 
AU$7 million on a AU$46 million profit; however, the company’s profits 
from its Australian operations were actually somewhere in the vicinity of 
AU$2 billion, which had been shifted offshore, and its tax bill was in fact 
just AU$466,802 (West 2014). 
One of the ways companies are able to shift profits and thus lower 
their tax liabilities is through what is referred to as the ‘double Irish–
Dutch sandwich’ (Gravelle 2013: 11). Using this strategy, for example, 
Google registered IP rights in Ireland. This then established a subsidiary, 
which sold advertising into the rest of Europe. ‘Sandwiched’ between 
the Irish parent company and its affiliated European sales firm was a 
subsidiary incorporated in the Netherlands, which channelled royalty 
payments from the sales firm back to Ireland. The Irish parent company, 
however, then claimed that it was not in fact managed in Ireland, but in 
Bermuda, whose zero per cent tax rate was applied rather than Ireland’s 
12.5 per cent. The American rate of 35 per cent was nowhere to be seen 
(Gravelle 2013: 11; Wood 2014). Since the discovery of the double Irish–
Dutch sandwich in 2010, it was revealed that a number of information 
technology companies had been using this or similar methods of profit 
shifting to reduce taxes, including Apple, Twitter and Facebook (Wood 
2014). Facebook alone transferred ‘USD $700 million [AU$920 million] 
to the Cayman Islands in a Double Irish’ (Wood 2014). Like Bermuda, 
the Cayman Islands also has no tax on company profits. Combined 
with transfer pricing, IP registration and patent mobility, multinational 
corporations are provided with opportunities for enormous global 
flexibility in shifting profits and relocating proprietary rights, lowering 
(and even cancelling out) taxes in the process. As Drahos (2013: 91) has 
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demonstrated in his account of the regulatory challenges presented by 
parent offices and their globalisation, ‘the scale of the problem has grown 
in magnitude’. 
Even though the double Irish–Dutch sandwich has been closed in 
its current form under US pressure, whenever regulatory authorities 
discover and end one arrangement, others are quick to emerge and take 
their place. As Forbes tax columnist Robert W Wood (2014) wrote: 
‘Tax people will be scrambling to create new structures, but there’s some 
breathing room. And when new structures are developed, I’ll bet Ireland 
will have a role.’ 
Individual OFCs are seldom used in isolation, especially archetypical 
island state tax havens with low populations and small domestic markets 
where large transactions raise red flags of tax risk for revenue authorities. 
Instead, they form parts of wider structures involving multiple 
jurisdictions. Tax planners working for HNWIs and multinational 
corporations find countries with economies of substance (Netherlands, 
Singapore, Ireland and the United Kingdom) to be particularly attractive 
in arranging legal structures because of the network of double taxation 
agreements they are party to (which means that taxes are not paid twice 
and deductions can be claimed, sometimes to cancel them out altogether). 
These jurisdictions do have tax systems that can be quite high, but they 
‘ring fence’ international operations (which are taxed at low or zero rates) 
off from domestic activities, which continue to be charged at regular 
rates. Companies and their lawyers and accountants can also conclude 
specific deals with particular governments to exempt them from local 
taxes even where they might ordinarily be payable. The European 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which straddles the boundary between 
a medium-sized economy and an archetypical tax haven, has given 
hundreds of multinational companies special concessions and private 
agreements allowing them to avoid not only its 29 per cent company 
tax rate, but also taxes elsewhere, including in the corporations’ home 
countries. In November 2014, 28,000 pages of tax agreements between 
Luxembourg’s government and 340 multinational companies were 
leaked to the media, illustrating how these firms incorporated, organised 
and ‘managed’ subsidiaries and local parents out of Luxembourg to 
reduce and avoid their overall total tax bills, using variations of the 
double Irish–Dutch sandwich, together with other forms profit shifting, 
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IP flexibility, research and development deductions, back-to-back loans, 
interest rebates and transfer pricing (Bowers 2014). The Luxembourg 
authorities approved these tax agreements as perfectly legal. 
There are active and synergistic relationships between OFCs and major 
financial markets and emerging economies. Money is invariably parked 
only temporarily in tax havens, before it is reinvested onshore, often 
sheltering under the tax-free domicile with which foreign incorporation 
provides it. Common law OFCs, such as those found in countries that 
are current or former UK territories, are able to draw on the precedents 
of trust and equity to manage HNWI and multinational corporate 
assets, income, profits and, from time to time, even losses (which can 
then be claimed as tax deductions back home). Through establishing 
trusts in OFCs, wealthy individuals can deny a beneficial connection 
with their property (which technically ceases to be ‘theirs’) and thus 
any income earned from it is accrued tax-free (or incurs minimal taxes) 
(see Rawlings 2011). 
Companies, as opposed to individuals (although often the two are 
the same and this distinction is not mutually exclusive), find SPEs or 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that can provide corporate structures 
for subsidiaries that are particularly convenient for tax minimisation 
purposes.  The BVI specialises in these as IBCs. Despite having a 
population of fewer than 30,000 people, the BVI has 459,000 globally 
active trading IBCs (TJN 2013). They are particularly attractive 
for investments into China. In 2009, the BVI, one of the smallest 
countries in the world, ranked as the second-highest source of FDI into 
China—the largest nation on Earth (Maurer and Martin 2012: 532; 
Vlcek 2014: 538). 
Since OFCs proliferated in the 1970s, new ways to tax offshore profits 
and income have been developed. These include implementing controlled 
foreign company (CFC) rules whereby offshore income is treated 
as locally earned for tax purposes unless it can be proved otherwise, 
targeted listings of specific jurisdictions and applying direct measures to 
transactions involving them (for example, imposing withholding taxes 
or disallowing deductions) (Sharman and Rawlings 2006) and treating 
trust distributions as taxable dividends. However, the complexity of these 
arrangements can make taxing offshore structures challenging at the 
least, and impossible at the most. Moreover, these regulatory measures 
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are based on the disclosure of offshore investments and arrangements. 
They become particularly difficult to enforce where taxpayers secretly 
hide assets, income and profits offshore. 
Until the turn of the twenty-first century, tax havens focused on 
providing financial regimes based on secrecy, privacy and confidentiality, 
to the extent that clients could be completely anonymous and virtually 
‘unknown’. This is still a feature of many OFCs. For example, the auditor 
who leaked the 28,000 pages of tax agreements with the Luxembourg 
Government has been charged with criminal offences relating to the 
‘theft’ of information and its ‘illegal’ release to the media. The legal 
action against this whistleblower has been condemned internationally 
and reflects the increasing intolerance for tax evasion that is facilitated 
by excessive layers of confidentiality, anonymity and secrecy. As a result, 
multilateral organisations such as the OECD have been at the forefront 
of advancing efforts designed to reduce tax evasion by improving 
transparency, accountability and access to information about clients, 
monies and entities based in, and organised out of, tax havens and OFCs. 
These efforts are beginning to show signs of success. 
4. Closing the gaps: Between bilateral 
bundles and multilateral advances 
The regulation of tax havens has bilateral, unilateral and multilateral 
characteristics. The main multilateral organisations involved in pursuing 
new policy initiatives to improve the regulation of tax havens and 
offshore finance include the OECD, IMF, World Bank and the G20. 
In 2000, the OECD identified 35 tax havens, in addition to advance 
letters of commitment to the principles of transparency and exchange 
of information from six other OFCs/IFCs (OECD 2000; see also 
Table 37.1). Despite initial hostility from the tax havens—a term that 
was soon dropped in favour of more neutral classifications such as 
‘participating partners’—the OECD reached out to these jurisdictions 
and, in 2001, formed the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes. Members of the forum, which 
included OECD states and the participating partners, concentrated on 
establishing peer-reviewed benchmarks for international best practice 
in improving financial transparency in banking, accounting and funds 
management processes and exchanging this information between 
countries. A number of bilateral tax information exchange agreements 
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(TIEAs) were concluded between OECD states, an increasing number 
of interested non-OECD countries and the participating partners 
(the ‘former’ tax havens) (Rawlings 2007). Until the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) erupted in 2008, these TIEAs were negotiated bilaterally, 
contained caveats preventing ‘fishing expeditions’ and usually included 
provisions requiring a local court order before information about 
beneficial account holders in contracting states could be supplied. They 
necessitated expensive and time-consuming investigations with no 
automatic rights of access. The TIEA framework established by the 
OECD before 2008 was ‘not a “multilateral” agreement in the traditional 
sense. Instead, it provide[s] the basis for an integrated bundle of bilateral 
treaties’ (OECD 2002: 5). 
The OECD’s efforts in establishing best practice global regulatory 
norms, guidelines and policies were advanced as a result of the GFC. 
Although tax havens and OFCs did not cause the GFC, they were 
involved in some of the more dubious, opaque and troubling corporate 
structures and debt-saturated arrangements that were at its core. 
For  example, many subprime mortgage funds, collective investment 
vehicles and huge stockpiles of debt were domiciled offshore in tax 
havens, benefiting from regimes of secrecy, to the extent that in some 
cases even parent headquarter companies had no idea of their liabilities 
together with the retail banking sector whose credit systems almost 
came to a halt as a result. 
In the wake of the GFC, which brought to light even more scandals 
involving tax evasion, the OECD, with a mandate provided by the G20, 
has moved towards establishing truly multilateral regulatory measures 
to reduce risks associated with OFCs. In 2009, the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information was restructured. Originally 
emerging out of the 2001 listing of tax havens, by 2014, the Global Forum 
had 124 members, including most tax havens, OECD member states, 
related multilateral organisations and representatives from emerging 
markets. In 2014, the forum established the Common Standard for 
the Automatic Exchange of Information. This complements, but also 
moves far beyond, the extensive range of TIEAs that now exist between 
states, and allows information to be obtained directly from banks and 
other financial institutions (including trust companies) without specific 
court orders, warrants or expensive investigations. Some 65 countries 
and territories, including major OFCs/IFCs, have committed to the 
standard. In related developments, the 1988 Convention on Mutual 
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Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters was amended in 2010 and 
became available for states to sign in 2011. By 2014, 84 jurisdictions, 
including financial centres previously classified by the OECD as tax 
havens, had signed. The convention strengthens international cooperation 
between states to collect and assess taxes and recover monies owing and 
enshrines the Automatic Exchange of Information Standard between 
signatories. 
5. Conclusion 
These initiatives pioneered by the OECD (in conjunction with other 
multilateral organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and European 
Union, together with leading state actors such as the United States) have 
invoked principles of responsive regulation, cooperation and consensus 
rather than sanction, penalty and threat against tax havens. Indeed, 
the OFC states have been brought on board to such an extent that they 
are considered partners readily committed to ending global tax evasion. 
So successful have these strategies been that the OECD has consigned 
its 2000 tax havens listing ‘to history’. As it observed in its assessment 
of the work of the Global Forum: 
There have been many positive changes in jurisdictions’ transparency 
and exchange of information practices since that time … no jurisdiction 
is currently listed as an uncooperative tax haven by the OECD. While 
these lists are not replaced by the progress report, they should be seen 
in their historical context. (OECD 2013: 23)
However, this does not necessarily mean that tax havens have ceased 
to exist. If anything, they are stronger than ever. Yet tax havens are 
not confined just to distant islands and high alpine sovereign valleys. 
Major  onshore markets, in conjunction with their niche offshore 
auxiliaries, continue to provide highly attractive features that allow for 
the extensive minimisation of taxation through taking advantage of 
regulatory lacunae, diversity and exceptions in legal regimes, policies and 
principles. Transfer pricing, profit shifting and the ability to register IP 
in low or no-tax jurisdictions have become fundamental in maintaining 
offshore markets, affording multinational companies, especially those 
dealing with technologies and patents, enormous flexibility in driving 
down costs, including their fiscal obligations (see, for example, Drahos 
2013). Even with advancements in transparency and access to financial 
account information kept offshore, this will not necessarily prevent 
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the rapid and widespread movement of assets, property and income 
from one jurisdiction to another in search of lowered tax costs, which 
is increasingly and openly occurring as a continued risk to the fiscal 
foundations of contemporary economies and an increasingly sceptical 
taxpaying citizenry who do not have the same opportunities for 
global mobility. 
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In 2011, in a small court in Ecuador’s Amazon jungle, a judge ordered 
the American oil giant Chevron to pay US$9 billion (AU$12 billion) in 
damages for pollution in the region caused by drilling activities in the 
1970s and 1980s. The company quickly denounced the landmark ruling 
as illegitimate. More than a year before the final ruling had been issued, 
Chevron had already taken steps to initiate an investor–state dispute 
against the Government of Ecuador under the terms of a United States–
Ecuador bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The company seeks to avoid 
paying the $9 billion by convincing an international tribunal that the 
courts of Ecuador are corrupt and that the government is ultimately 
responsible for any environmental damage and associated health issues 
experienced by local residents.
In the same year, only days after a tsunami struck Japan, leading to 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
announced the closure of Germany’s oldest operating nuclear power 
plants. Shortly thereafter, the government moved to phase out all 
nuclear power by 2022. While German society has embraced this 
policy move, unsurprisingly, nuclear power companies in the country 
did not. In 2012, after months of threatening to take the government to 
arbitration, the Swedish energy company Vattenfall finally launched its 
case under the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty, an international 
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trade and investment agreement in the energy sector. Press reports 
have suggested that Vattenfall will claim €4.7 billion (AU$7  billion) 
in compensation for the closure of its two nuclear power plants. 
The company reached a settlement with the government in a previous 
dispute over the regulation of a coal-fired power station.
On the other side of the world, Australia was introducing legislation 
in 2011 that requires that all tobacco products be sold in plain brown 
packaging. Health warnings would still be included on cigarette 
packets, but logos would disappear. Several companies challenged the 
legislation as an expropriation of their intellectual property in Australia’s 
High Court. They lost. However, one company was also able to pursue 
its case for compensation in international arbitration. Philip Morris 
International restructured its investment through its Asian subsidiary 
to access arbitration under a BIT between Hong Kong and Australia. 
The company was no stranger to arbitration, as it had already launched 
a dispute against Uruguay for similar tobacco packaging requirements.
Over the past decade, there has been an explosive increase in cases of 
investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS). Until the mid-1990s, only a 
handful of cases had emerged. Then, following a few high-profile cases, 
everything changed. Between 2003 and 2013, one arbitral body registered 
more than 30 new cases every year and more than 50 cases in each of 
the last three years of that 10-year period (UNCTAD 2014). As of the 
end of 2014, there were 608 known cases. By then, 101 governments had 
responded to one or more ISDS claims (UNCTAD 2015). 
As the above examples demonstrate, what is notable is not just the 
number of disputes that have arisen, or the number of states that have 
been involved, but also the particular nature of disputes that have 
emerged. Rather than solely involving straightforward incidences of 
nationalisation or breach of contract, modern investor–state disputes 
often revolve around public policy measures and implicate sensitive 
issues such as health and environmental protection.
How did such matters become the purview of unelected ad hoc panels 
whose expertise lies in the realm of commercial law? The answer is 
not immediately evident. It could be argued that states themselves 
are the ones responsible. Governments have quietly been negotiating 
bilateral and regional investment agreements (collectively referred to 
as international investment agreements (IIAs)) that provide foreign 
investors with considerable legal protection and access to international 
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arbitration. There are more than 3,200 such agreements in existence 
(UNCTAD 2015). Governments, particularly in developing countries, 
also sign contracts directly with foreign investors that contain similar 
privileges (or ‘rights’, depending on one’s view). 
However, although states may have opened the door to ISDS, they 
arguably did not anticipate that arbitral tribunals would reach so far 
into the public policy domain. IIAs were ostensibly created to promote 
foreign investment in developing countries and designed to protect 
investors from discrimination and particularly egregious conduct on the 
part of the host state. While the performance of investment agreements 
in helping states to attract investment is debatable, the success investors 
have had in convincing arbitrators to stretch the traditional meaning of 
clauses on ‘expropriation’ and ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is undeniable.
This chapter examines the system of ISDS and its importance in global 
affairs. First, the basis for the system—a complex web or ‘spaghetti 
bowl’ (as it is sometimes called) of bilateral and regional investment 
agreements—is outlined. Second, the authority of arbitral tribunals, and 
how this authority has expanded over time, is discussed. The chapter 
then turns to the cost of investment arbitration for states, both in hard 
monetary terms and in terms of the unquantifiable costs of ‘regulatory 
chill’. Finally, the current backlash from some states against investment 
arbitration is examined. The chapter concludes that the future for ISDS 
is not bright, as, increasingly, even the traditional champions of the 
system (developed countries) are beginning to question its merit.
2. The spaghetti bowl
As there is not an unlimited supply of investment that is equally 
distributed around the world, it is often argued that states must 
compete for foreign direct investment (FDI). Governments compete for 
investment by providing incentives (such as tax holidays, loan guarantees 
and cash grants) and also by differentiating their legal jurisdictions from 
those of their competitors. In this latter sense, legal reform has become 
an important tool for developing countries in their bid to attract FDI. 
Domestic measures, although important for signalling, are limited 
by the ‘credible commitment’ problem—that is, governments cannot 
demonstrate to investors in a meaningful way that a country’s ‘investment 
environment’ will not simply be changed once investors have established 
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themselves in the country and have substantial sunk costs. Furthermore, 
due to the perceived or real corruption of the courts in many countries, 
investors do not view local remedies as a neutral or fair option for the 
resolution of disputes. This is the reasoning behind the development 
of the system of ISDS.
The first proposal for ISDS emerged in the 1959 Abs–Shawcross Draft 
Convention on Investment Abroad (Newcombe and Paradell 2009). 
Businesspeople rather than governments drafted this document, but it 
provided a model that proved to be extremely attractive to developed 
countries and was taken up by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its Draft Convention on 
the Protection of Foreign Property of 1962. While the OECD draft 
convention was never adopted due to opposition from some member 
states, it was revised in 1967 and approved by the council of the OECD 
as a model for BITs. 
The first BIT containing an ISDS clause was signed between Italy and 
Chad in 1969. While the pace of BIT signing was initially slow, this 
changed in the 1990s. In the period following the 1982 debt crisis, 
most developing countries shifted from an antagonistic or ambivalent 
approach to FDI to the active courting of foreign investors (Van Harten 
2007). In this environment, BITs—designed to provide investment 
protection—were presented to developing countries as vehicles for 
investment promotion. This ‘mechanism of reward’ (in the terminology 
of Drahos, Chapter 15, this volume) was central to the spread of BITs. 
Unfortunately, research suggests that BITs may not actually have any 
impact on flows of FDI (Yackee 2008; Aisbett 2009). 
In addition to hoping to attract FDI, many governments in developing 
countries were pressured by developed countries and international 
finance institutions to sign BITs. José Alvarez, a former member 
of the US BIT negotiating team, has acknowledged that a BIT is 
‘hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction’ (quoted in Garcia 2004: 316). 
The  most economically and politically powerful developing countries 
have managed to avoid BITs; Brazil has signed several, but never ratified 
one, and China’s BITs have historically been quite strictly circumscribed.
OECD countries participate in BITs almost exclusively with developing 
countries; while there is an increasing number of global South–South 
BITs, there is a dearth of agreements between industrialised nations. 
On the other hand, there are a number of bilateral and regional 
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free-trade agreements between developed countries that have chapters 
on investment, the most famous being the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on investment 
marks a significant milestone in investment law, despite the fact that 
the language of many of the provisions in the agreement is essentially 
drawn, with relatively minor modifications, from BITs that the United 
States had concluded prior to 1993. It is noteworthy because investors 
have extensively employed ISDS under Chapter 11, marking a new era 
of investment arbitration, and arguably triggering the current surge 
in disputes brought under other agreements. Despite the fact that the 
investment chapter was largely aimed at constraining Mexico, investors 
have made claims against all three signatory countries and Canada has 
actually faced the largest number of disputes. 
Attempts have been made to enshrine ISDS in a global treaty on 
investment. In 1995, negotiations on a multilateral agreement on 
investment (MAI) were commenced under the auspices of the OECD. 
While the OECD is not a global forum, the MAI, once completed, 
would have been opened up for signature by any country. However, 
disagreements among members of this ‘like-minded’ club were more 
intractable than expected and ardent opposition to the agreement 
from civil society also complicated the negotiations. In 1998, the MAI 
talks fell apart. There remains debate over whether non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement ‘killed’ 
the MAI through their campaigns to pressure governments or if, 
instead,  OECD countries simply failed to find common ground on 
certain key issues (Graham 2000; Muchlinski 2001).
In 2003, debates about an MAI once again came to the fore, at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Cancun, 
Mexico. These talks were also a dramatic failure. In a classic example of 
forum shifting (see Drahos, Chapter 15, this volume), the United States 
and other countries have since refocused their efforts on negotiating 
regional agreements, such the United States–Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement, as well as more BITs. These ‘minilateral’ agreements are 
easier to negotiate and generally garner less attention from NGOs 
(although this has not been the case with the TPP). The result is 
effectively near global coverage of investment protection (particularly 
because corporations can shift nationality; see below), but in a complex 
and confusing patchwork of rules. 
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3. The expansion of arbitral authority
IIAs appear deceptively mundane at first glance. Essentially, they are 
reciprocal agreements between states to provide investors from one state 
with legal protection when they are operating within the territory of 
the other state(s). The precise content of IIAs varies to a certain degree. 
Generally speaking, IIAs contain provisions on national treatment, most-
favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment/the minimum 
standard of treatment and expropriation (Sornarajah 2004). However, 
these standards are very vague and they are consequently open to a 
considerable amount of interpretation. Experience has demonstrated 
that minor variations in wording can have substantial consequences 
for governments. 
As there is no global treaty on investment, there is also no international 
investment court (although the European Union has recently proposed 
the creation of one). Instead, one-off arbitral tribunals review the cases 
launched by investors and interpret the provisions in IIAs. Procedurally, 
these tribunals follow established arbitration rules, typically those 
developed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) or the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). Regardless of what rules are chosen by 
the investor, the tribunal will have three members: one chosen by the 
investor, one chosen by the state and a third who is mutually agreed on 
and will act as president. Barristers and retired judges are not the only 
ones who are frequently appointed as arbitrators, but also professors, 
who, in many cases, also have careers as leading private lawyers. 
From the historical context in which IIAs were first developed, one 
can extrapolate what states intended to give arbitrators authority over: 
the resolution of certain types of disputes that might arise between a 
government of one party to an IIA and an investor from one of the 
other parties to the IIA. Their intention was not to extend protection to 
all investors, but only to those who were domiciled in one of the other 
parties to the IIA. Furthermore, their intention was not to delegate to 
arbitrators the authority to resolve every possible type of dispute that 
could arise between an investor and a government. The expansion of 
arbitrator authority in recent years stems from arbitrator movement away 
from the intentions of states both in terms of who should be protected 
under IIAs and what constitutes a breach of treaty. 
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On the issue of who should be protected, there are ongoing debates 
about the definition of the fundamental terms ‘investor’ and ‘investment’, 
but another fundamental problem is ‘treaty shopping’—when a 
multinational corporation establishes a holding company in one IIA 
party to access arbitration when a dispute arises over its investment in 
the territory of another IIA party (Van Harten and Loughlin 2006). One 
oft-cited example of a treaty shopping investor is the American firm 
Bechtel. When a dispute arose over its investment in Bolivia, Bechtel 
established a subsidiary in the Netherlands to access arbitration through 
that country’s BIT with Bolivia (the United States–Bolivia BIT  was 
not in force at the time). As noted in the introduction, Philip Morris 
International also engaged in treaty shopping to bring a suit against 
Australia, although, in this instance, the strategy backfired as the panel 
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Tribunals that have determined that they do have the jurisdiction to 
hear the claims of treaty shopping investors have expanded arbitration 
beyond what was intended by states when they established reciprocal 
relationships with other states through IIAs. Domestic investors have 
even used this method to gain access to treaty protection against their 
own government. Sornarajah (2010: 280) argues that it ‘could never have 
been the intention of any state’ to protect domestic investors through 
IIAs, as the unambiguous aim of these agreements was to protect and 
promote foreign investment. 
In terms of what constitutes a breach of an IIA, prior to the mid-1990s, 
when ISDSs began to flourish, only very dramatic actions by a state that 
were clearly directed at an investor (for example, an expropriation of 
property or a blatant act of discrimination) were seriously contemplated 
as breaches of international law. However, in more recent cases, several 
standard investment provisions have been interpreted in such a broad 
manner that it would appear that (at least some) arbitrators believe that 
it is within their purview to review any state regulatory action, or indeed 
inaction, that has a negative (not necessarily devastating) impact on 
a foreign investor or investment. 
The clearest example of this is the arbitration-induced evolution of the 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard. Several tribunals have moved 
away from the traditional customary international law understanding of 
this term (requiring states to provide a ‘minimum’ standard of treatment 
including access to justice) and have advocated a ‘plain meaning’ 
interpretation that requires a state to: comply with the tenets of 
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‘good governance’, maintain a ‘stable and favourable investment climate’ 
and meet the ‘legitimate expectations’ of foreign investors. Such  a 
capacious standard effectively allows tribunals to review any regulatory 
measure, even if it was enacted in the public interest (for example, to 
protect the environment; see further Tienhaara 2009). 
The evolution of the fair and equitable treatment standard illustrates 
very well the idea that the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism 
are not solely about deregulation, but instead involve the creation of 
new rights and an element of re-regulation (see Scott, Chapter 16; 
and Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, this volume). To comply with the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, as defined by some tribunals, states are 
not only required to refrain from certain actions that would interfere 
in the operation of an investment, but also obliged to proactively take 
certain steps (for example, to ensure transparency when policies that 
affect investors are being developed). In other words, the state is being 
asked to do both more and less at the same time.
By expansively interpreting both who is protected by IIAs and what IIA 
protection entails, arbitrators have pushed the bounds of the authoritative 
space that had been carved out for them by states. In some respects, 
ISDS tribunals resemble the transnational non-state regulatory regimes 
discussed by Tusikov (Chapter 20, this volume). Although the ‘rules’ of 
investment protection are ostensibly created by states (undoubtedly with 
input from corporate lobbyists), they are so vague that they are only 
given meaning when they are applied to specific facts and are filtered 
through the ideological lens of an arbitrator. As such, arbitrators are 
effectively creating rules and acting as regulators. Given the absence of 
appropriate accountability mechanisms to accompany such a role, there 
is an understandable feeling (expressed even by those within the system) 
that the legitimacy of ISDS is increasingly in doubt (Van Harten 2007; 
Sornarajah 2010). 
4. How BITs bite
It has been said that ‘the awards of arbitrators are more widely 
enforceable  than any other adjudicative decision in public law’ 
(Van Harten 2007: 5). IIAs often explicitly obligate states to recognise 
awards, thus allowing investors to seek enforcement in the local courts 
of the host state. Furthermore, where an IIA provides for enforcement 
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under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), 
an  investor can seek enforcement in the domestic courts of any state 
party to the convention. Awards may also be enforceable under other 
arbitration treaties such as the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). 
Tribunals are given a significant degree of discretion to determine 
damages, which may include a company’s ‘lost future profits’. Many 
ISDS claims now exceed US$1 billion (AU$1.3 billion) and, although 
the compensation actually awarded is generally much lower than what 
is sought, the impact on the public purse can be substantial. The Czech 
Republic was obliged to pay more than US$350 million (AU$460 
million) in compensation to a Dutch investor, which, according to one 
report, meant a near doubling of the country’s public sector deficit (IISD 
2007). In 2014 the US$1.77 billion (AU$2.33 billion) award against 
Ecuador (brought by Occidental Petroleum)—previously the largest 
known ISDS award in history—was vastly outstripped by a mind-
boggling US$50  billion (AU$66 billion) award against Russia in its 
high-profile dispute with the oil company Yukos.
Even if a state wins a case it may be costly. International arbitration 
was originally seen as a cheaper and quicker alternative to domestic 
courts, but it is actually very expensive and cases can drag on for years. 
An OECD survey shows that legal and arbitration costs for the parties 
in ISDS cases have averaged over US$8 million (AU$10.5 million), 
with costs exceeding US$30 million (AU$39 million) in some cases 
(Gaukrodger and Gordon 2012). Australia is reported to have spent 
AU$50 million in its dispute with Philip Morris—a case that never even 
proceeded to the merits phase.
The considerable procedural costs associated with arbitration as well 
as the risk of having to pay large awards have led some scholars to 
suggest that the mere threat of an investor–state dispute could chill the 
development of regulation in the public interest. Peterson (2004: 139) 
notes that ‘practicing lawyers do admit that they hear rumours of 
investors applying informal pressure upon host states while brandishing 
an investment treaty as a potential legal stick’. In a globalised world, 
ISDS cases may also be initiated in one jurisdiction by investors hoping 
to deter the development of policies in other jurisdictions. This may, in 
part, explain Philip Morris’s disputes with Uruguay and Australia over 
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plain packaging of cigarettes—that is, the company may be hoping that 
the threat of arbitration will deter the development of similar labelling 
policies in other countries.
Occurrences of regulatory chill are incredibly difficult to prove 
(effectively, one has to find evidence of something that has not happened). 
Nevertheless, several scholars have put forward case studies that suggest 
that investor threats of arbitration had an impact on the development 
of specific policies (Schneiderman 2008; Tienhaara 2009, 2011).
5. Once BITten, twice shy
There is evidence that government officials in developing countries 
historically had a poor understanding of the risks posed by signing 
IIAs. For example, the Attorney-General of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali 
Khan, has claimed that BITs ‘are signed without any knowledge of their 
implications’ and it is not until ‘you are hit by the first investor–state 
arbitration [that] you realize what these words mean’ (quoted in Peterson 
2006). It is also made very clear in a government document from South 
Africa that BITs have had unanticipated policy consequences in that 
country: ‘Prior to 1994, the RSA [Republic of South Africa] had no 
history of negotiating BITs and the risks posed by such treaties were not 
fully appreciated at that time’ (DTI 2009: 5).
In fact, even the few developed countries that have faced investor–state 
disputes appear to have been taken aback by the scope of investment 
treaties, as interpreted by tribunals. For example, Stiglitz (2008: 460–1) 
suggests that US President Bill Clinton was unaware of the potential of 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 to be used to challenge government regulation, 
and goes on to point out that if:
the United States, a country with a great deal of experience adopting 
such agreements, was not fully aware of NAFTA’s import, developing 
countries are even less likely to understand the complexities of such 
agreements.
The absence of evidence of any clear benefits of IIAs in terms of 
increased FDI flows, coupled with increasing concerns about the costs 
of the system, has led many countries to reconsider BITs and the 
inclusion of ISDS clauses in trade agreements. Reactions have ranged 
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from the careful qualifying of certain treaty standards in new agreements 
to the more radical rejection of and withdrawal from BITs and arbitral 
institutions. 
Despite the fact that the United States has never lost a case, there is 
considerable opposition to ISDS from both left-wing and right-wing 
political parties and groups in America (even the Cato Institute has come 
out against ISDS; see Ikenson 2014). Nevertheless, the government has 
opted to continue to strongly support the system while introducing 
a number of reforms. The content of the US Model BIT (used as a 
template in all IIA negotiations) was revised in 2004 and 2012 to clarify 
the meaning of several provisions and also to increase the transparency 
of the ISDS process. 
Other countries, such as Canada and Colombia, have also revised 
their model BITs in ways that restrict the discretion of arbitrators. 
Interestingly, Norway—a country that ceased signing BITs in the mid-
1990s due, in part, to concerns about their policy implications—formed 
a working group to develop a new model in 2006. However, the public 
debate about the new model was so polarised—one side arguing that the 
model did not provide investors with enough protection and the other 
suggesting that it would restrict the government’s ability to regulate in 
the public interest—that, in the end, it was shelved (Vis-Dunbar 2009). 
Norway’s initiatives in this area, though ultimately unsuccessful, have 
been much more innovative than those taken in other Western European 
countries, where BITs have, by and large, remained short, simple and 
vague documents. However, as a result of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, 
the negotiation of IIAs now falls under the exclusive competence of the 
European Commission (EC). In April 2011, the European Parliament 
released a resolution on the future of European international investment 
policy, which expressed the parliament’s ‘deep concern regarding the level 
of discretion of international arbitrators to make a broad interpretation 
of investor protection clauses’ and called on the European Commission 
to ‘produce clear definitions of investor protection standards in order 
to avoid such problems in the new investment agreements’ (European 
Parliament 2011: para. 24). 
The debate about ISDS in Europe has since intensified. Negotiations 
for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with 
Canada concluded in October 2013, but, in January 2015, France and 
Germany requested that the European Commission review the treaty 
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and remove or modify the ISDS provisions. In part, this is an attempt 
to also steer the ongoing negotiations in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. The results of 
a public consultation on ISDS in the TTIP resulted in over 150,000 
submissions, the majority of which expressed opposition to its inclusion 
in the treaty. 
Australia has also had a complicated relationship with ISDS. The 
Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, signed by the 
conservative Howard Government in 2004, excluded ISDS. Australia 
subsequently negotiated several agreements containing ISDS, but, in 
April 2011, the Gillard Labor Government discontinued this practice. 
The Gillard Government’s policy was that it would not support: 
provisions that would confer greater legal rights on foreign businesses 
than those available to domestic businesses … [or] provisions that 
would constrain the ability of Australian governments to make laws 
on social, environmental and economic matters in circumstances 
where those laws do not discriminate between domestic and foreign 
businesses. (DFAT 2011) 
The Abbott Government then abandoned this policy, opting to approach 
ISDS on a case-by-case basis, accepting it in treaties with South Korea 
and China but excluding it in one with Japan (which is rendered 
irrelevant in the event that the TPP comes into force). The change in 
policy provoked a Greens senator to propose a piece of legislation that 
would prohibit the government from agreeing to ISDS in any treaty in 
the future (Whish-Wilson 2014).
Developing countries have, by and large, been most affected by ISDS 
and have also reacted the most strongly against it. BITs have been 
unilaterally terminated by Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and South Africa 
(UNCTAD 2013). It has also been reported that Indonesia is considering 
terminating all of its BITs. In 2015, India released a model BIT that is a 
radical departure from traditional agreements, and is particularly notable 
for its exclusion of any reference to ‘fair and equitable treatment’.
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have all denounced the ICSID 
Convention. In explaining the move, Bolivia’s Trade Ambassador 
Pablo Solon suggested that arbitration is expensive and biased against 
developing countries (Fairies 2007). The first seeds of Bolivian discontent 
with ICSID were likely sown during the controversial Aguas Del Tunari 
case (a dispute over a water privatisation contract, often referred to as 
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Bolivia’s ‘water war’). At the time Ecuador made its denunciation, the 
country was facing more than US$12 billion (AU$16 billion) worth 
of ICSID-based ISDS claims. The withdrawal of these countries from 
ICSID does not affect ongoing cases and future cases may still arise 
under other arbitration rules. Nevertheless, the move away from ICSID 
sends a strong message to the international community that these 
countries are dissatisfied with ISDS.
6. Conclusion
The future of ISDS is uncertain. Although some governments continue 
to sign IIAs, they are doing so at a much slower pace than in the 1990s. 
While this is in part a result of the inevitable exhaustion of potential 
treaty partners, it also reflects increasing doubts about the value of the 
system. As the number of new treaties declines, the content of those that 
do emerge is also evolving in a way that reduces arbitrator discretion and, 
thus, authority. 
At the same time, record numbers of investors are making use of 
ISDS  through existing IIAs. As cases pile up and more information 
about these cases becomes available (in part due to increases in the 
transparency of the ISDS process), opposition from civil society 
intensifies. Complaints about ISDS are not limited to one end of the 
political spectrum; farmers who want to be able to ‘lock the gate’ to coal-
seam gas exploration companies share the same concerns about ISDS as 
do environmental NGOs. 
Strong reactions against ISDS are also no longer confined to ‘radical 
left-leaning’ governments in Latin America; steps to withdraw from 
ISDS or limit its application have been taken by governments with 
very different perspectives on broader issues of globalisation and 
trade liberalisation. What appears to be the common thread linking 
governments that have taken action on this issue is a negative experience 
with arbitration. This would tend to suggest that, in the coming years, 
as more states are exposed to ISDS claims, discontent with the system 
will grow.
Alternatively, it is possible that arbitrators will recognise that the 
writing is on the wall (as they did when ISDS was identified as being 
overly ‘secretive’) and will begin to self-regulate to avoid further 
circumscription of their powers or the complete abandonment of the 
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system. However, such restraint may equally doom ISDS to obscurity 
because, if the main clients of the system (only investors can bring suits) 
do not view it as beneficial (for example, if they do not have a high 
likelihood of winning), they will look elsewhere for the means to achieve 
their objectives. 
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The regulation of competition, as a phrase, is, at first glance, contradictory. 
How can we write of regulating competition when regulation and 
competition are classically viewed as alternatives or opposites? 
Competition law is concerned with deterring restraints on competition 
in the market mainly by prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and 
abuse of market dominance and by requiring prior approval of mergers 
that are likely to restrict competition.1 Thus, the competitive market, 
seen as a public good, is facilitated as the best mechanism through 
which to empower the consumer (Drexl 2004). Regulation, on the other 
hand, is classically seen as the control, order and influence of conduct 
through standard-setting, monitoring, compliance and enforcement 
(Hood et al. 2001: 23). It is closely associated with state control of the 
market where there is market failure and is seen as addressing particular 
markets—notably, utilities. It is supervisory and instrumental in nature. 
Competition law is generally applicable across all markets, is associated 
with a more rule-based doctrinal approach and is prohibitory in nature. 
The two phenomena are thus portrayed as opposites. 
1  See, for example, the model competition law of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD 2010).
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However, this clearcut distinction obscures the extent to which 
regulation and competition overlap (Maher 2004). Thus, the traditional 
notion of regulation as command and control has dissipated in favour 
of more nuanced definitions where the emphasis is on ‘steering’ by 
the state rather than ‘rowing’; where private and meta-regulation have 
decentred the state as market regulator (Coglianese and Mendelson 
2010); and where competition has been introduced into classic 
regulatory domains—telecommunications being the best example 
(Baldwin et al. 1998: 24). Similarly, a shift can be seen in competition 
law, where a more instrumental quality has emerged, with instruments 
of market control appearing as part of the ‘toolkit’ of competition 
agencies. This hybridisation suggests the classic regulation/competition 
dichotomy needs to be more nuanced (Dunne 2014a). They can be 
viewed on a continuum, with command-and-control regulation at one 
end of the spectrum and the ordinary workings of a market based on 
contract law and property rights at the other end. Competition law lies 
somewhere in between because it constrains freedom of contract to the 
extent necessary to ensure competition (Maher 2004). 
2. Instruments and institutions
Competition regimes use organisational forms and instruments that 
are regulatory in nature to ensure markets remain competitive. As well 
as the classic deterrence approach to anticompetitive behaviour with 
fines, injunctions and even criminal sanctions, competition regimes 
have developed hybrid legal instruments that straddle competition and 
regulation (Dunne 2014a). For example, in the United Kingdom, market 
studies constituting a review of a particular market may lead to a wide 
range of competition or regulatory actions, while sectoral studies in the 
European Union (EU) may lead to further individual investigations and 
sanctions.2 Thus, a European Commission pharmaceutical sector inquiry 
in 2009 led to proceedings with a fine of €60 million (AU$89 million) 
imposed in one instance ( Jones and Sufrin 2014: 728).3 Competition 
litigation may also lead to a regulatory-type outcome, for example, in 
disputes involving intellectual property rights (IPR). If the IPR holder’s 
conduct is deemed anticompetitive, the outcome may be to require 
mandatory licensing with monitoring systems to ensure the licences 
2  Enterprise Act 2002, ss. 131–4 and Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L 1/1, Article 17.
3  AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v. Commission [2012] ECR I-770, Case C-457/10P.
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are offered on a ‘fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’ (FRAND) 
basis. Similarly, where access to an essential facility (the classic example 
of which is a port) is deemed necessary to prevent anticompetitive 
practices, the remedy may be mandatory and very different from the 
traditional cease and desist (and fines) approach found in competition 
law (Hellström et al. 2009). A legislative variation on this can be found 
in Australian competition law (Dunne 2014a: 253).4 
In terms of organisational form, competition regimes, like regulatory 
regimes, are characterised by agencies that operate at arm’s length 
from the executive. Agency networks are an increasingly common 
feature of both regimes. Networks have emerged as a result of the 
shift from government to governance (Rhodes 1997); from ‘rowing’ to 
‘steering’; from greater delegation of executive functions to agencies; 
the  liberalisation of markets; the exponential growth in markets 
as a  result of globalisation; and recognition of the importance of 
information in securing particular policy and enforcement outcomes. 
Competition networks can be seen as part of this trend, especially in 
the transnational context where jurisdictional overlap creates incentives 
for communication and coordination. This overlap arises in three main 
contexts: between the competition agency and sectoral agencies; where 
there are multiple competition agencies enforcing the same rules; and 
internationally, given so many competition disputes are not limited to 
single jurisdictions but there is no international competition regime. 
The  exponential growth in national competition regimes in the past 
25 years, from 23 in 1990 to 127 in 2013, has also vastly increased the risk 
of jurisdictional overlap and the need for coordination of enforcement 
and information-sharing across borders (Capobianco et al. 2014: 21). 
3. Networks
Börzel (1998: 260) defines networks as:
a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and 
interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common 
interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue 
these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way 
to achieve common goals. 
4  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Part IIIA. 
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Networks as a form of governance can be contrasted with hierarchy and 
markets. They may be heterogeneous or homogeneous, sites of interest 
mediation with a strong interdependence between the state and private 
actors that are largely informal and a response to the wide dispersal 
of resources in the modern state (Börzel 1998). 
Transgovernmental networks based on discussions among government 
subunits, including non-executive agencies, have been a feature of 
supranational and international governance for over 100 years. There are 
three broad categories: information exchange, enforcement coordination 
and harmonisation (Slaughter 2004: 44, 52). Competition networks are 
concerned with information exchange and enforcement coordination. 
Harmonisation—the mandatory adoption of common international 
standards—is not a feature even in the EU, which is a highly integrated 
supranational regime. Voluntary convergence of procedural or substantive 
rules, which encourages commonality while allowing for national 
variation, is found in many competition networks (Gerber 2010: Chapter 
8). For example, in the EU, the European Competition Network (ECN) 
developed a nonbinding model leniency program (immunity from fines 
for those who bring cartels that operate secretly to the attention of the 
competition agency) (EC 2012a). Member states committed to use 
their best efforts within the limits of their competence to align their 
programs, culminating in the adoption of 26 leniency programs out of 
28 states in six years (EC 2012b). Nonetheless, competition networks 
are primarily information and enforcement networks, with the majority 
information networks where the information being exchanged is ‘soft’ or 
‘grey’ information about the internal operations and the challenges faced 
by agencies. The most valuable information—confidential information 
garnered following investigation—can be exchanged only where there is 
a statutory base. A rare example is the ECN.5 
Sokol (2011) sees all transgovernmental and transnational networks 
operating within a soft law paradigm—that is, measures are capable 
of practical effects and possibly even legal effects (Snyder 1995: 64; 
Ştefan 2008: 753). Consensus, peer pressure and policy learning are the 
preferred methods of securing change. Soft law has been preferred even 
where binding legal norms are available—for example, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) may enact 
5  Article 12, Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L 1/1.
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binding legal norms,6 but it has not done so in the competition sphere, 
instead  relying on soft law measures, primarily recommendations.7 
The  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations (UN), enjoys 
the status of an intergovernmental body and has enacted conventions in 
other fields, but relies on soft law measures to advance competition law 
in developing countries (Sokol 2011: 198). The exception is the ECN, 
which was set up (albeit minimally) by formal binding norms.8 
Because networks operate mainly on the basis of soft law, their impact 
depends on political support, especially from the United States and 
the European Union. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) show how the 
American model of competitive mega-corporate capitalism globalised 
and, alongside it, its commitment to competition rules. The EU 
emerged as a global competition law player when it rejected the Boeing/
McDonnell Douglas and General Electric/Honeywell mergers that the 
United States had approved and when it spearheaded (unsuccessfully) a 
World Trade Organization (WTO) competition regime9 (Maher 2012b). 
US rules are often seen as a surrogate for an international standard 
(Gerber 2010: 106), which may explain effective US resistance to a 
WTO competition regime (Freyer 2006: 154). Sokol (2011: 199) notes 
the powerful snowballing effect when the United States and European 
Union support an initiative such as the International Competition 
Network (ICN) and how the lack of such support is damaging, for 
example, for the UNCTAD model competition law (Gerber 2010: 144). 
China enacted a competition law in 2008 and in the future it, as well 
as the other ‘BRICS’ countries (Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa) 
may be regarded as equally influential in the competition sphere (Maher 
2012a). For now, however, while it is a member of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, China is not a member of the 
ICN or the OECD.
6  Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 14 December 
1960, Art. 5.
7  The OECD published is first recommendation on competition policy in 1967. See: 
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, 5 October 1967, C(567) 53/final (since revised).
8  Reg. 1/2003 OJ 2003 L 1/1, Art. 11–12.
9  See Communication from the EC and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/152, 25 September 
2000.
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The significance of political influence is most apparent in the failure 
of the EU initiative to include competition within the WTO and the 
US-supported compromise resulting in the ICN ( Janow and Rill 2010). 
A WTO working group was set up to discuss competition law following 
the Uruguay Round in 1996.10 The proposal was that members would 
have competition laws incorporating some core principles including 
nondiscrimination and a ban on cartels, a voluntary code on cooperation 
and provision of technical assistance. The initiative failed because of the 
unwillingness of the United States to see a binding international regime 
and the concerns of developing countries that competition laws would 
be imposed on them, the omission of antidumping and export cartels, 
that technical assistance would not be forthcoming and that the main 
beneficiaries would be Western multinational corporations securing 
access to their markets (Bhattacharjea 2006). The ICN is a very loose 
form of enforcement cooperation, seen as necessary by the United States 
given the European Union’s rejection of the General Electric/Honeywell 
merger and one that went some way to meet EU preferences for an 
international framework (Maher 2012a). Thus, efforts to create binding 
norms were jettisoned to be replaced with softer governance through 
networks where the emphasis is on information sharing and consensus 
building and where competition law is taken as a given with the 
emphasis on how it is enforced rather than its relationship with the state, 
trade or whether it is appropriate (Sum 2013). Competition networks 
now include those found in international bodies (OECD, UNCTAD), 
regional groups (APEC, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
Nordic Cooperation, the ECN, the European Free Trade Association 
Network, the European Competition Association) and networks set up 
just for competition matters—for example, the Lusaphone Network, the 
Ibero-American Forum and the African Competition Network (Maher 
and Papadopoulos 2012). At the same time, there is exponential growth 
in competition regimes, which is partly voluntary, partly a response to 
the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) initiatives, 
partly arising out of regional and bilateral trade or competition 
agreements and partly as a result of technical assistance programs 
(Maher 2012b). The  proliferation of networks points to coordination 
problems, duplication of effort, a risk of systemic incoherence and 
overload and a narrow managerial approach to competition enforcement 
that eschews wider and more controversial concerns. At the same time, 
10  WTO, Ministerial Declaration, 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC/20, 36 ILM 218. 
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the bottom-up and consensual approach allows for necessary variation in 
regimes and differences in approach, which may, in the long term, ensure 
a more responsive regulation of competition, although the extent of 
influence from actors such as international bodies, the European Union 
and the United States (and other actors depending on the network) is 
nonetheless an important caveat on what is understood within these 
networks as consensus. 
Finally, these networks can be distinguished from epistemic 
communities,  which are not defined by any particular membership, 
have no executive functions and are relatively amorphous but share 
expertise and a common discourse (Haas 1992). There is an important 
epistemic community of academics, bar associations and competition 
law practitioners in the international competition sphere (van Waarden 
and Drahos 2002). Such a knowledge community seeks to influence 
policy indirectly through its knowledge and expertise, which are 
acknowledged and drawn on by agencies. Given the extent to which 
the episteme and networks in the competition sphere overlap and are 
self-referential, competition law and policy may not adequately reflect 
wider trends in society. The episteme is also dominated by those with 
the greatest expertise and knowledge—that is, those from the European 
Union, United States and other Western states. It is not clear to what 
extent this expertise can be garnered to create dynamic and experimental 
spaces where agencies and other actors can engage to address common 
concerns and share best practice with a view to developing competition 
law in a manner widely perceived as a public good. 
Competition agencies and sectoral regulators
As a significant feature of competition law practice, networks operate 
at different levels of enforcement and with different levels of intensity 
(Maher, forthcoming). Below, we explore those arising out of the 
interface of regulation and competition, those within states and polities 
where there are multiple enforcement bodies and, finally, regard is had 
to the largest international network, the ICN. 
As a consequence of the liberalisation of sectors that historically 
had state  monopolies or special or exclusive rights (for example, 
communications, energy), competition was introduced alongside 
regulatory mechanisms necessary to prevent market failure. The potential 
overlap of jurisdiction in Australia was addressed by conferring 
regulatory, as well as competition, powers on the competition agency in 
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relation to telecommunications and energy.11 In the United Kingdom, 
there is concurrent jurisdiction in competition law for the competition 
agency, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), and all sectoral 
regulators in their respective fields (communications, gas and electricity, 
health services and, to a limited degree, water, rail and civil aviation) 
(Dunne 2014b; UK Government 2014). Only one body will apply the 
competition rules in any instance but a mechanism is required to decide 
which one.12 This is the UK Competition Network (UKCN), set up via 
a CMA guidance note (CMA 2014: 54). The network decides on case 
allocation through close cooperation. It is a forum for strategic dialogue 
and actively engages in peer review. It facilitates information sharing, 
staff training and secondment, the sharing of best practice and improved 
advocacy and the timely provision of information for the Annual Report 
on Concurrency. Hence, the ‘flavour’ of the network is nonhierarchical, 
with the guidance at pains to point out that its parameters and 
operations were agreed to by all its members. The CMA can remove a 
case from a regulator but this is seen as a remote possibility given the 
emphasis on close cooperation (CMA 2014: 60). The network—central 
to enforcement—is not mentioned in statute. Instead, its operation is set 
out in soft law—in an annex to the guidance note with a commitment to 
flexibility (CMA 2014: 1.13). Despite the shortcomings of the previous 
regime (only two competition cases were brought by regulators over 
13 years; Whish and Bailey 2015: 465), the relatively informal and flat 
network model was retained under the 2013 Act but bolstered by giving 
substantive priority to competition law, while the minister ultimately has 
the power to remove competition jurisdiction entirely from a regulator, 
albeit following consultation. Cooperation is still seen as the best way to 
secure effective and appropriate enforcement of competition.
Plurality of competition agencies 
Competition networks are also found in federal structures. In the 
United States, the two federal enforcement agencies, the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice, have a clearance mechanism 
to decide which of them will deal with a case (US Department of Justice 
2014: Chapter VII). However, jurisdiction also is partially shared with 
state attorneys-general, who, in addition to enforcing state antitrust 
11  Australian Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Act 1997 and Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010, Part IIIAA.
12  The Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014, SI 2014 No. 536.
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(competition) laws, can bring actions for damages on behalf of citizens13 
and seek injunctive relief for any violation of federal antitrust law. 
A  state-to-state network of antitrust enforcement agencies emerged 
from the longstanding National Association of Attorneys-General in the 
1980s, partly in response to a reduction in federal antitrust enforcement 
under the Reagan administration (Cengiz 2012: 126–40). The network 
facilitates multistate actions, creates opportunities for cost-sharing and 
cooperation in settlements and engages in policy initiatives introducing 
guidelines, filing amicus briefs and proposing federal bills. This informal, 
nonhierarchical network is a loose form of cooperation as there are 
constraints on information sharing and members are free to pursue their 
own actions. The original confrontation between the federal and state 
agencies that led to the creation of the network dissipated in the 1990s 
allowing for greater cooperation between federal and state enforcement 
agencies. Thus, an informal nonstatutory network was the response to a 
perceived crisis in enforcement and the informal cooperative structure 
also facilitated rehabilitation between federal and state agencies.
In China, there are three bodies responsible for the enforcement of 
competition law: the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for mergers, 
the National Development and Reform Commission has primary 
responsibility for pricing and the State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce is responsible for antimonopoly actions and other non–
price-related antitrust enforcement (Huyue Zhang 2011). An umbrella 
body, the Anti-Monopoly Commission, appointed by the State Council, 
is responsible for supervision, coordination and guidance of work under 
the law.14 Despite the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between 
the three bodies, at the moment there is no mechanism for them to 
coordinate their activities. However, flexibility is retained as they are not 
specifically mentioned in the legislation, allowing scope for jurisdictional 
remits to change or be amalgamated; a less drastic initiative proposed 
is a ‘cooperation mechanism’ to avoid overlap (Emch 2014), although it 
is not clear if such a network will emerge.
The European Union, as a supranational entity, operates in a regulatory 
space between a federation and a purely international body and hence 
the ECN is at the interface of a common single legal order and multiple 
regimes. Within the EU, competition law is enforced by the European 
Commission, an executive body responsible for application of EU law. 
13  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 1976.
14  Antimonopoly Law 2008, Art. 9.
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Following a radical overhaul of the system at the turn of the century, 
competition law enforcement was (re)delegated to national competition 
agencies, which enforce EU as well as national competition laws (Maher 
2010: 717). With a minimum of 29 competition agencies, there was a 
real concern about coordination. The response was to establish a network 
under legislation with the details in a nonbinding notice15 and where the 
rule of thumb is that if more than three jurisdictions are involved, the 
commission assumes jurisdiction. The European Commission remains 
first among equals with the ultimate power to remove a case from a 
national agency—thus, the shadow of hierarchy underpins the system.16 
The inherent flexibility in the network has worked well (Wilks 2007). 
This can be explained in part by the strong commitment to confidentiality 
among the agencies, the fact they enforce common rules and that they can 
share confidential information, limited only by the extent to which it can 
be used for criminal actions, all within the context of a highly integrated 
economic union. This enforcement network, allowing for exchange of 
confidential information, is the most formalised competition network 
and yet operates mainly through informal legal structures, where, once 
again, the emphasis is on peer review and learning with an exceptionally 
high level of trust.
International Competition Network
Finally, the ICN operates in an entirely different context from the 
ECN.  Straddling the divide between the OECD and UNCTAD, 
with 126 members, it is by far the largest competition network. It is the 
key forum for the discussion of competition issues following the collapse 
of the WTO initiative. With no offices, it operates virtually but for an 
annual meeting of members and non-governmental advisers (from 
academia,17 business and mainly law firms). Working groups devoted 
to consideration of particular topics (for example, mergers, advocacy, 
cartels) engage between meetings and the website is a major resource 
for information on best practices in enforcement, all overseen by a 
15-member steering group (Maher and Papadopoulos 2012).18 Its aim is 
to advocate for best practices, to develop proposals for convergence and to 
facilitate cooperation between agencies through policy learning. It does 
15  European Commission, Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities 
[2004] OJ C101/43, Art. 11, Reg. 1/2003.
16  ibid., Art. 11(6), Reg. 1.
17  The author has been a non-governmental adviser.
18  See: internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
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this by creating templates, toolkits and manuals and running workshops. 
Although it is seen as influential (Gerber 2010: 116), questions have been 
raised as to how it will develop following initial activity addressing ‘low-
hanging fruit’—notably, merger notifications—while more challenging 
issues such as the intersection of international trade and competition and 
the relationship between competition law and state enterprises are largely 
absent (Sokol 2011: 201). It is also questionable how much convergence is 
either possible or desirable given the varieties of competition regimes and 
the contexts within which they operate ( Jessop 2013). 
As a transgovernmental network that is horizontal and decentred 
facilitating informal contact and exchange of nonconfidential information 
between government officials who share a common functional interest 
(enforcement of competition law), the ICN is currently the only 
acceptable forum through which the challenge of enforcement of 
competition laws across and within national boundaries is addressed, 
mainly because it operates entirely on the basis of consensus.
4. Conclusion
While competition law and regulation are seen as different, in recent 
years, the instruments and organisational nature of competition law 
have overlapped. The regulatory tool of the network has become a 
defining feature of competition law at the national and transnational 
levels—a  trend also seen in other areas of regulation (see Holley and 
Shearing, Chapter 10; Drahos, Chapter 15; Tusikov, Chapter 20; and 
Brewer, Chapter 26, this volume). Braithwaite (2008) notes the extent to 
which corporations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
been transformed into networks, with those states which fail to adapt to 
this private networked governance failing to adapt to global governance. 
The rejection of a top-down WTO regime and the emergence of 
competition networks can be seen in this context as nimble responses 
to market dynamics. With the emphasis on information sharing, 
consensus and policy learning, the networks do not interrogate the 
values underpinning competition law but only its enforcement. This 
narrow functional concern, with the emphasis on expertise, knowledge 
and resources, allows for influence to be exerted by the best-resourced 
and most influential competition regimes—that is, the United States and 
European Union as well as other OECD states. Wider interrogation of 
contentious issues such as the state, the market, trade and competition 
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
704
remain sidelined for now. There is currently no prospect of more formal 
international competition rules, leaving networks as the main forum for 
engagement on competition matters. The challenge is to ensure consensus 
does not preclude taking full account of ‘varieties of competition’ 
where different successful narratives, cultures and experiences support 
competitive markets (Dowdle 2013). 
Further reading
Ezrachi, A (ed.) 2012. Research Handbook on International Competition 
Law. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Lugard, P (ed.) 2011. The International Competition Network at Ten. 
Antwerp: Intersentia. 
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Trust, culture and the limits of 
management-based regulation: 
Lessons from the mining industry
Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair
1. Introduction 
For over a decade, private enterprise and governments in North 
America, Western Europe and Australasia have been experimenting 
with an innovative approach to standard-setting variously termed 
‘process-based’, ‘systems-based’ or ‘management-based’ regulation 
(Coglianese and Lazar 2003). In contrast with traditional prescriptive 
standards (which tell duty holders precisely what measures to take) or 
performance standards (which specify outcomes or the desired level of 
performance), this approach involves firms developing their own process 
and management system standards and developing internal planning 
and management practices designed to achieve regulatory or corporate 
goals. Such standards—whether they are imposed by the firm on its 
various operations (internal regulation), by governments on firms or by 
industry associations on their members (external regulation)—have the 
considerable attractions of providing flexibility to enterprises to devise 
their own least-cost solutions to social challenges, of facilitating their 
going beyond compliance with minimum legal standards and of being 
applicable to a broad range of circumstances and to heterogeneous 
enterprises. 
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For present purposes, such initiatives will be termed ‘management-based 
regulation’. This form of regulation is now to be found in a diversity 
of policy domains including environmental protection, food safety, 
occupational health and safety (OHS), rail regulation, sustainable 
forestry, toxic chemical reduction and trades practices (Coglianese and 
Lazar 2003; Coglianese and Nash 2006). 
Taken one step further, management-based regulation can become 
a form  of meta-regulation or ‘meta risk management’. In this form, 
government (or a corporation seeking to regulate its multiple facilities), 
rather than regulating directly, risk manages the OHS management of 
individual enterprises or facilities. Under such an approach, the role of 
regulation ceases to be primarily about inspectors or auditors checking 
compliance with rules, and becomes more about encouraging the industry 
or facility to put in place processes and management systems that are 
then scrutinised by regulators or corporate auditors to ensure their 
appropriateness and effectiveness. Rather than regulating prescriptively, 
meta-regulation seeks to stimulate modes of self-organisation within 
the firm in such a way as to encourage proactive internal self-critical 
reflection about its performance (Parker 2002; Grabosky, Chapter 9, 
this volume).
So how effective are management-based and meta-regulation? Are 
government regulators or corporate decision-makers wise to put so many 
of their eggs into this basket? To the extent that this form of regulation 
falls short of expectations, is this inevitable or can its shortcomings 
be overcome? And what is the relationship between management-
based regulation and organisational trust? Is it the case, as some have 
claimed (Gunningham and Sinclair 2009), that ‘culture eats systems for 
breakfast’? These and related questions will be addressed below. 
2. Management-based regulation: What the 
literature tells us
At their best, management-based initiatives have the capacity to 
influence the internal self-regulation and norms of organisations and 
make them more proactive and responsive (rather than merely reactive) 
to social concerns. In theory, they will encourage enterprises to ‘build 
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in’ regulatory considerations at every stage of the production process, 
to improve their social performance and to achieve behavioural change 
(Coglianese and Nash 2006: 250). 
However, to what extent these theoretical benefits will be realised in 
practice is a matter for empirical inquiry. Such inquires have to date 
produced rather mixed results (Bluff 2003; Coglianese and Lazar 
2003: 724). Some studies have found a positive relationship between 
the introduction of management systems and environmental outcomes 
(Thomas 2011); others have not (Tyteca et al. 2002; Hertin et al. 2008)—
leading an edited collection concerned to understand how management-
based initiatives have worked to date to conclude that ‘we know little 
about the conditions in which’ management-based initiatives work 
(Coglianese and Nash 2006: 20).
There could be a variety of reasons for these mixed results. Some 
companies may have adopted such systems (which in environmental 
protection are usually voluntary) for cosmetic reasons—such as to 
maintain public legitimacy—rather than to substantively improve 
performance. If that is the case, the principal problem may be not with 
the system itself, but with the motivations of those who adopt it. Indeed, 
it  may be that management systems, like other process-based tools, 
are just that—tools—and they can only be effective when implemented 
with genuine commitment on the part of management and ownership 
on the part of the workforce. In short, it may be that management matters 
far more than management systems or management-based strategies 
more broadly. 
This, however, should not lead to a focus simply on individual members 
of management because much organisational behaviour is group 
behaviour, and, in the context of the corporation, it is more fruitful to 
explore compliance with rules (whether corporate or state based) at the 
collective rather than the individual level. 
In this context, one factor that can have a particularly powerful impact 
on group behaviour in general and on rule compliance in particular is 
organisational culture—defined as ‘the way we do things around here’ 
or, in more formal terms, as involving ‘shared values (what is important) 
and beliefs (how things work) that interact with a company’s people, 
organizational structures and control systems to produce behavioural 
norms’ (Uttal 1983, in Reason 1997: 192). However, not infrequently, 
the  beliefs and values of those who are expected to implement 
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a management system are not congruent with its aspirations, in which 
case edicts from regulators or (in the case of internal regulation) from 
senior management may be met with creative compliance (McBarnet 
and Whelan 1999), resistance, ‘ritualism’ (Merton 1968; Braithwaite 
2008: 140–56) or various other forms of tokenism. 
Trust is one aspect of culture that is often of great significance, 
particularly in areas of social regulation such as the environment or OHS. 
According to the literature, for example, effective worker participation is 
crucial to improved OHS. However, such participation is unlikely to 
be effective in the absence of constructive dialogue between employers 
and employees (Gallagher 1997: 6.2). Constructive dialogue, in turn, is 
unlikely to take place in the absence of trust. Trust is often referred to 
as the lubricant for open and frequent safety communication (Reason 
1997), as enhancing cooperation (Morgan and Hunt 1994), promoting 
the acceptance of decisions (Tyler 2003), improving knowledge sharing 
(Dirks and Ferrin 2002), supporting all aspects of organisational 
functioning (Bijlsma and Koopman 2003) and resulting in enhanced 
safety performance (Barling and Hutchinson 2000: 77). Trust can 
therefore become a central issue for social regulation in areas such 
as OHS. 
The above literatures raise issues that go to the heart of the question: 
to what extent can management-based regulation achieve business or 
regulatory goals? This, in turn, raises the questions: Are policymakers, 
trade associations and corporations mistaken in their belief that 
those required to develop and implement plans, systems and other 
management-based strategies will improve their performance as a 
result? Is reliance on monitoring, measuring, accountability and extrinsic 
motivation misplaced? Might it be that management commitment or 
culture (or specific cultural issues such as trust) is far more important to 
achieving desired outcomes than management-based initiatives alone? 
In the following section, we explore the above issues through the lens of 
OHS management and regulation in the Australian coalmining industry, 
summarising the implications of empirical research we undertook within 
two large coalmining corporations. Limitations of space, however, 
preclude a fuller description of the research itself or of our methodology. 
These can be found elsewhere (Gunningham and Sinclair 2012).
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3. Mine safety in Australia: Management-
based regulation and its consequences
Although the mining industry confronts a number of serious OHS 
challenges, since the 1990s, statistics (which it is unlikely can be 
manipulated, including fatality statistics) suggest it has achieved 
substantial improvements in safety (Galvin 2005). This has coincided 
with an increased corporate focus on management-based initiatives 
as the central means of improving OHS, with a heavy emphasis on 
sophisticated systems, auditing and other process-based mechanisms. 
Indeed, such systems are now a regulatory requirement in the two 
principal coalmining jurisdictions of Australia: New South Wales and 
Queensland. 
Below, we describe the findings of two case studies, designed to examine 
the experiences of two mining companies that, for various reasons, have 
relied substantially on management-based regulation to attempt to 
achieve improvements in their OHS performance or to meet regulatory 
requirements. While the two companies have different histories and 
management philosophies, there are similarities in how they sought to 
address OHS and in the outcomes they achieved. Either because they 
were  driven by corporate concerns to improve OHS (Minerals Inc.) 
or by  a combination of growing pains, peer pressure and government 
regulation (Coal Company), they relied heavily on a range of management 
tools to achieve their objectives. 
In the language of this chapter, they relied substantially on either 
internally or externally driven management-based regulation with 
a particular emphasis on OHS management systems, standards and 
audits. Yet, notwithstanding the virtues of this approach, in practice, they 
both struggled, often unsuccessfully, to implement management-based 
regulation and, through it, to improve OHS outcomes. Why was this so? 
A lack of organisational trust was certainly one of the most important 
problems, for our evidence shows that, without trust, the effectiveness 
of management-based regulation may be severely and sometimes fatally 
compromised. The most striking lack of trust at Minerals Inc. was 
between workers and management. At their worst-performing mines, 
such mistrust was deep-seated and longstanding. The reasons for this 
often related indirectly to the adversarial and bitter history of the mining 
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industry, and directly to past site-specific incidents in which workers felt 
betrayed by management. Geographic isolation, parochialism and high 
management turnover sometimes exacerbated these problems. 
But, as the Coal Company study reveals, a lack of trust between other 
groups was sometimes equally, if not more, important. We found 
corrosive mistrust between a variety of parties: corporate and mine site 
management; workers and middle management on one hand and senior 
mine management on the other; one group of workers and another; 
and middle management and the mine manager. We also found that 
corporate management can have its own distinctive culture, being locked 
into past practices and beliefs, and seemingly incapable of adjusting to 
the needs of managing an increasingly complex organisation. Within 
this mindset, corporate management at Coal Company were the ones 
who lost the trust of mine management. 
All this suggests that trust—one important manifestation of workplace 
culture—needs to be understood not at the company level, and often not 
even at the mine-site level (although, in some respects, different mines 
do have distinctive cultures), but rather at the level of subcultures (and 
sometimes countercultures) that manifest themselves within different 
groupings within individual mines. These are what are likely to contain 
the most deep-seated values and norms, which are most likely to shape 
behaviour in general and the effectiveness of management-based 
regulation in particular.
At both companies, organisational mistrust was generated not just by 
local factors (such as how workers were treated by mine management), 
but also by broader factors (such as the adversarial history of mining). 
These factors commonly interacted, generating perceptions that 
often amplified mistrust and shaped behaviour. For example, where 
there was a history of mistrust then all management action on OHS 
(however genuine) was likely to be dismissed by the workforce as 
insincere. This resulted in a lack of commitment to management’s OHS 
initiatives—a classic illustration of Thomas and Thomas’s (1928) dictum 
that what is perceived to be real is real in its consequences. 
An overlapping but distinctive theme was the conflict of loyalties 
experienced by different levels of management within the mine site 
hierarchy. This was most graphically illustrated by the experience 
of deputy under-managers (the lowest level of management), who, 
in both companies, felt torn between their obligations as members 
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of management and their loyalties to their crew ‘mates’ as colleagues. 
To a lesser extent, other levels of management experienced the same 
tension—as, for example, where middle management sided with the 
workforce against the mine manager or where mine managers, while 
conscious of their obligations to corporate management, nevertheless felt 
acutely the needs of their own mine and of their own management team 
and workforce. This, too, had a negative influence on the effectiveness 
of management-based regulation.
A further theme was that a failure to obtain commitment from and 
engagement of middle management and the workforce was detrimental 
to implementation of management-based initiatives. This, too, was 
related to trust, though more so with workers than middle management. 
Our interviews suggested that lack of engagement was a particular 
problem with regard to the latter. Workers, already burdened with a range 
of duties and demands on their time, commonly viewed the additional 
requirements of applying management-based regulation as yet one more 
imposition. Importantly, they could not see the need for the imposition. 
They perceived that there were ulterior motives (‘they want to cover their 
arse’) and, as a result, they resented complying with the directions. 
Finally, and closely related to the previous themes, there was the issue 
of unequal power. Workers often felt vulnerable and threatened by 
management initiatives. Increasingly pressured into individual contracts 
of employment, they are often unable to advocate collectively through 
trade unions capable of acting as a countervailing force. Middle 
management, too, feared that management-based regulation might be 
a means of placing them under greater senior management scrutiny and 
control. Deputy under-managers’ allegiance often remained with the 
crew from which they had come. They felt uncertain whether higher 
management would support any safety initiatives they undertook or 
whether they would be ‘hung out to dry’. In an industry with such an 
acrimonious history, such issues were never far from the surface. As we 
will see, they were particularly prone to arise in the situation where the 
tension between ‘safety and profit’ was most stark: deciding whether to 
halt production on safety grounds. 
The most common response by both workers and middle management to 
mistrust, divided loyalties, lack of commitment (the three characteristics 
often being related) and/or a perception of powerlessness was ritualism. 
They would go through the motions without any conviction that this 
would achieve anything of substance. For example, participation in 
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behavioural-based safety programs was perfunctory (particularly for 
those based on supervisor/subordinate observations), incident reporting 
was trivialised or ignored, systems were honoured more in the breach 
and sophisticated electronic monitoring systems were sidetracked.
It will be apparent that ritualism and resistance are unlikely to be 
overcome—or management-based regulation to succeed—in the 
absence of engagement with the culture or, more accurately, the various 
subcultures identified above. Cultural change is never easy to achieve. 
Indeed, some organisational theorists have argued that an organisation 
may be incapable of shaping its own culture (Schein 1983), while others 
argue that ‘you only meddle with organisational culture if you’ve got little 
choice, lots of resources and lots of time’ (Sinclair 1993: 68). However, 
we disagree with these pessimistic conclusions. In our case studies, 
the top OHS ranked mine sites of both enterprises shared a cluster of 
characteristics—largely as a result of strategic management intervention. 
While not all these characteristics were present at all these mines, the 
more of these characteristics that were present, the more likely a mine 
was to have minimised mistrust, to have overcome divided loyalties 
and a lack of buy-in and to have achieved a high OHS performance. 
Accordingly, our findings are consistent with the general approach of 
Reason (1997), who suggests that safety culture is actually a product 
of various interdependent subcultures, and that these can be socially 
engineered to a significant extent. 
Among the cluster of characteristics we identified as important in 
overcoming mistrust, four, in particular, must be emphasised. First, there 
was strong evidence that organisational trust was strongly influenced 
by the extent to which the mine manager (the visible manifestation 
of ‘the corporation’ at site level) was genuinely committed to OHS 
improvement. This seemed to be a particularly important indicator of 
managerial leadership. At one high-ranking mine, for example, workers 
and middle managers spoke highly of the mine manager’s leadership 
role. They said he engaged with the workforce, he did ‘lots of things 
to be seen around the workforce—and chase[d] up all the complaints’ 
(crew  member). Crucially, he was willing to place OHS ahead of 
production, to the extent of shutting down the mine (at great expense) to 
address a safety issue. In contrast, at low-performance, low-trust mines, 
there were widespread complaints concerning management’s willingness 
to cut corners and sacrifice safety to maximise production. 
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Second, a common refrain—which resonates with Tyler’s work (2003; 
see also Murphy, Chapter 3, this volume) concerning the importance 
of procedural fairness—was the preference that workers had for a 
mine manager who ‘gives it to us straight’ (as one crew member put it). 
As  long as workers’ complaints had been heard and investigated, and 
they had received feedback (even when being told that no further action 
would be taken), their levels of acceptance and trust were high. Workers 
(and  deputies) at many lower-performing mines, however, expressed 
their frustration with what they perceived as conflicting messages and 
the inconsistent responses and attitudes of different managers.
Third, workers seemed far more likely to ‘take on board’ and implement 
OHS initiatives if they had a high degree of ownership of them. 
This was achieved by engaging them in the creation of these initiatives, 
or, in the case of corporate initiatives, by involving them in how these 
policies were interpreted and adopted at individual mine sites. Perhaps 
the best illustration concerns an attempt by management to introduce 
behavioural-based safety observations—usually resisted by the workforce 
because it is seen as a ‘blame the worker’ approach. Yet such an initiative 
was enthusiastically adopted at one mine. This was primarily because a 
high-status and influential group of miners was engaged at an early stage 
and came to feel that it was ‘their’ initiative. 
Finally, it is striking that the strategies that corporate management 
relied on under management-based regulation—namely, an emphasis 
on accountability mechanisms that make it difficult for managers to 
avoid their OHS responsibility, coupled with surveillance, various 
performance tracking devices and auditing aimed at transparency—
were antithetical to measures that our findings suggested had a positive 
impact on OHS. We found that in imposing stringent oversight and 
control, accountability and discipline, corporate management risks 
a number of counterproductive consequences. For example, the use 
of surveillance systems: 
has deleterious effects on the social climate of groups. The use of 
surveillance implies distrust which decreases people’s ability to 
feel positive about themselves, their groups and the system itself. 
(Tyler 2008: 810) 
This, in turn, lowers motivation, creates an adversarial relationship and 
encourages the sort of resistance and ritualism described earlier. 
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What made a difference, in the best OHS performing mines in our 
sample, were various mechanisms that provided workers and site 
management with more, rather than less, autonomy and discretion. 
These were the various approaches that served to gain worker or middle 
management commitment. They provided greater ownership of and 
participation in OHS initiatives, which involved greater communication 
and feedback. This involved providing deputies and middle management 
with greater training, mentoring and managerial support (albeit not 
control). Collectively, these actions served to gain or regain trust. 
The key is to ensure that informal systems ‘support the formal system by 
enhancing cohesion, initiative and morale’ (Selznick 1992: 235). Only in 
this manner may the gap between formal regulation and informal local 
norms be successfully bridged. 
In short, trust and a number of related factors are vital in obtaining the 
consent and support of managers and workers to win their ‘intrinsic 
motivation’. Once these groups accept and take ownership of the rules 
and regard them as reasonable and their purpose laudable, compliance 
becomes a matter of voluntary cooperation. People follow not just the 
letter, but also the spirit of management-based regulation and external 
monitoring costs become low. Workers and managers become ‘active 
participants in creating and maintaining conditions of social order’ 
(Tyler 2008: 873). This is largely irrespective of surveillance and other 
external controls. In Reason’s (1997) terminology, it becomes possible to 
build in a culture of ‘mindfulness’. This is not to imply that management-
based regulation has no value. It remains an important technology of 
governance, but one that can only work effectively in tandem with a 
supportive workplace culture built on trust, engagement and commitment. 
4. Conclusion
Many regulators and corporations have concluded that management-
based regulation has considerable promise, particularly in encouraging 
enterprises to take greater responsibility for developing their own 
systemic approaches to regulatory or business challenges, and to create 
their own best means of identifying and managing risks. Nevertheless, 
to what extent or in what circumstances this promise will be realised in 
practice remains largely an open question. This is particularly so when 
it comes to applying management-based regulation to the multiple 
facilities of large corporations.
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Our case studies suggest that, in the mining industry at least, 
management-based regulation was vulnerable to failure for a variety 
of often interrelated reasons. At Minerals Inc., this approach was 
applied across the corporate portfolio, but it proved far more effective 
at mines where levels of trust between workers and management 
were higher. Moreover, management-based regulation was sometimes 
unable to overcome a combination of mine management resistance, 
middle management inertia and the unwillingness of deputies to take 
managerial responsibility and implement management systems at 
the mine site. At Coal Company, the attempt to shift from a flexible 
discretionary approach to uniform mandatory management standards 
applying across the board failed not only because some mine managers 
remained unconvinced of corporate management’s commitment or 
capability and an absence of mine site ownership, but also because of a 
lack of understanding of what was required to make management-based 
regulation work at a corporate level, coupled with an organisational 
history and management philosophy in which a belief in the virtues 
of decentralisation was deeply embedded. These pathologies were 
compounded by high levels of mistrust between workers and management 
at some mines. 
On the basis of this study at least, it would appear that corporate systems 
and other tools of management-based regulation only work well when 
OHS is institutionalised, and when it gets into the ‘bloodstream’ of 
the organisation at site level. Only when the formal systems (audits, 
reporting, monitoring, and so on) are supported by informal systems 
(trust, commitment, engagement, means of overcoming conflicting 
loyalties) will they be fully effective. 
These findings have important implications for regulatory theory. 
They  suggest that the claim that management-based regulation—
or  meta-regulation more broadly—can overcome many of the 
traditional challenges of regulating complex organisations is overstated. 
On the contrary, this study suggests that management-based regulation 
(or  indeed meta-regulation) confronts much the same challenges 
as other forms of regulation (albeit on a different scale). The result is 
that management-based (or meta-) regulation may simply relocate the 
problems (from outside to inside the firm), rather than solving them. 
We have insufficient evidence to say whether the mining industry, with 
its distinctive history of conflict and polarisation, is unrepresentative in 
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this respect. In this industry at least, management-based regulation is 
substantially constrained by low organisational trust, minimal mine site 
commitment and divided loyalties. 
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Urban sustainability and resilience
Jeroen van der Heijden
1. Introduction
For some 7,000 years, cities have been governed through traditional 
top-down mandatory regulation and other governance instruments—
building codes and zoning legislation, predominantly—implemented 
and enforced by governments; initially by city governments, later, by 
national governments. This approach has worked reasonably well to 
ensure a safe and healthy built environment, but not so well for addressing 
climate change mitigation (urban sustainability) and adaptation (urban 
resilience) at city level.
Cities are considered unsustainable sources of resource consumption 
and  waste production, greenhouse gasses included, and are a key 
contributor to climate change. At the same time, cities are highly 
vulnerable to climate change risks, such as extreme weather events. 
Traditional top-down mandatory regulatory interventions are often 
unable to address these risks. They take a long time to develop, 
implement and achieve their effects and they require fairly sophisticated 
regulatory bodies and regulatory capacity (not in place all around the 
world). An additional complication is that new or amended regulatory 
interventions apply only to buildings and cities of the future, not to the 
buildings and cities of today. These are often exempted from regulatory 
changes—a process known as ‘grandfathering’.
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Seeking to respond to these regulatory problems, governments 
around the world have been experimenting with novel regulatory and 
governance tools for urban sustainability and resilience; they have been 
very active in collaborating with firms and citizens in the development 
and implementation of such tools, and firms and citizens have even 
developed and implemented such regulatory and governance tools 
without any governmental involvement at all. These new tools can be 
considered a continuation of developments mapped, explored and 
interrogated by Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) scholars in 
the past: the move from prescriptive to performance-based regulation 
(for example, May 2011), from deterrence-based regulatory enforcement 
via responsive regulation to smart regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992; Gunningham et al. 1998) and from mandatory regulatory 
interventions to more voluntary ones (Gunningham 2009).
This chapter seeks to explore and interrogate the range and content 
of traditional and contemporary regulation and governance for urban 
sustainability and resilience (to the extent possible in a short contribution; 
an extensive discussion is available in van der Heijden 2014). In the 
conclusion, it touches on some important issues that regulatory scholars 
may wish to take up in future studies, including the changing role of 
cities in governing urban sustainability and resilience. Throughout the 
chapter, it becomes clear, also, that cities and the built environment more 
generally are intriguing areas for regulatory scholarship—yet, they have 
received strikingly limited attention from regulatory scholars to date.
2. Traditional regulation and governance for 
urban sustainability and resilience
For a long time, governments have sought to govern urban sustainability 
and resilience through direct regulatory interventions such as building 
codes and zoning legislation. These are normally expressed in standards 
that seek to steer behaviour in such a way that harmful results are prevented 
or a desired outcome is achieved. Governments have experimented with 
various types of standards to achieve sustainable and resilient cities, 
buildings and infrastructure (May 2011). In addition to direct regulatory 
interventions, governments have sought to govern urban sustainability 
and resilience through subsidies and (other) economic incentives.
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Statutory regulation
Over the past three decades, statutory regulations for urban sustainability 
and resilience have changed considerably. Traditionally, these were 
expressed in prescriptive standards that stipulated rather precisely what 
is expected from regulatees. A hypothetical example is: ‘a wall should 
have at least 10 cm of insulation.’ Such prescriptive standards often 
faced criticism: their one-size-fits-all approach often conflicted with 
particular local circumstances (for example, what to do with a heritage 
building when adding the 10 cm of insulation means that it loses its 
characteristic appearance?). They are also critiqued for hampering 
technological innovation. 
Seeking to overcome the straitjacket of prescriptive standards, 
governments have moved to performance-based standards that specify 
the performance of a good or service, but do not specify how that 
performance is to be achieved. In the Netherlands, for example, the 
building codes set rather ambitious energy requirements (expressed in 
a numeric energy performance index) for new buildings, but do not 
stipulate how performance is to be achieved (it is left to builders to 
choose between highly insulating building materials and low energy-
intensive equipment, among other things). Reaching even further are 
goal-oriented standards that link the behaviour of individuals, goods or 
services to a regulatory goal. A hypothetical example is: ‘a building should 
be energy efficient.’ Both types of standards are normally considered to 
give those regulated an incentive to find a solution that is both effective 
in terms of meeting the standard and efficient in terms of costs, which, 
in turn, is expected to stimulate (technological) innovation.
Yet, these types of standards come with their own complications. 
Where  prescriptive standards are fairly clear on what complies and 
what does not, performance-based and goal-oriented standards allow 
a lot of leeway. Regulatees and regulatory authorities may differ in 
their interpretation of standards. Also, not all regulatees may desire to 
innovate and use the latest technologies. Further, they may not wish 
to indicate how they comply (as is normally done with performance-
based and goal-oriented standards) but prefer to submit to inspection 
as to whether they do comply (as is normally done with prescriptive 
standards). Responding to such issues, governments have begun to 
introduce standards that combine goal-oriented, performance-based 
and prescriptive standards. The Australian building codes are a typical 
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example. These state the regulatory goals that buildings and building 
parts are expected to meet, but also provide accepted solutions on how 
to meet these goals in prescriptive terms.
Subsidies
Governments have also been active in seeking to steer urban sustainability 
and resilience through subsidies. Subsidies are often a form of financial 
support aiming to promote beneficial economic or social outcomes. 
Subsidies may be introduced for various reasons. Take the example of 
subsidising the instalment of solar panels by households, as is done in 
a wide range of countries around the globe. Such subsidies may serve 
different goals: supporting the market for solar panels by increasing 
household demand; addressing the negative consequences of using fossil 
fuels by supporting a transition to renewable energy; and changing 
households’ attitude towards solar panels by making them a more normal 
aspect of daily life as more and more people install them on their houses.
Yet, while subsidies are, at first glance, an easy tool for governments 
to steer urban sustainability and resilience, they are also the topic of 
some controversy. There is a risk that subsidies will not achieve their 
goals: what can governments do if the money is spent, but the regulatory 
outcome is not achieved? Subsidies are also critiqued for making the 
already well-positioned in society even better off. In the example of 
subsidies for solar panels, such subsidies are available only to those who 
can afford the upfront costs of solar panels. 
Subsidies are sometimes even considered harmful. In this case, a typical 
example comes from the state of New York, USA. In the late 1960s, more 
and more people were moving to the state and wanted to live in scenic 
locations near rivers on floodplains. While planning legislation allowed 
for the development of floodplains, there was an issue. Private insurers 
provided flood insurance at market rates (read: high rates because of high 
risks), but homeowners were not willing to pay the premium for this 
insurance at market rates. In response, the federal government introduced 
the National Flood Insurance Program to provide homeowners with 
low-cost flood insurance. For decades, the program worked well, but 
the insurance program has experienced a major blow from the various 
hurricanes that have plagued the state of New York since 2005. Before 
Hurricane Sandy hit in 2012, the program was already US$17 billion 
(AU$22.5 billion) in debt from payouts resulting from earlier hurricanes 
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(Katrina, Rita and Wilma), and it is expected that this debt will grow to 
an astonishing US$30 billion (AU$40 billion) due to payouts resulting 
from Sandy. To recover from this debt and to mitigate future financial 
risks, the program’s rate will go up 25 per cent a year until it reaches 
levels that actually reflect the risk from flooding. Instead of paying about 
US$500 (AU$660) a year for flood insurance, homeowners are more 
likely to face fees that reach into thousands of dollars yearly. It goes 
without saying that this has resulted in considerable civil unrest (this 
example, and the others in this chapter, are discussed in greater depth in 
van der Heijden 2014). 
Economic incentives
As well as direct regulatory interventions and subsidies, governments 
apply a range of other economic instruments to steer urban sustainability 
and resilience. The two best known are taxes and tradable permits. 
Such taxes seek to correct the prices of production and consumption by 
including the costs of negative externalities. For instance, in a number 
of European countries, taxes apply to the extraction of sand, gravel and 
rock for the cement industry. The environmental costs of these activities 
would not normally be included in the price of cement and the taxes 
seek to address this particular issue. The critique of such taxes, however, 
is that they give the illusion that harmful behaviour is accepted because 
the behaviour is paid for; (large) firms may consider such taxes as just 
one of the costs of doing business.
In line with environmental taxes, tradable permits seek to overcome 
market failures. However, they not only correct the price of production 
and consumption, they also often seek to put a limit on the amount 
of negative externalities. Carbon emission trading is a typical example. 
The  cities of Tokyo and Beijing, for example, introduced city-wide 
carbon trading schemes in 2014, and other cities in China and elsewhere 
are experimenting with similar schemes. Under such city-wide carbon 
emission trading schemes, a city government may set a maximum 
(a ‘cap’) to the carbon emissions it expects to be produced. It can then 
issue permits that allow the holder to produce a certain amount of 
carbon emissions. For instance, the city’s major commercial property 
owners receive a permit that stipulates how much carbon their buildings 
are allowed to emit. If a holder produces less than it is allowed, it can 
trade its permit with a producer that seeks a quota of carbon emissions 
larger than it holds under its own permits. It is then expected that a price 
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will be achieved that expresses the market costs of carbon emissions. 
Further, under a tradable permit scheme, it is expected that producers 
will seek modes of production that (cost-)effectively reduce their carbon 
emissions below the cost of buying permits—for instance, by owning or 
occupying energy-efficient buildings.
The application of city-wide carbon trading schemes is a rather novel 
approach and it remains to be seen whether it will achieve the desired 
outcomes. Such schemes can, again, be critiqued for providing the 
illusion that undesired behaviour is allowed—because one pays for it. 
The ‘cap’ may prevent actors in the construction industry from reducing 
their carbon emissions to zero as long as the costs for emissions are 
lower than the cost of preventing them. Neil Gunningham and Peter 
Grabosky identified such issues in their highly influential Smart 
Regulation (Gunningham et al. 1998).
3. Novel regulation and governance for 
urban sustainability and resilience
Aiming to overcome problems with direct regulatory interventions, 
governments have begun to seek new regulatory and governance 
systems, processes and tools. In particular, insights into the causes and 
consequences of (anthropogenic) climate change, specifically at the city 
level, have spurred national and city governments around the globe to 
trial such novel systems, processes and tools. What is of interest is that 
city governments often collaborate with each other in international city-
to-city collaborations in such trials; governance for urban sustainability 
and resilience has become both more local and more global. Governments 
are, further, actively involving firms and citizens in their trials and 
experiments. Experimentation, the involvement of citizens and firms in 
development and implementation and localisation are all characteristics 
of a larger trend of collaborative governance that RegNet scholars and 
others have been writing about for some time now (Gunningham 2009).
At the same time, firms and citizens have been very active in the 
development of voluntary programs that seek to improve the performance 
of their participants, but without the force of law (Potoski and Prakash 
2009). Often governments are involved in their development and 
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implementation at some distance. Again, a variety of (collaborative and 
voluntary) regulatory and governance systems, processes and tools for 
urban sustainability and resilience is in place.
Government-to-government collaborations
While government-to-government collaboration can be found at the 
local,  regional and national levels, the most well-known and best-
documented examples are the international Local Governments for 
Sustainability (ICLEI), a network of more than 1,000 cities and local 
governments working together to achieve urban sustainability and 
resilience, and the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, a network 
of the world’s largest cities that collaborate to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions through increased urban sustainability. Through such networks, 
cities work together in the development and implementation of novel 
governance tools for urban sustainability and resilience. The  scale of 
such networks implies that experiments with similar tools can be 
carried out in different cities, but overseen by a similar group of actors. 
Together, the cities may even have sufficient funds available to involve 
professional researchers and communication support. This has resulted 
in high-quality research results that are communicated in a highly 
accessible manner. Further, the sheer size and global coverage of these 
two networks make them highly visible, and, particularly through their 
involvement of the mayors of the world’s largest cities, these networks 
have a considerable voice.
But there are some downsides to this type of collaboration. They run 
the risk of becoming elite networks that exclude non-members from 
lessons learned and other advantages. The highly accessible websites of 
such networks often provide a wealth of case studies, best practices and 
lessons learnt, but they all have members-only sections that provide more 
information or information well before it is made public. Also, it remains 
to be seen whether lessons from the major cities that are often active and 
leading in these networks reach smaller cities within these networks and, 
more importantly, those outside these networks. The majority of cities 
around the world have a population of less than 100,000 inhabitants and 
it appears that these are somewhat underrepresented in the currently 
dominant international government-to-government collaborations.
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Other collaborations and networks
Besides such government-to-government collaborations and networks, 
others have also been introduced. Governments actively collaborate 
with firms and citizens seeking to overcome barriers faced by traditional 
regulatory interventions. A typical example is CitySwitch Green 
Office in Australia. Under this nationwide program, city governments 
work together with tenants to improve the energy efficiency of offices. 
By participating in the network, office tenants come to agreements with 
city governments about their future environmental performance, and the 
city governments then provide support to help them meet these goals. 
Certain city governments provide financial support to tenants, while 
others facilitate meetings and ensure an ongoing supply and distribution 
of information. On a national level, the program helps to share best 
practices and lessons through a website, workshops and seminars; 
in addition, a yearly awards ceremony showcases top-performing 
participants and attracts media attention for the program as a whole.
Not all such collaborations, however, are government led. In 2006, 
Cisco, an international developer of networking equipment, initiated 
a collaboration with the cities of Amsterdam, San Francisco, Seoul, 
Hamburg, Lisbon and Madrid—the SMART 2020: Cities and 
Regions Initiative. The initiative seeks to understand whether and how 
urban carbon emissions can be reduced through innovative computer 
and information technology, and how current regulatory and other 
barriers may be overcome. Another example is the Australian Resilience 
Taskforce, a collaboration of a number of key players in the Australian 
insurance and construction industries and government. The taskforce 
argues that current Australian building regulation does not set adequate 
requirements to ensure the resilience of, particularly, existing buildings 
to extreme weather events. It has developed a rating tool that allows it to 
rate the resilience of buildings to extreme weather events. When linked 
to insurance policies, the rating tool may provide considerable incentives 
for building owners to improve their buildings: a building with a high 
rating may face reduced insurance premiums, while a building with a low 
rating may face increased premiums.
Again, such collaborations and networks come with advantages and 
disadvantages. Through collaboration with regulated (local) actors, 
city governments have an opportunity to build on the experiences and 
expertise of these actors. This may result in more effective governance 
tools than those developed by somewhat distant bureaucrats. 
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In  addition,  regulatees may consider tools that have been developed 
in collaboration with them as more legitimate. Yet, the often voluntary 
nature of such collaborations comes at a cost. There is only so much 
that can be asked of participants as they may decide to step out of the 
collaboration when the cost or effort of participation outweighs the 
rewards for doing so. One may also question why regulatees seek to 
become involved in such collaborations. In the case of Cisco and the 
Australian insurance industry, there are clear rewards for these actors for 
collaborating with governments: once the solutions developed in these 
collaborations are implemented, they will be at the forefront to provide 
products and services. Here, the dividing line between self-interested 
lobbying and collaboration in the interest of the ‘greater good’ becomes 
quite thin.
Negotiated agreements and covenants
Specific forms of collaboration are negotiated agreements and covenants. 
These partly address the problems with collaborations flagged above. 
Under a negotiated agreement or covenant, an individual, a firm or a 
group of firms pledges to achieve a particular goal and the government, 
in return, commits itself to a related objective—for instance, supporting 
private sector actors in achieving their goal or not introducing regulation 
during the span of the agreement or covenant. Typical illustrations of 
these are the Climate Change Sector Agreements between the State 
Government of South Australia and business entities, industry sectors, 
community groups and regions. The state of South Australia aims to 
significantly reduce carbon emissions, well beyond goals set by the 
federal government. To achieve these goals, it needs its large firms and 
most-polluting sectors to take action voluntarily, and it understands that 
it needs to offer something in return for such action. In an agreement 
with the commercial property sector association, for instance, the state 
government seeks reduced carbon emissions from commercial properties. 
It has agreed with the association that it will promote the benchmarking 
of the energy performance of existing buildings and will develop 
and implement educational and promotional strategies to encourage 
property owners and tenants to improve their buildings’ environmental 
performance. In return, the Government of South Australia will 
financially and administratively support the actions undertaken by the 
commercial property sector, publicly acknowledge the achievements of 
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the sector association and its participants and has committed to realign 
various government policies and programs that are of interest to the 
property sector. 
Such negotiated agreements are a popular tool applied throughout 
the world. Yet, empirical evidence on their performance is currently 
lacking. Additional research is needed to understand whether negotiated 
agreements and covenants for improved urban sustainability and 
resilience face similar constraints as those reported in other areas—partly 
resulting from the high private interests on the side of firms participating 
in such agreements and the risk of regulatory capture—or whether more 
positive outcomes may be expected. 
Certification and classification
Aside from such collaborations, negotiated agreements and covenants, 
a  wide range of voluntary programs (Potoski and Prakash 2009) 
has been implemented, seeking to improve urban sustainability and 
resilience. Space limits the discussion to one example here. Perhaps the 
best-known and most widely applied voluntary and market-driven tools 
for urban sustainability and resilience are certification and classification. 
These tools normally allow for the assessment of the particular 
performance of buildings, infrastructure or cities (for example, energy 
performance, carbon emission) and their ranking into a particular 
class. A particular identifier is given that can be used to market this 
performance. To  illustrate, for developers, investors, property owners 
and occupants alike, it is easy to understand that on a scale that ranges 
from poor performance to high performance—say, one to five stars or 
bronze to gold—a five-star or gold-class building is better than a one-
star or bronze-class building. Certification and classification form an 
information-based regulatory tool.
Since the early 1990s, hundreds of such certification and classification 
tools have been introduced around the world. The best known is the 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), which 
is often considered the world’s most positive example of what can be 
achieved in terms of urban sustainability and resilience through voluntary 
programs. LEED was implemented in the United States in 1993, and is 
now applied in 135 countries and territories. It boasts billions of square 
metres of built space certified as having high levels of environmental 
performance in the United States alone. Municipalities in the United 
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States are widely adopting the voluntary LEED standards as mandatory 
requirements in their own jurisdictions. But if things sound so good at 
the outset, there likely is a flipside as well.
Some questions arise, for instance, when looking at the actual 
transformative impact of LEED since it was introduced some 20 years 
ago. While LEED boasts high absolute numbers, its relative impact is 
marginal: at best, 3 per cent of all built space in the United States is 
currently LEED certified, and most of this has only a moderate LEED 
certification, which implies that it performs barely better than non–
LEED-certified built space. The highest LEED certification possible 
has been applied to less than 0.2 per cent of all built space in the United 
States over the course of 20 years—yet, policymakers, practitioners 
and academics alike still consider LEED the prime example of what 
voluntary and market-driven tools can achieve at the city level. Further, 
there is criticism regarding the adaptation of the tool by municipalities: 
the rules underlying LEED certification lack the kinds of accountability 
structures of rules developed by governments. Thus, while it can be 
a shortcut for municipalities that lack funds or staff to develop their 
own sustainable building codes, the adaptation of privately developed 
regulation brings considerable risks.
4. Conclusion
Urban sustainability and resilience are an intriguing area for empirical 
and theory-driven regulation and governance research. The use of both 
traditional and novel regulatory and governance tools, processes and 
systems to govern urban sustainability and resilience, the wide variety 
of actors and (vested) interests involved in cities, the wide range of 
contexts that cities provide and the rapid growth of city networks that 
seek to bypass national regulatory standards are but a few aspects that 
should inspire scholars to explore regulation and governance questions 
in this setting. Strikingly, however, cities and the built environment more 
generally have to date received little attention from regulatory scholars. 
In this chapter, I have briefly discussed a range of traditional and novel 
governance interventions that seek to achieve urban sustainability 
and resilience. The discussion of direct regulatory interventions for 
urban sustainability and resilience largely confirm and contribute to 
existing regulatory theories developed by RegNet scholars and others 
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(see various discussion in this book; Baldwin et al. 2011). It goes without 
saying that these traditional regulatory and governance interventions for 
urban sustainability and resilience come with pros and cons. In terms 
of pros, it could be argued that such interventions provide governments 
with a means to be deeply involved in governing urban sustainability 
and resilience. With the wide range of actors involved in city, building 
and infrastructure developments, the technical complexities of such 
developments, the large economic interests involved and the wide 
range of negative externalities of such developments, it almost goes 
without saying that it is unreasonable to expect that ‘the market’ will 
come up with effective solutions to achieve urban sustainability and 
resilience. Governments may be in the right position to set long-term 
and large-scale goals and seek to realise these through direct regulatory 
interventions. 
However, the wide range of actors, technical complexities and large 
economic interests involved in city, building and infrastructure 
developments are exactly what make it difficult for governments to 
introduce effective direct regulatory interventions. The development of 
these often takes a lot of time, which means this type of governance tool 
often cannot keep up with technological innovation. The vast economic 
interests involved mean that governments often face resistance when 
they propose regulatory change. Such resistance comes from firms with 
considerable vested interests, but also from households that do not want 
to see new regulation that requires them to upgrade their existing homes. 
At first glance, novel governance systems, processes and tools such as 
collaborative governance and voluntary programs come with many pros. 
They bring together relevant stakeholders to work, in collaboration, 
towards governance interventions that are tailored to a specific local 
context. This is expected to result in increased effectiveness, efficiency, 
accountability and legitimacy of governance tools. But when scratching 
a little deeper under the surface of collaborative governance and 
voluntary programs some questions arise. Who should be involved in the 
development and implementation of novel governance tools for urban 
sustainability and resilience: all actors affected by a future governance 
intervention? In a city context, ‘all’ actors quickly add up to hundreds or 
thousands of people and organisations. It goes without saying that such 
large collaborations will face collective action problems (for example, 
they will find it difficult to reach consensus on a governance intervention 
that is supported by everyone involved). However, not including all 
737
41 . URBAN SUSTAINABILITY AND RESILIENCE
the people and organisations affected means that some get a say over 
what others will have to do. This raises questions about the democratic 
accountability of collaborations in general and of voluntary programs 
when governments adapt these as public regulation. 
While collaborative governance is widely pursued and preferred by 
governments, businesses, civil society groups and individuals, the 
question remains how this governance ideology can be translated into 
governance processes that indeed live up to these promises. The examples 
discussed in this chapter have flagged a range of (potential) problems 
with collaborative governance for urban sustainability and resilience 
(for example, collaborations may become elite groups, participants may 
seek to pursue only their own interests and there is a risk of regulatory 
capture). Scholars interested in collaborative governance may wish 
to look at the wide range of examples available in the area of urban 
sustainability and resilience to better understand what conditions 
and what types of collaborations are in fact promising alternatives for 
traditional direct regulatory interventions. Similar concerns hold true 
for the application of voluntary programs that seek increased urban 
sustainability and resilience. The questions remain why individuals and 
organisations would want to participate in such programs, under what 
conditions these programs can achieve their intended goals and how such 
programs can have a transformative effect. The wide range of voluntary 
programs that has been introduced in the area of urban sustainability and 
resilience should give scholars enough insight to answer such questions.
Of course, it is unlikely that a single governance system, process or tool 
will be sufficient to achieve improved urban sustainability and resilience. 
It is likely that various systems, processes and tools will need to interact—
and, in cities, often a wide variety of systems, processes and tools are 
implemented. Such governance mixes, and the wide range of traditional 
and novel governance systems, processes and tools that operate side 
by side in various contextual settings, should allow for empirically 
rich studies that can help to strengthen, refine and even develop new 
theories on regulation and governance; again, Neil Gunningham and 
Peter Grabosky’s Smart Regulation (Gunningham et al. 1998) is a typical 
example from RegNet scholarship that is interested in such policy mixes. 
It seems therefore that urban sustainability and resilience, and cities 
and the built environment more generally, make for ideal areas in which 
to study governance systems, processes and tools. They have remained, 
however, largely outside the scope of regulation and governance scholars 
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to date. In this chapter, I have only scratched the surface of a range 
of traditional and novel governance tools (see further van der Heijden 
2014). I hope that future regulation and governance scholarship will 
have a stronger focus on this area of significant importance. 
That leaves me to raise a final issue that strikes me as odd when looking 
a  urban sustainability and resilience in particular, and cities more 
generally, through a regulation and governance lens: there is no strong 
theorising on urban governance. There is a strong literature on urban 
politics and urban studies, but not a similarly well-developed urban 
regulation and governance literature (a similar argument is made by 
some of the authors referred to in the Additional Reading list). This is 
odd for many reasons, and many interesting regulation and governance 
questions beg to be answered. To name a few: 
• Cities are extremely complex arenas with many actors and interests 
involved: how is it that anything gets regulated, governed and realised 
at all at city level? 
• Cities also appear to become more important as non-state actors in 
international negotiations and governance processes: how do cities 
combine this role as (often very strong) non-state actors in the 
international sphere with their fairly weak administrative roles (such 
as the enforcement of building codes) under regional or national 
governments? 
• Some cities rival in size the output of multinational companies 
or even countries (London, for example, produces more carbon 
emissions and consumes more resources than some small nation-
states): what does this imply for the governing of global common 
goods and societal problems? 
• Finally, the trend of city-to-city collaborations such as those 
described in this chapter indicates the emergence of a new (non-
state) economic and governing (super)power: why do cities seek 
to participate in such networks, and do such networks hold more 
potential to address pressing global risks than international state-to-
state negotiations and agreements do currently? 
In sum, the city as an actor and area of regulation and governance 
(and institutions and networks) provides scholars of regulation and 
governance with many promising research avenues to explore.
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The world is speeding down an unsustainable path (UNEP 2012). 
Biodiversity loss, water scarcity, pollution and climate change are 
threatening the life-support functions of our planet (UNEP 2012). These 
threats persist because of many factors, not least an ongoing crisis of 
governance (Lange et al. 2013). Since the birth of modern environmental 
regulation in the 1970s, designing and implementing effective, efficient 
and legitimate regulation and governance have remained a continuing 
challenge for governments and society. 
Initially, governments and their agents managed environmental 
problems through enforcement of strict rules and standards set out in 
legislation and treaties (Gunningham 2009). However, with the rise of 
neoliberal ideals in the 1980s, governments began to shift their attention 
away from this Westphalian vision of state power through hierarchy. 
Instead, environmental degradation was, in many cases, to be curbed 
via market-based approaches, voluntarism and other ‘light-handed’ 
policy initiatives such as partnerships and cooperation (Gunningham 
1  This work is based on research supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery 
Early Career Researcher Award (DE140101216). 
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and Holley 2010). Yet, by the end of the 1990s, continuing ecological 
degradation and the increasing complexity of social and environmental 
problems saw a new shift towards environmental governance (Driessen 
et al. 2012) or what is increasingly being called ‘new environmental 
governance’ (Holley et al. 2012). The new environmental governance 
(NEG) emphasised collaboration, integration, participation, deliberative 
styles of decision-making, adaptation and learning. As with many 
other issues discussed in this book, NEG may equally be described 
as polycentric governance, where governments, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the private sector and civil society form many 
centres of decision-making and action that are formally independent 
of each other, but that can either function independently or constitute 
an interdependent system of relations (Ostrom 2010: 643). Although 
NEG is still an evolving concept, a growing number of scholars and 
policymakers believe it can substantially improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency and legitimacy of responses to environmental problems. 
This chapter provides an overview of the recent NEG trend and maps 
the  shifts in environmental regulation and governance that led us 
here. It also highlights recent debates and unresolved challenges for 
governing the environment. In such a short chapter, much of what will 
be discussed will inevitably caricature the wealth of global experience 
and debates. For example, this chapter primarily focuses on domestic 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions (for other contexts, see, for example, Dubash 
and Morgan 2012; Sofronova et al. 2014), but consideration is also given 
to related trends at the international level. It also does not consider a 
range of related fields and subfields, such as disaster governance (Djlante 
et al. 2013), risk governance (Renn 2008) or rights (Kotzé and Du 
Plessis 2010).
The chapter commences with a brief discussion of traditional 
environmental regulation before examining the shift to markets, 
light-handed approaches and early forms of partnerships. Finally, it 
turns to the recent NEG approach, discussing theory and examples, 
before highlighting recent debates, including whether NEG can deliver 
more effective, efficient and legitimate performance, and the relationship 
of NEG to more conventional regulatory approaches. As we will see, 
the shift between regulation, markets and NEG is ongoing and has 
not seen each stage entirely replaced with another. Rather, different 
phases very often coexist and relate to each other in a variety of ways 
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(see, for  example, Gunningham and Sinclair, Chapter 8, this volume; 
Driessen et al. 2012: 157). The chapter concludes with a brief summary 
and key references. 
2. Traditional environmental law 
and regulation
The development of international and national environmental laws 
arose against a backdrop of states exercising sovereignty over natural 
resources within their territorial boundaries (Gess 1964). It was only 
natural, then, that the early environmental protection of the 1970s 
relied on the nation-state or, at the international level, groups of states, 
acting primarily through treaty-based intergovernmental organisations 
(de Burca et al. 2013; Abbott and Snidal 2009: 505). A raft of issue-
specific international rules (for example, on world heritage, trade in 
endangered species and pollution from ships) was developed and overseen 
by international organisations such as the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (Kelemen and Vogel 2010). Under this approach, 
states believed they understood environmental problems clearly, that 
they could be defined in advance and managed through mandatory rules 
(de Burca et al. 2013: 730). 
A similar example was the so-called command-and-control 
approach to  environmental regulation adopted by domestic Western 
governments.  Evoking Hobbes’s Leviathan (1985), this involved 
centralised legislatures setting blanket environmental targets, such 
as emission standards, exposure levels or technology standards (the 
command). Delegated agents, such as environmental protection 
agencies,  were then empowered to police compliance and impose 
penalties where standards were breached (the control) (de Burca et al. 
2013; Gunningham et al. 1998). 
At least in some circumstances, these state-centred approaches to law 
and regulation were relatively effective, achieving a number of gains in 
halting and reducing environmental degradation (Cole and Grossman 
1999; Najam et al. 2006). However, they also suffered from a number 
of weaknesses that limited their effectiveness. 
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For example, at the international level, ‘treaty congestion’ and 
fragmentation led to claims that international environmental law was 
too unwieldy, incoherent and ineffective to confront increasingly serious 
global environmental challenges (Najam et al. 2006; Scott 2011). Similar 
claims were levelled at domestic systems, where the centralised and 
uniform nature of command-and-control regulation was increasingly 
criticised as costly, cumbersome, inefficient and insensitive to local 
contextualities (Stewart 2001; Karkkainen 2006; Holley et al. 2012). 
This insensitivity, along with the tendency of governments to administer 
regulation through departments that are fragmented along ecologically 
arbitrary, human-defined boundaries, made it increasingly difficult for 
traditional regulation to address more complex environmental problems, 
which often involved multiple polluters and required a more holistic 
and integrated management approach (Freeman and Farber 2005; 
Durant et al. 2004; Holley et al. 2012: 2). Adversarial enforcement by 
‘stick’-waving agencies, particularly in the United States, also produced 
counterproductive resistance from regulated individuals and enterprises 
(Lazarus 2004).
As a result of these weaknesses, state-centred hierarchy was no longer 
seen as the exclusive response to all environmental problems (Durant 
et al.  2004). Instead, by the 1980s, new market-based instruments, 
partnership and light-handed approaches were being explored, 
particularly relating to more complex environmental issues such as 
resource extraction and in sectors resistant to external intervention. 
3. Market-based instruments, partnerships 
and light-handed approaches 
The unpopularity of traditional environmental regulation was fuelled in 
part by the rise of neoliberal economists in the public domain during the 
1980s. According to those working within this governance paradigm, 
Adam Smith’s vision of an ‘invisible hand’ would, if allowed to materialise, 
lead rational, self-maximising individuals to promote ‘public interests’ 
without the need for forceful government interference (Smith 2007). 
Environmental degradation was occurring as a consequence of a failure 
of markets to properly value environmental resources (Cutting and 
Cahoon 2005: 55; Roma 2006: 534). What was needed was the creation 
of market signals that would place a value on and charge appositely for 
the use of scarce assets (Holley et al. 2012: 2). 
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Although public opposition prevented wholesale deregulation, a variety 
of government-supported, market-based instruments would eventually 
emerge, such as ‘cap-and-trade’ schemes, along with a mixture of 
subsidies and, to a lesser extent, pollution taxes (Gunningham and 
Holley 2010). Prominent market-based instruments introduced to 
address point sources of pollution over subsequent decades included 
the acid rain sulphur dioxide trading scheme developed in the United 
States (Stavin 1998), climate markets spurred by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto 
Agreement (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002) as well as water rights and 
trading (Godden 2008). Economic incentive–based schemes, subsidies 
and other market approaches, such as land acquisitions and payments, 
were also increasingly adopted to address more complex ‘second-
generation’ issues (Farrier 1995: 399–405). 
Yet, despite some successes, many market-inspired approaches have 
proved to be less environmentally successful than command-and-control 
approaches (Howes et al. 1997). In part, this is because of a variety of 
practical and contextual difficulties faced by governments who seek to 
develop and rely on market mechanisms. Although free markets in theory 
mobilise knowledge (Hayek 1945), most market-based instruments are 
similar to command-and-control instruments in their requirement for 
centralised planning and knowledge, which are necessary for setting 
the right tax level, charge or even cap. Setting these levels can often be 
difficult for policymakers in the absence of an existing market reference 
(Sabel et al. 1999; Freeman and Farber 2005). Tradable rights/pollution 
likewise need a level of compliance and enforcement machinery similar 
to traditional performance-based regulation (Holley and Sinclair 2012). 
Regulated businesses also historically opposed the introduction of 
economic initiatives such as taxes and charges, preferring the certainty 
of regulation to the uncertainty of novel approaches (Gunningham and 
Holley 2010).
An alternative to direct regulation more popular with businesses 
(and increasingly cashed-strapped domestic government regulators) was 
a variety of voluntary and light-handed initiatives that emerged during 
the 1980s and 1990s. These included business-led voluntary and self-
regulatory approaches such as Responsible Care (Lenox and Nash 2003). 
While they achieved limited success, they typically failed to deliver 
acceptable levels of industry-wide compliance, particularly where the 
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gap between the private interests of business (not least, making a profit) 
and the public interest in environmental protection was substantial 
(Gunningham and Sinclair 2002: 145–55; Freeman and Farber 2005). 
Stronger, but reconfigured, roles for domestic state regulation were 
accordingly pursued. These approaches typically maintained a state 
underpinning, but looked to engage with business and NGOs in ways 
that were considered more effective and efficient, while also maintaining 
the cooperation and trust of regulated actors. This was primarily achieved 
by accounting for, and facilitating the use of, non-state knowledge and 
capacities and harnessing related motivational drivers, such as profit, 
social licence (for example, negative business publicity by NGOs) and 
other informal sanctions (Gunningham and Sinclair 2002). 
These reconfigured approaches varied in form, and have been thought 
about and analysed using a variety of theories. These included 
environmental partnerships and negotiated agreements in Europe (Orts 
and Deketelaere 2001); tripartite arrangements between regulators, 
communities and industry (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), such as 
environmental improvement plans in Australia (Holley and Gunningham 
2006); informational-based regulation, embodied most prominently in 
the Toxic Release Inventory in the United States (Karkkainen 2001); 
eco-modernisation that facilitated cooperation and the uptake of new 
technologies in Europe (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000); and reflexive law 
approaches, where firms developed their own process and management 
system standards, designed to achieve regulatory goals (Orts 1995). 
While each of these approaches provided greater flexibility to enterprises, 
including facilitating beyond compliance activities, in the absence of 
more coercive intervention by domestic state regulators, their impact has 
(for the most part) been very modest and tended to operate more or less 
at the margins (Gunningham and Holley 2010). 
Even so, what is unique about these flexible and cooperative programs is 
that they signified some of the first steps towards what has become NEG 
thinking and practice (discussed below), where non-state actors take on 
a greater role in the ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’ of environmental governance 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1993). 
This trend was mirrored by unique international changes. For instance, 
new  transgovernmental environmental networks of state officials and 
private actors emerged to combat the abovementioned international 
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inertia and fragmentation (Slaughter 2004; de Burca et al. 2013). 
International organisations also sought to use their mandates and expertise 
to extend governance beyond the point of state agreement and deepen 
the application of rules. They did this through partnerships, involving 
other organisations and actors, and establishing and diffusing new niches 
of environmental governance, including the uptake of integrated water 
resource management and community-based biodiversity management 
(de Burca et al. 2013: 734; Glasbergen et al. 2007; Andonova 2010). 
A different instance of non-state-led international networks and 
partnerships was the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification 
scheme, established by civil society organisations (de Burca et al. 2013). 
Although the FSC does not necessarily have authority from, or  over, 
states, its rules proved influential in the commercial marketplace 
(Overdevest and Zeitlen 2014; de Burca et al. 2013: 734).
These developments, both internationally and domestically, opened up 
new forms of non-state auspices and influence, in ways that arguably 
pioneered NEG. However, as we will see below, what makes the NEG 
phase distinct from these earlier developments is that it demands 
levels of  collaboration, participation, flexibility and adaptability that 
would have been unimaginable some years before (de Burca et al. 2013; 
Holley et al. 2012).
4. New environmental governance
The NEG enterprise involves collaboration between a diversity of 
private, public and non-governmental stakeholders, who, acting together 
towards commonly agreed (or mutually negotiated) goals, hope to achieve 
far more collectively than individually (Holley et al. 2012: 4). It relies 
heavily on participatory dialogue and deliberation, flexibility (rather 
than uniformity), inclusiveness, knowledge generation and processes of 
learning, transparency and institutionalised consensus-building practices 
(see, generally, de Burca and Scott 2006; Trubek and Trubek 2007). 
There is no firm agreement on a definitive ‘model’ of NEG (van  der 
Heijden 2013). Rather, various terms and theories have been 
developed to describe and prescribe how NEG operates. These include 
‘experimentalism’ (de Burca et al. 2013), ‘post-sovereign environmental 
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governance’ (Karkkainen 2004a), ‘collaborative governance’ (Freeman 
1997), ‘adaptive governance’ (Chaffin et al. 2014) and ‘global 
environmental governance’ (Okereke et al. 2009). 
These perspectives vary in their emphasis, encompassing different 
schools  of thought and applying varying institutional and political 
approaches to a range of environmental problems. Experimentalism, 
for example, draws inspiration from pragmatism (Dewey 1946), 
while adaptive governance draws more on social-ecological systems 
and adaptive management (Holling 1978; Berkes and Folke 1998). 
However,  these theories are bound by a number of common 
characteristics. These  include a focus on the virtues of flexibility, 
participation, deliberation, collaboration, learning and adaptation. These 
common features have led a burgeoning group of scholars to collectively 
refer to these approaches as NEG (Karkkainen 2004b; de Burca and 
Scott 2006; Holley et al. 2012). 
Consistent with evolving understandings of new governance, not all 
the above characteristics need to be present for a particular practice or 
program to fall within this category; indeed, there are very few single 
institutional forms that fully capture the idea of NEG in its entirety. 
However, the more characteristics that are present, the stronger is the 
claim that they fall within the category of NEG (de Burca and Scott 
2006; Holley et al. 2012).
Domestic programs that fall within this category typically involve 
a variety of non-state actors assuming administrative, regulatory, 
managerial and mediating functions previously undertaken by the state 
(Gunningham 2009; Ostrom 2010: 643). Prominent examples include 
the establishment of 56 regional natural resource management bodies 
in Australia (Holley et al. 2012); collaborative approaches to water 
management in New Zealand (Holley and Gunningham 2011); and the 
endeavours of multiple agencies and stakeholders to address competing 
demands on water resources in the Bay Delta in the United States 
(Holley 2015).
NEG has also been identified internationally (and in the interaction 
between international and domestic levels) with the emergence of open-
ended standards, multilevel networks, deliberation for the internalisation 
of international norms, as well as significant decisions and implementation 
roles being taken by non-state actors (Cottrell and Trubek 2012: 362). 
This has included the European Union’s Water Framework Directive 
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(Trubek and Trubek 2007) and Forest Law Enforcement Governance 
and Trade initiative (Overdevest and Zeitlen 2014); the Partnership 
for the Development of Environmental Law in Africa (Kimani 2010); 
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (de Burca et al. 2013); 
and management of the Great Lakes in the United States/Canada 
(Karkkainen 2004a).
It is an open question whether NEG sufficiently accounts for the 
practical differences within these evolving environmental governance 
examples and theories (Karkkainen 2004b). Using a generalised rubric of 
‘new governance’ to lump together different theories and practices does 
risk NEG becoming little more than a ‘catchall term’ (von der Porten and 
de Loë 2013; Karkkainen 2004b). For this reason, scholars are beginning 
to try to dissect different modes of environmental governance (Driessen 
et al. 2012). Even so, at this stage of the inquiry, there are, arguably, 
considerable benefits to be gained from grouping different theories 
and scholarship within a NEG framework. Consistent with emerging 
understandings within the new governance literature itself, a generalised 
understanding of NEG (with apposite attention to differences) can 
facilitate the linking and comparison of theories, as well as testing, 
developing and reformulating thinking (Lobel 2004; Karrkainen 2004b). 
Doing so can ensure a better understanding of what is occurring, and 
offers a constructive approach for developing a normative vision capable 
of influencing the direction of the sprawling governance theory in the 
environmental arena (Lobel 2004: 501–6; Walker 2006).
Certainly, the shift to NEG has to some extent been shaped by specific 
contexts and influences (de Burca 2010), but, generally speaking, it has 
come about because of the perceived capacity of these more collaborative 
and adaptive approaches to deliver benefits in circumstances where 
traditional approaches cannot (Holley et al. 2012: 4). For example, 
prescriptive regulatory standards—and even caps/taxes in some market-
based instruments—depend on a degree of centralised knowledge 
(for  example, to set suitable standards, prices or caps) that is often 
not available. In contrast, the sort of collaborative, participatory and 
deliberative approaches contemplated by NEG are said to lead to problem 
solving that is inclusive of local circumstances and able to capitalise on 
the unique local knowledge and other capacities of multiple public and 
private actors (Holley et al. 2012: 4). The direct involvement of these 
actors in deliberative styles of governance (albeit varying from local 
citizens to international NGOs) can also foster stakeholder ownership 
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and ‘buy-in’, giving a greater voice to marginalised interests (in contrast 
with an exclusive reliance on bureaucratic expertise in hierarchy or 
on price and competition in markets) (Sabel et al. 1999; Holley et al. 
2012: 4). 
NEG’s learning and adaptation focus, meanwhile, is thought to ensure 
that it copes better with the dynamism, uncertainty and complexity 
of environmental problems than either traditional regulation (which 
can easily ossify, freezing standards at a particular point in time, or by 
adopting a one-size-fits-all approach) or other market-based approaches 
(where significant post hoc program corrections to pollution levels 
and permits set from the centre prevent new entrants or become very 
difficult without undermining the security of ownership rights on which 
the market itself depends) (Holley et al. 2012: 5). Instead, NEG ideals—
be it adaptive management, pragmatism or other forms of knowledge 
generation (Lobel 2004)—are said to enable governance processes that 
‘learn’ more easily from changing circumstances ‘on the ground’ (and can 
also promote accountability via peer review) (Sabel et al. 1999: 3; 
Durant et al. 2004: 4; Lobel 2004: 502; Orts 1995). 
Yet, despite the promise of these benefits, it is uncertain whether they 
can  be achieved in practice (Driessen et al. 2012; van der Heijden, 
Chapter 41, this volume). Indeed, NEG has faced a litany of criticisms, 
including claims that it leads to lowest common denominator 
solutions, rent-seeking, dominance by self-interested economic actors, 
disenfranchised environmental interests and problems sustaining 
participation after initial bursts of enthusiasm (Holley et al. 2012).
Considerable empirical research is still required to resolve these 
arguments about the impacts of NEG, as the principles and practical 
conditions are what will enable successful NEG experiments to be 
replicated (Karkkainen 2006; Holley et al. 2012: 9). 
One particularly fruitful area of research regarding these issues has 
focused on whether and how NEG interacts with earlier phases of 
environmental regulation—principally, command and control, which 
remains a bedrock of point source pollution control in most countries 
(Karkkainen 2004b; Lobel 2004; Gunningham 2009: 159). Scholars 
have tentatively identified a range of possible relationships between 
traditional command and control and NEG, each of which has differing 
implications for ‘success’. Some of the most underexplored hypotheses 
include: ‘gaps’, where law and collaboration conflict and potentially 
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inhibit mutual success; ‘NEG in the shadow of the law’, a constructive 
relationship akin to Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) regulatory pyramid, 
where regulation should be set precisely for the purposes of inducing 
otherwise reluctant people to embrace NEG; and ‘integration’, where 
the two approaches are merged into an integrated system (Trubek and 
Trubek 2007). While debates over these hypotheses continue, a range 
of NEG theories is increasingly recognising that NEG very often 
needs to operate in hybrid form within conventional approaches—to 
act as backstop, to prevent abuse and to incentivise actor participation 
(Holley and Gunningham 2011; de Burca et al. 2013).
More generally, the few studies that have attempted to grapple with 
NEG’s performance increasingly suggest that it is no panacea for the 
globe’s continuing environmental problems (as perhaps it was once 
thought to be) (de Burca et al. 2013; Holley et al. 2012). This may be 
a particularly important realisation, as we now, arguably, confront new 
global challenges in the era of the ‘Anthropocene’. This new classification 
of the modern planetary epoch signifies a new role for humankind: from 
a species that had to adapt to changes in its natural environment to 
one that has become a driving force in the planetary system (Biermann 
2014:  57). Such developments may call for increased attention to 
not only making NEG ‘work’, but also new ways of governing global 
problems and systems (see, for example, Stevenson and Dryzek 2014; 
Biermann 2014). 
5. Conclusion
Over the past 40 years, the environmental governance landscape has 
shifted significantly, but it also remains multifaceted, covered with both 
new and old policy approaches (Driessen et al. 2012). A good example 
of this is the current response to climate change, which involves not 
only market-based instruments, but also hierarchy, as well as NEG 
approaches (see, generally, Dryzek et al. 2011). 
In the Anthropocene, where environmental problems such as climate 
change will likely affect generations, the journey of governing 
environmental problems is far from complete. In many ways, both 
international and domestic environmental governance remain something 
of a continuing experiment: keeping what works and finding new ways 
to do things better when they don’t work. While the recent shift to NEG 
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remains a work in progress, the reformation will no doubt continue, 
however unevenly, suggesting there is all the more reason to learn now 
from both successes and failures so we can build a more effective and 
democratic approach for environmental governance in the future. 
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Three large-scale processes of change currently confront regulatory 
networks and institutions everywhere: eco-processes collapse, techno-
processes collapse and financial processes collapse. Collapse, such as 
the filing for bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers in 2008, is always the 
product of a process. This chapter focuses on characterising the processes 
of change with which actor networks either knowingly or unknowingly 
engage as they attempt to influence the flow of events while being 
situated, at least in most cases, within a variant of capitalism. 
This chapter is not intended to be a piece of forecasting about the 
outcome of these processes. That is much more a game for futurists 
employing scenario building or those who have managed to capture 
real-world processes through their formal models of complex systems. 
Rather, in this chapter, the goal is to provide a clear statement of the 
long-term governance challenges facing regulatory capitalism. We begin 
with a discussion of capitalism and regulation. 
1  My thanks to John Braithwaite and Martin Krygier for their comments on this chapter. 
My thanks also to Jeroen van der Heijden for his patience and reflections as I paced up and down 
my room trying to explain the ideas of the chapter.
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2. Capitalism and regulation
The 42 chapters of this book support the view that regulation by 
state and non-state actors permeates the activities of state and non-
state actors. Actors are, in other words, part of a systems duality and 
circularity in which they sometimes function as regulator and on other 
occasions as regulatee. The dual regulator–regulatee role holds true for 
all actors, irrespective of size. Credit ratings agencies such as Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Services, which regulated the credit 
worthiness of states through their ratings prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), have, post GFC, found themselves on the receiving end 
of regulatory reform. This happened after their self-interested rating of 
complex financial instruments was exposed. 
The scale and intensity of regulator–regulatee relationships will most 
likely increase. Information and communications technology (ICT) 
is delivering rising interconnectedness, creating more opportunity for 
these relationships to be created. Digital divides still remain, especially 
in Africa, but, according to the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), 3G mobile broadband now covers 89 per cent of the 
four billion people living in urban environments and 29 per cent of the 
3.4 billion living in rural regions (ITU 2015). It is the pace of ICT’s 
global extension that is impressive compared with communications 
technologies from earlier eras such as telegraph and radio. If Marshall 
McCluhan’s observation that the medium is the message holds true then 
perhaps networks will bring a new and global resonance to Heraclitus’s 
observation that ‘all is flux’. 
The rise and rise of regulation has led to the identification of another 
species of capitalism: ‘regulatory capitalism’ (see Levi-Faur, Chapter 17, 
this volume). Capitalism has turned out to be a system (or systems) 
for which much has been predicated. One can study capitalism 
territorially, as Galbraith (1993) did in American Capitalism: The Concept 
of Countervailing Power, or as Huang (2008) does in his Capitalism 
with Chinese Characteristics. Others have distinguished among 
oligarchic capitalism, state-guided capitalism, big-firm capitalism 
and entrepreneurial capitalism (Baumol et al. 2012). Hall and Soskice 
(2001), drawing on the comparative capitalism literature, develop a 
varieties-of-capitalism approach in which liberal market economies 
and coordinated market economies occupy opposite ends of a spectrum. 
In  their investigation of capitalisms, the focus is on how firms solve 
763
43 . REGULATING CAPITALISM’S PRoCESSES oF DESTRUCTIoN
various types of coordination problems. Another cluster of predicates 
such as knowledge capitalism, information capitalism and post-industrial 
capitalism draws attention to the increasing role of knowledge in the 
production and distribution of services and products in some capitalist 
economies—a phenomenon first systematically studied by the economist 
Fritz Machlup (1962). These and many other predications of capitalism 
seem to bear out Schumpeter’s observation that it is ‘by nature a form 
or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be 
stationary’ (1976: 82).
The description of capitalism as regulatory seems oxymoronic, at 
odds with the idea of capitalism being a method of perpetual change. 
Perpetual change implies freedom rather than regulation. It suggests 
that capitalism does best when the state turns itself into a watchman 
of public order and avoids intervention in the market. This belief drives 
neoliberal initiatives of privatisation and deregulation, but is it an 
accurate description of capitalism’s evolution? 
The first signs that neoliberalism did not offer a good description of what 
was happening in capitalist systems came towards the end of the 1980s 
as regulatory scholars began to point out that the Thatcher and Reagan 
eras had not led to anything like the uniform decrease in regulation 
in the United States and United Kingdom that might have been 
expected (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 7–12). Small government had 
seemingly delivered big regulation. This was not following a neoliberal 
script. Patterns of regulation seemed to follow privatisation and 
deregulation. When states privatised public assets such as health services, 
telecommunications, water, electricity, railways and so on, they had to 
either create or strengthen independent regulatory agencies. The lists of 
regulators in countries grew longer, especially in the 1990s, a decade in 
which the impact of the neoliberal privatisation initiatives of the 1980s 
should have produced a decline in the number of agencies (Levi-Faur 
2005: 18–19). Regulation of one kind or another kept breaking out at 
different levels of governance. Voluntary standard-setting initiatives such 
as those to be found in fair trade were seeing the emergence of fair trade 
organisations and certification systems, creating, in effect, regulatory 
standards with which supermarkets and multinational food producers 
were increasingly engaging (Hutchens 2009). It appeared as if there was 
a regulatory version of Newton’s third law: for every deregulatory or 
privatisation initiative, there was an opposite regulatory reaction from 
somewhere within the system.
REGULAToRY THEoRY: FoUNDATIoNS AND APPLICATIoNS
764
Levi-Faur and Jordana coined the term ‘regulatory capitalism’ to describe 
a system capable of generating regulation from many actors, at different 
levels and using a variety of instruments to communicate and enforce 
their chosen norms (Braithwaite 2008: xi). Regulatory capitalism 
represents, in contrast to laissez-faire capitalism and welfare capitalism, 
a shift in governance functions in which the state, broadly speaking, does 
more ‘steering’ and business more ‘rowing’ (Levi-Faur 2005: 16). Welfare 
states had developed systems for directly provisioning the entitlements 
of citizens in areas such as education, employment, health, disability and 
age pensions and child care. Regulatory capitalism reorganises many of 
the processes of the welfare state. Many social entitlements are delivered 
through third-party organisations that are paid by governments to 
provide them. Citizens, as the holders of welfare rights, find themselves 
entering networked worlds made up of government agencies and third-
party providers (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). Governments spend 
much more time monitoring, checking, supervising and testing the 
activities and services of providers. 
The reorganisation of regulation across capitalism’s many sectors has 
been achieved through the use of networks. Networks are not a new form 
of organisation, but their use in markets and by governments has been 
dramatically accelerated by ICT. Information technologies contribute 
to their own spread, as well as the spread of other technologies, creating 
feedback loops of all kinds, and thereby creating a process that ‘endlessly 
amplifies the power of technology’ (Castells 2010: 31). Corporations 
harness information technology networks to develop longer and more 
complex supply and production networks (Dunning and Lundan 
2008: 489–90). In these networks, China often ends up being the final 
assembly point for a product, the parts of which will have come from 
other countries that make up the links in a global chain of production 
(Athukorala and Yamashita 2009). For example, Apple’s products begin 
their life as research and development initiatives in the United States, 
with parts coming from countries such as Malaysia and Taiwan and 
software from other multinationals such as Toshiba, with the last stop in 
the production network being China, from where the finished products 
are exported back to eager customers in the United States. It is not so 
much that command and hierarchy cease being characteristics of the firm 
in this ‘post-industrial’ or ‘informational’ age, but rather that corporations 
have more options to reorganise production and distribution, as well as 
their tax affairs, using contracts and networks.
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Globally dominant corporations are not peculiar to regulatory capitalism. 
The British Empire was served by one of history’s most powerful trading 
corporations, the British East India Company. Few industries have 
been dominated by private corporations in the way the oil industry was 
dominated by the seven majors in the first half of the twentieth century 
(Sampson 1976). What is different for today’s multinationals is the 
way in which they can rapidly become objects of regulatory strategies 
formulated by other actors. For example, large companies in the textile, 
footwear and clothing industries, which, through the clever use of 
contracts, insulate themselves from the reach of labour laws to generate 
cost pressures on homeworkers, may find themselves on the receiving end 
of community-based initiatives such as Australia’s FairWear initiative 
and ultimately supply-chain legislation that imposes liabilities where 
none previously existed (Marshall 2014). Fossil fuel companies—to take 
another example of how regulatory capitalism can generate regulation 
from any quarter—are seeing non-governmental actors developing 
strategies aimed at encouraging institutional investors to divest their 
holdings in these companies (Ayling and Gunningham 2015). 
Regulatory capitalism is a distinctive system precisely because regulatory 
initiatives can be generated from any part of its technology-enabled 
networks. One can see it as the coevolved complementarity to capitalism’s 
restless economic nature in which each new accumulation phase or 
impulse of capitalism coexists with a regulatory phase or impulse. 
Through this coevolutionary process, regulatory capitalism generates 
various public principles of conduct, such as procedural fairness, respect 
for human rights and restorative justice, that serve to reduce the risk of 
societal destruction. Such a risk, Polyani (2001) argued, looms over a 
society in which the principle of the self-regulating market has assumed 
a tyrannical status, driving out all other principles. This way of describing 
regulatory capitalism might be taken to imply that it is more adaptive 
than previous forms of capitalism. Many of the chapters in this book 
suggest that the problem-solving capacity of regulatory capitalism is 
superior to its predecessors. Even if one cannot write the regulatory 
equivalent of QED after initiatives emerging out of regulatory capitalism 
in fields such as human rights, migration, cybercrime or tax evasion 
problems, one might nevertheless see them as Pareto improvements or 
improvements judged by some other criterion. 
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The remainder of this chapter probes the idea that regulation is a source 
of capitalism’s adaptivity in a little more detail. Towards the end of his 
book on regulatory capitalism, John Braithwaite (2008) asks whether 
it is a ‘good thing’. His answer, which is based on his identification of 
regulatory capitalism’s systemic capacity to produce global markets in 
vice or virtue, is that it is a mixed bag. The question being asked here 
is slightly different. Is regulatory capitalism sufficiently adaptive to 
cope with the three existential challenges described in the next section? 
As will become apparent, the labels used to distinguish the challenges 
represent simplifications of complex and interacting processes, but it is a 
simplification that is both convenient and necessary for present purposes. 
The aim here is to show that the adaptivity of regulatory capitalism will 
be globally tested by different types of processes. 
There is little doubt that regulatory capitalism, because of its globalised 
and networked nature, is in a better position than any previous form 
of capitalism to uplift regulatory capacities and capabilities from the 
nodes of its countless networks to develop interventions in its systems. 
This intervening agency does depend heavily on an entrepreneurship that 
sees soft-wiring solutions where others see only hardwired structures. 
Washington lobbyists saw the possibilities for globalising intellectual 
property rights where government officials saw only treaty impediments 
(Drahos with Braithwaite 2002). Social entrepreneurs saw opportunities 
to create fair trade for poor farmers where most saw only domination 
by commodity cartels. These and many other examples of agency that 
produce a rewiring of some of capitalism’s networks are, however, 
examples of sector or domain-specific solutions. Our interest here is in 
the broader adaptivity of the system to existential challenges thrown up 
by the macro-processes identified in the next section. The purpose is to 
make clear that the superior adaptivity of regulatory capitalism at sector 
or domain levels does not necessarily translate to the macro-processes 
of existential crisis that confront capitalism in this century. Putting it 
at its simplest, regulatory capitalism’s capacity to deal with crises within 
its parts may fail it when it faces a crisis that affects it as a whole. As we 
will see, the sources of crisis in capitalism are more varied than those 
that Marx first identified from his economic data—data gathered from 
a nineteenth-century liberal capitalism that too often turned a blind eye 
to what was happening to the women and children trying to survive on 
its dangerous factory floors. The contradictions between labour practices 
and the promises of capital were evident enough. Over time, welfare 
and then regulatory capitalism helped to align these practices with 
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liberalism’s promises of what ought to happen in a society where all were, 
at least formally, bearers of rights. Regulatory capitalism now confronts 
processes of collapse on a scale and scope not envisaged by Marx and 
to which his data do not speak. 
3. Three processes of collapse
Ecosystems processes 
Early on in Silent Spring, Rachel Carson asks what has silenced the 
voices of spring. The first large-scale study of this and many other 
environmental  questions is not her book, but the 1972 report by 
Meadows  et al. entitled The Limits to Growth (LG). This study of the 
world’s future relied on what is, by today’s standards, ancient computing 
technology. Around that time, Intel’s first processor was capable of 
processing about 60,000 instructions per minute. Today’s processors 
operate in hundreds of millions of instructions per minute. Despite its age, 
the LG’s analysis of the trajectory of world population, industrialisation, 
pollution, food production and resource depletion has proved to be 
much more robust than one might have anticipated, especially since its 
formal world model plots these trajectories to 2100. In 2008, Graham 
Turner published a paper in which he compared three key LG scenarios 
with independently obtained historical data from 1970 to 2000. Of the 
three scenarios, the scenario described by LG as the standard run (where 
the world system follows a business-as-usual path) lined up well with 
the actual historical data. In the standard-run model, food production, 
industrial output and population grow exponentially, consuming non-
renewable resources to the point where resource extraction consumes too 
much investment and the industrialised food system collapses, bringing 
about eventual population decline. 
Since LG, we have much more understanding and evidence concerning 
processes of ecological change. The work of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is well known. Equally important, 
but less well known, is an initiative known as the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment that was launched in 2001.2 Involving more than 1,360 
scientists from 95 countries, it produced a  series of technical studies 
2  See: www.millenniumassessment.org/en/index.html.
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and reports on changes in ecosystems and the likely consequences for 
human wellbeing. Economic growth has impacted on these ecosystems 
to the point where some 15 out of 24 major systems are in global decline 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005: 1).
Obviously, ecosystems processes can be described in scientific terms in 
many different ways, but, for our purposes, we will say that these are 
nonlinear processes containing feedback loops and exponential growth 
patterns. Exponential functions played a critical role in the systems 
modelling done in LG. 
Techno-processes collapse
Large-scale extinction of humans through a technological process 
may be an accident or intentional. The world became much more 
conscious of intentional extinction after ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man’ 
exploded over Japan in 1945. Some of the scientists who had built these 
atomic bombs formed an organisation called the Atomic Scientists 
of Chicago.  Through  a publication called the Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists of Chicago, they began to inform the public of the dangers of 
nuclear energy. In 1947, the bulletin showed on its front cover a clock 
set at seven minutes to midnight, with midnight being the moment of 
apocalypse.3 Since 1947, the bulletin has warned of two other riders 
of the apocalypse: carbon technologies leading to climate change 
and biological developments that threaten biosecurity. Technological 
developments continue to open up new scenarios. The cheap printing of 
millions of war robots would enable aggressors to launch wave after wave 
of attack against carefully chosen key economic centres—something 
both difficult and costly to defend against.
How might one characterise the processes of techno-collapse? 
One obvious feature of these processes is to say that they are examples 
of innovation. Clearly, this raises the rather large issue of how best to 
characterise innovation. Over the past few decades there has been within 
economics a shift towards analysing innovation using various kinds 
of evolutionary models (Foster and Metcalfe 2001). The evolutionary 
economics literature on innovation is large. For present purposes, we 
draw on the idea advanced by Richard Nelson (2001) that technology 
and institutions are characterised by a coevolutionary relationship. 
3  The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago is available at: thebulletin.org/.
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Technologies do not arrive courtesy of Promethean delivery, but rather 
are endogenous, their future path dependent on institutional responses 
to them.
Financial processes collapse
The GFC of 2007–08 was a reminder that capitalism’s markets of 
financial intermediation bust as well as boom. How do we characterise 
the processes that lead to financial crises? Marx believed that crisis was 
a structural property of capitalism, linked to the tendency of profit to 
fall and ultimately to a contradiction between the forces of labour and 
capital. One can label this a dialectical process, but, ultimately, there is 
not much specificity in the idea, especially when compared with the 
models of financial behaviour being developed within economics. Much 
more sophisticated models have emerged within economics to explain 
the instability of capitalism’s financial systems. An early example of 
this is Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, which is based on the 
idea that instability is linked to expectations generated during euphoric 
phases of the economy (for a formal model, see Keen 1995). For present 
purposes, the processes behind capitalism’s fluctuations or instabilities 
can be roughly characterised as belonging to the family of nonlinear 
dynamics in which system chaos plays a prominent role. 
Summing up, the governance systems of regulatory capitalism face three 
distinct existential challenges: ecosystems collapse, techno-collapse 
and financial systems collapse. These challenges are best thought of as 
ongoing processes of change to which regulatory capitalism is currently 
responding and to which it will have to continue to respond adaptively 
if it is to survive in the long term. In the case of ecosystems, capitalism 
has to confront nonlinear dynamics containing exponential functions; in 
the case of techno-collapse, there are processes of coevolution in which 
institutions play a crucial role; and, in the case of financial collapse, 
we have nonlinear dynamics characterised by chaotic behaviour. 
Section 2 suggested that regulatory capitalism, through its many 
networks of regulatory intervention and governance, has increased 
rather than decreased its adaptive capacities. Section 5 discusses in more 
detail the question of how these improved adaptive capacities fare in the 
face of the processes of change described in this section. Before moving 
to this, the next section identifies a core feature of capitalism that will 
shape its systemic responsiveness to these processes: commodification.
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4. The tragedy of commodification
Ever higher levels of commodity production and exchange are 
a fundamental characteristic of capitalism. Marx, in explaining 
capitalism as a distinctive system of commodity production, borrows a 
distinction from Adam Smith between use value and exchange value 
(Fine 1984: 20–3). Some things, such as ecosystems, have a use value 
without necessarily having an exchange value. Capitalism, as a system 
of commodity production, relies on property rights in the process of 
converting things that have use values into commodities—that is, things 
with exchange values. It is through new property rights that capitalism 
expands the horizons of its commodification possibilities (Drahos 
1996). For example, mathematical algorithms have use values (think of 
the algorithm of addition that underpins your checking of the restaurant 
bill), but they do not have an exchange value until property rights are 
defined in ways that allow for their appropriation (for example, by 
allowing the patentability of algorithms). 
Piketty (2014), in his recent treatment of capitalism, draws from Marx 
the ‘principle of infinite accumulation’—the idea that capital necessarily 
accumulates and concentrates in fewer hands. For our purposes, it 
is important to emphasise that continued capital accumulation is 
only possible if capitalism keeps on generating new commodification 
possibilities. The generation of these possibilities depends most deeply 
on the institution of property. New forms of property rights such as 
intellectual property rights create new asset classes and these assets 
become part of financial capitalism, underpinning, for example, the price 
values of new financial instruments such as different types of derivatives. 
Property along with contracts constitute processes of propertisation 
that are fundamental to capitalism’s method of change and expansion. 
While one can identify many different types of capitalism, the one 
thing that unites them is the expansion of their commodity horizons 
through propertisation. One can think of the propertisation process 
of capitalism as a bias or weight in the system, meaning it will tend 
to land on a commodity rather than commons solution more often 
than not. This bias manifests itself in various ways, including in the 
influential idea associated with Hardin (1968) that the commons leads 
to a ‘tragedy’ of destructive overuse—a tragedy that the propertisation 
of the commons can prevent. The problems of this propertisation bias 
are too great to explore here, but, among other things, it ignores the role 
of the intellectual commons in serving multiple generations of creators 
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and its function of diffusing knowledge (Drahos 1996). Solutions based 
on the blind application of property rights risk another kind of tragedy: 
the tragedy of commodification. 
5. Capitalism and processes of collapse: 
Some reflections
As indicated at the outset, this final chapter is not an attempt at 
forecasting. It does not present a model of any kind, but simply sketches 
the essential characteristics of regulatory capitalism and identifies 
the deeper processes of change with which its systems of networked 
governance must engage. This final section of the chapter looks back 
to some historical examples of how well networked governance has 
coped with the processes of change. However, as any financial adviser 
would point out, past performance is not necessarily a guide to future 
performance. That said, the historical performance of networked 
governance might offer some insights into how this form of governance 
responds to the three types of processes described earlier. We begin with 
processes of techno-collapse.
Obviously, for a system to respond to a doomsday technology, it must have 
some warning of its existence or imminent arrival. Where knowledge of 
a technology is dispersed throughout the nodes of a network, there are at 
least more sources from which a warning might be sounded. Historically, 
scientific nodes have acted as a warning system. For instance, soon after 
the invention of recombinant DNA technology in 1975, which allowed 
for a gene from one organism’s sequence to be cut out and spliced into 
the genetic sequence of another, a conference of concerned scientists held 
at Asilomar, California, produced some guidelines for the experimental 
use of the technology. Recently, more than 1,000 researchers involved 
in artificial intelligence projects issued an open letter warning of the 
dangers of an arms race driven by the increasingly rapid developments 
in artificial intelligence (Gibbs 2015). 
The responses to nuclear technology were shaped by various social 
movements such as the peace, antinuclear and environmental 
movements, their influence aided by nuclear accidents such as those at 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. These accidents were also important 
in catalysing other networked regulatory responses. Three Mile Island, 
for example, led to the formation in 1980 of the Institute of Nuclear 
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Power Operations, an industry body aimed at promoting safety in the 
industry, with a global version in the form of the World Association 
of Nuclear Operators, established in 1989 (Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000: 301). The detonation of a nuclear bomb in 1952 by the United 
Kingdom showed the United States that a strategy for dealing with a 
doomsday device based on the premise of central control by a single actor 
was unlikely to work. Instead, the history of nuclear power regulation, 
beginning with President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ program, has 
been one of creating and strengthening networks for the control of 
technology for both military and civilian purposes. The coevolutionary 
relationship between these regulatory networks and nuclear technology 
has, in the case of nuclear power operators, led to the adoption of a 
strong safety culture (Rees 1994), along with decades of investment in 
the development of safer and more fuel-efficient reactors. In the case 
of nuclear weapons, the nonproliferation regime has been an important 
regulatory accomplishment, especially if one keeps in mind that in the 
1960s there were predictions from people such as President John F. 
Kennedy that, by the 1970s, there could easily be 15 to 25 nuclear powers 
in the world (Mueller 2010: 89–90). Today there are nine countries with 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons (Kristensen and Norris 2016).
In the military sector, the coevolutionary process, this time between 
military-industrial security networks and nuclear technology, has 
produced large stockpiles of different types of weapons. One might 
plausibly argue that the probability of techno-collapse scenarios involving 
nuclear war has been reduced because of decades-long initiatives such as 
the strategic arms limitation talks and agreements concluded between 
the United States and the Soviet Union (and later Russia), but, given the 
continued existence of large stockpiles of nuclear weapons along with 
their much greater explosive power compared with earlier generations 
of weapons, it is clear that this probability has not been reduced to zero. 
Pakistan, for example, which appears to be increasing its nuclear stockpile 
at a faster rate than India, is seen as an outlier in the global nuclear order 
(Dalton and Krepon 2015) and reports of it agreeing to supply Saudi 
Arabia with nuclear devices continue to appear (Kaye 2015).
Perhaps—and it is only a perhaps—a networked governance that is 
dense with globally connected research networks, as well as civil society 
actors that track dangerous technologies, does increase the probability 
of early warnings about the emergence of doomsday technologies. 
The history of nuclear power regulation also suggests that networked 
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governance can globalise a safety culture in a way that command-and-
control regulation cannot. However, the case of nuclear technology also 
demonstrates that coevolutionary processes can dramatically increase the 
scale of consequences of a technology. Military-industrial networks have 
been the institutional drivers of an evolution from simple bombs and 
planes to nuclear weapons systems of great power and flexible delivery. 
The networked governance of capitalism will, within its networks, have 
coevolutionary processes that will for the foreseeable future continue 
to deliver an ever greater variety of forms of destructive technological 
capability. Moreover, states will continue to compete to acquire such 
capabilities, suggesting that the rate of these coevolutionary processes is 
not likely to decrease.
Before we move on to consider financial collapse, we should note that 
capitalism’s capacity to deal with processes of techno-collapse will also be 
affected by propertisation. The Asilomar conference of 1975 around the 
dangers of DNA was a good example of how scientists were able to start 
a self-regulatory process that ultimately led to the greater involvement 
of states in the regulation of gene technology. Since Asilomar 1975, 
however, biotechnological research has become more intertwined with 
commodification through the patent system (Palombi 2009). Paul 
Berg, one of the organisers of the 1975 conference, has suggested that 
it would be much more difficult to organise an equivalent conference 
today because at that time most of the attending scientists were working 
for public institutions whereas today ‘many scientists now work for 
private companies where commercial considerations are paramount’ 
(2008: 291). Berg has a point. The capacity of states to manage the risks 
of pandemic influenza in 2004–05 was significantly weakened by patents 
over key medicines (Lokuge et al. 2006). 
More abstractly, the propertisation bias of the system works against 
the warning-call function of some nodes in the network. One might 
counter argue that it is improbable that the propertisation process would 
capture all the nodes and so losing some nodes would not be a problem 
as long as there were some left to sound the call. The problem with this 
line of thinking is that it does not recognise the importance of having 
many warning nodes. Asilomar 1975 was influential precisely because 
it represented a consensus among leading public researchers working 
on DNA technology. Having a large number of uncompromised nodal 
actors potentially available to assess technologies in a public-minded 
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way is critical to dealing with the risk of techno-collapse. The warning 
call of one bird is easy to miss in a world full of noise. One is less likely 
to miss a screeching flock.
Turning now to financial collapse, if one looks to financial history, 
crisis and collapse seem to be permanent features of global capitalism. 
The Great Depression, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) inflation shock of the 1970s and the international 
debt crises of the 1980s that began with Mexico’s inability to service its 
debt are all examples of crises with large-scale repercussions. In fact, it 
is difficult to find decades in the twentieth century without significant 
financial crises. The 1990s saw Mexico take the lead with the peso crisis 
of 1994, then there was the East Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian 
rouble crisis of 1998 saw out the decade. The first decade of the twenty-
first century opened with the collapse of the dot.com bubble and 
Argentina, a crisis stalwart, ran into severe problems in 2001–02 with 
its currency peg to the US dollar. The effects of the GFC of 2007–08 
continue and the eurozone crisis, which ended the first decade, looks 
set to dominate the next if it is not surpassed by a new Asian crisis 
with Chinese characteristics. This is far from being a complete list of 
crises in these decades. Moreover, if we added the many high-profile 
individual banking failures that have occurred over the decades, such 
as the Herstaat Bank in 1974, BCCI in 1991 and Barings in 1995, or 
the lingering banking crises such as the one that beset the Japanese 
banking system from around 1990, one can plausibly claim that crisis is 
a multilevel feature of capitalism’s financial systems. And, of course, as 
Kindleberger (1978) has shown, crisis and contagion in financial systems 
form part of capitalism’s earliest history.
Any given financial crisis tends to trigger a debate about the virtues of 
heavy versus light-touch regulation. Our interest here is more abstract. 
Capitalism’s financial processes are part of the family of nonlinear 
dynamics with chaotic properties. The history of financial regulation 
suggests that such a characterisation is not unreasonable. Economic 
systems exhibit a degree of chaos without being examples of extreme 
states of chaos (Potts 2000: 87). History also shows that the system has, 
despite its many multilevel crises, not randomised. Put simply, while 
we can point to many cases of dramatic perturbations, such as falling 
currency values, capital flight, bank runs and crashing stock markets, 
we also see recovery and stability. The hypothesis here is that, over time, 
capitalism has developed a networked governance approach to global 
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financial regulation that is characterised by the integration of more 
nodes into regulatory networks and the evolution of independent nodes 
that have developed tools for the management of perturbations. It is 
this networked regulatory governance that has acted to stabilise the 
chaotic properties of the system. An example of nodal integration in the 
financial system is the incorporation during the 1990s of key developing 
countries into the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).4 Formed 
in 1930, the BIS is the single most important forum for cooperation 
among central banks. Other examples of nodal integration include the 
integration of banking supervisory authorities from key developing 
countries such as Brazil, China and India into the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the principal international forum for cooperation 
on matters of banking supervision. 
The evolution of independent institutions of central banking is perhaps 
the single most important regulatory accomplishment of financial 
capitalism. The anteroom of the Bank of England may look like a London 
gentlemen’s club of an earlier era, but it and other central banks have 
become repositories of data and experience concerning the management 
of global systems. Whatever one thinks of the successes of central 
banks in managing crises, history suggests that they are better than the 
alternative of having political hands on the tiller of complex systems. 
Each new crisis has brought experience with tools of intervention, from 
which central banks have been able to learn. The Bank of Japan’s use 
of quantitative easing procedures in 2001 provided the US Federal 
Reserve with some valuable learning when it came to launching its own 
quantitative easing program in 2008. Regulatory capitalism’s networks 
of financial governance have been able to stabilise systems in crisis and 
to generate periods of stability, although, as many Greek citizens would 
no doubt point out, choices about techniques of stabilisation are still 
error prone, affected by politics and come at great social cost. 
Turning now to ecosystems collapse, here, regulatory capitalism’s 
networked governance also confronts processes belonging to the 
family of nonlinear dynamics with an emphasis on feedback loops and 
exponential functions. Based on the evidence coming from sources 
of aggregated scientific data such as the IPCC and the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, regulatory capitalism’s greatest challenge may 
well be survival governance in the face of accelerating rates of ecosystems 
4  For the dates, see: bis.org/about/chronology/1990-1999.htm. 
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collapse. In core form, the problem is how quickly networked governance 
can respond to processes with exponential trajectories. The obvious 
variable here, which the LG study highlighted in all its various models, is 
time. In cases of exponential growth (and decline), time can rapidly run 
out, as it does in the case of the French story about a lily in a pond that 
doubles in size every day, meaning it would cover the pond in 30 days. 
On the twenty-ninth day, with the pond half covered, those looking after 
the pond have one day to save it. Many climate scientists would say 
that, because of the feedback effects they are already observing, we have 
little time in which to act to stop the earth system from shifting to an 
equilibrium likely to be disadvantageous for mammalian life.
One of the strengths of regulatory capitalism is that its interventions can 
begin from anywhere within its networks and then, through diffusion 
mechanisms, can quite rapidly globalise. The system is not dependent 
on one actor for initiating regulatory responses. Even if individual 
governments fail to act, other nodal actors from other parts of the 
system’s networks, such as those in business or social movements, may 
initiate responses to the dangers of ecosystems collapse. Naturally, this 
still leaves the question of whether regulatory capitalism can scale a 
response to processes occurring at the earth system level. Regulatory 
capitalism offers a better chance of success than previous capitalisms, 
but prospects of it saving the twenty-ninth day may not be high. 
Turning now to the possible effects of propertisation on ecosystems 
collapse, we saw earlier that propertisation creates a bias in capitalism’s 
evolutionary operation, pushing it into the expansion of its commodity 
horizons. This may well be an important advantage when it comes to 
financing adaptive responses to ecosystems crises. The movement to 
encourage investors to divest from fossil fuel needs the complement of 
investment in renewable energy technologies. This has been happening 
for some time, with the World Bank issuing green bonds in 2008 
(World Bank 2015). More recently, the lure of tax equity financing 
has seen multinationals such as Google partner with renewable energy 
companies—the incentive for Google being the tax benefits that accrue 
to the renewable energy company (Martin 2015). Innovative financing, 
which is underpinned by propertisation, will be critical to scaling 
responses to avoid ecosystems collapse.
However, propertisation also creates a drag on the speed of network 
responses within regulatory capitalism. Schumpeter’s metaphorical 
description of capitalism’s ‘creative gales of destruction’ is beguiling 
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but quite inaccurate. Industries that have globalised are not swept 
away overnight by gales, leaving a cleared building site for use by the 
next generation of entrepreneurs. Globalised industries such as oil 
and gas build up huge capital stocks that they continue to deploy for 
their survival and expansion. As the fracking revolution in the United 
States has shown, these companies continue to invest successfully in 
innovation (Downie and Drahos 2015). Propertisation is crucial to 
entrenching these companies within regulatory capitalism’s networks 
of economic production. The response of the state has been to regulate 
these global industries, but the regulation is much more the product 
of joint negotiation than it is unilateral declaration by the state. The 
entrenchment of fossil fuel industries in capitalism’s networks of 
production means that changing capitalism’s energy systems from 
fossil to renewable fuels is much more likely to be a long, drawn-out 
affair involving complex contests among networks than a rapid, smooth 
transition to new renewable energy systems. Gales of destruction will 
arrive, but they are more likely to be products of changing earth system 
dynamics than entrepreneurial agency.
6. Conclusion
Networked actors have always been important to capitalism’s evolution. 
The glaring gaps between the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ of capitalism were already 
being decreased during Marx’s time, and continue to be narrowed, 
by networked actors. Examples of such actors in the early phases of 
capitalism include the various abolitionist movements that progressively 
ended slavery in European and other states, trade unions and the 
suffragettes. Examples of other movements that have caused capitalism 
to pivot globally in a direction different to the one it might have taken 
are the environmental and consumer movements. Cometh the moment 
of crisis, cometh the networked actor, or so it seems in the case of 
capitalism. As we have seen, regulatory capitalism appears to be reaching 
new heights of adaptivity and resilience through information technology 
networks. New ideas for strengthening it, for making it work better and 
for saving it can emanate from any one of its many nodal centres and 
diffuse to other parts of its networks. Specialist movements, such as the 
free software movement, the access to medicines movement, indigenous 
peoples’ movements, peoples’ seed movements and so on, function as 
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countervailing agencies creating contests with corporate capital where 
none existed before. Capitalism’s networks—now much more neural in 
character—hum and crackle with ideas and contests about its future. 
This is one, admittedly optimistic, view of regulatory capitalism’s capacities 
to generate and uplift into its regulatory systems the ideas needed to 
improve and save it. In this view of capitalism’s networks the future is 
much more plastic, less path-dependent, something that can be shaped 
through concrete ideas and interventions. And so it makes sense and is 
a practical public good for leaders in ideas about regulation such as Neil 
Gunningham to continue to identify and synthesise the best innovative 
practices in environmental regulation or for Christine Parker to show 
how corporate self-regulation might be improved if the corporation is 
made sufficiently permeable to outside influences that shift it from the 
amoral profit-maximising fiduciary to a fiduciary that has internalised 
social duties. These ideas and the many others described in the chapters 
of this volume—such as meta-regulation, smart regulation, responsive 
regulation, restorative justice and nodal/networked governance—show 
the beauty and importance of ideas about regulation. Generated at low 
cost, they can generate massive lifesaving and system-saving returns. 
There is everything to play for.
How does the propertisation bias of capitalism affect this optimistic 
reading of its future? As we have seen, propertisation does compromise 
the warning-call function of nodes in capitalism’s systems and, more 
worryingly, does set up the possibility of tragedies of commodification. 
The continued deepening globalisation of intellectual property rights 
sets up a system of private taxes on future generations of innovators 
and, as already pointed out, property rights are being used by industries 
to entrench themselves in ways that make Schumpeter’s idea of creative 
destruction by entrepreneurs look fanciful. The coal and oil industries 
need to be managed out of existence in the next two decades, if the 
world is not to descend into a struggle for survival, its states crowded 
around resources like dying animals around a shrinking waterhole. 
And yet, under the cloak of property rights, networks of corporate 
capital continue to invent new monopoly privileges for the purpose of 
entrenching themselves ever more deeply in networks of production, 
thereby compromising the adaptive function of free markets. The cold 
logic of commodification is about obtaining resources and maximising 
the rent extraction process. Public goods and assets are there to be raided. 
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The effects of these raids on equality, equity and the environment are 
something over which the weak can wring their hands. Marx’s insights 
into this dimension of capitalism remain valid today. 
The answer to the question ‘what is to be done?’, perhaps somewhat 
predictably from someone who has been at the Regulatory Institutions 
Network for a long time, is to continue to develop the countervailing 
regulatory ideas to capitalism’s commodification logic. A global discourse 
of information environmentalism that exposes commodification logic is 
needed (Cunningham 2014). Histories of innovation not dependent on 
commodification have to be spread to create the realisation that there 
are alternative paths of innovation (Shao 2013). A positive inclusive 
version of the intellectual commons in which people are included by 
design has to replace access regimes in which access is dependent on 
winning a game of legal rights (Drahos 1996). And, closer to home, 
scholars should oppose university managers who think that the mission 
of the university is to be a propertised knowledge factory, churning out 
paid-for commodities instead of what it should be: a communal place 
for creating radical and free ideas that allow people to choose different 
futures. There truly is everything to play for.
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